Shands v. City of Marathon

Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-1859

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; January 1, 2019; Florida; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida issued an opinion on January 2, 2019, regarding an appeal by Rodney E. Shands and others (the Shands) against the City of Marathon, concerning a summary judgment favoring the City in an inverse condemnation case. The Shands claimed that zoning and environmental regulations effectively deprived them of all economic use of their property, Shands Key, which they inherited after purchasing it in the 1950s. The property was initially zoned for general use but was reclassified as Conservation Offshore Island in 1986, affecting its development potential.

The Shands' application for a dock permit was denied in 2004 due to environmental restrictions. They subsequently sought a Beneficial Use Determination (BUD) and received a favorable recommendation from a Special Master, who suggested granting a building permit or purchasing the property. However, the Marathon City Council rejected these recommendations and denied the BUD application, prompting the Shands to file suit for regulatory taking without just compensation.

The trial court stayed the case pending a related decision in Beyer v. City of Marathon. After the court upheld a summary judgment in that case, the City sought summary judgment in the Shands' case, which the trial court granted, citing indistinguishable facts. The Shands appealed this summary judgment, which is reviewed de novo by the appellate court, affirming that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the trial court's summary judgment favoring the City.

Summary judgment is a legal mechanism used to evaluate whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant a trial. It is appropriate only if, when viewing the evidence favorably for the non-moving party, that party cannot win as a matter of law. Courts must avoid two extremes: they should not force a trial if only a directed verdict is possible, nor should they treat summary judgment as a trial by affidavit or deposition. Genuine disputes over material facts must preclude summary judgment.

In this case, the Shands contended that summary judgment for the City was wrongly granted because the regulations constituted a facial taking of their property. However, prior appeals characterized their claim as "as applied," meaning the statute of limitations did not start until the City rejected their application in 2007. The trial court correctly classified the case as an as-applied challenge.

The Shands argued that the trial court erroneously equated their case with Beyer, where summary judgment was affirmed because the Beyers were not deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property. The key difference lies in that Beyer involved specific economic benefits tied to assigned ROGO points, which were not similarly valued in the Shands' case. Thus, the trial court could not conclude that Beyer was indistinguishable from the Shands' situation, warranting reversal of the summary judgment.