Marcus Daniel Gray v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 11-16-00358-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 30, 2018; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Marcus Daniel Gray was convicted by the trial court of delivering a controlled substance (less than one gram) in a drug-free zone, receiving a ten-year confinement sentence, which was suspended in favor of ten years of community supervision and a $3,000 fine. Gray appealed, arguing insufficient corroboration of evidence given only by an accomplice and a cooperating agent. The prosecution's key witness, Brandy Stokes, was a confidential informant for Investigator Joe Aaron Taylor, motivated by pending drug and forgery charges against her. During the investigation, Stokes informed Taylor that Breanne Jones had offered to sell her methamphetamine. Jones, who was incarcerated during the trial and actively using methamphetamine, confirmed that she had no drugs at the time of Stokes's inquiry but later contacted Stokes after learning that Gray had methamphetamine available. Stokes coordinated a drug purchase with Taylor’s guidance, who equipped her with recording devices and cash. Surveillance was maintained by Taylor as Stokes arrived at Jones's house, where Gray was present. The trial established that Stokes’s contacts and arrangements with Jones connected Gray to the offense, leading to the affirmation of his conviction.

No evidence indicated the presence of other males at Jones's premises during the drug transaction. Stokes identified Appellant as the individual present at Jones's house after Investigator Taylor showed her his picture. During a recorded conversation, Jones referred to her supplier as "my guy" and mentioned meeting her "good homeboy" at her house, indicating a familiarity with Appellant. Jones communicated with her supplier before the meeting and later gave Stokes the $50 for purchasing methamphetamine. After entering the house with Appellant, Jones exchanged the money for the drugs. Upon returning to Stokes’s vehicle, Jones was seen adding methamphetamine from her bra to the purchase, despite claiming to have used all her drugs prior. Jones denied possessing any methamphetamine upon arrival, suggesting that any found later originated from Appellant. After the transaction, Investigator Taylor attempted to locate the "white male" seen with Jones and observed a gray minivan leaving the residence. A traffic stop was executed on the minivan, which contained only Fuentes, the driver, and Appellant, who provided inconsistent accounts of their whereabouts. Although no drugs or weapons were found on them, hypodermic syringes were visible in the minivan. Following the stop, Investigator Taylor returned to Jones's house and discovered her hiding in a closet with a syringe loaded with methamphetamine, matching the type seen in the minivan.

Jones testified she had consumed all her methamphetamine and indicated that the drugs sold to Stokes amounted to $50, confirming that the loaded syringe found with her contained the same substance. Although she occasionally obtained meth from different sources, she acknowledged receiving it from the Appellant on this occasion. Under Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a conviction based solely on an accomplice's testimony requires additional corroborating evidence linking the defendant to the offense. Article 38.141(a) further stipulates that testimony from a covert agent, unless corroborated, also cannot support a conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified that the corroboration standards for both accomplice and covert-agent witnesses are the same; testimony from either cannot corroborate itself. Therefore, when assessing the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, the court must exclude the testimonies of Jones and Stokes. The remaining evidence must connect the defendant to the crime, whether directly or circumstantially, without needing to independently establish guilt.

Corroboration of accomplice or covert-agent testimony in Texas does not require a specific amount of evidence and does not need to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Traditional sufficiency standards do not apply, and direct linkage of the accused to the offense is not necessary. Mere presence with an accomplice or informant is insufficient alone for corroboration; however, it can support a connection when combined with other suspicious circumstances. Even minor incriminating details can provide satisfactory corroboration. The absence of strong evidence does not invalidate the connection. 

Both parties in the case appear to believe that accomplice testimony cannot corroborate covert-agent testimony and vice versa. However, the Texas statutes allow for the use of accomplice testimony to support covert-agent testimony and vice versa, as there are no prohibitive limitations within the statutes. Both statutes aim to prevent convictions based on unreliable testimony, and while they require corroboration by "other evidence," they do not limit the types of evidence that can be used for corroboration across the two categories.

The statutes in question, Articles 38.14 and 38.141 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, require corroboration for convictions based solely on accomplice witness testimony or covert agent testimony. Specifically, Article 38.14 mandates that accomplice testimony must be supported by other evidence linking the accused to the crime, while Article 38.141 has the same requirement for covert agent testimony. Each statute treats the other's testimony as corroborative evidence, meaning that neither type of testimony can be solely relied upon for a conviction. The corroborating testimony does not need to be sufficient for conviction; it merely needs to connect the defendant to the offense. The text clarifies that using one type of testimony to corroborate the other does not constitute a basis for conviction but serves only to support the credibility of the testimony. The standards for sufficiency to convict differ from those for corroboration. Despite criticisms labeling the approach as 'absurd,' the judiciary emphasizes adherence to the statutory language, recognizing that it is not their role to rewrite laws. The legislature is presumed to have deliberately chosen the words in the statutes, and any perceived issues should be addressed by legislative amendment rather than judicial interpretation.

The legislature has the authority to amend statutes to clarify that 'other evidence' excludes any evidence requiring corroboration by another statute. The trial court did not err in considering the testimonies of Jones and Stokes as corroborative evidence; no legal provisions prevented this. Even if this interpretation were incorrect, the testimonies of Jones and Stokes were independently corroborated. Investigator Taylor testified that Stokes, under his direction, arranged to purchase methamphetamine from Jones, and he maintained surveillance throughout the transaction. Evidence included an audio recording of Jones discussing the drug deal and identifying her source. After the transaction, Stokes returned with methamphetamine, which she presented to Investigator Taylor. Following a traffic stop of a minivan that left Jones's residence, Appellant was the only male present, and he provided inconsistent statements. Physical evidence, audio recordings, and Investigator Taylor's testimony sufficiently linked Appellant to the offense, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment.