Hoffman v. Superior Ready Mix Concrete, L.P.

Citation: Not availableDocket: D072929

Court: California Court of Appeal; December 18, 2018; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Lynda Hoffman owns 28 acres of land, part of which is designated for a nursery, adjacent to a 211-acre rock quarry operated by Superior Ready Mix Concrete, L.P. (SRM). Hoffman successfully sued SRM for trespass, resulting in a court order awarding her attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.9, which permits such fees for damages to cultivated property due to trespassing. SRM appeals, arguing that Hoffman is not entitled to fees since the trespass did not occur on the areas where she was actively growing plants. Even if this argument is dismissed, SRM claims the trial court erred by not apportioning the awarded attorney fees of $289,153.75 between successful and unsuccessful claims and by not reducing the amount for Hoffman's limited success. SRM also contests the trial court's finding that its section 998 settlement offer was invalid and less favorable than Hoffman's trial outcome. The appellate court affirms the trial court's interpretation of section 1021.9 and its fee award, rejecting SRM's claims regarding apportionment and reduction of fees. The court notes that SRM's concession on these points renders its argument about the validity of the section 998 offer moot. The background details indicate that Hoffman's property is landlocked with mutual easements with SRM, and she has developed the land for a commercial nursery and koi operation. Significant investment in infrastructure was made, but a water well pump failure in 2010 led to a substantial loss of her plant inventory.

In June 2015, Hoffman initiated legal action against SRM, claiming trespass to land, private nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, and seeking quiet title for several easements. Hoffman alleged SRM's trespass, which began in 2012, caused damage in five specific areas of her property, including issues related to drainage, encroachment, silt build-up, erosion, and disruption of water flow due to SRM's construction activities. The trial focused on the equitable issues of both parties' claims for quiet title and declaratory relief, ultimately resulting in the court confirming Hoffman's 40-foot-wide easement and SRM's 20-foot easement, while stating most of SRM's activities exceeded its easement rights. The jury found in favor of Hoffman for trespass but against her on nuisance and negligence claims, awarding her $17,000 in compensatory damages but no additional damages. Post-trial, both parties sought costs, with Hoffman also seeking attorney fees under section 1021.9. The trial court tentatively ruled Hoffman as the prevailing party, awarding her costs while rejecting SRM's section 998 offer as unreasonable. However, the court denied Hoffman's request for attorney fees, deeming section 1021.9 inapplicable since the trespass did not affect agricultural activities. The court planned to review relevant case law before making a final determination on the attorney fees issue.

The court upheld its previous rulings regarding section 998 issues and reversed its decision on Hoffman's attorney fees, determining she was entitled to full fees as the prevailing plaintiff under section 1021.9, despite not winning on every claim since all claims stemmed from a common set of facts. After a minor adjustment to her claimed costs, Hoffman was awarded $16,178.66 in costs and $289,153.75 in attorney fees. SRM appealed the judgment, arguing that Hoffman did not qualify for attorney fees since only a small portion of her property was used for nursery purposes and the trespass did not damage this area. Hoffman countered that the term "lands under cultivation" pertains to the land's general use rather than the specific area trespassed upon. The court agreed with Hoffman, emphasizing that the interpretation of section 1021.9 should focus on legislative intent and the statute's purpose. It noted that the prevailing plaintiff in a trespass action is entitled to attorney fees if the trespass occurred on lands used for cultivation. The court referenced a precedent case, Haworth v. Lira, which supported awarding attorney fees under section 1021.9 even for non-commercial land uses, reinforcing the notion that such fees are applicable in this context.

In Quarterman v. Kefauver, the appellate court determined that section 1021.9, which pertains to attorney fees in trespass actions, does not apply to the prevailing plaintiffs who suffered lead contamination in their backyard garden due to their neighbors' activities. The court analyzed the phrase "lands under cultivation" by examining various statutes and concluded that it typically refers to agricultural land rather than urban backyards. The legislative history further clarified that this phrase should be understood as part of a broader description that includes land used for raising livestock, indicating its application to rural property.

Despite the Hoffmans not having officially opened their nursery, their property was zoned for agriculture, and they had taken steps towards establishing a nursery, including cultivating approximately 20,000 plants prior to a well pump failure. The court found that these activities demonstrated the property was indeed under cultivation, a fact unchallenged by SRM. 

SRM argued that section 1021.9 should not apply because the trespass did not damage the specific area where the plants were grown. However, the court clarified that the statute allows for attorney fee recovery if any damage occurs to "lands under cultivation," regardless of whether the trespass directly impacted the cultivated area. The court emphasized the overall character of the land rather than the precise location of the trespass. It rejected SRM's interpretation that attorney fees could only be awarded if the trespass directly damaged the cultivated portion, illustrating that such a narrow reading would produce unreasonable outcomes not intended by the Legislature.

SRM contends that the statute differentiates between lands under cultivation, which must be actively cultivated, and lands used for livestock, which can be intended for such use. However, this distinction does not support SRM's position since Hoffman's land was indeed under cultivation. The central issue is whether trespass must result in damage to cultivated land. The case of Starrh v. Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC establishes that attorney fees can be awarded under section 1021.9 for trespass on cultivated agricultural land, regardless of whether crops were damaged or farming operations were interrupted. In Starrh, the plaintiff's claim involved subsurface trespass from polluted water migration, which did not directly damage crops or farming activities. The trial court initially denied attorney fees based on the interpretation that the trespass did not occur on "lands under cultivation." However, the appellate court disagreed, affirming the plaintiff's right to extract groundwater as part of property ownership rights. The legislative history of section 1021.9 indicates a broader intent to protect the rights of ranchers against trespassers, emphasizing the need for enhanced legal recourse. The Starrh decision indicates that the inquiry should focus solely on whether the land is under cultivation, not on the existence of damage. Therefore, the trial court appropriately interpreted section 1021.9 and awarded Hoffman her attorney fees. Furthermore, SRM's argument against the fee award, based on a failure to apportion fees between fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting claims and an assertion of limited success, was rejected by the court.

Once a trial court determines that a party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the apportionment of those fees is at the court's discretion. Fees do not need to be apportioned if they are incurred for issues common to both fee-eligible and non-fee-eligible causes of action. Additionally, apportionment is unnecessary when the claims are based on a common core of facts or related legal theories, or when the fee and non-fee claims are so intertwined that separating them is impractical. In this case, SRM argued that the trial court should apportion fees to only Hoffman's successful trespass claim. The court rejected this, emphasizing that all of Hoffman's claims arose from the same core facts surrounding SRM's unauthorized alterations to her property. Although Hoffman did not succeed on all claims, the court found she prevailed overall, given her success on key issues and the retention of a significant easement. SRM contended that the trial court should have evaluated whether the claims were inextricably intertwined, which would necessitate apportionment. However, the argument was dismissed as the court applied an acceptable legal standard for fee apportionment, one of three standards available for such determinations.

SRM contends that attorney fees should not be apportioned in cases with overlapping claims due to potential impairment of legislative policies. It references Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. and Carver, which highlight conditions under which attorney fees can be recovered or denied based on the specific claims involved. In Cassim, the court established that while a plaintiff could recover fees for obtaining insurance benefits, they could not recover for bad faith claims, necessitating apportionment. Carver reinforced this by denying fee recovery for overlapping claims under the Cartwright Act, emphasizing that allowing recovery in such cases would contradict legislative intent. SRM argues for mandatory apportionment under section 1021.9, claiming Hoffman's non-fee claims do not align with the statute’s goals, yet fails to provide supporting authority. A review of various unilateral fee-shifting statutes reveals no precedent requiring apportionment. Consequently, the trial court correctly applied the general rule that attorney fees need not be apportioned for claims with common issues, as established in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson.

Hoffman's causes of action for trespass, nuisance, and negligence were all founded on the same factual basis, as indicated in her complaint and the jury instructions, which used a unified measure of damages. The special verdict form further consolidated damages inquiries regardless of the cause of action. Hoffman's attorney fee motion included a declaration noting the intertwining of professional services across the claims, making separate billing impractical. The appellate record lacks complete reporter's transcripts from the trial, preventing an assessment of the time spent on each cause of action; thus, the order is presumed correct in the absence of demonstrated error.

SRM contended that Hoffman's claims were not based on identical facts, arguing that nuisance and negligence required proof of additional facts beyond trespass. However, this conflates the elements of the claims with their underlying facts, which were the same.

SRM also challenged the trial court's discretion in denying a reduction of Hoffman's attorney fees due to her limited success at trial. SRM argued the court should have calculated a lodestar figure for successful claims and adjusted for overlapping claims. Citing relevant case law, SRM called for a reversal and remand for correct discretion application. The appellate review of fee awards is deferential, recognizing the trial judge's authority to evaluate the value of professional services without needing expert testimony. The court considers multiple factors, including the litigation's nature and difficulty, skill required, and overall success. There is no obligation for the fee award to correlate with the degree of success, and the appellate review for abuse of discretion requires showing a lack of reasonable basis for the trial court's decision.

SRM challenges the trial court's attorney fee award by focusing solely on Hoffman's success at trial, asserting that this should dictate the fee amount. However, while a party's success is a relevant factor, it is not the only consideration in determining reasonable attorney fees. The court emphasized that a proportionality rule linking fee awards to damages recovered is inconsistent with the flexible lodestar method, which evaluates all aspects of reasonableness concerning time spent. The court also rejected SRM's claim that the trial court misapplied the legal standard, citing relevant cases. In *San Diego Police Officers Assn.*, the appellate court upheld a fee reduction based on limited success and other factors, while in *Mann*, the court noted that fees awarded to partially successful defendants should reflect the impact of their motion on the lawsuit's nature, considering various relevant factors. Ultimately, both cases do not support the notion that attorney fees must be proportionate to success in litigation and are distinguishable from section 1021.9, as every fee-shifting statute requires individual assessment.

Disagreement exists regarding SRM's assertion that previous cases set the correct legal standard for fee awards under section 1021.9. Legislative history indicates that plaintiffs in trespass actions often spend a significant portion of their recovery on attorney fees, justifying unilateral fee awards to support their ability to sue. Although Hoffman's monetary recovery was modest, she successfully achieved a declaration of rights that invalidated SRM's claims regarding secondary easements. The trial court recognized Hoffman as the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees, noting that despite the smaller damages award, Hoffman accomplished her primary goal of protecting her property. SRM’s argument against the fee award reduction was rejected.

Regarding SRM's section 998 offer made before trial, which included a right of way easement, abandonment of claims to an easement over Hoffman's property, and a cash offer of $70,000, the trial court ruled the offer invalid as unreasonable. SRM contended the court erred in this assessment and in comparing Hoffman's recovery to the offer. However, SRM conceded that any ruling against it on Hoffman's attorney fees made this argument moot. Under section 998, a plaintiff must achieve a more favorable judgment than an unaccepted offer to recover post-offer costs. Hoffman's total recovery, when adding preoffer costs and attorney fees to her monetary judgment, surpassed SRM's offer. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed, and respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.