Aaron A. Negash v. State of Indiana

Citation: 113 N.E.3d 1281Docket: 18A-CR-840

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 10, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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Aaron A. Negash appeals his convictions for Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license and Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug or lookalike substance, following a bench trial. He raises three main arguments: 1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the synthetic marijuana, claiming it was seized during an illegal search; 2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for carrying a handgun without a license; and 3) the trial court erred in ordering him to pay probation fees.

The court concluded that the trial court properly admitted the evidence, found sufficient evidence to uphold the handgun conviction, and determined that there was no error in imposing probation fees. However, it remanded the case for the trial court to conduct an indigency hearing after Negash completes his sentence.

Key issues addressed included: the legality of the evidence admission, the sufficiency of evidence for the handgun conviction, and the appropriateness of the probation fee order.

On the night of May 22, 2017, Indianapolis police responded to a report of shots fired and encountered Negash, who was seated in a vehicle with two other occupants. Upon questioning, all occupants denied having heard gunfire or possessing weapons. During a pat-down of Negash, an officer felt a bag containing synthetic marijuana in his pocket and subsequently seized it. A loaded handgun was later discovered in the vehicle's glovebox.

Officer Plummer testified to his extensive experience with synthetic marijuana in downtown, having encountered it over 100 times in just over two years. During an interaction with Negash, who was standing by a police vehicle, a conversation ensued regarding a firearm. Negash claimed to have a permit for the gun located in the trunk, but Officer Plummer found no permit upon investigation. The State charged Negash with two Class A misdemeanors: carrying a handgun without a license and possession of a synthetic drug. At his bench trial on February 13, 2018, both Officer Plummer and Negash provided testimony. The defense objected to the admission of the synthetic marijuana as evidence, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search that violated Negash's rights, as he was not read his rights nor did he consent to the search. The trial court overruled the objection, admitting the evidence and ultimately finding Negash guilty on both counts.

During the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Negash to 30 days in Marion County Jail, followed by 305 days of probation under standard conditions and fees, including various monetary obligations. Negash appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence from the illegal search, that there was insufficient evidence for the handgun conviction, and that the probation fees imposed were erroneous. Specifically, he contended that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the equivalent provision in the Indiana Constitution.

The trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and challenges to this discretion are reviewed for abuse. A reversal occurs only if the admission contradicts the facts and affects substantial rights. When a challenge questions the constitutionality of a search or seizure, it is evaluated de novo. Evidence obtained from an unlawful search is generally excluded under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

There are three levels of police investigation relevant to the Fourth Amendment. First, an arrest or detention lasting longer than briefly requires probable cause. Second, police may conduct a brief investigatory stop without a warrant if they have reasonable suspicion based on specific facts. Third, casual inquiries that do not involve an arrest or stop are considered consensual encounters and do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. 

In this case, Officer Plummer and Sgt. Gregory’s approach to Negash’s parked vehicle did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation since there was no display of weapons or coercive language. Detention is assessed based on whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Negash contended that being asked to exit the vehicle and a subsequent pat-down violated his rights; however, an officer may conduct a protective search for weapons if there is reason to believe they are dealing with a potentially armed individual, even without probable cause for arrest. The standard is whether a prudent person would reasonably fear for safety in that situation.

Officer Plummer was investigating a report of shots fired when he approached Negash and a passenger in the back seat. The back-seat passenger pointed to Negash and mimicked a gun with his hand, while the front-seat passenger displayed suspicious behavior, prompting Officer Plummer to believe he was dealing with a potentially armed individual. This justified his request for Negash to exit the vehicle and the subsequent pat-down. Upon exiting, a bulge was visible in Negash's right pocket, leading Officer Plummer to conduct a limited search, during which he felt and saw a baggie of synthetic marijuana. This seizure was deemed proper under the "plain view doctrine," as the contraband's identity was immediately apparent.

Negash contended that Officer Plummer's actions violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which mirrors the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the legality of the search is assessed based on the reasonableness of police conduct considering the totality of circumstances, including the degree of suspicion, the level of intrusion, and law enforcement needs. The State argued that Negash waived his state constitutional claim by not objecting to the evidence on those grounds at trial, as he had initially objected based on different legal grounds. The court agreed, stating that raising new arguments on appeal after not doing so at trial constitutes waiver.

Even if the claim were not waived, Officer Plummer's actions were deemed reasonable under the state constitution. The high suspicion was justified given the context of investigating a shooting, coupled with the suspicious behavior of both passengers. The intrusion was minimal, as the police approached calmly without displaying weapons or using force until necessary. Law enforcement's need for safety was significant due to the ongoing investigation of a shooting suspect. Thus, the officer’s initial approach and pat-down were upheld as reasonable actions.

Officer Plummer's search was deemed reasonable and compliant with the Indiana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, allowing the trial court to admit evidence of synthetic marijuana found on Negash. Negash contested the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction of carrying a handgun without a license, arguing there was insufficient proof of possession. The court clarified that to convict, the State must show Negash carried a handgun without a license, which could be demonstrated through actual or constructive possession. Although Negash did not have exclusive control over the vehicle, he had the capability to exercise dominion and control over the handgun located in the glove compartment. His incriminating statement about having a permit and the proximity of the handgun to him further supported the conclusion of constructive possession. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction.

Negash also challenged the imposition of probation fees, arguing that the trial court may not have intended to impose them and, alternatively, that an indigency hearing was necessary to assess his ability to pay the fees.

Sentencing decisions, including the imposition of fees and costs, are reviewed for abuse of discretion, defined as a decision that contradicts the facts or logical deductions available to the court. Fees within statutory limits are not considered an abuse of discretion. The statute requires trial courts to specify probation conditions when placing someone on probation, allowing for a prescribed user fee for misdemeanors. In Marion County, local rules mandate the imposition of specific fees unless modified by the sentencing judge, with a priority order for fee collection.

Negash contends that the trial court did not intend to impose probation fees, noting that the fee sections on the probation order were blank. However, the State argues that the trial court did specify fees on page two of the sentencing order. The court confirmed that despite the blank lines, the trial court properly ordered probation fees, citing the standard conditions and fees stated in the sentencing order.

Additionally, while the court agrees that an indigency hearing is required before imposing probation fees, it clarifies that there is no specific timeline for this hearing. The court may defer the hearing until after assessing the defendant's ability to pay. The ruling affirms the trial court's decision to impose fees and remands the case for the required indigency hearing, with judges Najam and Crone concurring.