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State v. Jorge A. Espinoza

Citation: Not availableDocket: 08-16-00087-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 29, 2018; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The dissenting opinion in the case of The State of Texas v. Jorge Arturo Espinoza argues against the majority's conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion justifying the traffic stop for suspected driving while intoxicated (DWI). The dissent emphasizes that the State failed to provide sufficient facts to support a warrantless stop, noting that reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts rather than mere hunches.

Officer Wilkinson's observations included Espinoza's vehicle straddling lane markers and making a U-turn without signaling. However, the dissent highlights that Wilkinson's own testimony revealed that the observed straddling did not constitute an unsafe driving action, nor did it fit the established definition of a traffic violation as per the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The dissent concludes that the trial court acted correctly in granting Espinoza’s motion to suppress evidence from the stop and argues for affirming the trial court’s order.

Wilkinson identified two driving violations during the traffic stop: failure to signal lane changes when Espinoza briefly entered another lane and then returned, and subsequently moving to the right lane without signaling. Although he initially indicated that Espinoza was in his lane of travel, he later noted that Espinoza crossed the lane divider. However, he acknowledged there were no other vehicles on the road, and Espinoza was not endangering anyone. 

Wilkinson, a peace officer with nine and a half years of experience in the DWI Task Force and SFST certified, initially claimed he did not suspect intoxication before the stop but later stated he had reasonable suspicion of intoxication when he activated his lights. His testimony was inconsistent regarding whether the lane changes indicated intoxication; he denied that moving without signaling was indicative of impairment but referred to "drifting" as a behavioral cue. 

Despite his experience, Wilkinson's testimony lacked clarity and left the court with the impression that DWI was not a justified reason for the stop, as the court's findings did not mention intoxication. The appellate review implied that DWI was implicitly rejected as a justification for the stop. Given the trial court's conclusions and Wilkinson's equivocal testimony, there were grounds to question the credibility of his assertions.

When assessing an officer's reasonable suspicion for a DWI traffic stop, factors such as the time of day, location, and the officer's observations of the driver's behavior must be considered. In Curtis v. State, the court upheld a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion, while in Alderete, the court reversed a suppression ruling due to the officer's direct testimony indicating suspicion of driver impairment. In the current case, the trial court's ruling is deemed reasonable as Officer Wilkinson provided inconsistent testimony regarding his reasonable suspicion of impairment. The court favors the trial court's credibility assessment over the State's argument that Wilkinson's testimony supported reasonable suspicion. Regarding the claim of failing to maintain a single lane, the State conceded that the officer initiated the stop due to a failure to signal rather than a lane violation. The trial court found that video evidence did not support the officer's claim of a lane violation, stating that the vehicle's movements were not unsafe. Texas Transportation Code Section 545.060 outlines two independent requirements for lane usage, which the Court of Criminal Appeals clarified in Leming v. State, establishing that either failing to maintain a single lane or unsafe lane changes can constitute an offense.

Lower court interpretations of the statute in Atkinson v. State and Hernandez v. State were rejected by Leming, which addressed whether a driver failed to remain entirely within a single lane. In Leming, the officer's testimony indicated that the vehicle's tires were on the lane markings, but the video evidence did not confirm that the vehicle crossed into the adjacent lane. The court ruled that to justify a traffic stop, actual commission of the offense is not necessary; rather, the totality of circumstances should be considered, which included both the officer's observations and a citizen's report of swerving.

The arresting officer noted the vehicle was traveling below the speed limit, was swerving, and came close to the curb multiple times before the stop. The court acknowledged the officer's rationale based on the community caretaking function. Despite the officer's observations suggesting a lane violation, the trial court assessed the dashcam footage and determined that the vehicle only moved gradually within its lane and did not pose a danger. The trial court concluded that the vehicle did not completely cross into another lane and rejected the stop based on the officer's assessment of lane violations, finding no unsafe maneuvers.

Traffic conditions were light, and no other vehicles reacted to the defendant’s driving behavior, which included slight weaving that was not deemed unsafe. The trial court determined that video evidence contradicted the officer's claim that the vehicle completely crossed into the right lane and concluded that the vehicle’s movements were gradual and did not pose safety issues. The court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, deeming it unlawful under Texas Transportation Code Section 545.060. The court noted that Espinoza's vehicle primarily stayed within its lane, unlike other cases where dangerous swerving occurred. Officer Wilkinson's testimony was that Espinoza’s vehicle was not in danger of hitting anything and that the stop was based on a supposed signal violation. The video timestamp indicated the officer followed Espinoza for less than a minute, contrasting with longer durations reported in similar cases. Furthermore, the court ruled there was insufficient justification for stopping Espinoza for failure to signal a lane change under Section 545.104, emphasizing that mere tire crossing over the lane marker does not constitute a lane change without the driver’s intention to do so.

Criminal statutes outside the penal code are to be strictly construed with any ambiguity resolved in favor of the accused, as affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. In this case, Officer Wilkinson testified that he observed Espinoza drifting between lanes and failing to signal. However, the trial court found the video evidence did not corroborate Wilkinson's claims of lane crossing. The trial court concluded there was no indication of Espinoza’s intent to change lanes before the traffic stop was initiated. Wilkinson's testimony was deemed uncertain, and the State did not provide adequate evidence to establish a signal violation, particularly since Wilkinson acknowledged that a driver is not required to signal if there is no intent to change lanes. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that Officer Wilkinson lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's decision to suppress evidence. The dissenting opinion concludes that the State's arguments should be overruled, affirming the trial court's ruling in favor of Espinoza.