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v. Cielo Vista Ranch
Citations: 2018 COA 160; 433 P.3d 596Docket: 16CA2083, Alire
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; November 14, 2018; Colorado; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Summaries of published opinions by the Colorado Court of Appeals are provided solely for reader convenience and do not constitute part of the official opinion. They may not be cited or relied upon, and any discrepancies with the official opinion should be resolved in favor of the latter. In the case of Alire v. Cielo Vista Ranch, the court reviewed whether the district court fulfilled the mandate from the Colorado Supreme Court, which had instructed the identification of all landowners with access rights to the Taylor Ranch, now Cielo Vista Ranch. The Supreme Court's prior rulings established that landowners in present-day San Luis Valley, whose lands were settled by 1869, have access rights. Historically, Charles Beaubien encouraged settlement in the valley by granting grazing and timber rights. From 2004 to 2010, the district court identified access rights for landowners without requiring claims to be asserted. However, post-2010, it required landowners to come forward to claim access rights. The Court of Appeals determined that while the district court's actions were largely aligned with the mandate, it did not fully comply because the post-2010 identification process lacked comprehensiveness. The Court remanded the case for the district court to complete the identification of all landowners whose properties were settled by 1869, based on undisputed evidence. Cielo Vista Ranch I, LLC; Jaroso Creek Ranch, LLC; and Western Properties Investors, LLC are the Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees in a legal case involving numerous Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, including individuals with the last names Alire, Atencio, Espinosa, Gallegos, Lobato, and Sanchez, among others. The court issued a judgment that is partially affirmed and partially reversed. The case has been remanded with specific directions. The opinion was delivered by Judge Welling, with Judges Webb and Harris concurring, and the decision was announced on November 15, 2018. Squire Patton Boggs, LLP represents a large group of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, including individuals from Costilla County, who have established rights to access Cielo Vista Ranch for grazing livestock and gathering firewood and timber. The case has historical roots predating Colorado's statehood and has undergone extensive litigation, comprising three prior court visits and three supreme court opinions. The current appeal focuses on remand proceedings following the Colorado Supreme Court's decisions in Lobato v. Taylor (2002 and 2003), which recognized the landowners' rights based on historical settlement from 1869. The appellants, including CVR Properties, Ltd., Jaroso Creek Ranch, LLC, and Western Properties Investors LLC, dispute the trial court's adherence to the supreme court's mandate, while the appellees cross-appeal, asserting that some remand proceedings were contrary to the supreme court's directives. Carlos Beaubien recruited families to settle in the area during the 1850s and granted them rights to use the Ranch for grazing, firewood, and timber, formalized in the Beaubien Document of 1863. The supreme court affirmed that Beaubien granted permanent access rights tied to the land. Following its rulings in Lobato I and Lobato II, the court mandated the trial court to identify all landowners with access rights and to safeguard those rights. The appellate court's role is limited to reviewing the trial court's compliance with this mandate, without the authority to modify it. The Ranch Owner contends that the trial court's process from 2004 to 2010, which established access rights for landowners who did not come forward, improperly relieved them of their burden of proof. Conversely, landowners on cross-appeal argue that the 2010 switch to an 'opt-in' process violated the mandate by failing to comprehensively identify landowners with access rights. The appellate court concluded that the opt-out process from 2004 to 2010 complied with the mandate, while the subsequent opt-in process from 2010 to 2016 did not meet the comprehensive identification requirement. During the opt-out phase, the trial court relied on a 1894 Costilla County land survey, referred to as 'Map A and Book E,' which documented the original tracts conveyed by Beaubien. The trial court presumed these lands were settled by 1869, granting current owners access rights to the Ranch. It identified benefited landowners based on this survey and appointed a title company owner to trace current landowners. The Ranch Owner could invoke res judicata to challenge individual claims, and the court informed those not barred by this defense of their access rights. Landowners in Costilla County were not required to assert individual claims for the trial court to adjudicate their rights until a new process was implemented in 2010. From 2004 to 2010, approximately 4,500 landowners gained access rights to the Ranch through an "opt-out process," which was efficient and aligned with the supreme court's mandate to identify all benefited landowners. After 2010, a new "opt-in process" required remaining landowners to come forward to assert their claims, resulting in an additional 350 landowners gaining access rights. However, this opt-in process did not fully comply with the mandate, as the trial court failed to comprehensively adjudicate access rights for all landowners in Costilla County, despite evidence of other lands being settled timely. The trial court's October 2016 order, which required landowners to assert their claims, was reversed. The case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to identify and adjudicate the rights of all remaining benefited landowners. The document also references a detailed historical background, beginning with Jack Taylor's 1960 purchase of the Ranch, during which he attempted to extinguish the landowners' access claims without properly notifying most of them, leading to a series of legal challenges. Taylor's predecessor filed a Torrens title action in 1960, which established that Costilla County landowners had no access rights to the Salazar estate. This action, along with Taylor's similar 1960 Torrens action, is referred to as the 1960 Torrens actions. In 1981, several Costilla County landowners sued in Colorado state court, claiming that Taylor's actions violated their access rights to the Ranch. The district court dismissed their suit on res judicata grounds, citing the binding nature of the Salazar action and prior Sanchez decision, a ruling affirmed by the appellate court. The Colorado Supreme Court later granted certiorari, partially reversing the lower court's decision and questioning the adequacy of publication notice in the 1960 Torrens actions. It instructed the trial court to assess which landowners received adequate notice and to conduct a merits trial. Following this, the trial court dismissed all but ten landowners due to res judicata and denied class certification, ultimately ruling that those remaining had not established prescriptive rights as their use was not adverse. This decision was upheld by the appellate court. In Lobato I, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, recognizing implied rights of access for original settlers of Beaubien’s grant and their successors to the Taylor Ranch for specific purposes such as grazing and timber collection, while excluding recreational activities. The Ranch was defined to encompass a 77,000-acre mountain tract and a 2,500-acre Salazar estate. The court retained jurisdiction for further issues regarding due process and res judicata. In Lobato II, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that successors to the original settlers had reasonable access rights and found that Taylor's notice by publication in the 1960 action did not satisfy due process. However, res judicata prevented claims from landowners personally served in the Torrens action. The court remanded for the trial court to identify all landowners with access rights to the Ranch and to issue necessary orders to protect these rights. During the remand, the trial court clarified its responsibility to identify current landowners with access rights to the former Taylor Ranch and aimed to expedite this administrative task. It acknowledged potential contested issues during the identification process, advising litigation on those matters to occur afterward. Before identifying landowners, the trial court granted access rights to nine landowners who successfully traced their titles back to historical claims. The trial court ruled that landowners were free to invite assistance for exercising their rights on the Ranch but warned Ranch Owner that issues of abuse could be brought to court later. In January 2004, Ranch Owner suggested serving notice to all Costilla County landowners to claim access to the Ranch, failing which they would lose their rights. The court deemed this impractical due to the over 31,000 landowners and the potential for misunderstandings regarding rights adjudication. Instead, the court opted to adjudicate rights based on Map A and Book E, certifying a class of all Costilla County landowners with use rights claims, citing that conventional class action requirements were impractical due to the unique case circumstances. The court established a two-phase process for identifying landowners' rights. The first phase involved appointing David Duncan of San Luis Valley Title Company to report on current landowners connected to the original settlers, enabling an opt-out process. The court recognized Duncan's superior access to land records. The second phase would focus on notifying and adjudicating rights for other landowners, representing an opt-in process. Both phases included a res judicata component to bar claims of those previously served in past actions. The opt-out process spanned from 2004 to 2010, with the title company submitting its initial report in September 2004, identifying sixteen tracts of land and documenting ownership history. In March 2005, the court granted access rights to the identified tract owners as per the 2004 Duncan Report. The trial court granted access rights based on the 2004 Duncan Report, finding it credible and unchallenged regarding the accuracy of the information it contained. It determined that all tracts identified in the report were timely settled, as each tract was deeded by Carlos Beaubien to a first settler during his lifetime, a conclusion supported by a lack of competent evidence to the contrary from the Ranch Owner Defendants. The Ranch Owner later stipulated to the timely settlement of all Map A lands. The court also established the conclusive identity of the current landowners as identified in the report and confirmed their access rights to the Ranch, subject to res judicata constraints. The court explained that res judicata must be entirely effective to limit access rights, noting that successors in title could not be barred if they received title through a co-owner who was not barred. The trial court examined evidence related to service in 1960 Torrens actions, determining that personal service must meet specific Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure requirements to be valid. From 2005 to 2010, the title company issued reports identifying current and historical owners of Map A tracts, revealing some areas included original vara strip lands from Beaubien's grant. Access rights were decreed for the identified landowners whose claims were not barred by res judicata, with notifications and hearing offers provided to those affected by the bar. This identification process resulted in access rights for 4,500 landowners and 6,000 parcels. Additionally, access rights were granted to landowners in San Luis, San Pablo, and Los Vallejos, as these towns were referenced in Beaubien’s granting document, and the opt-out process was largely completed by 2010. The trial court certified its orders on remand as final under C.R.C.P. 54(b) after the opt-out process concluded, finding no reason to delay entering a final judgment. Ranch Owner appealed, while Landowners cross-appealed; however, the court dismissed the appeal as premature, stating that a final appealable judgment had not been entered. From 2010 to 2016, the trial court initiated an opt-in identification process, mailing approximately 23,000 notices to landowners in southern Costilla County, advising them to respond within 120 days to participate, with assurances that non-participation would not forfeit their access rights. About 1,200 landowners claimed rights, leading to the granting of access rights to around 350 additional parcels. In January 2015, a joint stipulation was made between landowners and Ranch Owner, defining areas settled by January 1869, allowing landowners tracing their property back to that date to claim easement rights as outlined in a previous court ruling (Lobato II). The stipulation identified the "Stipulated Settled Lands," encompassing all properties from Map A, Book E, and certain towns. In 2016, Ranch Owner sought to notify unidentified claimants through publication, which the trial court denied, asserting it would violate the supreme court's mandate and potentially extinguish rights without personal service. The court concluded that "pragmatic finality" was achievable without such publication and certified its orders as final for appeal, clarifying that unadjudicated rights could still be claimed in the future. An appeal and cross-appeal ensued following this decision. Ranch Owner raises six claims on appeal: (1) the trial court's opt-out identification process on remand contravened the supreme court's mandate; (2) access rights to the Salazar estate were improperly decreed using the same process as for the mountain tract; (3) the trial court incorrectly limited res judicata to landowners 'personally named and served' in the 1960 Torrens actions, disregarding Colorado law on co-owners and successors; (4) Ranch Owner was denied necessary finality in a quiet title action under C.R.C.P. 105 by not allowing service by publication after the opt-in process; (5) the trial court failed to apportion access rights based on parcel sizes or to implement regulations to prevent harm to the Ranch; (6) the trial court improperly allowed landowners to exercise access rights on portions of the Ranch that were previously part of the dominant estate, exempting them from these rights. Landowners cross-appeal, asserting that the trial court's 2010 opt-in identification process also violated the supreme court's mandate. Before addressing these issues, the court examines whether the trial court's orders were properly certified as a final judgment for appeal under Rule 54(b). Both Ranch Owner and landowners argue the trial court's judgment is sufficiently final for jurisdiction, which the court agrees with. In October 2016, the trial court certified all previous orders regarding 25 access rights as final and appealable under Rule 54(b), despite acknowledging potential unadjudicated claims from other landowners. The court deemed its actions as fulfilling the mandate "as completely as is reasonably possible," asserting a pragmatic finality after a decade-long identification process with no new landowner claims in the prior eight months. In June 2017, the court requested justification for the appeal and cross-appeal's jurisdiction, noting the October 2016 order lacked an express determination regarding just reasons for delay as required by Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) allows for final judgment entry on fewer than all claims or parties if a court expressly finds no just reason for delay and directs judgment entry. This certification is appropriate when the decision is final for an individual claim and the trial court confirms no just reason for delay. A three-step process is outlined to determine the appropriateness of Rule 54(b) certification for appeals, as established in Lytle v. Kite. The jurisdiction to appeal a Rule 54(b) certified decision hinges on the correctness of the certification, which is subject to de novo review. The trial court properly classified its orders as final judgments for appeal. It spent over a decade resolving access rights for numerous landowners in Costilla County, fulfilling the requirement for ultimate disposition of an individual claim as per Harding Glass. The trial court did not need to explicitly state a finding of no just reason for delay in its final order, as its oral findings during a June 2016 hearing sufficed. The court concluded it had met its mandate sufficiently and that the case must be considered final to prevent undue hardship from delays in appeal. The prolonged remand proceedings, lasting over a decade, further supported the need for an appealable resolution. Additionally, the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification was not premature despite not adjudicating all potential landowner claims, as requiring complete adjudication would delay appellate review indefinitely. The court recognized that additional claimants could only come forward independently, and it had fulfilled its mandate to the extent reasonably possible. The trial court's certification of its orders as final under Rule 54(b) was deemed appropriate after eight months of no pending claims, allowing for appellate review of the court's determination regarding the feasibility of more comprehensive identification procedures. The appellate court rejected the notion that a complete result was necessary for Rule 54(b) certification, as this would require remanding the case for an unattainable outcome, hindering the review process. During the opt-out process from 2004 to 2010, Ranch Owner argued that the trial court violated the supreme court's mandate by granting access rights without notifying claimants or requiring their appearance to assert claims. Ranch Owner asserted this undermined their ability to present evidence to counter claims. However, the appellate court found no inconsistency with the supreme court's mandate regarding the opt-out process. The supreme court's Lobato II decision provided explicit instructions for remand, stating that Ranch Owner must cover costs for identifying and notifying landowners with access rights to the Taylor Ranch. It mandated the trial court to identify these landowners and safeguard their rights. The court specified that claimants must demonstrate their lands were settled when the Beaubien document was created in 1863, with evidence tracing back to the time of Gilpin's ownership of the Taylor Ranch. The standard of proof required was a preponderance of the evidence, using the best available evidence to establish property boundaries. Notably, landowners were not required to prove a marketable chain of title for their properties. Landowners are required to present the best available evidence to demonstrate that their properties benefit from the easements granted by Beaubien. The 1894 Costilla County survey and inventory, known as Map A and Book E, is identified as the most credible evidence for this purpose. However, landowners are not restricted from providing additional evidence to substantiate their claims. The standard of review for a trial court's implementation of an appellate mandate is de novo, while compliance requiring factual determinations is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Ranch Owner argues that the trial court's opt-out process was inconsistent with the supreme court’s mandate, citing three main issues: reliance on a conclusive presumption relieving landowners of their proof burden, denial of the opportunity to examine the title company’s work, and exclusion of rebuttal evidence. The court found no merit in the Ranch Owner's claims, stating that reliance on Map A and Book E did not violate the mandate as it provided sufficient presumptive evidence of landowners' rights. Furthermore, the supreme court clarified in a modified footnote that landowners are not required to prove a marketable chain of title, and thus the trial court's use of Map A and Book E was aligned with the supreme court’s instructions. The landowners had requested confirmation that they could meet the proof requirements with the best available evidence regarding their lands settled during Gilpin's time. Landowners expressed concern that Ranch Owner might argue that each plaintiff claiming access rights must individually provide formal evidence of a complete chain of title, despite the existence of Map A and Book E which officially catalogued this information. Following the modification of Lobato II by the supreme court, it was established that landowners must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their property falls within the boundaries occupied by settlers during Gilpin’s ownership of the Sangre de Cristo grant. The court identified Map A and Book E as the "best evidence" to meet this standard, responding to the landowners' request for clarification on proof mechanisms. Consequently, the trial court's reliance on these maps was deemed consistent with the supreme court's mandate. Additionally, Ranch Owner's claim that the trial court improperly presumed access rights for current property owners within the records of Map A and Book E was rejected, as the Ranch Owner had the opportunity to challenge this evidence before the trial court's decision on access rights. Regarding discovery issues, Ranch Owner argued that the trial court wrongfully denied the chance to depose representatives of the title company or inspect its work product. However, any potential error was deemed harmless, as the trial court appointed the title company's principal as an abstractor to provide written reports on present-day landowners. The court limited direct contact with title company personnel to avoid interference with their work but facilitated communication by allowing parties to submit questions for the court to relay. Although the trial court did not reference CRE 706 in its order, the title company's principal was effectively acting as a court-appointed expert witness under that rule. CRE 706 mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence 706, allowing for the deposition and cross-examination of court-appointed experts, as established in Forbes v. 39 Goldenhersh. However, these provisions do not apply to court-appointed advisors or consultants unless they contribute new evidence. The distinction hinges on whether the appointee is deemed a source of evidence. In this case, the trial court utilized the title company as a source of evidence, thus treating it as more than an advisor. Consequently, the trial court's prohibition against examining title company representatives appears contrary to CRE 706(a). Despite this, Ranch Owner failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the limitation, as the title company’s reports were accessible, and the court allowed Ranch Owner to question the title company’s processes post-conferences. Ranch Owner did not identify errors in the title company’s work nor any improperly granted access to land. Therefore, any error was deemed harmless. Ranch Owner's claim that the inability to examine the title company’s principal hindered its challenge to the presumption of timely settlement of land was unfounded, as the title company's reports did not directly address this presumption. Ranch Owner's eventual stipulation acknowledging the timely settlement of all lands in Map A further undermined this argument. Additionally, Ranch Owner's assertion of being denied the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence regarding the timely settlement is unsupported by the record, as it ultimately stipulated to the timely settlement of the lands in question in January 2015. Ranch Owner asserts that a stipulation does not limit its right to appeal regarding the trial court’s orders related to the status of certain lands as Stipulated Settled Lands. However, the court finds that Ranch Owner’s reservation of appeal rights does not negate its clear stipulation that the lands were timely settled. Ranch Owner claims prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to allow evidence to counter the presumption of timely settlement for Map A and Book E lands, yet this argument is undermined by its own stipulation on the matter. The only evidence Ranch Owner cites is a 1913 survey, which it claims it was ready to present but fails to show it actually requested the court to consider this evidence during any hearing or provided a formal offer of proof. The court notes that Ranch Owner has not indicated any instance where it was denied the opportunity to present the survey. Moreover, the trial court had found that Ranch Owner did not provide competent evidence to dispute the presumption of timely settlement. The court also acknowledges that Ranch Owner had previously submitted an offer of proof regarding access rights and was given the chance to expand on it but did not do so. Consequently, the court concludes that the trial court acted appropriately during the proceedings. The trial court's identification of landowners using Map A and Book E did not create a conclusive presumption, allowing Ranch Owner to present evidence against the presumption of timely settlement. Although the court may have mistakenly limited discovery of its appointed expert, this error was deemed harmless. Ranch Owner argued that the court improperly included the Salazar estate in remand proceedings without considering its unique factual and procedural history, relying solely on findings related to the mountain tract. However, this argument is negated by the supreme court's mandate in Lobato I, which confirmed that the mountain tract and the Salazar estate together constitute the Taylor Ranch. The supreme court also reiterated in Lobato II that the Taylor Ranch includes the Salazar estate, rejecting Ranch Owner's claims. Ranch Owner additionally contended that the trial court incorrectly restricted the application of res judicata to landowners who had received personal service in the 1960 Torrens actions and their successors. Ranch Owner argued that participation in litigation waives due process notice requirements and that res judicata applies to those in privity. However, the supreme court's ruling in Lobato II clarified that individuals not personally served are not barred from bringing claims, and Ranch Owner's arguments were precluded by the court’s mandate. The trial court's denial of Ranch Owner's motion for a broader application of res judicata was thus properly upheld. Ranch Owner argued in its Lobato II brief that personal jurisdiction and proper service should be presumed for any landowner involved in the 1960 Torrens actions, even without personal service. They contended that the presence of counsel for landowners negated the need for individual service. However, the supreme court rejected this argument, stating that claims by landowners or their predecessors not personally named or served in the 1960s action were not barred. The court emphasized that a judgment must meet the minimum procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause to have a preclusive effect, and where there are “constitutional deficiencies of notice,” the res judicata bar cannot apply. Consequently, the court intended to limit res judicata to landowners who received personal service, irrespective of their participation in the litigation. The court noted that both appellate holdings and their rationales are binding in future proceedings. Ranch Owner's second argument regarding the application of res judicata to landowners with a co-owner personally served was also dismissed, as the supreme court repeatedly stated that res judicata applies only to those who were “personally named and served.” The trial court's decision to deny Ranch Owner a hearing on res judicata issues was affirmed, as the supreme court's explicit language must be respected. Lastly, Ranch Owner's claim that the trial court erred by denying its motion to serve unknown claimants by publication was also rejected, as it hindered the finality required for a quiet title action under Rule 105. The trial court denied Ranch Owner’s initial request to personally serve all Costilla County landowners regarding their obligation to assert claims to access the Ranch, opting instead for an opt-out process. During this process, landowners were identified based on specific records, and notifications were sent only after adjudicating their rights. Following the opt-out phase, an opt-in process commenced, notifying all landowners of ongoing proceedings while preserving their rights to future claims without forfeiting them for non-response. Subsequently, Ranch Owner sought to finalize the process through notice by publication to unidentified claimants but did not renew its request for personal service. The trial court denied this request, asserting that it would contravene the supreme court’s mandate by extinguishing non-responding claimants' rights without personal service. Ranch Owner argued that the trial court's refusal to allow service by publication deprived them of a complete adjudication as required by Rule 105 in quiet title actions. They contended that the decade-long effort to identify claimants satisfied due process. In contrast, landowners claimed that publication would violate the mandate from the supreme court, which stated that personal service is necessary before extinguishing any landowner’s rights. The court agreed with the landowners, affirming that Ranch Owner's request for service by publication would breach the supreme court’s mandate, which necessitated personal service to ensure procedural due process was met before rights could be extinguished. The supreme court determined that the names and addresses of all landowners in Costilla County were "reasonably ascertainable" from public tax records, concluding that Taylor did not exercise reasonable diligence by opting for publication service instead of attempting personal service. The law mandates personal service whenever feasible, a requirement consistent from 1960 to the present. After the identification process on remand, Ranch Owner did not renew its request for personal service on unadjudicated landowners. The court rejected Ranch Owner's claim that due process was satisfied after the identification process, emphasizing that reasonable diligence entails efforts to personally serve all landowners identified in public records. The trial court found that personal service would have upheld the due process rights of the landowners and that Ranch Owner's failure to pursue this route warranted the rejection of publication notice as contrary to the supreme court’s mandate. Ranch Owner's assertion that the trial court's refusal of publication notice hindered finality in a quiet title action was dismissed; the mandate of the supreme court takes precedence over any conflicting rules. Additionally, Ranch Owner argued that the trial court erred by not apportioning each landowner's access rights based on parcel size and by failing to define the scope of those rights. However, landowners countered that Ranch Owner did not demonstrate actual overuse, thus lacking grounds for relief on a speculative basis. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apportion access rights or impose regulations on landowners' use of their rights. The supreme court, in Lobato I, recognized that landowners possess implied rights to access the Ranch through prescriptive easement, easement by estoppel, and easement from prior use. These rights are defined by the Beaubien Document and permit access for pasture, firewood, and timber, with usage limited to what is deemed reasonable. Specifically, grazing is restricted to a reasonable number of livestock, firewood is limited to household needs, and timber use is confined to what is necessary for constructing and maintaining residences and farm buildings. In 2004, landowners sought to enforce this reasonable use standard, which the trial court partially upheld, affirming that grazing rights are limited to survival or household use and explicitly excluding commercial use. The court noted that while enforcement of these access rights is currently justified, future non-compliance could lead to further legal action by the Ranch Owner Defendants. Subsequently, the Ranch Owner filed a motion for clarification regarding access rights, claiming landowners were violating the reasonable use standard. Supporting affidavits indicated that the grazing capacity of the Ranch was 470 animal units, yet some landowners were allegedly exceeding this capacity. The Ranch Owner indicated attempts at informal resolution had failed and requested remedial orders to tie each landowner’s access rights to their property descriptions and apportion those rights based on the division of the original vara strip parcel. Rules, regulations, and guidelines were established to govern access and use of the Ranch, along with the designation of a representative group for landowners in negotiations. The trial court denied Ranch Owner’s motion for prospective relief, citing a lack of evidence showing adverse effects from landowners’ grazing practices and noting the fragmented interests of current property owners made rule creation based on apportionment impossible. In 2006, Ranch Owner sought to limit landowner usage based on property size, arguing that unrestricted grazing rights could overburden the Ranch. The trial court granted the request for landowners to complete an “intended-use” form, which would help determine if their intended use exceeded their parcel rights, emphasizing that landowners' use should remain reasonable and based on their original parcel size. Subsequently, a “Notice of Intended Use” form was approved, requiring landowners to outline their property ownership and intended Ranch use as a condition for access. Although Ranch Owner could not limit access based solely on the provided information without further court orders, they could utilize the information to pursue separate legal action for abuse or trespass. Later, Ranch Owner requested an evidentiary hearing to assess the Ranch's grazing capacity, opposed by landowners who argued that such a determination was irrelevant to the remand mandate and would delay the identification process. Landowners submitted expert testimony indicating that past grazing practices exceeded Ranch Owner's capacity estimates and highlighted that Ranch Owner had not demonstrated actual overburdening of the Ranch. The trial court denied Ranch Owner's motion without conducting a hearing, concluding that the Ranch's grazing capacity is influenced by seasonal weather, making immediate orders potentially unjust in future years. The court determined that the issue did not involve common factual questions for all class members and suggested the Ranch Owner utilize Notices of Intended Use to assess claims against individual landowners for overuse or access abuse, although no such claims have been made thus far. Legal principles dictate that access rights should be apportioned to prevent undue burdens on the servient estate. Easement holders must not cause unreasonable damage or interfere with the servient estate's enjoyment. When a benefited property is subdivided, each parcel can utilize the easement, but apportionment is necessary to avoid unreasonable burdens. Furthermore, a benefited property can expand its easement use without imposing undue burdens, with reasonable variations in use permissible over time. Courts must assess whether additional uses are acceptable by comparing original and new uses, considering purpose, typical development of the dominant estate, and the servient estate's burden. The standard of review for a trial court's adherence to an appellate mandate is de novo, while factual determinations post-remand are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ranch Owner's requests for apportionment and management plans. Ranch Owner claimed the court neglected evidence of overgrazing, failed to enforce the Supreme Court's mandate for necessary orders to protect landowners' rights, and violated easement law principles. However, the arguments presented were not convincing, and each contention was addressed in turn by the court. The record does not support Ranch Owner's claim that the trial court ignored evidence of livestock overburdening the Ranch. Ranch Owner's March 2005 motion cited evidence of four landowners grazing between twenty-three and fifty-one livestock animal units simultaneously, along with an affidavit estimating the Ranch's grazing capacity. However, Ranch Owner's assertion of overuse merely suggests that landowners' practices exceed this estimate, without demonstrating actual harm to the Ranch. Despite landowners being required since 2006 to report their intended use of the Ranch, Ranch Owner has not provided specific evidence of overuse. Additionally, the argument that the increased number of landowners using the Ranch constitutes an unreasonable burden is unpersuasive; merely increasing the number of users does not inherently increase the burden on the servient estate. The trial court found no evidence of actual or imminent overuse, leading to the conclusion that it was not obligated to consider apportionment as a remedy to prevent resource damage. Ranch Owner's assertion that the supreme court's mandate required apportionment or rule-setting is also unfounded. The court's instructions to safeguard landowners' access rights necessitate evidence of actual harm or imminent risk, which was not demonstrated. Lastly, the principles of easement law do not mandate apportionment or rule establishment as Ranch Owner suggested. The supreme court recognized that landowners established a prescriptive easement through continuous use from the 1800s until the Ranch's acquisition in 1960, which further supports the trial court's conclusions. No opinion is offered regarding the reasonableness of the Ranch owner's potential interruption of landowners’ usage had the land been more subdivided. It is concluded that even if an unreasonable increase in burden is assumed concerning the landowners' prescriptive easement, their increased usage remains within the framework of two recognized easements. The specifics of how an easement is acquired are crucial in assessing the extent to which the dominant estate can burden the servient estate. Previous court rulings confirm that landowners have an easement by estoppel due to past allowances for access, which were essential for the success of nearby settlements. The intention of the parties at the easement's creation and the purpose it serves should guide its interpretation, favoring the continuation of land usage that has thrived since the 1860s. Public policy generally supports maximizing the utility of both the easement beneficiary and the servient estate. The Ranch owner has not convincingly argued that the increased usage constitutes an unreasonable burden under easement law. The current landowners’ increased usage compared to that of the original settlers reflects a change in degree rather than kind, which is permissible under easement law. Prior case law supports that modifications in the degree of use do not alter the fundamental nature of the easement. The Ranch owner's claim that the trial court should have extinguished landowners’ rights due to impractical apportionment is unsubstantiated; apportionment concerns arise only after establishing that it is necessary. Since the Ranch owner failed to demonstrate that the increased landowners’ usage created an unreasonable burden, the issue of apportionment is not pertinent. Thus, it is concluded that the Ranch owner did not prove that the landowners’ increased usage resulted in an unreasonable burden on the Ranch. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Ranch Owner’s request for apportionment and the establishment of new regulations. The title company’s November 2006 report indicated that portions of the Ranch were formerly vara strip parcels linked to Beaubien’s grant. Ranch Owner argued that the court wrongly allowed landowners to exercise access rights over these parcels, insisting they should be excluded from the servient estate, as access rights cannot be exercised over original vara strip parcels. Landowners countered that Ranch Owner waived this argument by not raising it earlier, to which Ranch Owner responded that prior to Lobato II, it could not have known access rights would relate to original vara strip parcels. The trial court's decision was upheld. Furthermore, Ranch Owner’s request fell outside the scope of the supreme court's mandate, which focused on determining the dominant estate's scope. The supreme court had previously concluded that the entire Taylor Ranch was burdened, leaving no room for the trial court to redefine the servient estate. In a separate cross-appeal, landowners argued that the trial court violated the Lobato II mandate by requiring individual Costilla County landowners to opt into proceedings from 2010-2016 to adjudicate their rights. They provided undisputed evidence proving that certain areas in southern Costilla County were settled during Gilpin's time, known as Stipulated Settled Lands. The landowners contended that the trial court should have identified current owners of these benefited lands for access rights adjudication without requiring them to assert claims. The court agreed that the trial court's opt-in process was inadequate regarding the Stipulated Settled Lands. From 2004-2010, the trial court decreed access rights for owners of designated lands (opt-out process). After identifying these owners, the court shifted to the remaining lands in Costilla County. From 2010-2016, after notifying landowners by mail, the court only decreed access rights for approximately 350 landowners who opted in. This procedural change occurred alongside the retirement of the presiding trial judge, Gaspar Perricone. Judge Perricone acknowledged that landowners in Costilla County outside of Map A and Book E needed to provide different evidence to establish their claims due to the lack of a presumption of timely settlement. He approved a plan for notifying landowners in the southern half of Costilla County about their rights to participate in the proceedings, requiring responses within 120 days to make claims, although failure to respond would not forfeit their access rights. In March 2010, Judge Kenneth Plotz took over and authorized the mailing of 23,000 notices, resulting in about 1,200 responses. The trial court then divided the area into four regions for evidentiary hearings. Landowners' counsel presented historical evidence supporting timely settlements in certain areas, leading Ranch Owner to stipulate to the timely settlement of several towns, including Garcia and others, from 2012 to 2014. In January 2015, Ranch Owner agreed to a master map of all known settled lands. In 2013, following the stipulation of Garcia's timely settlement, landowners from Garcia requested the trial court to identify rights for all landowners within Garcia's stipulated boundaries, arguing that they should be treated similarly to those in Map A and Book E. They expressed concern that requiring individual claims would hinder participation and finality. They sought the appointment of Integrated Land Services as an expert to identify specific lots within the Garcia Settlement Map. Ranch Owner opposed this request, insisting that only the nine landowners who had responded after the 2010 notices were entitled to rights, based on Judge Perricone's established process requiring individual claims. The trial court denied the Garcia landowners' motion, asserting that Judge Perricone's prior description established the law of the case. Judge Perricone had indicated that the presumption of access based on Supreme Court decisions ceased, placing the burden on those seeking access. Judge Plotz interpreted this to mean future claimants must assert their claims without the Ranch Owner incurring costs to identify landowners who had not come forward. Specifically, the court determined that the Garcia Residents must prove their land was settled during the relevant time, as their properties were not identified in the applicable documentation. Furthermore, the trial court incorrectly concluded it was mandated to implement an opt-in process for the Stipulated Settled Lands during a remand phase. While the law of the case doctrine generally requires adherence to previous rulings, it allows for discretion in reconsidering those rulings. Judge Perricone's statements did not preclude the trial court from adjudicating the rights of all Garcia landowners. The law of the case is not binding if it leads to error or if circumstances have changed. Judge Perricone's statements were not mandated following his retirement and held the same weight as Judge Plotz’s own statements. The doctrine serves efficiency rather than strict adherence, and the trial court's reliance on Judge Perricone's statement ultimately hindered its ability to fulfill its mandate to identify all landowners with access rights to the Taylor Ranch. The court should have reconsidered whether the identification process should be an opt-in system. Judge Perricone's earlier statement, while deserving of deference under the law of the case doctrine, did not prevent the trial court from establishing an opt-out process to determine access rights for landowners of timely settled lands, including Garcia and other unadjudicated areas. The presumption of timely settlement, mentioned by Judge Perricone, applied primarily to lands classified under Map A and Book E, indicating that landowners outside these classifications would need to provide different proof of their claims. Although Judge Perricone acknowledged that the burden of proof now rested with these landowners, by 2013, evidence had been presented showing that Garcia was settled by January 1869, and Ranch Owner had stipulated to this timely settlement. Consequently, landowners in Garcia were entitled to access rights if their properties fell within the stipulated boundaries. Furthermore, the stipulation by Ranch Owner fulfilled the landowners' burden of proving timely settlement, rendering the presumption irrelevant and eliminating the need for an opt-in process for non-Map A lands. The trial court's reliance on Judge Perricone’s statement led to a misunderstanding, conflating the presumption of timely settlement with the opt-out process. Thus, the trial court incorrectly determined that it was bound to implement an opt-in process for adjudicating the Stipulated Settled Lands. The conclusion is that Judge Plotz was not obligated to enforce the opt-in process from 2010 to 2016, and the next step is to assess whether the implemented process was consistent with the earlier mandate. Identification of all landowners with access rights to Taylor Ranch is mandated by the supreme court, as outlined in Lobato II. Although an opt-in process from 2010 to 2016 provided access decrees for around 350 additional Costilla County landowners, it was inherently insufficient. The Ranch Owner's stipulations modified the identification process by establishing a master map of lands settled as of 1869, termed the Stipulated Settled Lands. The trial court, starting in 2004, aimed for a comprehensive identification of current landowners based on Map A and Book E as the best evidence of timely settlement. Once the Ranch Owner acknowledged that certain non-Map A lands were settled, the trial court was expected to adopt a similar administrative approach for identifying owners of the Stipulated Settled Lands, rather than continuing the flawed opt-in method. The trial court itself recognized that the opt-in process left many landowners unidentified. For instance, while the Garcia Township was acknowledged as timely settled, only a few landowners submitted individual claims. Although some landowners were granted access rights based on submitted affidavits, the process remained incomplete. Ultimately, the ruling emphasizes that the responsibility for identifying all Costilla County landowners with access rights lies with the trial court, as per the supreme court's mandate, and that the costs of this identification should be borne by the Ranch Owner. The plaintiff landowners have won their claims, prompting Taylor to cover the costs of identifying and notifying all individuals with access rights to the Taylor Ranch. The trial court's opt-in process for adjudicating access rights from 2010 to 2016 was deemed inadequate, necessitating further proceedings to comprehensively identify all benefited Costilla County landowners. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine and decree access rights for all property owners within the 88 Stipulated Settled Lands without requiring these landowners to come forward. Concerns from the Ranch Owner about finality will need addressing once the access rights for these landowners are adjudicated. After identifying the current owners, the Ranch Owner may choose to serve notice to the remaining Costilla County landowners who have not had their rights adjudicated. This notice will inform them to claim access rights within a time frame set by the trial court to avoid being barred from making claims. If the Ranch Owner opts for personal service, they must bear the associated costs. Taylor's failure to diligently identify and serve all individuals with a stake in the Taylor Ranch necessitates that they bear the costs of rectifying this oversight on remand. After attempting personal service on remaining landowners, the Ranch Owner may use publication to notify unidentified individuals for finality. Should the Ranch Owner decide against pursuing personal service, those landowners with unadjudicated rights may assert their claims later. The court affirms the trial court’s orders regarding access rights for Costilla County landowners, reverses the October 2016 order requiring landowners to assert claims, and remands for the identification and adjudication of access rights for any unidentified individuals within the Stipulated Settled Lands. Judges Webb and Harris concur.