Antoinette Martinez v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-17-00689-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 13, 2018; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Antoinette Martinez was found guilty of two counts of capital murder by a jury, which led to a life sentence for each count as the State did not pursue the death penalty. Martinez raised six issues on appeal, arguing that her prosecution for capital murder constituted double jeopardy, contested the evidence's sufficiency, and claimed the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the defense of duress, misapplied the law of parties, and did not require unanimous jury findings on her guilt. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed certain aspects of the trial court's decision while reversing and rendering others. The background of the case reveals details surrounding the murders of Xavier Cordero and Steven Rendon, including key evidence such as the discovery of Cordero's body with gunshot wounds and Martinez’s connection to the case through her phone records. Investigators found a handgun in Martinez's apartment and identified Rendon’s body in a cornfield, further linking her to the crimes.

On June 30, 2014, Detective Luna identified Rendon as a missing person. That same day, Sergeant Perez interviewed Gomez, who revealed that Martinez confessed to robbing and killing two men. Gomez testified that Martinez referenced one victim as Xavier and showed him an ID belonging to a man named Steven. Later, Martinez was interviewed by Detective Luna and Sergeant Perez, during which she admitted to creating a fake dating profile to lure Rendon for robbery. She stated that she was interested in Rendon’s car and planned to shoot him, preferring not to do so in her apartment to avoid noise and mess. Martinez invited Rendon to her apartment, bound him with tape, and then Clines emerged with a gun. They transported Rendon in his own car to a cornfield, where Clines shot him. Martinez requested Clines to confirm Rendon’s death by shooting him again and assisted in moving the body further into the field.

Martinez also discussed her relationship with Cordero, expressing anger towards him for allegedly transmitting chlamydia to her and Clines. She invited Cordero to her apartment with the intent to rob him, during which Clines threatened Cordero with a gun. After Cordero resisted, Clines assaulted him, tied him up, and forced him into his own car trunk. Clines then took Cordero to a remote location where he shot him multiple times, while Martinez remained in the car. During the interview, Martinez compared herself and Clines to “Bonnie and Clyde” and acknowledged their actions, including disposing of evidence. Clines, who pleaded guilty to the murders, testified that he had exploited Martinez's past trauma to manipulate her into participating in the robberies.

Clines testified that he returned to Martinez's apartment uninvited and armed, instructing her to contact Rendon, whom she invited over for sex. Upon Rendon's arrival, Martinez restrained him with tape while Clines threatened him with a shotgun. They then transported Rendon to a remote location, where Clines shot him. Although Clines claimed Martinez did not plan the murders, she followed his instructions and assisted with the aftermath, despite her reluctance. The State charged Martinez with capital murder under two theories: murder in the course of committing robbery and murder of multiple persons in the same criminal episode. During pre-trial, the State abandoned part of the indictment concerning multiple murders, proceeding instead on two counts: Count 1 alleged Martinez shot Cordero and Rendon, while Count 2 specifically related to the murder of Rendon during a robbery. The jury found her guilty of both counts, leading to automatic life sentences because the State did not seek the death penalty.

Martinez argues she faced double jeopardy for being prosecuted twice for the same offense, and contends the trial court erred in issuing two separate judgments and sentences for what she views as a single offense of capital murder. The State maintains that each count represents a distinct offense. Under Texas law, one indictment typically leads to one conviction unless exceptions apply. Article 21.24(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows for the joinder of multiple offenses in one indictment if they arise from the same criminal episode, which includes the commission of similar offenses.

An indictment may not charge more than one offense per paragraph, per TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.24(b). While multiple offenses can be included in an indictment, they must be articulated in separate counts and paragraphs. Convictions for properly joined offenses are valid. In this case, Count 1 accuses Martinez of the capital murder of Cordero, detailing two aggravating elements: (A) the murder of Rendon as part of the same scheme, and (B) the murder occurring during a robbery. Count 2 pertains to the capital murder of Rendon, with the aggravating element being that it occurred during a robbery. Under article 21.24, these counts are validly charged as distinct offenses unless deemed a single offense, which would lead to a sentencing error.

Martinez raises a double jeopardy claim, which protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. The claim focuses on whether the two capital murder counts are separate offenses under Texas law. The court considers previous cases, noting that capital murder can be characterized by different victims, as seen in Graham v. State, where an indictment for capital murder included multiple victims in distinct paragraphs, demonstrating that they were treated as separate offenses. The court underlines that each capital murder charge must meet statutory definitions and aggravating circumstances, and concludes that if the allegations represent one offense, double jeopardy protections would apply and sentencing would be erroneous.

The court distinguished the case from Hathorn by noting that it involves multiple murders rather than multiple theories. The indictment contains two distinct capital murder charges: the murder of Hurtado, supported by two theories (during a robbery and in the same transaction as Giraldo's murder), and the murder of Garcia-Castro, supported by a single theory (during a robbery). Unlike Hathorn, where multiple theories supported one capital murder charge, the current indictment alleges two separate capital offenses.

A footnote referenced a scenario where Garcia-Castro’s murder could be considered an aggravating circumstance for Hurtado’s murder, which would change the case's dynamics. However, the court of criminal appeals indicated that the capital murder statute permits only a single conviction when multiple murders occur during a single transaction. The prosecution's theory must demonstrate that the defendant killed more than one person in that transaction, marking it as the 'allowable unit of prosecution.'

In non-capital cases, each murder can be charged separately, but in capital murder cases, the multiple murders must be treated as a single count. The indictment's Counts 1 Paragraph A and Count 2 both involve the same victims, violating Martinez’s double jeopardy rights and failing to comply with article 21.24(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, when multiple convictions infringe on double jeopardy, the conviction for the most serious offense is retained while the others are set aside. Similarly, when an indictment does not adhere to article 21.24(a), the less serious offense is vacated.

In cases where the offense degree and punishment term are identical, as seen here, courts are directed to consider any fines or restitution ordered. In this instance, both convictions imposed the same punishment, and the trial court did not require Martinez to pay a fine or restitution. Although the court of criminal appeals has not directly ruled on this situation, it suggests that if all punishment factors are equal, the conviction to retain is typically that from the first jury verdict form, usually corresponding to the first count in the indictment. Consequently, the judgment on Count 1 is affirmed, while Count 2 is reversed with a judgment of acquittal.

Regarding jury instructions, these are essential for guiding jurors on applicable law, requiring accurate law statements and all essential offense elements. The jury charge must align with the indictment and aim to prevent confusion. An application paragraph must clearly specify conditions for conviction and logically connect with other jury charge paragraphs. 

Errors in jury charges are reviewed in two steps: first, determining if an error exists, and second, assessing if the error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. Harm evaluation is contingent upon whether the error was preserved by objection; preserved errors require a showing of 'some harm' for reversal, while unpreserved errors must rise to 'fundamental' status, necessitating a demonstration of egregious harm, which significantly impacts the case's foundation or the defendant's rights.

Martinez argues that the trial court wrongly denied her request for a jury instruction on the defense of duress, claiming she acted under duress due to Clines' possession of guns and potential for violence. The State contends that the evidence presented does not justify a duress instruction. Under Texas law, duress is an affirmative defense requiring proof that the defendant was compelled to act due to an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, which must be immediate and directly linked to the failure to commit the charged offense. Threats must be of imminent harm, not future threats. The defense of duress focuses on the behavior of the person making the threats, and claims must have an objective basis.

Martinez's assertion of duress is based primarily on Clines's testimony, where he indicated he knew of Martinez's past trauma and used it to foster a relationship, subsequently forcing her to assist in criminal acts. Clines described incidents where he, while armed, coerced Martinez into luring victims to her apartment, leading to violent crimes, including murder. Despite this, the court must evaluate whether the evidence raised a legitimate defensive issue warranting jury instruction, as defendants are entitled to such instructions on any issue backed by evidence, regardless of its strength or credibility.

Clines testified that Martinez did not conspire with him in the murders but complied with his instructions, including assisting with Rendon's body despite reluctance. The court found that merely following orders is insufficient for a duress defense. Martinez claimed she was aware of Clines's violent background and that he was armed, arguing that this constituted a threat of imminent harm. However, her vague fears and Clines's statement did not provide the necessary objective threat to warrant a duress instruction. Previous cases indicated that general fears of a co-defendant's temper are inadequate for such a defense. Consequently, the court determined that Martinez failed to demonstrate entitlement to a duress instruction, thus upholding the trial court's decision to exclude it.

Regarding the law of parties, Martinez did not object to the jury charge during the trial nor preserved any error for appeal. She argued for specific jury instructions regarding the primary actor and the nature of her assistance. However, established case law supports that a general reference to the law of parties in the jury charge suffices, as long as there was no objection or request for specificity from the defendant. The court concluded that the application paragraph adequately incorporated the law of parties and affirmed that the trial court did not err in its jury charge.

Criminal responsibility can arise from one's own conduct, the conduct of another for which one is responsible, or both. Mere presence at the crime scene does not establish liability. A person is liable for another's actions if they intended to assist in the crime by soliciting or aiding. If a felony is committed by a conspirator while attempting to commit another felony, all conspirators are guilty of the offense committed, provided it was in furtherance of the conspiracy and foreseeable.

In this case, Antoinette Martinez was charged with the murders of Xavier Cordero and Steven Rendon, occurring on June 18 and June 25, 2014, respectively. The jury charge specified that if evidence showed Martinez acted alone or with Cameo Clines in causing these deaths with a firearm, she could be found guilty. Additionally, the charge addressed whether she was committing or attempting robbery against Cordero at the time of the first murder.

The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the application paragraph of the jury charge is sufficient if it generally references the law of parties, unless a defendant requests specificity regarding their actions in facilitating the crime. Martinez did not object to the jury charge or request a more detailed application, thus she was not entitled to a narrowing of the charge regarding party liability. The court found no error in the charge and did not conduct a harm analysis, ultimately overruling the issue raised by Martinez.

Martinez argues that the jury instructions denied her the right to a unanimous verdict, specifically that jurors were not required to agree on which complainant she was responsible for killing. The verdict forms did not list the names of the complainants, but Texas law mandates a unanimous verdict on the specific crime committed. The State's amended indictment charged Martinez with two counts of capital murder, detailing two methods for the murder of Cordero and one for Rendon, which included allegations of robbery. The jury verdict forms indicated which complainant was the subject of each guilty verdict, satisfying the requirement for unanimity. Texas law allows for multiple paragraphs in an indictment to address different methods of committing the same offense, and the jury may be charged disjunctively on alternate theories. Since both allegations under Count 1 required proof of Cordero’s murder, the unanimity requirement was not violated. Consequently, Martinez's fifth issue is overruled.

In her sixth issue, Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her conviction, relying solely on the testimony of Cameo Clines, who testified on her behalf, arguing that it was insufficient to prove she was the primary actor, a party to, or a co-conspirator in the murders of Cordero and Rendon.

The court articulated the standard of review for evaluating evidence sufficiency in capital murder cases, emphasizing that all evidence must be viewed favorably to the verdict. The review encompasses both properly and improperly admitted evidence, allowing for reasonable inferences that a rational juror could use to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that cumulative circumstantial evidence can suffice for a conviction, and direct evidence is not necessary to establish guilt.

In the case of Martinez, her recorded interview revealed her admission of involvement in the murders of Cordero and Rendon. She described luring the victims under false pretenses for robbery, tying them up, and instructing Clines to ensure they were dead after taking them to remote locations. Although she attempted to minimize her role by referencing Clines's testimony, the jury was tasked with assessing witness credibility based on all evidence, including the recorded statements.

Ultimately, after reviewing the evidence favorably to the verdict, the court concluded that the jury could find all essential elements of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt, supporting Martinez's conviction in Count 1. Conversely, the court reversed and acquitted her on Count 2. The judgment of the trial court for Count 1 was affirmed.