State v. Hand

Citation: 429 P.3d 502Docket: 94902-6

Court: Washington Supreme Court; November 8, 2018; Washington; State Supreme Court

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The opinion addresses the detention of Anthony Gene Hand, an incompetent defendant, who was held in jail for 76 days before receiving competency restoration treatment, raising substantive due process concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court had declared Hand incompetent to stand trial and mandated his admission to Western State Hospital (WSH) within 15 days. However, Hand remained in county jail for 61 days beyond this deadline due to WSH's inability to admit him, resulting in a total of 76 days of confinement. While Hand's competency was later restored and he faced conviction, he asserted that this prolonged detention violated his due process rights and sought dismissal with prejudice as a remedy.

The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, concluding that the 76-day detention indeed violated Hand's due process rights, but determined that dismissal with prejudice was not an appropriate remedy. The procedural history reveals that Hand was initially charged with first-degree escape and unlawful possession of methamphetamine. After a competency evaluation requested by his counsel, he was ordered to WSH for a 45-day commitment. Despite multiple motions filed by Hand regarding his prolonged detention, the trial court found no initial due process violation but later held the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) in contempt for not complying with its order. The court imposed sanctions and acknowledged that Hand might belong to a class in a related federal case, Trueblood v. DSHS, which had previously established that DSHS delays in providing competency services violated due process rights. However, the trial court maintained that the federal case did not influence the current proceedings.

Hand was not transferred to Washington State Hospital (WSH) as ordered on February 26, 2015, and was instead admitted on March 10, 2015, after a 61-day delay beyond the court's 15-day deadline. The court found no due process violation and denied motions to dismiss, but imposed $6,000 sanctions on the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) for failing to comply with its order. On April 29, 2015, Hand was found competent to stand trial, subsequently convicted after a bench trial. Hand appealed, and the Court of Appeals determined that his substantive due process rights were violated due to his 76-day detention without bail prior to treatment admission. Nevertheless, the court ruled that dismissal was not warranted as Hand did not demonstrate that the delay prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Hand's petition for review was accepted by the state supreme court. 

The legal framework for determining competency includes criteria under former RCW 10.77.010(15), which defines incompetence related to a defendant's mental capacity. Procedures mandate that if competency is questioned, the court must appoint an expert for evaluation. If deemed incompetent, proceedings are stayed, and the defendant is committed for restoration treatment. If competency is restored, proceedings continue; if not, charges are dismissed without prejudice. Former RCW 10.77.068 sets a performance target of seven days for treatment admissions but clarifies that these targets do not create enforceable rights or grounds for contempt or dismissal of charges.

Hand alleges that the State infringed upon his substantive due process rights by detaining him for 76 days in jail before he was admitted for treatment at Western State Hospital (WSH). He argues that this violation justifies a dismissal with prejudice since no alternative remedy offers adequate relief. The core issue revolves around whether the duration and nature of his detention align with the restorative objectives of his commitment. According to the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, pretrial confinement of incompetent defendants must balance their liberty interests—both in receiving treatment and in freedom from incarceration—against the State's interests. Recent amendments to RCW 10.77.068 now impose a 14-day limit for the admission of defendants awaiting competency restoration. Precedents from federal courts indicate that the State must admit incompetent defendants for treatment within seven days of the order for such treatment. The State's claim that Hand's situation falls outside the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment is rejected, as similar issues have been addressed under this constitutional provision. Notably, cases like Mink and Trueblood have established that prolonged detention without timely admission for treatment violates substantive due process rights. The consensus among the courts is that indefinite detention of incompetent defendants is inconsistent with due process protections, necessitating prompt admission to treatment facilities.

A constitutional requirement mandates a seven-day limit for the detention of incompetent defendants awaiting restorative treatment, as prolonged incarceration exacerbates mental health issues, increases suicide risks, and complicates recovery efforts. The Supreme Court stipulates that individuals cannot be held longer than necessary to assess their potential to regain competency, and continued commitment must be justified by demonstrable progress. In this case, Hand was ordered to receive treatment within 15 days, but he remained jailed for 76 days, violating his substantive due process rights. The court reaffirmed that such prolonged detention undermines the purpose of competency restoration and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that this detention was unconstitutional. The district court's ruling in Trueblood established that competency evaluations must occur within seven days, and individuals must be admitted to treatment within the same timeframe. Additionally, at the time of Hand's incarceration, it was established that indefinite detention of incompetent defendants awaiting treatment due to lack of space in state hospitals violated their rights. Although Hand sought dismissal with prejudice as a remedy, he did not demonstrate that it was warranted, given Washington's provisions allowing for dismissal without prejudice to facilitate mental health assessments.

RCW 10.77.084(1)(c) permits a court to dismiss charges against an incompetent defendant without prejudice if competency is not restored by the end of the restoration period. Following a notice and hearing, if competency is restored, the court will lift the stay; if not, the charges are dismissed without prejudice, unless further treatment is deemed likely to restore competency within established time limits. Case law, particularly State v. Kidder, confirms that charges can be dismissed without prejudice if a defendant is not admitted for treatment within the specified timeframe. 

In the current case, Hand seeks dismissal with prejudice, arguing that a dismissal without prejudice does not remedy his situation as he is already serving a sentence. He references State v. Striker, which mandates a dismissal with prejudice for untimely trials to prevent prosecutorial delay. However, Hand does not claim a violation of his speedy trial rights or that his detention resulted from prosecutorial delay, making Striker inapplicable. 

The trial court can set deadlines for treatment admissions, as it did in Hand's case, and the 76-day delay for his admission was due to WSH's resource limitations. While the court sanctioned WSH for violating its order, these sanctions do not assist Hand in his current pursuit for dismissal with prejudice, which is deemed unwarranted based on the circumstances. Hand's prior motions did not specify the type of dismissal sought, but his communications suggest he favored dismissal without prejudice. He may still pursue civil claims for damages related to the delays.

Detaining an incompetent defendant for 76 days without providing competency restoration treatment violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, dismissal with prejudice is not warranted. Anthony Hand briefly raised a speedy trial violation in his appellate brief, but this argument was underdeveloped and also mentioned in motions to dismiss. His time in county jail will count toward earned release time as per WAG 137-30-030 and -040. 

Judge Madsen concurs with the outcome but disagrees with the majority's view that Hand's detention relates to substantive due process. Madsen argues that substantive due process requires a fundamental right, which is not established here, as RCW 10.77.068 only sets aspirational timelines for competency evaluations and services. Instead, Madsen believes the issue is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, which Hand waived by not adequately raising it. 

The conclusion references the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson v. Indiana, which holds that mentally incompetent individuals cannot be held under less stringent standards than those required for release. The majority's reliance on Jackson and other cases is challenged, particularly regarding the distinction between pretrial detention awaiting restorative treatment and civil commitment for competency restoration. Madsen argues that a speedy trial right is implicated when a defendant's trial is delayed due to waiting for competency restoration services, and criticizes the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in this context. He asserts that the issues in Jackson differ from those of pretrial detention, which does not involve civil commitment but rather the timing of treatment for competency restoration.

Due process is not engaged for individuals detained pending restorative treatment unless a statutory right exists. The legislature has set performance targets for timely competency evaluations and inpatient service admissions, acknowledging that achieving these targets may compromise evaluation quality. The statute does not impose a duty on Western State Hospital (WSH) or provide defendants with remedies for prolonged detention. Without a fundamental right at stake, substantive due process is not implicated. However, both the Sixth Amendment and the Washington State Constitution guarantee the right to a speedy trial, evaluated using the Barker v. Wingo test, which considers delay length, reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of rights, and any resulting prejudice. CrR 3.3 mandates that defendants in jail must be tried within 60 days, exempting time for competency restoration. However, time cannot be exempted under CrR 3.3(e)(1) if WSH fails to admit a defendant within seven days of the court order. The law does not classify pretrial detention awaiting state hospital admission as a proceeding under former RCW 10.77.068, thus it cannot be exempt from the speedy trial calculation. Delays due to administrative issues, such as a 76-day wait for treatment, do not serve the interests of justice. If timely admission is not feasible, the State may dismiss cases without prejudice to avoid violating speedy trial rights. Delays in state services can occur, as seen with backlogged toxicology reports, prompting prosecutors to dismiss actions to protect these rights.

The State is held accountable for competency proceedings, providing relief for defendants awaiting restorative treatment in understaffed institutions. The speedy trial analysis under the Barker test applies to pretrial detention for defendants awaiting such treatment. The 60-day trial period per CrR 3.3(b)(1) has lapsed, considering the time spent waiting for restorative services exceeds the former RCW 10.77.068's seven-day guideline, indicating a violation of Hand's speedy trial rights. However, since Hand did not assert a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, the analysis concludes here. There is a distinction between pretrial detention and pretrial competency restoration commitment, which involves different constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment's speedy trial clause, rather than substantive due process, governs pretrial detention issues, and since Hand did not argue a violation of his speedy trial rights, his conviction should be upheld.