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State of Iowa v. Richard Ryan Lamb Carson
Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-1035
Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; November 6, 2018; Iowa; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Richard Ryan Lamb Carson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and is appealing his conviction and sentencing. He contends that prosecutorial errors during closing arguments denied him a fair trial and claims ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to object to certain prosecutorial questions. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the prosecutor’s comments did not prejudice Carson’s case, and the denial of his mistrial motion was not an abuse of discretion. The court preserved the ineffective assistance claim for potential postconviction relief. The background facts indicate that on January 23, 2015, Carson and his girlfriend were at the home of Chris Elben and Lynn Sutton, where Carson allegedly assaulted someone before leaving with Elben. Later, two men, Noe Flores and Erick Reyna, were found dead in a Honda, shot by Carson, who admitted to the shootings but asserted self-defense. He claimed he was attacked first when he approached the vehicle, prompting him to fire in response. Evidence included the discovery of the gun used in the shootings and Carson’s actions following the incident, such as disposing of clothing and washing the weapon. Carson fired multiple shots at a driver reaching for a revolver, resulting in the driver convulsing, dropping the firearm, and slumping over the steering wheel. Following the incident, Carson, feeling scared and shaken, wiped the gun and placed it back in the car, where he also found a large automatic pistol and magazine in the passenger's lap. He later told a person named Elben that he shot individuals who attempted to kill him, but the vehicle involved had disappeared by the time they went outside. After a jury trial from May 1 to May 4, 2017, Carson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, leading to two consecutive life sentences. He is appealing the verdict. In the appeal, Carson claims he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial errors. He argues that the prosecution, while having the duty to vigorously pursue the case, also must ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial. For a successful claim of prosecutorial error, a defendant must demonstrate both the occurrence of error or misconduct and resulting prejudice. Carson identifies three prosecutorial missteps during closing arguments: implying he was dishonest, questioning his invocation of the right to an attorney, and mentioning 'insanity.' Although prosecutors can analyze evidence during closing arguments, they are prohibited from expressing personal beliefs. Carson objected to comments that he argues improperly suggested he was a liar or misled the jury regarding his competency, a topic first raised during cross-examination when Carson struggled with responses. Tracy Johnson was identified as the girlfriend of the witness, who lived part-time with his mother while occasionally staying at Johnson's house. He had shared custody of his son, Colton, who was around fifteen years old and had begun to have conflicts with his mother. The witness had 49% custody, with the mother holding 51%, but this changed as Colton turned eighteen. The witness confirmed his competency to stand trial, although he initially struggled to answer questions directly, prompting the court to admonish him to respond succinctly. His defense counsel noted that he had difficulty communicating in the courtroom context but requested the jury consider this when evaluating his testimony. The prosecutor sought to clarify that the jury needed to understand that the insanity defense must be affirmatively raised by the defense to be considered. The court acknowledged the prosecutor's comments as part of the record, deeming her reference to "insanity" unfortunate but not significantly impactful. In closing arguments, the prosecutor questioned the credibility of the witness's testimony, implying that if he was not truthful, his claim of self-defense could be disregarded. The prosecutor emphasized that self-defense should only be claimed if it is genuine, arguing that if the jury found the witness untruthful, they were not obligated to accept his defense. Carson contended that this suggestion unfairly implied he had fabricated his account of the events. Carson's account of events significantly contradicts those of several witnesses, including Tracy Johnson, Victoria Byers, Officer Michael Cody Smith, and Machelle and Bernard Critz. The State contends that the prosecutor's remarks aimed to guide the jury in evaluating the differing narratives and determining credibility. The prosecutor emphasized Carson’s actions after the shooting, highlighting his failure to report the incident to police and his decision to hide the car on a property he was connected to, suggesting that such behavior undermines his claim of self-defense. Carson objected to these statements, but the court overruled the objection while cautioning the prosecutor. During closing arguments, the prosecutor questioned Carson’s credibility, noting that he initially misled police about the events surrounding the shooting, claiming he was merely "testing the cops." The prosecutor asserted that Carson’s admission of untruthfulness was relevant for the jury's consideration. The court ruled that the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute inflammatory remarks about Carson’s credibility, which would violate Iowa appellate standards. Additionally, the prosecutor addressed discrepancies in Carson's testimony about his police interview, implying that Carson was evasive when questioned about his self-defense claim. Carson acknowledged that he ended the police interview himself, after asserting he wanted a lawyer. The dialogue highlighted inconsistencies in Carson's narrative regarding the events of the shooting and his interactions with law enforcement. The prosecutor justified her comments during closing arguments regarding the defendant's police interview, asserting that the defendant voluntarily ended the conversation when questioned about inconsistencies in his story. The prosecutor clarified that she did not reference the defendant's request for a lawyer but noted that his cessation of questioning was part of the evidence. The court concurred, stating that the defendant's decision to stop talking was consistent with his behavior during the interview and was accurately reflected in the record. The prosecutor further argued that the jury's role was to discern the truth, emphasizing the lack of necessity for the State to explain the defendant's actions. Carson contended that these remarks improperly suggested he was a murderer and a liar, amounting to prosecutorial error that warranted a new trial. However, the determination of prosecutorial error must also consider whether Carson suffered prejudice from these comments. The analysis of potential prejudice includes evaluating the severity and impact of the misconduct, its relevance to the case's central issues, the strength of the State's evidence, any curative instructions provided, and whether the defense provoked the misconduct. Trial courts hold broad discretion in assessing the presence of prejudice, given their firsthand observation of the trial proceedings. Carson contends that the errors in the trial were severe and pervasive, starting during his cross-examination and continuing through the prosecutor's closing argument. He emphasizes that closing arguments are not evidence, as confirmed by jury instructions. The court had instructed the jury that statements made by attorneys during various phases, including closing arguments, should not be considered evidence. Jury instruction number five clarified what constituted evidence and explicitly excluded attorney statements and arguments. The prosecutor's comments, while critiquing Carson's credibility, were minor in the context of the overall argument and were not solely focused on his truthfulness. For instance, remarks about Carson "spinning a tale" pertained to his police interview, where he admitted to withholding information. The central issue of the case, self-defense, hinges on the jury's perception of Carson's credibility. Carson argues this makes any comments on his truthfulness particularly significant. The strength of the State's case is also a critical factor in assessing prejudice. Carson asserts that the State's evidence is weak, given the absence of eyewitness accounts and the lack of gunshot residue on him, which he claims does not contradict his self-defense assertion. In contrast, previous case law indicated that a strong State case diminishes the likelihood of jury bias. Carson admitted to shooting two individuals in self-defense, claiming he acted after one fired at him and the other reached for a weapon. Carson claims the gun used in the killings belonged to others and that three guns were present in a Honda; however, law enforcement found no guns in the vehicle. Instead, they discovered the murder weapon in a storm drain near Johnson’s apartment, with Johnson testifying that Carson had previously possessed this gun. Carson is unsure how the Honda was relocated from the Elben/Sutton residence to his ex-mother-in-law's property. Johnson recounted picking up Elben and Carson after receiving a call from Elben regarding car trouble, as confirmed by Bernard and Machelle Critz, who testified about Elben's phone call for a ride. Johnson also stated that after picking up the men, they went to Carson’s mother’s home where they cleaned themselves and the gun with bleach and disposed of their clothing in a trash bag. This evidence strengthens the State’s case. Carson contends that the district court did not provide adequate curative measures regarding jury instructions after defense counsel's request. The court decided that any instruction could unduly emphasize non-evidential matters to the jury. Carson argues that his defense did not invite error, as his counsel did not comment on his truthfulness. Although the defense did not explicitly address Carson's credibility, the central issue was the plausibility of his narrative, which was contradicted by multiple witnesses, implying deception. Even if the prosecutor's comments were erroneous, Carson has not shown he was prejudiced by them, as the strength of the State's case is significant. The alleged errors were limited to closing arguments, and the district court's jury instructions mitigated potential prejudice by clarifying that such arguments are not evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial motion. Carson also claims ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the prosecutor's questions about competency and the police interview's termination. The court preserves this issue for potential postconviction relief, allowing for a full evidentiary hearing and counsel's response to these allegations. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision, concluding that Carson was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments and preserving the ineffective assistance claim for future consideration. Judge Vaitheswaran concurring specially emphasizes that the prosecutor’s role is to seek justice rather than merely obtain a conviction, as established in *State v. Graves*. He highlights that prosecutors must avoid making inflammatory or prejudicial remarks about defendants, noting that disparaging comments can unduly influence a jury. Specifically, he criticizes a statement made by the State during rebuttal which implied distrust in a defendant's honesty by labeling him a “murderer.” The judge argues that if referring to a victim is deemed improper, then similarly referring to a defendant as a murderer should also be considered inappropriate. He cites several examples of comments made by the State that he believes violated established legal standards, indicating that these remarks strayed from discussing the evidence and instead resorted to inflammatory characterizations of the defendant. Despite acknowledging the improper nature of these comments, he notes that the defendant, Carson, must demonstrate prejudice resulting from them. He concludes that, although the State's comments were inappropriate and the defendant's credibility was essential to his self-defense claim, the overwhelming strength of the evidence against Carson ultimately justified denying his request for a new trial.