Stephen G. Endicott, Administrator v. City of Oak Hill

Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-0765

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; November 2, 2018; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

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Stephen G. Endicott, as Administrator of the Estate of P.E., appeals a July 10, 2017, summary judgment from the Circuit Court of Fayette County in favor of the City of Oak Hill, the Oak Hill Police Department, and Patrolman Joshua Jones. P.E., a 14-year-old, died in a single-vehicle accident on January 31, 2015, after being socialized with friends at "Granny's house." A friend, J.B., stole his grandmother's car and drove with P.E. and others to a junkyard for reckless driving. After being stopped by Officer Jones for a defective headlight, J.B. received a citation, and Officer Jones advised the boys to remain at Granny's house. Despite this, J.B. and P.E. later attempted to return the car, leading to a police chase initiated by Officer Jones upon spotting them again. The appeal was considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which found no substantial legal questions or prejudicial errors, thus affirming the circuit court’s decision under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

About 300 to 400 yards beyond the Custard Stand, J.B. lost control of his vehicle on a cold road, potentially icy with snow remnants. His car struck a guardrail, which then caused severe injury to P.E., resulting in his death. Officer Jones, who did not witness the wreck, later found J.B. at the scene, where J.B. admitted to running from the police and implied responsibility for P.E.'s death. The petitioner filed a civil complaint against the respondents, alleging Officer Jones acted with reckless disregard during a vehicle pursuit, leading to the accident and P.E.'s death. The circuit court set a discovery deadline of May 5, 2017, after which the respondents filed for summary judgment. Following a hearing on June 22, 2017, the court granted the motion on July 10, 2017, concluding that the case was governed by Syllabus Point 5 of *Peak v. Ratliff*, which states that police officers are liable for third-party injuries during pursuits only if their conduct amounts to gross negligence or recklessness and is a substantial factor in causing the collision. The court found no evidence of Officer Jones's gross negligence or that his actions contributed to the wreck or P.E.'s death, attributing responsibility to J.B.'s actions while evading arrest. The petitioner is now appealing the summary judgment, which will be reviewed de novo, following the criteria that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A motion for summary judgment is warranted when no genuine issue of material fact exists and further inquiry is unnecessary for legal clarity. The petitioner argues that the circuit court incorrectly granted summary judgment, asserting that West Virginia Code § 17C-2-5 provides police officers immunity in emergency pursuits, contingent on driving with due regard for safety and not exhibiting reckless disregard. The petitioner claims disputes exist regarding Officer Jones's conduct during a pursuit, suggesting it may have amounted to reckless behavior. However, the circuit court found no evidence to support such a claim, adhering to the precedent established in Peak v. Ratliff, which states that liability arises only if an officer's conduct during a pursuit is characterized as reckless or grossly negligent.

The court concluded that the pursuit by Officer Jones was brief, occurring on a straight road at 2:50 a.m. with minimal traffic and clear weather. Evidence indicated that Officer Jones was significantly behind the pursued vehicle, J.B., at the time of the crash, and that the wreck may have occurred before any active pursuit began. Therefore, there were no genuine factual disputes regarding Officer Jones's alleged reckless conduct or gross negligence, and further factual inquiry was deemed unnecessary for applying the law correctly.

The circuit court granted summary judgment to the respondents, concluding that J.B.’s actions were the direct cause of P.E.’s death. The petitioner contended that the court erred in finding that J.B.’s actions alone severed the respondents’ liability, arguing that Officer Jones’s failure to ensure P.E.’s safety after the first traffic stop initiated a causal chain leading to J.B.’s flight and subsequent actions. The petitioner asserted that whether J.B.'s actions constituted a substantial intervening cause should be determined by a jury. Under West Virginia law, issues of negligence and causation are generally for a jury when evidence is conflicting or when undisputed facts allow for different reasonable conclusions. However, for a jury to consider the case, the petitioner must demonstrate that the officer's reckless conduct was a substantial factor in causing the collision. The court determined that the petitioner failed to present evidence of the respondents’ gross negligence or breach of duty. Additionally, despite the possibility that a jury could find Officer Jones’s actions grossly negligent, there was insufficient evidence to establish that his conduct was a substantial cause of P.E.’s death. J.B. admitted that he fled from Officer Jones due to fear and his own carelessness led to the crash. The court found no error in concluding that J.B.’s actions caused P.E.'s death. Lastly, the petitioner argued that the court abused its discretion by denying a continuance for additional discovery time, highlighting that both parties requested more time due to un-deposed witnesses. However, the respondents pointed out that the petitioner had ample time, having filed the case 15 months prior to the discovery deadline.

The circuit court's September 2016 scheduling order allowed seven months for discovery. The trial court has broad discretion regarding the granting or denial of continuances, which appellate courts typically will not review unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. This analysis must consider the specific circumstances of each case, particularly the reasons presented for the request. The petitioner argued on appeal that he was unable to depose Officer Jones due to scheduling conflicts, which he claims were not intentional. However, he did not seek the court's assistance until after the discovery deadline had passed. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance.

Additionally, the petitioner argued for sanctions against respondents for discovery violations after learning that Officer Jones's mother was present at the scene of an incident. Although the petitioner had drafted a motion for sanctions and served it before a hearing, he abandoned this motion during the hearing when it became apparent that the court would grant summary judgment for the respondents. The court acknowledged the motion but noted that the discovery cutoff had already passed and did not rule on it.

Finally, the petitioner contended that the "special relationship" exception to the "public duty" doctrine applied, arguing that the respondents had a special duty to P.E. due to Officer Jones's actions in citing J.B. and subsequently leaving the minors without adult supervision. The public duty doctrine generally grants immunity to political subdivisions from liability concerning police or fire protection failures, as outlined in West Virginia Code. The special relationship exception, established in previous case law, requires specific factors to determine the existence of such a duty.

Petitioner argued for a special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine before the circuit court, which did not address this argument in its summary judgment order. The Supreme Court of Appeals adheres to the principle that it will not consider issues not ruled upon by the circuit court, as established in prior cases. In this instance, the circuit court also did not rule on the petitioner’s motion for discovery sanctions or discuss public duty immunity, leading the Supreme Court to decline addressing these points and affirm the circuit court's summary judgment order dated July 10, 2017.

Chief Justice Workman, dissenting with Justice Farrell, contended that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment without adequate discovery. She emphasized that the case hinges on factually driven aspects of statutory immunity, highlighting specific provisions of West Virginia law regarding the immunity of political subdivision employees and the responsibilities of emergency vehicle operators. Each statutory standard necessitates factual determinations related to negligence and conduct, which were not sufficiently developed in the case.

Petitioner claims against respondents involve allegations of negligence and recklessness, which are deemed inappropriate for summary judgment due to their factual nature. The court emphasizes that issues such as negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause should be resolved by a jury when evidence is conflicting or when reasonable interpretations vary. The necessary factual basis for addressing immunity claims was insufficiently developed prior to the summary judgment. A joint motion to continue was filed by both parties, acknowledging the need for additional discovery, including depositions and expert witness reports. Notably, Brenda Jones, the first person at the accident scene, was not disclosed by respondents until after a deposition revealed her existence. Likewise, Patrolman Jones, crucial to the case, has not been deposed, hindering the ability to assess the facts surrounding the incident. The court referenced the necessity of determining whether the officer's actions constituted reckless conduct or gross negligence, as established in prior cases. Ultimately, actionable negligence must be proven as the proximate cause of the injury, necessitating thorough factual development before any resolution through summary judgment can be appropriately reached.

In Beckley v. Crabtree, the West Virginia Supreme Court clarified the employee immunity statute, specifically West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b), which protects employees of political subdivisions from personal tort liability unless their actions are outside the scope of their employment, or are malicious, in bad faith, or reckless. This principle was further explored in Smith v. Burdette, where the court ruled that determining whether an officer acted negligently was a factual issue that precluded summary judgment against the city. Similarly, in Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, the court held that questions of material fact regarding police conduct and the scope of employment also barred summary judgment. In Kelley v. City of Williamson, the court reiterated that if a jury finds an officer acted negligently within their employment scope, the city would be liable for that negligence. The current case reveals genuine issues of material fact regarding Officer Barnes' conduct that must be resolved by a jury to determine if the city holds immunity or if Officer Barnes is liable for his actions under the relevant statutes.

The Court reverses the lower court's summary judgment and remands the case for further proceedings, citing the need for factual determination regarding the reasonableness of police actions. In previous cases, such as Kelley and Baker v. Chaplin, it was established that determinations of qualified immunity are fact-dependent and may require jury evaluation if relevant facts are in dispute. The Court highlighted that in Sergent v. City of Charleston, adequate factual development through discovery was crucial for summary judgment, which led to affirmation of the circuit court’s order. 

In the current case, the officers’ pursuit of suspects, who were armed drug dealers, was deemed not negligent, wanton, or reckless based on specific circumstances: the pursuit lasted about 2.5 to 3 minutes over 2.7 miles, occurred in good daylight and weather conditions, and the suspects were driving below the speed limit. However, unlike Sergent, the parties acknowledged the necessity for additional discovery, specifically the need for depositions from Patrolman Jones and his mother, who had firsthand knowledge of the events. The circuit court's denial of the joint motion to continue and its decision to grant summary judgment without this testimony was deemed inappropriate and indefensible, leading to a respectful dissent.