Hendrickson v. Moses Lake Sch. Dist.

Citation: 428 P.3d 1197Docket: 94898-4

Court: Washington Supreme Court; November 1, 2018; Washington; State Supreme Court

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Filed on November 1, 2018, Chief Justice Susan L. Carlson addressed the case of Heidi Jo Hendrickson, a single individual, against the Moses Lake School District (the District). Hendrickson sought damages for injuries sustained while using a radial table saw in a high school woodshop class. While the jury found the District negligent, it determined that such negligence was not a proximate cause of Hendrickson's injuries. Hendrickson appealed, contending that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the District owed her an ordinary duty of care rather than a heightened duty of care.

The Court of Appeals sided with Hendrickson, reversing the trial court's decision and ordering a new trial. However, the Supreme Court clarified that school districts are only required to meet an ordinary duty of care, thus reversing the Court of Appeals' ruling on this point. Conversely, Hendrickson argued against the District's ability to claim contributory negligence. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' conclusion that contributory negligence was applicable, leading to the reinstatement of the jury's original verdict.

The factual background reveals that Hendrickson, a freshman, injured her thumb while using the table saw after attempting to dislodge a stuck board without using a push stick. During the incident, the supervising teacher, Kevin Chestnut, was not in the immediate area. Chestnut had trained Hendrickson and other students on safe saw operation and had removed certain safety devices from the saw. Hendrickson's lawsuit claimed vicarious liability against the District for Chestnut's negligence in training, supervision, and maintenance of the saw. The trial included debates over jury instructions, notably Hendrickson's proposed instruction asserting a heightened duty of care, which the court declined to adopt in favor of the ordinary care standard instead.

Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise ordinary care, which includes actions a reasonably careful person would not take or the omission of actions a reasonably careful person would take under similar circumstances. Hendrickson challenged the trial court's refusal to give Proposed Instruction No. 7 and objected to the instruction on contributory negligence. At trial, Moses Lake contended that Hendrickson's negligence, specifically her failure to use a push stick and to turn off the saw after it became stuck, caused her injuries. The jury found Moses Lake negligent but determined that its negligence did not proximately cause Hendrickson's injuries, leading to her appeal.

The Court of Appeals partially affirmed and reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the court erred by not providing an instruction on Moses Lake's enhanced duty of care, but found no error in instructing the jury on contributory negligence. Both parties appealed this decision, prompting a review.

The reviewing court reversed the Court of Appeals' conclusion regarding the heightened duty of care, clarifying that a school district is held to a standard of ordinary care, not heightened care, thus validating the trial court's refusal to give the erroneous instruction. Conversely, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that there was no error in the contributory negligence instruction, as comparative negligence is the default rule. The court reaffirmed that school districts must exercise ordinary, reasonable care to protect students from foreseeable harm, grounding this duty in established case law.

Intervening acts by third parties do not automatically relieve a school district from liability for harm if such harm is "reasonably foreseeable." A school district may be liable if it fails to take reasonable precautions against foreseeable risks, even when these risks are caused by third parties. The determination of liability hinges on whether the harm falls within a "general field of danger" that should have been anticipated. School districts bear an "enhanced" duty of care to protect students from foreseeable harm, as established in case law, but this duty does not exceed the standard of ordinary, reasonable care. 

Sections 314 and 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts delineate the duty of care based on the nature of the relationship between parties. Section 314 outlines that parties without a special relationship are not obligated to take action to prevent harm unless they control the harm-causing object. In contrast, Section 314A specifies that parties with a custodial relationship, such as school districts with students, have a duty to protect against unreasonable risks of physical harm, including those posed by third parties. Despite this special duty, the standard of care remains one of reasonable care, and liability does not arise if the party was unaware of the unreasonable risk.

School districts must operate within a broader "pool of risk," requiring them to take affirmative actions to safeguard students. They are obliged to anticipate and mitigate dangers that can be reasonably foreseen. Hendrickson contended that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the school district's heightened duty of care. However, her proposed instruction lacked clarity regarding the term "heightened," and the court is not required to provide legally erroneous instructions.

A trial court is not obligated to provide jury instructions that are legally erroneous, as established in Vogel v. Alaska S.S. Co. and reaffirmed in Griffin v. W. RS, Inc. In the case at hand, Proposed Instruction No. 7 was deemed legally erroneous since it proposed a "heightened" duty of care for the school district, contradicting the standard of ordinary care owed to students. The standard requires schools to protect students from foreseeable harm, but not beyond that. The inclusion of "foreseeable" in Instruction No. 7 did not rectify its erroneous nature, as it was tied to the incorrect heightened duty claim. Hendrickson's argument for a foreseeability instruction was insufficiently supported, as the only mention of foreseeability came with the flawed Proposed Instruction No. 7. There were no extensive discussions regarding foreseeability that would preserve her objection for review, thus the trial judge did not err in refusing this instruction. Regarding Instruction No. 12, which outlined the ordinary duty of care, it was ruled appropriate as it did not mislead the jury and adequately conveyed the applicable law, allowing counsel to argue their case effectively.

Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. establishes that jury instructions containing erroneous legal statements that prejudice a party warrant reversal. Prejudice is presumed for clear misstatements of law, while misleading instructions require demonstration of actual prejudice. In this case, the school district had a duty of ordinary care towards Hendrickson, defined as the care a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. Instruction No. 12 accurately described this duty and did not contain a clear misstatement of the law, thus not presumed prejudicial. The court evaluated whether the instruction hindered Hendrickson's ability to present her negligence theories, which included failures by Moses Lake to maintain safety equipment, provide adequate instruction, and supervise her use of a table saw. To succeed, Hendrickson needed to show Moses Lake did not exercise ordinary care. The court noted that the existence of a duty was undisputed, focusing instead on whether that duty was ordinary or heightened. The dispute centered on whether Moses Lake met its duty, not on foreseeability, which was accepted by both parties. Evidence indicated that while Mr. Chestnut provided some care, it was insufficient for safe table saw operation.

Neither party contested the foreseeability of the harm suffered by Hendrickson, making an instruction on foreseeability unnecessary. Instruction No. 12 was deemed accurate regarding the duty of ordinary care, allowing Hendrickson to present her negligence claims against the District. The District's potential use of contributory negligence as a defense was debated, but the court did not examine the necessity of foreseeability instructions in other cases. The jury found Moses Lake negligent, but the special verdict did not clarify which theory of negligence was used. The Court of Appeals suggested potential prejudice due to a lack of proper instruction on the duty of care, but this was insufficient to overturn the jury's verdict. Instruction No. 12 did not mislead the jury, accurately defining ordinary care and guiding the jury's assessment of negligence. The trial court's decision to reject Hendrickson's proposed heightened duty of care instruction was upheld as it was misleading. The trial court did not err in providing Instruction No. 12 or in instructing the jury on contributory negligence, leading to a reversal of the Court of Appeals' findings on these issues.

A defendant can assert an affirmative defense of contributory fault against a plaintiff, as outlined in RCW 4.22.005. The "Tort Reform Act of 1986" mandates that the trier of fact allocate fault among all entities responsible for the claimant's damages, excluding those immune under Title 51 RCW. The total fault must equal one hundred percent, and the plaintiff can be assigned a portion of this fault. If a jury finds that the plaintiff contributed to their own damages through negligence, the court will reduce the compensatory damages proportionately, though this does not bar recovery.

Certain exceptions exist where contributory fault cannot be applied. Specifically, it has been determined that a school district cannot claim contributory negligence for cases of sexual abuse by teachers, as children do not have a duty to protect themselves in such situations. Similarly, prisons cannot use contributory negligence as a defense in inmate suicides, as this would undermine their duty of care. While Hendrickson argues against the applicability of contributory negligence in school district negligence cases, this has not been universally established. Courts have recognized the right of school districts to assert contributory negligence, particularly for children over the age of six. Unlike cases involving sexual abuse or inmate suicide, Hendrickson is legally capable of consenting to the use of a dangerous tool, thus distinguishing her situation from the established exceptions.

Hendrickson's case differs from Gregoire in that she was not involved in intentional self-harm, meaning contributory fault does not shield the district from liability. Hendrickson failed to provide context-specific reasons against applying contributory negligence, instead claiming that a special relationship with Moses Lake should prevent its application. This argument was rejected, as no state has ruled out contributory negligence in school district negligence cases, and there is no supporting case law or precedent in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court declined to establish a new rule against contributory negligence. The conclusion reverses part of the Court of Appeals' decision while affirming the trial court's actions, including the rejection of Proposed Instruction No. 7 for being misleading, the appropriateness of Instruction No. 12, and the jury's instruction on contributory negligence. The jury's verdict is reinstated.