Edmund Zagorski v. Tony Mays

Citation: 907 F.3d 901Docket: 18-6052

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; October 29, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

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Edmund Zagorski, a Tennessee capital prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) concerning his impending execution. He argues that a recent Supreme Court decision and the merits of three previously procedurally defaulted constitutional claims necessitate equitable relief. Zagorski was convicted of two first-degree murders in 1984, with his conviction and death sentence affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. After exhausting state post-conviction remedies, he sought federal habeas corpus relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, and unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty due to a prior plea offer. The district court found these claims procedurally defaulted, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit and later denied review by the Supreme Court.

In 2012, the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan allowed claims of ineffective assistance at initial-review collateral proceedings to excuse procedural defaults. Zagorski filed for post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b)(6), arguing that Martinez and Edwards v. Carpenter justified his case's reconsideration. The district court denied his motion but issued a certificate of appealability. Zagorski sought a stay of execution while his appeal was pending; the district court denied this request, but a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit granted it. Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated the stay, but a reprieve from execution allowed the Sixth Circuit to address the merits of Zagorski's appeal. The court affirmed the district court's denial, giving deference to its discretion in balancing the equities involved.

The “catchall” provision in Rule 60(b)(6) grants courts significant equitable power to vacate judgments for substantial justice in unusual situations, as established in Stokes v. Williams. Courts must balance factors such as the finality of judgments and the pursuit of justice. The focus is not on whether extraordinary circumstances exist but on whether the district court abused its discretion in its decision. Zagorski argues that the district court wrongly denied his Rule 60(b)(6) motion by not considering three claims from his habeas petition: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate other suspects, incorrect jury instructions on mitigating circumstances, and an alleged violation of his capital sentence rights due to plea negotiations. The district court found these claims procedurally defaulted. Zagorski contends that the combination of Martinez and Edwards overcomes these defaults, asserting the case involves significant constitutional claims that merit Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

Regarding his ineffective assistance claim, Zagorski cites Martinez, which provides a narrow exception to the procedural default rule but does not alter constitutional rights or establish grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief based solely on changes in law. The district court correctly dismissed this factor. Zagorski's arguments concerning the Lockett and Jackson claims were also denied, as his new claims of ineffective assistance regarding jury instructions and death sentence imposition were procedurally defaulted. To excuse this default, he references Edwards, which requires demonstrating cause and prejudice for state-court defaults before considering federal claims.

Zagorski contends that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, as established in Martinez, provides sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This argument aims to overcome procedural bars on his original Lockett and Jackson claims in his habeas petition. The district court noted that allowing such a dual-layer cause to bypass procedural default would undermine Coleman’s procedural default protections, which prioritize state courts' opportunities to rectify constitutional violations. Zagorski’s interpretation is seen as undermining federalism principles, allowing petitioners to revive defaulted claims by simply invoking ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

The court emphasizes that it cannot interpret Martinez as an exception that invalidates established procedural rules. Even under a broad interpretation of Martinez, a Rule 60(b) motion that seeks to add new grounds for relief must be treated as a successive habeas petition. Zagorski's attempt to introduce ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims effectively presents new constitutional bases for relief, necessitating the court’s authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The court does not address the merits of these claims but notes that Zagorski must demonstrate that each new claim is based on a Supreme Court decision that retroactively establishes a new constitutional rule. The dissent's interpretation that Zagorski's argument poses a procedural issue rather than a substantive claim is rejected, as it is tied to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Additionally, Zagorski argues that his capital sentence and the merits of his claims present extraordinary circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, which the court finds unpersuasive.

In capital cases, profound respect must be given to the finality of previous decisions denying habeas relief, as emphasized in Miller v. 879 F.3d at 700–01. The irreversible nature of execution and the Supreme Court's views on finality in life-or-liberty cases are acknowledged, yet it is clarified that impending capital punishment does not automatically warrant Rule 60(b) relief. The merits of Zagorski's defaulted claims do not justify such an extraordinary remedy, consistent with Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535–36, which indicates that habeas cases seldom present circumstances for exercising equitable authority under Rule 60(b)(6). The court does not find it necessary to consider the merits of Zagorski’s constitutional claims in assessing whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Concerns are raised that allowing claims to bypass habeas jurisdictional bars through Rule 60(b)(6) motions could lead to an influx of frivolous post-judgment motions.

To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Zagorski must demonstrate that his counsel's failure to investigate other suspects constituted deficient performance resulting in prejudice, as established in Strickland v. Washington. The court notes that Zagorski has not met this burden because his own statements implicated him in the murders and he failed to name other suspects. Given the significant evidence against him, a more thorough investigation of another suspect would unlikely have changed the trial's outcome. Additionally, Zagorski's Lockett claim requires assessing whether the allegedly unconstitutional jury instruction tainted the trial to the extent that it violated due process, with a juror not being barred from considering any mitigating factors related to the defendant’s character or circumstances of the offense, per Lockett v. Ohio.

No violation was found by the district court regarding the definition of mitigating circumstances during the trial. The trial court informed the jury they could consider all evidence presented throughout the case, despite some mitigating circumstances having no specific relevance. Zagorski challenged the trial court's guidance to the jury about mitigating evidence, asserting that all evidence he presented in his habeas petition had already been considered during the guilt phase. Additionally, Zagorski's claim, citing United States v. Jackson, contended that offering plea deals for lesser sentences while imposing the death penalty after a trial violated his rights. However, the Jackson case invalidated a specific sentencing provision but did not prohibit plea bargains in capital cases, which are supported by Supreme Court precedent encouraging such negotiations. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding it did not abuse its discretion in denying Zagorski’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6), which requires exceptional circumstances for relief. The dissenting opinion argued that the combination of new legal standards, a valid constitutional claim, and the finality of capital punishment warranted consideration for relief, claiming the district court failed to adequately evaluate these factors.

Zagorski asserts two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. First, he alleges that the trial court incorrectly defined "mitigating evidence," violating the Eighth Amendment and Lockett v. Ohio, which prevented proper consideration of mitigating circumstances. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this violation. Second, he claims trial counsel inadequately demonstrated Jimmy Blackwell’s involvement in the murders, which could have supported reasonable doubt during the guilt phase or residual doubt at sentencing. Although Zagorski acknowledges these claims were procedurally defaulted, he argues that ineffective assistance of counsel in preserving these claims for state court review can serve as "cause" to excuse the default, as established in Edwards v. Carpenter and Martinez. He posits that the failure of post-conviction counsel to identify trial counsel's errors offers justification for the procedural default of his ineffective assistance claims. The court agrees with Zagorski, noting that his claims fit within the Martinez exception, which allows for establishing cause due to ineffective assistance of counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings. The court emphasizes that failure to object to constitutional violations can qualify as ineffective assistance under Strickland. The ruling references Coleman v. Thompson, which generally states that attorney mistakes in collateral proceedings do not excuse procedural defaults, but Martinez carved out an exception for claims of ineffective assistance at trial. This exception is crucial, as it addresses concerns over ineffective trial counsel failing to preserve claims for appeal or federal habeas review, which is the situation Zagorski finds himself in.

The majority contends that allowing a two-layer cause analysis to excuse the procedural default of a constitutional claim would undermine Coleman’s procedural default bar. Zagorski's case would require the court to analyze two layers of cause for procedural default, which the Supreme Court in Edwards anticipated. Justice Scalia indicated that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could serve as cause for defaulting another constitutional claim, provided it is presented as an independent claim in state courts first. If a defendant can meet the cause-and-prejudice standard regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the procedural default may be excused. However, the burden remains on the defendant to demonstrate Strickland's deficiency and prejudice requirements, as well as the substantiality requirement from Martinez, before relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is granted. The Third Circuit allows for review of merits after a defendant has successfully navigated procedural hurdles, applicable here under a Rule 60(b)(6) context.

Zagorski's claims focus on lifting procedural bars to his Lockett claim by demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel that led to the default. Martinez establishes that a claim of ineffective trial counsel can be excused if the petitioner shows ineffective post-conviction counsel and that the underlying claim has substantial merit. Zagorski provided evidence that his post-conviction counsel failed to recognize the need to object to a faulty jury instruction, constituting ineffective assistance under Strickland. This failure, devoid of strategic reasoning, suggests negligence rather than sound legal strategy. Zagorski's claim meets the substantiality threshold set by Martinez, as there is merit to the assertion that trial counsel's failure to object to the unconstitutional jury instruction constituted deficient performance, exemplified by the attorney's ignorance of fundamental law and lack of basic legal research.

Zagorski's prejudice claim holds merit due to potential juror bias stemming from a lack of appropriate mitigation instruction, which excluded consideration of the victims' characteristics as armed drug dealers. This omission could have influenced jurors' perceptions of the crime's circumstances, contrary to the constitutional requirement for individualized consideration of mitigating factors in capital cases. The absence of such consideration risks unjustly imposing the death penalty despite evidence suggesting a lesser penalty might be warranted. Additionally, Zagorski asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's failure to present evidence of another suspect, which the Tennessee Supreme Court recognizes as a valid nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. If this evidence, along with a proper jury instruction, had been provided, it is likely that at least one juror would have voted against the death penalty.

The court must evaluate extraordinary circumstances, considering factors like the risk of injustice and public confidence in the judicial process. The district court erred by dismissing Zagorski's proposed factors without adequate analysis. A death sentence itself is a compelling factor favoring relief under Rule 60(b)(6), especially when juxtaposed with the irreversible nature of execution. Previous rulings emphasize the necessity of balancing the finality of judgments against the severity of capital punishment. The combination of a shift in decisional law, the imposition of a death sentence, and a substantial Martinez claim presents extraordinary circumstances justifying the granting of Zagorski's motion for relief. The recommendation is to reverse the district court's decision and grant the motion.