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United States v. Eric Gonzalez
Citation: 906 F.3d 784Docket: 15-50483
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 10, 2018; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of Eric Gonzalez, Fernando Luviano, and Sussie Ayala for conspiracy to deprive Gabriel Carrillo of his civil rights, violating those rights, and falsifying reports to obstruct an investigation, stemming from Carrillo's beating by law enforcement while handcuffed. The panel found sufficient evidence supporting the conspiracy convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 241, emphasizing that even if the evidence for the excessive force claim was insufficient, there was ample evidence for the due process violation related to falsified evidence. The panel upheld the substantive convictions for willfully depriving Carrillo of his rights based on Pinkerton liability and dismissed challenges regarding the sufficiency of evidence for the 18 U.S.C. § 1519 convictions, clarifying that the statute applies to both the alteration of existing documents and the creation of false documents. The court rejected the defendants’ claims of juror bias, stating the record did not demonstrate any bias, and concluded that the district court did not err by omitting a proximate-cause requirement in its jury instruction related to bodily injury. Lastly, the panel found no prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments and determined Ayala's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Counsel Timothy Allen Scott and Nicolas O. Jimenez represent Defendant-Appellant Eric Gonzalez; Katherine Kimball Windsor represents Defendant-Appellant Fernando Luviano; and Jonathan I. Edelstein and Alan Ellis represent Defendant-Appellant Sussie Ayala. Assistant U.S. Attorney Bram M. Alden and Lawrence S. Middleton represent the Plaintiff-Appellee. The case involves a brutal assault on Gabriel Carrillo by law enforcement officers at the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail while he was handcuffed. The defendants—sergeant Eric Gonzalez and deputies Fernando Luviano and Sussie Ayala—were found guilty of violating Carrillo's civil rights and falsifying reports. Ayala instigated the assault, Luviano participated, and Gonzalez oversaw the cover-up. On the day of the incident, Carrillo was visiting his brother in jail when officers suspected his girlfriend, Griselda Torres, of smuggling a cell phone. After confirming the violation, Gonzalez ordered Carrillo to be brought to an employee break room. Once there, Carrillo was aggressively searched, and after he expressed frustration at being handcuffed, Ayala called for more officers. Luviano and other deputies surrounded Carrillo, and under the pretense of escalating the situation, Luviano punched Carrillo while he was still restrained. This led to a severe beating, with Carrillo sustaining multiple injuries and losing consciousness at one point. The jury upheld the convictions against the defendants, who are appealing based on the sufficiency of the evidence and juror bias issues. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions. Luviano pepper-sprayed Carrillo, exacerbating his injuries and obstructing his breathing during a 45-second beating while he was handcuffed and unable to resist. Carrillo sustained significant injuries, including bone fractures, head trauma, a broken nose, and severe facial lacerations that rendered him unrecognizable to Torres days later. After the incident, Sergeant Gonzalez led other officers in fabricating a narrative to justify their use of force, directing Zunggeemoge to draft misleading reports. These reports falsely claimed Carrillo had attacked the officers and attempted to escape while only one hand was handcuffed, presenting their violence as necessary. Each officer filed their own reports supporting this cover story, with Gonzalez’s report claiming he had called for additional officers to intervene. However, no witnesses corroborated this account. Gonzalez also instructed Zunggeemoge to prepare a probable cause declaration for Carrillo's prosecution, which echoed the false reports, leading to charges of assaulting an officer and resisting arrest. These charges were dropped after incriminating text messages between Gonzalez and another deputy emerged, revealing a joking acknowledgment of their excessive force. The federal government subsequently indicted Gonzalez, Luviano, and Ayala for civil rights violations and report falsifications. They faced three counts: conspiracy to deprive Carrillo of civil rights, willful deprivation of his right to freedom from excessive force, and obstruction of investigation through falsification of reports. After a five-day trial, the jury convicted all defendants on all counts. The district court denied their post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial and sentenced Gonzalez to 96 months, Luviano to 84 months, and Ayala to 72 months in prison. On appeal, the defendants raised multiple arguments, including challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for their convictions and a claim regarding a biased juror. Gonzalez and Ayala challenge the jury instructions related to their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 241, asserting prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and contesting the reasonableness of Ayala's 72-month sentence. They specifically argue that the evidence was insufficient to support one of the two objects of the conspiracy charged: (1) depriving Carrillo of his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force, and (2) depriving him of due process through the use of falsified evidence. While they concede there was adequate evidence for the second object, they claim the general verdict cannot be upheld due to insufficient evidence for the first object. The court rejects this argument, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Griffin v. United States, which establishes that a general verdict stands if at least one object of a conspiracy is supported by sufficient evidence, regardless of the evidentiary support for others. Gonzalez and Ayala do not argue that the objects themselves were legally deficient, only that the first object lacked sufficient proof. Since the jury's verdict can be sustained based on the second object alone, their challenge does not warrant reversal. They further argue that a precedent from their circuit, United States v. Manarite, contradicts this rule, but the court clarifies that Manarite does not apply here as the circumstances are different. Gonzalez and Ayala's convictions were affirmed despite their claims of insufficient evidence for the first object of their conspiracy under 241, as sufficient evidence supported the second object. The court referenced Manarite, indicating that the fraudulent scheme did not legally constitute mail or wire fraud, which led to a reversal of earlier convictions due to a legal deficiency that the jury could not recognize. The court clarified that the defendants' conspiracy convictions were valid under Pinkerton v. United States, which allows for liability based on co-conspirators’ actions if the offense was committed during the conspiracy, the defendants were members at the time, and the offense was a foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. Gonzalez and Ayala contested the applicability of Pinkerton, arguing that the government failed to prove their conspiracy to commit the first object. For a conviction under 241, the government needed to demonstrate an agreement to deprive Carrillo of his rights and that Gonzalez and Ayala knowingly joined this agreement. The court stated that an explicit agreement was not necessary; a tacit agreement could suffice, which could be inferred from the conduct of the conspirators. The evidence presented was deemed sufficient to establish a tacit agreement among the officers to use excessive force against Carrillo, despite the lack of direct communication to that effect. Ayala initiated the assault on Carrillo, who was handcuffed and subdued, by calling other officers to the break room with the intent to provoke violence rather than to restore order. She informed them that Carrillo had threatened to fight if not restrained, which prompted one officer to suggest removing Carrillo's girlfriend to eliminate the sole witness. The officers then collectively decided to punish Carrillo, engaging in excessive force by repeatedly hitting and kicking him. Following the assault, they collaborated to fabricate a narrative that would justify their actions, which they documented in falsified reports. This coordinated effort indicated a shared motive among the officers to punish Carrillo, supporting a conspiracy claim. The evidence also suggested that Gonzalez knowingly participated in this conspiracy, as he summoned additional officers without a legitimate purpose after witnessing the beating and directed his subordinates to use force against Carrillo. Although Gonzalez argued that his report cannot be used against him due to charges of falsification, the jury could still find parts of his account credible. His involvement in the cover-up reinforced the notion that he conspired to use excessive force rather than merely being a bystander. Similarly, Ayala's actions of instigating the assault and encouraging her colleagues further implicated her in the conspiracy. Her conduct demonstrated intent to see Carrillo punished, without needing to directly participate in the assault. Both Gonzalez's and Ayala's roles in the cover-up strengthened the inference of their active involvement in the conspiracy to inflict excessive force on Carrillo. Luviano and Ayala challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which criminalizes the alteration or destruction of records with intent to obstruct investigations. The jury was correctly instructed that the prosecution needed to prove: (1) the defendants knowingly falsified a record; (2) acted with intent to impede an actual or anticipated investigation; and (3) the investigation was under the jurisdiction of U.S. authorities. They did not dispute these instructions but claimed the evidence fell short. However, the evidence, viewed favorably for the prosecution, demonstrated that the defendants knowingly submitted false reports regarding Carrillo's beating to obstruct an investigation into the reasonableness of their use of force. They aimed to create a cover story to avoid accountability for their actions. The defendants also admitted that the inquiry into their conduct concerning Carrillo's civil rights was within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Justice and FBI. Luviano and Ayala presented three arguments regarding the scope of § 1519, asserting it applies only to financial documents due to its origins in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They cited a focus on corporate wrongdoing as indicative of a narrow scope. However, the statute's language explicitly encompasses "any record, document, or tangible object," and the intent to obstruct applies broadly to any relevant investigation. Legislative history supports a broader interpretation, indicating Congress intended a wide application to acts of evidence destruction or fabrication with the intent to obstruct any federal investigation. Reports prepared by law enforcement officers are considered "records" or "documents" under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, as established by several circuit courts. Defendants Luviano and Ayala argue that the term "falsified" should only apply to alterations of existing records, not the creation of new false documents. However, this interpretation is rejected, as the term encompasses both modifying existing documents and fabricating new ones, consistent with the legislative intent to address obstruction of federal investigations comprehensively. The evidence presented, including testimony from Zunggeemoge, supports the conclusion that Luviano and Ayala falsified their reports to justify excessive use of force against Carrillo, indicating intent to obstruct an investigation into their actions. Their reliance on United States v. Johnson is misplaced, as that case pertains to a different statute requiring specific intent to obstruct communication with federal officials, whereas § 1519 only requires intent to obstruct any federal investigation. Thus, the government must prove that the defendants intended to obstruct an investigation relevant to a federal agency, without the need to show a reasonable likelihood of communication to federal authorities. The defendant's knowledge of whether a matter falls within federal jurisdiction is not required. The government provided sufficient evidence to establish the defendants' intent under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. The defendants challenged the district court's refusal to dismiss a juror for actual or implied bias. A district court's decision on actual bias is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while implied bias is reviewed de novo. The juror expressed distress over a graphic photograph shown during the trial, stating it affected her emotionally despite her understanding of the legal instructions. After discussing her ability to remain impartial, she indicated a desire to be fair but acknowledged difficulty in managing her emotions. Ultimately, the district court found the juror capable of impartiality based on her responses and demeanor, denying the request for her dismissal. The defendants argue that both actual and implied bias warranted dismissal. Actual bias is present when a juror cannot be impartial, while implied bias arises when bias is presumed under certain circumstances, regardless of the juror's stated impartiality. Implied bias can only be presumed in extreme situations, such as when a juror has a close relationship with a participant in the trial, possesses relevant personal experiences, or is aware of prejudicial information about the defendant. In this case, the juror did not lie during voir dire, lacked knowledge of highly prejudicial information, and had no disqualifying relationship. Her concerns about impartiality stemmed from a strong emotional reaction to a properly admitted photograph of the victim, which is insufficient for an implied bias claim. The Federal Rules of Evidence aim to prevent juror bias from properly admitted evidence, and the juror’s reaction does not imply incapacity to decide the case fairly. The district court thoroughly questioned the juror, who affirmed her ability to evaluate the evidence impartially despite her emotional response. The court found her assurances credible, and there is no basis to contest this conclusion. This situation parallels the precedent set in Bashor v. Risley. A claim of actual bias was rejected during voir dire in a murder case where a juror initially expressed doubt about her impartiality due to a personal connection to the victim’s family. However, upon further questioning, she assured both the prosecutor and the trial court that she could set aside her emotions and render a fair verdict based on the evidence. The court upheld this conclusion, finding no actual bias as the juror acknowledged her duty to evaluate the case impartially. The defendants later argued that the juror’s behavior during the trial, specifically her looking away from a photograph of the victim's injuries and a video of an interview, indicated further bias that warranted additional inquiry. The district court determined that no further investigation was necessary, as the juror's prior statements had addressed her ability to remain unbiased. The court noted that the juror could still hear the audio of the video, suggesting her behavior was consistent with her earlier testimony. Additionally, the defendants challenged the jury instructions related to Count Two under 18 U.S.C. § 242, but the court indicated the argument was irrelevant as it failed regardless of preservation on appeal. Luviano failed to present an argument in his opening brief and only joined co-defendants' claims in his reply brief. The defendants did not contest the core elements of the offense but focused on a provision of 18 U.S.C. § 242 that enhances penalties if bodily injury results from the violation. The district court instructed the jury to determine if Mr. Carrillo suffered bodily injury due to the defendants’ actions. The defendants contended that the instruction was inadequate as it did not require the jury to find that each defendant's actions were the proximate cause of Carrillo's injuries. Since they did not request a proximate cause instruction, the review was limited to plain error. Referencing United States v. Houston, the court noted that the statute's use of "results from" indicates that only but-for causation is necessary, thus the failure to provide a proximate cause instruction was not a clear error. The defendants argued that Burrage v. United States required a different interpretation; however, Burrage reaffirmed the necessity of but-for causation without addressing proximate cause, leaving Houston's reasoning intact. Gonzalez alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, claiming the prosecutor improperly inferred that he directed excessive force against Carrillo based on his use-of-force report, which he contended was false. As Gonzalez did not object to these statements, the review was again for plain error. The court concluded that the prosecutor did not violate standards prohibiting false inferences, as the conduct did not cross the threshold of knowing falsehood. The prosecutor had a valid basis for asserting that Gonzalez directed others to use force, supported by his own use-of-force report. Although no witnesses at trial corroborated this claim, which weakens the inference from the report, Gonzalez's attorney argued that Gonzalez did indeed direct others to use force, maintaining the truth of the report to aid in securing an acquittal on Count Three. The government was justified in asking the jury to consider that some elements of Gonzalez’s report could be true, despite the absence of corroboration, as the jury could discern the truth based on the overall evidence. There was no prosecutorial misconduct in inviting the jury to accept this assertion. Regarding Ayala's appeal, her 72-month sentence was deemed substantively reasonable. The court had granted a downward departure from the 87-108 month range dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines. While such sentences can be challenged, they are rarely deemed substantively unreasonable. The district court provided a thorough rationale for the sentence, emphasizing Ayala's role in instigating the assault on Carrillo and her subsequent actions to cover up the misconduct by filing a false report. The court highlighted Ayala's "profound disrespect for the law" and determined that her conduct justified the 72-month sentence, affirming that the district court did not abuse its discretion.