John Doe v. State

Citations: 819 S.E.2d 58; 347 Ga. App. 246Docket: A17A0115

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; September 6, 2018; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration must be received in the clerk's office within ten days to be considered timely. In the case A17A0115, John Doe appealed the trial court's denial of his petition to seal his criminal record related to a 2003 arrest for possession of marijuana. Doe had entered a first offender plea, completed probation, and was discharged without conviction in 2008. Following this, he requested expungement, which the prosecuting attorney agreed to, citing that his case met the criteria for expungement under former OCGA. 35-3-37 (d). This statute mandated the destruction of records pertaining to cases that ended without conviction. However, the statute was amended in 2013, changing the process for restricting access to criminal history records. Under the revised law, records related to non-convictions can be automatically restricted by the Georgia Crime Information Center (GCIC) and sealed by the court if it finds the individual’s privacy interest outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and directed that Doe's petition to seal his record be granted.

Public records are generally accessible for inspection and copying unless exempted by court order or law, as per Uniform Superior Court Rule 21. Court records are public unless restricted by law or procedural rules. Doe's GCIC record was restricted under OCGA § 35-3-37(h)(2)(B). In December 2013, Doe filed a petition to seal his criminal history record, requiring notice to the clerk of court and prosecuting attorney, which could be given via registered mail. The court can restrict access to criminal history records if it finds that the privacy harm to the individual outweighs public interest. The clerk must restrict access within 60 days of the court's order. Individuals may petition the court to inspect their sealed records, which remain accessible to criminal justice agencies and the Judicial Qualifications Commission.

For arrests before July 1, 2013, individuals can request law enforcement to restrict their records. The amended OCGA § 35-3-37 applies to pre-amendment arrest information without constitutional issues. On February 21, 2014, the trial court denied Doe’s petition on procedural grounds. After a motion for reconsideration, the court denied it on May 29, 2014, citing that individual privacy harm did not outweigh public interest. In March 2015, Doe filed a renewed petition, presenting evidence of his law-abiding behavior, educational achievements in finance, and employment as a financial analyst, highlighting the adverse effects of his accessible court file. He testified that public access to his record hindered his career advancement due to background checks. During the hearing, the trial court acknowledged the need for transparency regarding criminal records but expressed frustration with legislative decisions that create unintended consequences.

The State did not present evidence at the hearing regarding Doe's March 2015 petition and acknowledged the accuracy of Doe's claims. The State argued that Doe received all negotiated benefits from his 2006 prosecution and could have requested sealing of records at that time, even though the statutory remedy was not established until later. It expressed concerns about transparency in criminal records, suggesting that granting Doe's request could set a precedent. The trial court denied Doe's second petition on February 6, 2016, stating that the individual's privacy concerns did not outweigh the public interest in access to criminal history, without further explanation. Doe asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not applying a statutory balancing test, arguing that the harm to him outweighs the public's interest in the information. The State opposes Doe's appeal on jurisdictional and procedural grounds, claiming Doe's notice of appeal was untimely since it was not filed within 30 days of earlier denials of his initial petition. However, the court found that Doe's March 2015 filing, labeled as a “renewed motion for reconsideration,” was effectively a second motion to seal records. The court determined that Doe's appeal was timely, as it was filed within 30 days of the February 5, 2016 denial. The State also argued that Doe did not comply with filing requirements under OCGA § 35-3-37(m) by not initiating a new action; however, this procedural challenge was not raised in the trial court, resulting in a waiver of appellate review. Additionally, the State contended that if Doe's March 2015 motion is seen as a second petition to seal, it is barred by res judicata, which prevents re-litigation of issues adjudicated in prior competent judgments.

The doctrine of res judicata requires an identity of cause of action, parties, and a prior adjudication on the merits by a competent court. The State did not raise this argument against Doe's second petition under OCGA 35-3-37 (m) in the lower court, so it cannot be considered on appeal. The State's jurisdictional and procedural arguments are deemed without merit. Doe argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not applying the statutory balancing test due to disagreement with the law and its underlying policy. It is established that a trial court must exercise discretion when required, particularly in weighing the benefits against the harms of a judicial action. OCGA 35-3-37 (m) mandates that the trial court seal criminal history records if the harm to the petitioner's privacy outweighs the public interest in accessibility. The State acknowledges the necessity of this balancing test. The Supreme Court of Georgia has clarified that, in evaluating expungement requests, a superior court should balance the state's interest in maintaining arrest records for law enforcement against the individual's interest in privacy. As the utility of records diminishes, the individual's interest in privacy increases. Superior court decisions on expungement are upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. The potential adverse effects of criminal records on employment and housing opportunities can lead to increased recidivism. The interests considered in sealing records under the current statute mirror those under the previous expungement provisions, but the 2013 amendments to OCGA 35-3-37 enhance protections for privacy. The amendments broaden the rights of individuals to restrict access to their criminal records while limiting public access. Despite these changes, the State argues that Georgia's public policy supports the maintenance and dissemination of criminal records, referencing case law.

Meinken v. Burgess addressed the State’s interest in regulating access to arrest records for law enforcement. Following the trial court's order, a new criminal justice reform bill, SB 367, was enacted, introducing restrictions on the dissemination of criminal history information in accountability court cases. Prior to this, access to criminal history records by private individuals was already limited. The trial court’s written order applied a statutory balancing test but exhibited a bias favoring transparency in criminal records, neglecting to properly weigh the public interest against Doe's privacy concerns. The State did not provide any evidence opposing Doe's petition to seal his record, focusing instead on general arguments for transparency. The appellate court determined that the trial court failed to exercise the necessary discretion under the law, leading to a reversal of the order. Doe's evidence demonstrated that the harm to him outweighed the public interest in access to his records, especially given the State's failure to object to or present counter-evidence. The court instructed the trial court to grant Doe's petition to seal the records of his 2003 arrest. Additionally, the concurrence highlighted that factual findings by the trial court must be based on evidence rather than policy judgments, and the trial court erred in relying on policy arguments instead of evidence.