Kevin Czech v. Michael Melvin

Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-1838

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 21, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

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Kevin Czech was convicted by an Illinois jury of first-degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm related to a drive-by shooting that killed fourteen-year-old Alonzo Zuniga, an innocent bystander. Czech's conviction was based on his alleged role in planning the shooting, directed by thirteen-year-old Marquis Falls, who fired the weapon. On appeal, Czech claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his lawyer failed to challenge the felony murder instruction provided to the jury, which included aggravated discharge of a firearm as a predicate felony. The Illinois Appellate Court recognized that the instruction violated state law but deemed the error harmless. The Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the case further. Following a failed post-conviction motion, Czech sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied this relief, stating that while the conviction violated federal law, the error did not substantially impact the jury's verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The background notes that the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Morgan stated that aggravated discharge of a firearm could not serve as a predicate felony for felony murder, as it could undermine the necessity to prove intentional killing in murder cases.

Czech argued on direct appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a jury instruction regarding felony murder. He claimed this instruction allowed the jury to convict him of first-degree murder improperly, based on the ruling in Morgan. The Illinois Court of Appeals acknowledged the instruction was incorrect under Illinois law, as the acts forming the basis of aggravated discharge of a firearm were inherent in the murder act. However, the court deemed the error harmless, presuming the jury convicted him of the most serious charge, intentional or knowing murder, and concluded that overwhelming evidence of guilt made it unlikely that the error affected the verdict. Consequently, Czech's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed.

Czech subsequently filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the felony murder instruction violated his due process rights. The district court appointed counsel and determined that the general verdict containing the improper conviction method violated established federal law but concluded that Czech was not entitled to relief, as the error did not significantly impact the jury's decision due to strong evidence of guilt. The court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability regarding the harmless error issue.

The district court's denial of the habeas petition is reviewed de novo, and under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), relief cannot be granted unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable fact determination. Czech argued that the inclusion of the invalid felony murder instruction in the general verdict violated his due process rights, raising the constitutional question of whether a jury instruction that diverges from state law constitutes a constitutional violation. This issue had precedent in Falconer v. Lane, where a similar jury instruction error was found to violate constitutional due process rights.

When the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions for murder and voluntary manslaughter are given together, the jury could mistakenly believe it can convict for murder even if the defendant has a mitigating mental state relevant to voluntary manslaughter. Such misdirection violates due process. The Supreme Court in Gilmore v. Taylor ruled that the 'new' rule established in Falconer does not allow for retroactive federal habeas corpus relief, as determined under Teague v. Lane. The Court did not question the correctness of Falconer but disagreed with the lower court's interpretation that precedent necessitated Falconer's outcome. The Court clarified that errors in jury instructions related to state law do not constitute federal constitutional errors unless they impact a capital case. 

Czech argues that state court decisions contradicted clearly established federal law from Stromberg v. California and Yates v. United States. He claims these cases support the notion that a general verdict by a jury instructed on alternative, one improper, grounds violates due process. In Stromberg, a defendant’s conviction was reversed because the jury's general verdict could not specify which valid ground was used, thus potentially violating constitutional rights. Yates extended this principle to a federal context. However, the respondent contends that neither Stromberg nor Yates established the constitutional claim Czech asserts.

Defendants were convicted, but the jury's general verdict did not specify whether the conviction was for 'advocating' or 'organizing.' The Court determined that the 'organizing' charge was barred by the Smith Act’s three-year statute of limitations. Citing the case of Stromberg, the Court held that a general verdict must be overturned if it is valid on one ground but not another, making it impossible to determine which ground the jury relied upon. Consequently, the conviction was reversed due to the ambiguity regarding the time-barred charge. The Court critiqued its application of Stromberg in the case of Yates, noting that it lacked clarity and did not invoke the Due Process Clause or supervisory powers.

In Griffin, the Court addressed whether a general verdict of guilty on a multiple-object conspiracy charge in federal prosecution should be set aside if one object lacked sufficient evidence. The Court concluded it should not, maintaining that a general jury verdict is valid if it is legally supportable on at least one submitted ground, regardless of the certainty about which ground the jury chose. Although Griffin did not overrule Yates, the Court did not extend its principles to cases where a conviction basis was merely unsupported by evidence, rather than unconstitutional or illegal. 

In 2004, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Czech’s conviction, ruling that no Supreme Court precedent invalidated a general verdict based solely on the inclusion of an invalid state law theory in jury instructions. The Court clarified that Stromberg only required reversal when one conviction basis was unconstitutional, and while Yates applied this to federal cases with legally improper bases, it was unclear if it was grounded in the Due Process Clause. The lack of clearly established federal law during the state court's decision typically would be conclusive but was complicated by Czech's ongoing state court remedies and a subsequent Supreme Court decision. After the Illinois Supreme Court denied Czech’s appeal in 2004, he sought post-conviction relief, which was ultimately denied and affirmed by the Appellate Court in 2013. Following this, he filed a federal relief petition. Additionally, during the state proceedings, the Supreme Court's ruling in Hedgpeth v. Pulido indicated that jury instructions based on multiple theories of guilt, including one invalid under state law, did not necessarily violate constitutional rights, further complicating Czech's case.

The lower courts granted the petition without assessing whether the petitioner experienced any prejudice, asserting that the instruction was a structural error requiring the conviction to be overturned irrespective of prejudice. The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, determining that the error was not structural and that relief necessitates a finding that the instruction flaw had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded for the lower court to evaluate the harmlessness of the error. The district court reasonably concluded that Yates constituted clearly established federal law, as Yates v. United States established that a constitutional error occurs when a jury is instructed on alternative theories of guilt, one being legally invalid, leading to a general verdict. Although the Court in Hedgpeth did not explicitly rule that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt constitutes a constitutional error, it focused on whether such an error undergoes harmless-error review. There is skepticism about whether 'clearly established federal law' can be inferred, but even if it can, the petitioner Czech was not entitled to relief as the district court found the error to be harmless. Under habeas review, a constitutional error is deemed harmless unless it can be shown to have had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Petitioners must demonstrate actual prejudice for habeas relief, and the reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of the entire record to ascertain if a properly instructed jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error. In this case, the jury was instructed on first-degree murder based on four potential bases, with only the fourth being improper.

A finding of guilt on any of the three remaining bases would have been appropriate. To assess whether the error was harmless, the complete record was examined to determine if any lawful basis for guilt was overwhelmingly supported by evidence, leading to the same verdict. The district court concluded that the evidence against Czech was compelling, and a reasonable jury would likely have found him guilty based on at least two bases. It was uncontested that Czech was in the car with Mejia, Malaves, and Falls during the shooting incident involving the Latin Kings; Czech admitted his presence in statements to police. The primary issue was whether Czech directed Mejia to drive by the Kings’ location and instructed Falls to shoot. Falls, who pled guilty to murder, testified that Czech provided him with the .357 revolver and urged him to retrieve it for the shooting. Czech instructed Falls on who would fire based on the positioning of the gang members, ultimately handing Falls the gun. During a second pass by the Kings, Czech identified gang member Chino as a target and urged Falls to shoot, resulting in Falls firing five shots. Witness Malaves corroborated much of Falls’ testimony, detailing how Czech orchestrated the events, including signaling gang signs to mislead the Kings. Although Czech contested the consistency of Malaves’ account with Falls’, the review found no significant discrepancies, supporting the conclusion that Czech initiated the attack and approved of Falls’ actions.

Czech admitted to directing Mejia to drive into Kings' territory after picking up Falls, who retrieved a gun. He confessed to shouting gang slogans during the first drive-by and instructed Falls to switch seats with Malaves before the second drive-by, ensuring that Malaves covered her ears and kept her head down before Falls fired. Although Czech's videotaped interview was less revealing, the detective’s account corroborated Falls’ and Malaves’ testimonies, indicating Czech’s intent or knowledge of the likelihood of death or serious injury resulting from the shooting.

Czech contended that the inclusion of a felony murder instruction affected the jury's verdict, referencing Jensen v. Clements, where a critical piece of evidence significantly influenced the trial outcome. However, it was determined that the prosecution's primary case focused on knowing or intentional murder, with felony murder as a secondary option. The prosecution's argument was not centered on the felony murder instruction as in Jensen, and the evidence supporting Czech's guilt under other theories was substantial. Ultimately, the court concluded that the inclusion of the felony murder theory did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict, and any potential error was deemed harmless. The district court's judgment was affirmed.