Emil Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale

Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-2594

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; September 14, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Emil Jutrowski, the appellant, brought excessive force claims against the Township of Riverdale, New Jersey State Police, and individual officers after sustaining a serious injury during his arrest, where he was kicked in the face. The officers involved acknowledged that one of them kicked Jutrowski, but each denied personal involvement in the act. Due to Jutrowski's inability to identify his assailant—while pinned to the ground—the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the necessity for “personal involvement” in civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court emphasized that a plaintiff must demonstrate personal involvement of each defendant to proceed with such claims, even when a constitutional violation is evident. However, the court recognized that if a plaintiff can present sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to cover up misconduct, a claim may still be viable under the due process right of access to the courts. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the excessive force claim but reversed and remanded the conspiracy claim for further proceedings.

On June 23, 2010, Emil Jutrowski crashed his SUV after consuming several vodka sodas at a bar in East Hanover, NJ. Despite a minor cut above his right eye, he was largely unharmed; however, he was unable to exit the car due to its position against a guardrail. Upon the arrival of the Riverdale Police Officers Travis Roemmele and Christopher Biro, followed by State Troopers Jeffrey Heimbach and James Franchino, it was quickly determined that Jutrowski was heavily intoxicated. Heimbach noted a strong odor of alcohol from Jutrowski’s breath, bloodshot eyes, and disorientation. Jutrowski attempted to apply hand sanitizer to his injury but also tried to ingest it.

Although Heimbach would typically conduct a field sobriety test, he refrained due to Jutrowski's injuries and the need for medical attention. Emergency personnel arrived to assist, but Jutrowski refused further treatment and was asked to exit the vehicle. After initially resisting, he climbed out the passenger door. While being escorted to an ambulance, Jutrowski wobbled, prompting Trooper Franchino to reach for his wrist for support. In response, Jutrowski pulled away, striking Franchino, who then executed a leg sweep, causing Jutrowski to fall to the ground with significant force. While lying face down, Jutrowski's hands were tucked underneath him, making it difficult for the officers to handcuff him due to his size and strength, as he was reportedly over 300 pounds.

Franchino used his baton to pry Jutrowski's arms from beneath him while Riverdale Officers Biro and Roemmele assisted by holding Jutrowski's legs. Heimbach subdued Jutrowski by placing his knee in the small of Jutrowski's back and searched him while he was face down. During this encounter, one officer kicked Jutrowski in the face, resulting in serious injuries including a broken nose and eye socket, necessitating surgery. On appeal, the State Trooper Defendants acknowledged the kick, while the Riverdale Defendants did not explicitly contest it but did not deny it in court. After Jutrowski was turned over, he kicked Heimbach in the face with his left foot while being searched. Jutrowski was subsequently handcuffed and transported to the hospital, where he later pleaded guilty to driving under the influence.

Procedurally, Jutrowski filed suit against Officers Biro, Roemmele, Troopers Franchino, Heimbach, the Township of Riverdale, and the State of New Jersey for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as conspiracy claims related to excessive force and false reporting. The complaint was initially filed in state court but was removed to federal court. A medical expert indicated that Jutrowski's injuries likely resulted from a forceful kick or punch rather than a fall. Jutrowski continues to suffer from pain and various symptoms due to his injuries. Despite the discovery process revealing that all officers were present when Jutrowski was kicked, he could not identify the perpetrator, and none of the officers admitted to witnessing the act. Heimbach, who maintained focus on Jutrowski's head, claimed he did not see anything related to the incident.

Trooper Franchino testified he was within a close range of Jutrowski during the incident but did not witness it, and no dashboard cameras recorded the event. Officer Biro, whose vehicle was nearest, did not activate his dashcam, believing he was responding to a traffic accident rather than conducting a vehicle stop. Although Biro claimed the camera should have recorded automatically with activated emergency lights, his testimony was unclear regarding whether this was standard practice at the time. The State Troopers’ dashcams were on but failed to capture the alleged critical events due to their positioning. 

The District Court granted summary judgment to all Defendants due to the lack of evidence identifying the perpetrator of the alleged excessive force. Although it was acknowledged that Jutrowski was kicked, he could not specify which officer was responsible, leading the court to conclude it could not determine liability. Jutrowski's request for an adverse inference concerning the missing dashcam video was denied because he had not made a formal request to inspect it, failing to prove its existence. Furthermore, the court found no evidence of conspiracy among the officers before or after the incident, which led to summary judgment on the civil conspiracy counts as well. Jutrowski is now appealing the summary judgment decisions on excessive force and civil conspiracy claims. The standard for review of summary judgment is de novo, requiring that there be no genuine dispute of material fact and that the facts be viewed in a light favorable to the non-moving party.

The non-moving party opposing a motion for summary judgment must provide specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, moving beyond mere allegations or denials. Assertions that lack substance will not suffice. A factual dispute is considered genuine if a reasonable jury could potentially favor the non-moving party, while failure to prove an essential element of the case results in no genuine dispute, allowing the moving party to obtain judgment as a matter of law. The District Court's jurisdiction is established under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, with appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

On appeal, Jutrowski contends that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment regarding his excessive force claim, asserting he demonstrated a genuine issue for trial by showing excessive force was used and that all Individual Defendants were in proximity. He also claimed that the lack of a dashcam video warranted an adverse inference against the Defendants. However, he misinterprets the law, as liability under § 1983 requires direct personal involvement in the alleged violation. Historical tort principles dictate that liability derives from one’s own actions, necessitating a connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff’s damages.

In § 1983 actions, the Supreme Court mandates a "showing of direct responsibility" from defendants, rejecting any liability theories where defendants did not play an active role in violating constitutional rights. Vicarious liability is not applicable in these cases; plaintiffs must demonstrate that each government official directly violated the Constitution through their own actions. Liability is confined to individual misconduct, extending to the notion that individuals cannot be held responsible simply for being present during another's wrongful act. This principle has been illustrated in several cases: in Howell, the court affirmed a directed verdict for defendants due to insufficient evidence to identify wrongdoing; in Sharrar, liability was denied where the plaintiff could not identify which officer caused his injury; conversely, in Smith, the court reversed a summary judgment because the plaintiff described collective actions by multiple officers, thus establishing a factual dispute regarding their involvement. This establishes a clear distinction between cases of mere possibility of participation versus those involving disputes over the extent of individual participation, which should be resolved by a jury. The approach aligns with the reasoning of other appellate courts, acknowledging the challenges of identifying specific officers in complex scenarios.

The plaintiff sued four out of ten officers for property damage resulting from a search of his bedroom, admitting he could not identify which officer caused the damage as he was excluded from the search area. The court noted that while the officers had acceptable reasons for their actions, this effectively immunized them from property-damage claims by preventing the plaintiff from identifying the responsible party. Consequently, the plaintiff was unable to meet the personal-responsibility requirement under § 1983 at the summary judgment stage. The court suggested that plaintiffs could allege misconduct not affected by their inability to observe the search, such as a "conspiracy of silence" among the officers.

Other Courts of Appeals have similarly ruled that personal involvement of each defendant is essential for liability in § 1983 cases. To establish liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation, not merely based on group membership. The legal consensus is that a § 1983 plaintiff must provide evidence of each defendant’s personal involvement to withstand a motion for summary judgment. In this case, the plaintiff, Jutrowski, could not identify the officer responsible for his injury and thus sought to proceed against at least three defendants who were not liable. The court found this insufficient to survive summary judgment.

Furthermore, Jutrowski's argument for an adverse inference due to the nonproduction of Officer Biro’s dashcam video was rejected. While such an inference could apply to evidence suppression, Jutrowski failed to demonstrate that the video existed or was suppressed, leading the District Court to conclude that there was no basis for an adverse inference. The absence of evidence to support his claims ultimately undermined his case.

Jutrowski's appeal hinges on the assertion of an automatic recording based on Biro's deposition statement that the recording device activates with emergency lights. However, Biro's statement was in the present tense, and he later referred to a “different system,” which Jutrowski failed to clarify through follow-up questions or by requesting video evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a). Consequently, Jutrowski could not demonstrate the video’s existence or that it was "actually suppressed." The District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to draw an adverse inference regarding the missing dashcam footage, resulting in an insufficient record for a reasonable jury to identify which Individual Defendant, if any, used excessive force. Jutrowski's claim that there is a material fact issue about the identity of the officer who kicked him does not meet the thresholds established in prior cases, leading to the conclusion that all Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Count I.

Despite recognizing the potential for the ruling to shield violators of constitutional rights, the court adhered to existing Circuit precedent. It noted that alternative legal avenues, such as a conspiracy claim, could provide relief without the need for direct observation of the wrongdoing. In this regard, Jutrowski alleged conspiracies to violate federal and state civil rights, outlining two conspiracies among the Individual Defendants: one prior to the alleged excessive force and another aimed at covering it up. The District Court found insufficient evidence to suggest an illicit agreement prior to the incident; however, it acknowledged the possibility of a conspiracy based on after-the-fact evidence, which merits further examination.

To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that individuals acting under state law conspired to violate constitutional rights, specifically referencing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. The rights at issue include the Due Process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, notably the right to an impartial hearing and access to the courts, as articulated in various cases including Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP and Monroe v. Beard. The right to access courts is a fundamental constitutional right that ensures individuals can present allegations of constitutional violations, as noted in Wolff v. McDonnell.

While often addressed in the context of prisons, the right to access courts applies broadly, including situations where law enforcement officers conspire to obstruct this right. This includes instances of a "conspiracy of silence" among officers, which can impede an individual's ability to seek judicial redress, as highlighted in cases like Colbert and Vasquez v. Hernandez. The concealment of facts critical to a victim's case can violate constitutional rights, but such concealment does not constitute a separate violation unless it directly impacts access to the courts.

For a successful conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must establish the conspiracy's objective—deprivation of a federally protected right—and provide factual evidence of agreement and concerted action among state actors, as outlined in Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J. and Kost v. Kozakiewicz. The plaintiff must show that the defendants reached a mutual understanding to deny rights.

In the context of conspiracy allegations, direct proof of a "meeting of the minds" is not required; instead, such an agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, as established in Startzell v. City of Philadelphia. Relevant circumstantial evidence may include actions or statements by the alleged conspirators, the timing and parties involved in the agreement, the duration of the conspiracy, and its objectives. In cases involving police officers, evidence may consist of discussions among officers about the incident, conflicting narratives, and irregularities in official investigations, as highlighted in Hampton v. Hanrahan.

Factfinders are tasked with inferring mental states from circumstantial evidence. A conspiracy allegation can only be dismissed at the summary judgment stage if the evidence submitted by the moving parties eliminates any possibility that a jury could find a "meeting of the minds." 

Regarding the conspiracy claims against individual defendants, Jutrowski's assertions of a premeditated agreement to use excessive force lack factual support. While he claims the officers relocated ambulances to prevent EMTs from witnessing the incident and acted in concert during the takedown, these assertions are not backed by specific evidence in the record. The court found that bare allegations or suspicions are insufficient to survive summary judgment. Testimonies indicate that only one officer executed the takedown, and others were not present or involved at that moment, undermining the possibility of a coordinated effort. Consequently, the court did not err in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy counts alleging premeditated actions.

Jutrowski's claims of a post-injury conspiracy are examined, with the court rejecting the defendants' argument regarding a lack of a valid conspiratorial objective. Jutrowski's alleged injury pertains to a denial of "access to the courts" rather than excessive force during his arrest. The court finds sufficient evidence of collusion among the officers from Riverdale and the State Police to support Jutrowski's claims. Material omissions in police reports are highlighted as potentially indicating a conspiracy, where officers may have agreed to misrepresent facts about the incident. The absence of documentation regarding Jutrowski's significant injuries during the arrest, despite admissions from several officers that his condition worsened, raises questions about the integrity of the officers’ accounts. The court notes that the inconsistent testimonies and lack of dashcam footage from Biro's vehicle could lead a reasonable jury to infer collusion among the officers.

Testimony from Heimbach indicated that multiple officers may have conspired to coordinate their accounts of an incident involving Jutrowski, suggesting possible irregularities and a cover-up. Evidence included conversations among officers before report submissions and discrepancies in reports regarding the use of excessive force. Heimbach acknowledged discussing the case with other officers, while Franchino noted he was in close proximity to Jutrowski yet failed to observe significant details. The report from Roemmele, the sole Riverdale Police report, omitted Biro's involvement and did not mention any excessive force, despite acknowledging the presence of State Troopers. Medical expert testimony suggested Jutrowski's injuries were likely caused by a kick or punch. Jutrowski's claims of conspiracies by the defendant officers to deprive him of his civil rights were deemed sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the District Court's summary judgment on these conspiracy allegations and remanded for further proceedings against the Individual Defendants, affirming some parts of the earlier ruling.