Michael Francis v. Accubanc Mortgage Corporation (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18A-CT-596

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; September 14, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Memorandum Decision is a ruling from the Indiana Court of Appeals affirming the denial of a motion to correct error filed by pro-se appellants Michael and Carmen Francis, who contested the trial court's handling of their complaint to quiet title against Accubanc Mortgage Corporation and PNC Bank. The appellants claimed newly-discovered evidence relevant to their case concerning a mortgage foreclosure on their residential property in Marion County. 

The case background reveals that the Francises executed a mortgage in favor of Accubanc on October 26, 1994, with a maturity date of November 1, 2001. Due to non-payment, EMC Mortgage Corporation, as the successor to Accubanc, filed for foreclosure on May 29, 2007. The Francises engaged in legal responses, including counterclaims, but ultimately the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of EMC. The court also approved amendments to incorporate a 2013 assignment of the mortgage. 

The key issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Francises' motion to correct error, which was ultimately affirmed by the appellate court. This decision does not serve as a precedent except in specific legal contexts such as res judicata or collateral estoppel.

On February 17, 2016, the trial court granted EMC Mortgage’s summary judgment, resulting in an in rem judgment of $248,709.74 against the Property and ordering its sale. The court ruled in favor of EMC on the remaining counterclaims from the Francises. On August 18, 2017, Francis initiated a complaint against Accubanc, Fannie Mae, EMC Mortgage, and Homesales, LLC, alleging various claims including lack of standing and fraud. Francis sought to amend this complaint on October 10, 2017, but the court denied the request. The Property was sold, and a Sheriff’s Deed was issued on February 17, 2017. Francis later entered bankruptcy proceedings, claiming multiple law firms asserted interests in his home, though these firms are not involved in the current appeal. On October 13, 2017, PNC responded to Francis’ complaint, asserting no interest in the Property. Subsequently, on October 30, 2017, the Co-Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on res judicata, which the trial court granted on October 31, 2017, dismissing them with prejudice. Francis’ motion to correct the dismissal was denied on December 4, 2017. PNC then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on December 1, 2017, claiming Francis' allegations were barred under res judicata and time limitations. The trial court granted this motion on January 8, 2018. Francis sought reassignment of the case on January 23, 2018, claiming untimeliness in ruling, but the Chief Administration Officer confirmed the trial court’s judgment was timely. On February 7, 2018, Francis filed a verified motion to correct errors, citing new evidence but was denied on February 20, 2018. This led to the current appeal. Under Indiana Trial Rule 59(A)(1), motions to correct errors regarding newly discovered evidence are treated with caution due to the importance of judicial finality.

The court's decision on a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error based on newly discovered evidence involves an equitable assessment of the potential injustice faced by the moving party against the need for finality in litigation. The denial of such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with the presumption favoring the trial court's decision. For a motion to be granted, the moving party must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence meets specific criteria, including being discovered post-trial, material, non-cumulative, credible, and likely to affect the outcome upon retrial. 

In this case, Francis alleged he found evidence of fraud involving a mortgage agreement and various irregularities, but he failed to show due diligence in discovering this evidence before the foreclosure judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to correct error based on newly discovered evidence.

Additionally, Francis raised procedural issues regarding the trial court's compliance with Indiana Trial Rule 53.1, which outlines the protocol for motions that are not ruled upon in a timely manner. He argued that the trial court's ruling was late and that this should entitle him to withdraw the case for reassignment. However, he did not substantiate his claim that a litigant has the right to seek withdrawal after receiving an unfavorable ruling due to an untimely decision.

Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) mandates that an appellant's argument must include their contentions on the issues presented, supported by clear reasoning and citations to relevant authorities and records. Failure to comply waives the issue for appellate review, as established in Dickes v. Feiger and Thacker v. Wentzel, which emphasize that poorly developed arguments will not be considered. Francis claimed he was improperly denied the right to amend his complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 15(A), which allows for one amendment before a responsive pleading is served or within thirty days after service if no responsive pleading is permitted. He cited Huff v. Travelers Indemnity Co. to support the policy favoring amendments, but his argument was insufficiently developed, failing to demonstrate reversible error. Francis also argued that the trial court wrongly denied his motion to correct error before PNC could respond, asserting that entering a final order before the twenty-day period for a responsive pleading constitutes reversible error. However, he did not provide adequate legal support for this claim. Ultimately, Francis did not show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion, leading to the affirmation of the lower court's ruling.