Town of Glastonbury v. Sakon

Citations: 194 A.3d 1277; 184 Conn. App. 385Docket: AC39907

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court; August 28, 2018; Connecticut; State Appellate Court

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In the case of TOWN OF GLASTONBURY v. JOHN ALAN SAKON, the town sought to foreclose on municipal tax liens against property owned by Sakon. The trial court ruled in favor of foreclosure by sale and awarded attorney’s fees to the town. Upon Sakon's motion for reconsideration regarding the attorney’s fees, the court acknowledged the fees were high but deemed them reasonable due to Sakon’s numerous nearly frivolous filings that prolonged the case. Sakon appealed, arguing the fees were excessive compared to the tax liens and similar cases, but the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The trial court had conducted a thorough hearing where evidence, including testimony and billing records, was evaluated, leading to the conclusion that the attorney’s fees were justified under statute 12-193. The procedural history includes motions and judgments made by Judges Robaina and Dubay, affirming the decision.

John Sakon, the appellant, is appealing a trial court judgment that granted the town of Glastonbury, the appellee, attorney’s fees and costs in a tax lien foreclosure action. Sakon argues that the awarded attorney’s fees were excessive and unreasonable. The court finds that the fees do not represent an abuse of discretion, affirming the trial court's judgment. 

The background involves Sakon’s failure to pay property taxes from 2009 to 2013 on two properties, leading Glastonbury to file tax liens. The town initiated the foreclosure process on November 6, 2012. After several procedural motions, including a motion for default that was granted, Sakon eventually filed an answer with special defenses and counterclaims. Throughout the case, there were multiple motions to strike filed by both parties regarding the special defenses and counterclaims, which culminated in the court granting the plaintiff’s motions to strike and addressing the various procedural matters to clarify the operative complaints and pleadings. The case demonstrates a series of legal maneuvers focused on the foreclosure of tax liens for the unpaid property taxes.

On July 9, 2015, the court, presided over by Judge Vacchelli, granted the plaintiff's third motion to strike the defendant's substitute special defenses and counterclaims, ruling them legally insufficient based on prior decisions from November 11, 2014. The court also entered a default against the defendant regarding his special defenses and issued a judgment of nonsuit in favor of the plaintiff concerning the counterclaims. Following this, on July 24, 2015, the plaintiff sought summary judgment on liability for both counts of the complaint. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the strike ruling on July 27, 2015, which was denied on August 12, 2015. The defendant's subsequent appeal was dismissed regarding special defenses, but the court affirmed the ruling on counterclaims.

On January 4, 2016, Judge Robaina granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability. On July 13, 2016, the plaintiff filed for a judgment of foreclosure by sale, leading to a hearing on August 1, 2016. The defendant requested a continuance to gather evidence and hire an expert, which was granted until August 8, 2016. At the August 8 hearing, the court heard arguments on the foreclosure motion, where the plaintiff presented property appraisals and sought attorney’s fees totaling $134,979.43. The court ordered foreclosure and awarded the requested attorney's fees despite the defendant's objections.

On August 26, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the foreclosure judgment. On September 9, 2016, the court granted reconsideration regarding attorney’s fees. During the October 7, 2016 hearing, Attorney Williams testified about the fees, and the defendant presented his case. On October 24, 2016, the court upheld the attorney's fees as reasonable, citing several findings: contemporaneous billing, lack of credible evidence from the defendant to challenge the fees, the reasonableness of the fees given the defendant's frivolous filings, the defendant's failure to timely object to the fee affidavit, and the defendant's ample opportunity to present his case. The awarded attorney's fees were $68,982.22 for the Griswold Street property and $65,997.21 for the Main Street property.

The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $140,479.43 in attorney’s fees, claiming this amount is excessive relative to the tax liens involved and fees awarded in similar cases. The plaintiff argues the fees are justified due to the defendant’s numerous motions aimed at delaying proceedings. The court affirms the trial court's decision, stating it did not abuse its discretion. The review follows the abuse of discretion standard, presuming the trial court's ruling is correct unless a clear abuse is evident. It emphasizes that the trial court, being closest to the case's circumstances, is best suited to determine reasonable fees. Connecticut follows the American rule on attorney’s fees, where recovery is only permitted through statutory or contractual provisions. In this case, the right to recover fees is statutory, based on General Statutes 12-181 et seq., which allows municipalities to foreclose on tax liens, and General Statutes 12-193, which permits municipalities to recover reasonable attorney’s fees in related foreclosure actions. The court evaluates the reasonableness of the fee award based on several factors, including the time and labor required, the complexity of the questions, the attorney's skill, customary fees for similar work, and the results obtained.

The court has discretion to assess the reasonableness of attorney’s fees requested, utilizing a variety of factors, as established in East Windsor v. East Windsor Housing, Ltd. LLC and governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5. In this case, a full evidentiary hearing was held where the defendant questioned Attorney Williams about the fees, and Williams also testified regarding their reasonableness. The court evaluated the evidence, including an updated affidavit from Williams, billing records from Shipman, Goodwin, LLP, and the extensive history of the case, which involved approximately 335 filings since its initiation in November 2012. The court credited Williams' testimony, and the appellate court will not reconsider credibility determinations made by the trial court. Consequently, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, affirming the judgment. The appeal also noted procedural issues regarding the defendant’s attempts to contest the foreclosure judgment and the court's actions concerning subpoenas and interim committee fees related to a canceled foreclosure sale.

The plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendant's first amended appeal as untimely, leading the defendant to submit a second amended appeal that included a challenge to an attorney's fees award granted on October 24, 2016. The plaintiff did not contest this second amended appeal. On December 7, 2016, the court dismissed the first amended appeal as untimely and ordered the second amended appeal, now designated AC 39907, to be considered separately, staying it pending a ruling on the defendant's motion to open, which was denied on December 12, 2016. The defendant subsequently amended AC 39907 twice, again challenging the August 8, 2016 judgment of foreclosure, the denial of his motion to open, and the award of interim fees to the committee of sale. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the challenge to the August 8 judgment, which the court granted on February 8, 2017, deeming that portion untimely and dismissing subsequent related amendments. Thus, the only issues before the court are the attorney's fees awarded on October 24, 2016, the denial of the motion to open, and the interim fees awarded to the committee of sale.

The court determined that the defendant abandoned his claims regarding the denial of his motion to open and the interim fees due to inadequate legal analysis in his brief, which lacked substantive discussion or authority citation. Furthermore, the defendant's argument for accommodating an expert witness was rejected, as case law establishes that expert testimony is not necessary for assessing the reasonableness of attorney's fees. The trial court had sufficient knowledge to evaluate the reasonableness based on the presented facts. The trial court also confirmed that the defendant had the opportunity to present testimony at the hearing, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for an expert witness.