Kendle v. State

Citation: 255 So. 3d 400Docket: 16-0243

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; August 15, 2018; Florida; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Lukace Kendle appealed a conviction and sentence for second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, claiming the trial court inadequately conducted a Faretta inquiry and made improper comments regarding his rights to remain silent and self-representation. The court reviewed the extensive record, including multiple Faretta inquiries, and found no merit in Kendle's arguments, affirming the lower court's decision.

The background reveals Kendle was charged for shooting two men outside Club Lexx on June 1, 2012, resulting in one death and one serious injury. Kendle maintained the shooting was justified under Florida's Stand Your Ground Law. Initially represented by Simon Steckel, he later expressed a desire to represent himself after Steckel's withdrawal. Despite his requests, Kendle's family sought to retain attorney Abe Bailey, but subsequently, attorney Carlos Gonzalez appeared on his behalf. Kendle later sought to discharge Gonzalez, leading to concerns about his competency.

Kendle refused to participate in competency evaluations, delaying proceedings. In a November 20, 2013 hearing, the court noted conflicting evaluations, with Dr. Richardson unable to opine due to Kendle's non-cooperation and Dr. Quintana deeming him incompetent. After agreeing to cooperate, Kendle was evaluated, but subsequent aggressive behavior led to further delays. Ultimately, he was adjudicated incompetent on December 12, 2013, but later found competent following hospitalization without medication.

The trial court conducted multiple Faretta inquiries throughout the proceedings, consistently determining that Kendle was competent to represent himself and granting his requests. Despite Kendle’s objections, the court appointed stand-by counsel, who was present at all times, but Kendle did not consult with them despite reminders. Ultimately, the jury found Kendle guilty on two counts, resulting in a life sentence for the second-degree murder of Mr. Byrd and a thirty-year sentence for the attempted second-degree murder of Mr. Smathers, each with a mandatory minimum term. 

The standard of review for a trial court's decision to allow a defendant to waive counsel is abuse of discretion, with a focus on the defendant's demeanor and credibility. The court's decisions regarding self-representation are given significant weight and upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Kendle's challenges to comments made during the trial were not preserved, thus they are reviewed for fundamental error.

Kendle argued that the trial court did not conduct sufficient inquiries as required by Faretta prior to allowing him to represent himself. However, the record shows that the court thoroughly questioned Kendle on multiple occasions, ensuring he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. According to Faretta, a defendant can represent themselves if the waiver is made with full awareness of the implications. Florida law requires that before a waiver is accepted, the court must ensure the defendant understands the risks of self-representation. The competence needed for waiving counsel pertains to the ability to make that waiver, not the ability to represent oneself effectively.

A defendant can represent themselves pro se without needing the technical legal knowledge of an attorney, as established in Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1996). The trial court faces the challenge of balancing the defendant's right to self-representation with the rights to counsel and a fair trial. To manage this balance, the Florida Supreme Court's model colloquy provides guidelines for the trial court, which include assessing the defendant's age, education, reading and writing abilities, mental or physical conditions, and any external pressures regarding the decision to waive counsel. The court must inform the defendant about the benefits of legal representation, such as assistance in calling witnesses and ensuring proper jury instructions, while also warning that self-representation comes with limitations, particularly regarding available resources in custody. Although adherence to the model colloquy is not mandatory, the defendant must generally understand the challenges of self-representation.

The Florida Supreme Court emphasizes that the core goal of the colloquy is to ensure the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives their right to counsel, focusing on the defendant's comprehension of their rights rather than the specific wording used. 

In the reviewed proceedings, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry with the defendant, Kendle, who expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney and insisted on representing himself. The court clarified the legal responsibilities of an attorney and the potential consequences of self-representation, ensuring Kendle understood his rights, including the option of court-appointed counsel. Despite the court's explanations, Kendle maintained his desire to proceed without legal representation.

A lawyer is essential in ensuring compliance with speedy trial rules and statutes of limitations. They can gather and present favorable evidence, file motions to exclude or suppress evidence, and seek to dismiss or reduce charges. The court emphasizes a lawyer's role in advising the defendant about entering a guilty plea, negotiating terms, and understanding the implications of self-representation, including lack of special consideration from the court.

The defendant is charged with second-degree murder, a life felony, and attempted second-degree murder, a first-degree felony punishable by up to 30 years. The court confirms the defendant understands the seriousness of these charges, the potential life sentence, the possibility of a permanent criminal record, and the risk of deportation for non-citizens.

The court explains how a lawyer's experience benefits the defendant during trial. A lawyer can present arguments, select jurors, call and question witnesses, and advise on testifying. They can also object to inadmissible evidence, assist in jury instructions, and ensure all trial errors are recorded for appeal. If convicted, a lawyer will prepare for sentencing, present mitigating factors, ensure a proper Pre-sentence Investigation Report is completed, and advocate for lawful sentencing. They can also help seek bail pending appeal. The defendant acknowledges understanding these points throughout the discussion.

Self-representation in court carries significant risks and disadvantages, as explained by the Court. The defendant is informed that they will not receive special treatment or additional privileges due to self-representation and will be restricted in accessing legal resources while in custody. They must abide by the Rules of Criminal Law and Courtroom Procedure, which typically require knowledge and skills that lawyers acquire through years of training. Disruptive behavior could lead to termination of self-representation and exclusion from the courtroom. The defendant's communication with the prosecuting attorney will be limited compared to that of a lawyer, and the prosecution will treat the case as if represented by an experienced attorney. The defendant also cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal if self-represented. The Court assesses the defendant's competency to waive counsel, confirming their age (27), literacy, educational background (nearly an associate's degree), and absence of substance influence or mental illness diagnosis. Evaluations by doctors suggest potential mental health issues, but the defendant has not reviewed these evaluations. The Court further inquires about any physical impairments that might affect self-representation, to which the defendant responds negatively. Finally, the Court confirms that the defendant has not been coerced into forgoing legal representation.

The court confirmed that the defendant, Kendle, understood he would be provided free legal representation. Kendle acknowledged his right to fire his appointed attorney and the option to have a different lawyer assigned but opted to retain his current counsel. Initially, Kendle had requested to represent himself, but after further evaluation, he withdrew this request, leading to the appointment of Jorge Viera from the Office of Regional Counsel. Following competency evaluations, Kendle was deemed incompetent to proceed on November 13, 2014, but was restored to competency by March 3, 2015.

During a subsequent Faretta inquiry on March 6, 2015, the court again assessed Kendle's understanding of the legal process and his background, confirming he had no legal training or history of mental illness, and was not under the influence of substances. The court explained the seriousness of the charges, potential penalties—including a minimum mandatory sentence of 25 years to life due to the use of a firearm—and the advantages of having legal counsel, such as assistance with witness preparation and trial procedures. Kendle demonstrated his understanding of these concepts and the implications of self-representation. Ultimately, despite being informed of the serious consequences, Kendle confirmed his decision to proceed without counsel.

Kendle requested to represent himself (pro se), leading the trial court to determine that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Despite his desire to discharge attorney Viera, the court appointed new stand-by counsel against Kendle's objection. On May 5, 2015, during a Faretta inquiry, the court reiterated Kendle's right to free legal representation and emphasized his lack of legal training and the benefits of having an attorney. Kendle acknowledged understanding the court's explanations but insisted on self-representation. As a precaution, the court ordered new competency evaluations, which Kendle cooperated with, resulting in a finding of his competence on May 22, 2015.

On June 5, 2015, the court performed another Faretta inquiry, reviewing Kendle’s background and the pros and cons of self-representation, ultimately concluding that he again made a knowing waiver of counsel. A similar inquiry occurred on August 13, 2015, before trial, where the court reiterated the charges, the seriousness of the offenses, and questioned Kendle’s confidence in his ability to represent himself. Kendle argued he could better cross-examine witnesses due to his firsthand experience with the events.

Following the transfer of the case to a new judge on August 17, 2015, another detailed Faretta inquiry took place. The new judge reviewed Kendle's background, the legal processes, and the potential consequences of self-representation, strongly advising him to reconsider. Kendle remarked that the questions exceeded previous inquiries. The court ultimately allowed Kendle to represent himself, noting his intelligence and articulateness. On August 31, 2015, the trial commenced with yet another Faretta inquiry.

The trial judge conducted a colloquy with Kendle to ensure he was not under the influence of drugs and fully understood the charges and penalties he faced. Despite lacking legal education and familiarity with court procedures, Kendle insisted on self-representation. The court concluded that Kendle knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, while reminding him of the availability of stand-by counsel. Throughout the trial, Kendle represented himself, displaying intelligence and articulation, including successfully impeaching a witness's testimony. The trial court affirmed that it adhered to the Faretta requirements, confirming Kendle’s informed waiver of counsel. Kendle consistently acknowledged his understanding of his rights and the implications of self-representation.

Additionally, Kendle challenged comments made by the trial court and the State during voir dire regarding his right to remain silent and his decision to represent himself. It is well-established that a defendant has the constitutional right to remain silent, as protected by the Fifth Amendment and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250. Any comments suggesting a defendant's failure to testify are considered erroneous but do not automatically warrant a reversal of conviction. The trial court's determination regarding Kendle's self-representation was supported by substantial evidence, affirming the validity of his waiver.

During voir dire, the trial court informed the jury about Kendle's right to remain silent and emphasized that the burden of proof lies solely with the State of Florida, which must prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The court assured prospective jurors that if Kendle chose not to testify, they could not infer guilt from his silence. After swearing in the jury, the court reiterated that no negative conclusions should be drawn from Kendle's decision not to take the stand, aiming to prevent any undue influence on their deliberations.

The court's comments and cautionary instructions were deemed appropriate and necessary to prevent jurors from speculating that a defendant's silence indicated guilt. The reference to the case Andrews v. State supported the necessity of such instructions to eliminate adverse inferences during jury deliberations.

Additionally, Kendle argued that comments made by the trial court and the State regarding his self-representation undermined his right to represent himself. Specifically, the State remarked on Kendle's status as a pro se defendant, stating he would be held to the same standards as an attorney, and questioned whether jurors would feel sympathy for him due to his lack of legal training. This raised concerns about the potential for bias in evaluating the prosecution's case against him.

Kendle contends that certain questions and comments made by the State improperly referenced his right to self-representation. However, he did not object to these inquiries, resulting in his inability to preserve these challenges for appeal, necessitating proof of fundamental error, which is absent in this case. The court highlights the necessity for counsel to identify any biases or prejudices among jurors to ensure they can impartially evaluate evidence and follow legal instructions. The prosecutor's inquiries about jurors' ability to assess evidence and adhere to the burden of proof, despite Kendle's self-representation, were deemed appropriate and free from error.

Kendle also disputes a discussion between himself and the trial court in front of the jury, arguing it undermined his self-representation rights. During the exchange, Kendle attempted to speak to the jury but was interrupted by the court, which reminded him of the established procedures. The court emphasized that while defendants have the right to self-representation, this does not permit disruptions or disregard for courtroom decorum. The trial court's comments, which went unobjected to, were considered a reasonable effort to maintain order during jury selection and did not constitute fundamental error or impede Kendle's right to a fair trial. 

In conclusion, the court found that 1) the trial court's interactions with Kendle were consistent with legal standards concerning self-representation; 2) Kendle made a voluntary and informed choice to represent himself; and 3) the State and trial court did not commit fundamental errors in their interactions with the jury. Therefore, the judgment and sentences were affirmed.