United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild

Citation: 899 F.3d 295Docket: 17-1625

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; August 7, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

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The Ancient Coin Collectors Guild (the "Guild") appeals a forfeiture judgment from the District of Maryland, concerning seven ancient Cypriot coins and eight ancient Chinese coins imported by the Guild. The Guild argues against the district court’s summary judgment, specifically challenging the treatment of its expert evidence, the striking of one of its pleadings, and the denial of requests for additional discovery. The Fourth Circuit, led by Judge King, finds no merit in these claims, noting that some issues are precluded by a prior ruling (Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 698 F.3d 171). Consequently, the court affirms the lower court's judgment. 

The ruling is contextualized by the U.S. signing the 1970 UNESCO Convention aimed at preventing illicit trade in cultural property, which includes antiquities like coins. The Convention allows State Parties to request import restrictions when their cultural heritage is threatened. Following this, the U.S. enacted the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) in 1983, outlining the process for such requests, which requires evidence of cultural patrimony jeopardy and that less severe alternatives are unfeasible.

The CPIA mandates that after publishing notice of a State Party's request for import restrictions, the President must refer the request to the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) for review and recommendations. CPAC, an eleven-member committee appointed by the President, examines the request, conducts an investigation, and prepares a detailed report on whether import restrictions are justified, specifying the materials affected. The President must consider this report before deciding on the request. If convinced of the need for restrictions, the President can enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that restricts the importation of archaeological or ethnological materials from the State Party, which are defined as objects of archaeological or ethnological interest subject to that State Party's export control.

Following the MOU, the President must report to Congress, explaining any discrepancies between his action and CPAC's recommendations. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is then required to create a designated list that specifies the materials covered by the MOU, ensuring that the list is precise enough to inform importers of what is restricted. Enforcement of these restrictions is governed by Section 2606 of Title 19, which makes it unlawful to import designated materials exported from the State Party after the designation. The term “designated archaeological or ethnological material” refers specifically to materials listed under the MOU, distinct from “archaeological or ethnological material of the State Party.” Importation of designated materials is allowed only if the importer provides documentation from the State Party certifying compliance with local laws regarding exportation.

Importers must provide "satisfactory evidence" to Customs to demonstrate compliance with importation requirements for designated materials under 19 U.S.C. 2606. Specifically, under 2606(b)(2)(A), evidence must show the material was exported from the State Party at least ten years prior to its U.S. entry, while 2606(b)(2)(B) requires proof that the material was exported on or before the date it became subject to restrictions. "Satisfactory evidence" includes an importer declaration and a seller statement verifying compliance with these provisions. Failure to provide the required documentation results in Customs refusing to release the material, with a 90-day window for the importer to submit the necessary evidence. If not submitted, the material is subject to seizure and forfeiture.

The "satisfactory evidence" for 2606(b)(2)(A) involves three components: (1) an importer declaration asserting the material was exported at least ten years before entry; (2) a statement confirming the importer acquired no interest in the material more than one year prior to entry; and (3) a seller statement specifying the export date or belief thereof. Conversely, the requirements under 2606(b)(2)(B) consist of two components: (1) an importer declaration indicating the material was exported on or before the restriction date; and (2) a seller statement detailing the export date or belief thereof.

Additionally, the Guild, a non-profit organization founded by Wayne Sayles in 2004, seeks to protect numismatists and opposes CPIA restrictions on ancient coins. The Guild argues that such coins should not be considered part of a country's cultural patrimony, as they often lack a known discovery location and have circulated internationally. They also express concerns about the difficulty collectors face in obtaining the necessary export certificates for compliance with CPIA evidentiary requirements.

Importers faced challenges in meeting the “provenance” requirements under 2606(b)(2), as many ancient coins lack ownership records due to a historical disinterest in maintaining such documentation among collectors. Sayles and the Guild argued that imposing Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) restrictions on ancient coins would threaten the existence of ancient coin collecting. In response to concerns over government-imposed import restrictions, the Guild initiated a lobbying campaign starting in 2004, which ultimately failed. In 2007, the U.S. State Department agreed to Cypriot government requests for import restrictions on ancient Cypriot coins, leading to the creation of the “Cypriot Designated List.” In 2009, a similar agreement was established with China for coins from the Zhou to Tang Dynasties, resulting in a “Chinese Designated List.” The Guild opposed these agreements, alleging bad faith by State Department officials and claiming non-compliance with the CPIA.

To address their grievances, the Guild sought to create litigation through the deliberate importation of restricted coins. They collaborated with British coin dealer Spink & Son to identify coins likely to be detained by Customs, shipping twenty-three coins from London to Baltimore on April 15, 2009. Spink's invoice, which accompanied the shipment, indicated that all coins had “no recorded provenance” and an “unknown” find spot, aiming to trigger Customs detention. Customs officers detained the shipment on April 24, 2009, issuing a Notice of Detention to the Guild due to “Cultural Property Import Restrictions per [19 U.S.C. 2606].” The notice required the Guild to provide evidence of compliance with the CPIA, to which the Guild's lawyer responded in May 2009, objecting to the detention.

The Guild argued that the State Department's regulations were arbitrary and capricious, and that Customs officers were required to trace certain coins back to China or Cyprus before detaining them. The Guild indicated it could not provide the requested certification and sought judicial review. On February 11, 2010, the Guild filed a civil action in the District of Maryland against the State Department, Customs, and two officials, contesting the detention of a coin shipment and alleging violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and constitutional rights. The Guild claimed the defendants acted ultra vires by imposing import restrictions on coins from Cyprus and China. On August 8, 2011, the district court dismissed the claims, ruling that the State Department's actions were not subject to APA review and that it had not exceeded its authority under the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA). The court also found that Customs acted within its authority and that the Guild's constitutional claims were without merit. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this dismissal in the Ancient Coin I decision on October 22, 2012, confirming that the State Department complied with CPIA procedures for the Chinese Designated List and that similar compliance was found for the Cypriot Designated List. The court addressed the Guild's ultra vires claim regarding import restrictions and clarified that the State Department and the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) are responsible for determining the origin of materials before listing them. The decision indicated that the Guild could challenge the government's assertions in a forfeiture proceeding, where the government would need to prove the coins were properly listed under the CPIA, ensuring fair notice to importers.

In the forfeiture proceeding, if the government meets its evidentiary burden, the Guild must prove that its coins are not subject to forfeiture as per 19 U.S.C. 1615. The government filed a complaint on April 22, 2013, in the District of Maryland seeking to forfeit ancient Cypriot and Chinese coins, alleging that the coins are archaeological materials subject to import restrictions and that the importer did not provide required CPIA-compliant documentation. Consequently, the district court issued a warrant for the coins' arrest. The Guild filed a Claim of Interest and responded to the Complaint with twelve affirmative defenses, demanding a jury trial. The government then moved to strike parts of the Guild’s answer, arguing that they attempted to relitigate issues settled by a previous decision (Ancient Coin I). While this motion was pending, the Guild amended its answer to present new defenses and counter the motion. The government had noted a discrepancy between the number of coins on an invoice and those detained by Customs, which was not relevant to the appeal. On June 3, 2014, the district court granted the government's motion to strike the Amended Answer, stating that it sought to challenge the validity of import regulations already settled by Ancient Coin I. Eight months later, the Guild filed a Second Amended Answer, omitting previous relitigated issues. Although the government moved to strike the Second Amended Answer, the court denied the motion, allowing it to stand as the Guild's operative response in the forfeiture action. Discovery commenced in March 2015, leading to various contested issues, including the Guild's challenge to the government's objections regarding requests for admissions related to the CPIA's jurisdiction over archaeological objects.

The government objected to the Guild's attempts to broaden the forfeiture action beyond the limits set by the Ancient Coin I decision. The Guild sought depositions from State Department officials Andrew Cohen and Maria Kouroupas, along with a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition concerning eleven topics, including circulation patterns of Cypriot and Chinese coins, relevant export control laws, and the drafting of the respective Designated Lists. In September 2015, the government requested a protective order to limit these depositions. Subsequently, in October 2015, the Guild sought to compel responses to document requests and interrogatories related to the same issues. 

On February 11, 2016, the district court ruled on these discovery motions, denying most of the Guild's requests and granting the government’s protective order, concluding that the Guild's inquiries were largely irrelevant to the forfeiture proceedings. The court emphasized the unlikelihood of export control status serving as a valid defense and deemed most requests for information from State Department officials as improper due to their legal rather than factual nature. 

The court also addressed the Guild's argument regarding the government's requirement to prove "first discovery," indicating that this was precluded by Ancient Coin I, though it noted the Guild might rebut the prima facie forfeiture case by showing that the specific coins were exported prior to CPIA restrictions. The Guild subsequently retained two experts, Douglas Mudd and Michael McCullough, who opined that the mass circulation of the coins made it challenging to classify them as illegally exported and that the exports from the UK and Hong Kong were legal under applicable laws. 

During discovery, the Guild made significant admissions, acknowledging that both the ancient Cypriot and Chinese coins listed in the complaint were on their respective Designated Lists and that it had knowingly imported these coins into the U.S. despite being aware of the applicable import restrictions.

The Guild denied awareness of import restrictions on seven unattributed Chinese coins named as defendants. Following discovery, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, leading to a district court decision on March 31, 2017, in United States v. 3 Knife-Shaped Coins. The court applied a burden-shifting framework from a previous decision, requiring the government to demonstrate the coins were listed under section 2604. It found that the government had already established the validity of the Cypriot and Chinese Designated Lists, shifting the burden to prove that each of the 22 coins fell within the designated classifications. The court ruled in favor of the government regarding seven ancient Cypriot and eight ancient Chinese coins, supported by the Spink invoice and Guild admissions that these were of restricted types. However, the Guild successfully defended against the forfeiture of the seven unattributed Chinese coins, as neither party provided evidence linking them to the Chinese Designated List.

For the contested fifteen coins, the burden shifted to the Guild to prove they were not subject to forfeiture or to present a valid affirmative defense. The Guild attempted to use expert evidence for this purpose, but the government objected, citing statutory limitations on acceptable documentation, which the Guild could not produce. The court did not address the admissibility of the Guild's expert evidence, concluding that the government was entitled to judgment regardless. The court found Mudd's expert testimony insufficiently specific to the defendant coins. It stated that general evidence regarding restricted materials could not rebut the government’s prima facie case, stressing that the Guild had not provided authority to support its claims against the designated lists. Additionally, McCullough's expert testimony was deemed inadequate for failing to meet the CPIA's documentation standards regarding lawful export from state parties.

Compliance with the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) necessitates a certificate or documentation from the State Party that requested import restrictions. The Guild failed to provide such documentation from Cyprus or China. Testimony indicated that the Cypriot coins were allegedly exported from the United Kingdom, but the CPIA requires proof of lawful export from the requesting country, Cyprus. Additionally, testimony regarding the Chinese coins only suggested potential lawful export, lacking the required specificity and contradicting CPIA standards. Consequently, the district court found that the Guild could not refute the government's case for forfeiture.

The court also dismissed the Guild's due process claims and requests for reconsideration, deeming them attempts to relitigate issues settled in a previous case. The court ruled that the constitutional claims were without merit and granted summary judgment to the government concerning the forfeiture of fifteen ancient coins (seven Cypriot and eight Chinese). The Guild has appealed, challenging multiple aspects of the district court’s judgment, including the requirement for the government to prove all forfeiture elements, the rejection of its expert evidence, and claims of deprivation of fair notice regarding the coins. The Guild also questioned the district court's discretion in denying certain discovery requests and striking defenses.

While the Guild suggests potential jurisdictional issues, the court confirmed its and its own jurisdiction regarding the forfeiture proceedings under relevant statutes. The summary judgment award will be reviewed de novo, with all facts viewed favorably for the nonmoving party, ensuring that no genuine disputes of material fact exist.

The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is the abuse of discretion, applicable to both evidentiary rulings and decisions to strike pleadings. Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. Although the Guild claims violations of its constitutional rights, only its third and fifth contentions substantiate these claims, while other assertions lack adequate briefing and merit, leading to their rejection based on waiver principles. 

In the context of federal forfeiture proceedings, most civil forfeiture actions are governed by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), which places the burden of proof on the government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture. However, forfeiture proceedings under the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) follow different rules, particularly under Title 19, where the initial burden of proof is placed on the claimants. Section 2610 of Title 19 specifies that the government must demonstrate certain conditions regarding the material's compliance with statutory requirements when the material is claimed.

The Guild argues that the district court erred by not requiring the government to prove two key elements for establishing a prima facie case for forfeiture: (1) that the coins were first discovered within a State Party subject to export controls, and (2) that they were illegally removed from that state's control. The Guild asserts that the government has failed to satisfy these requirements.

The government asserts that the fifteen seized coins were "listed in accordance with section 2604" of the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), fulfilling the two requirements: (1) classification by type and (2) providing fair notice to importers. The court agrees with the government, rejecting the Guild's arguments regarding the first discovery and illegal removal elements. The Guild claims that the government must prove the first discovery element at every stage of the CPIA process, but this assertion is only partially correct. The first discovery requirement applies solely to the initial listing of materials as restricted, not to subsequent actions involving imported materials once they are designated. The CPIA distinguishes between "archaeological material of the State Party," which includes the first discovery element, and "designated archaeological material," for which the requirement does not apply once listed. The responsibilities of the State Department and the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) in determining the cultural patrimony of the State Parties were properly executed, as previously upheld in the Ancient Coin I litigation.

Judge Wilkinson's opinion clarified that the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) and the Assistant Secretary of State evaluated where restricted cultural items originated during their review of requests from China and Cyprus. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) subsequently listed the items in the Federal Register by type, based on CPAC's determination that these items were part of each nation's cultural heritage. The court found no basis to challenge CPAC's conclusions regarding the discovery locations of the coins, affirming that it was reasonable to conclude that Chinese and Cypriot coins were discovered in their respective countries.

The court reiterated that it could not reconsider the prior ruling in Ancient Coin I, as one panel cannot overrule another's decision, and noted that the Guild's efforts to seek rehearing or certiorari were unsuccessful. With the legality of the listings already established, the focus shifted to whether the coins in question qualified as "designated archaeological material" eligible for forfeiture. According to the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), this term does not require establishing the first discovery element, directing Customs to prevent such material from entering the U.S. without proper documentation.

In forfeiture proceedings, the government must show that the material falls under the type listed in accordance with CPIA requirements. The Guild's misunderstanding of the CPIA stemmed from the "in accordance with section 2604" language, which mandates that restricted material lists be specific enough for fair notice to importers. However, the earlier ruling in Ancient Coin I precluded any further challenges to the listings' compliance with section 2604. Consequently, the government only needed to demonstrate that the specific coins fell within the listed types for the forfeiture action. The court concluded that establishing first discovery was not a prerequisite for the government's initial burden in these proceedings.

Congress intended the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) to balance procedural efficiency and recourse, with the judiciary generally not engaging in substantive reviews of the executive branch's international cultural heritage negotiations. Under the CPIA, in forfeiture actions, the government must show that the disputed material falls under the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), but is not required to prove that it was "first discovered" within the State Party. Such a requirement would necessitate inappropriate judicial scrutiny of international negotiations and contradict the established interpretation of the CPIA. 

The term "designated archaeological material" is crucial, indicating that once import restrictions are enacted, the government need not prove first discovery again, preventing entities like the Guild from challenging the State Department's determinations regarding a material's cultural patrimony. The courts are not equipped to reassess where archaeological materials are typically found, a matter reserved for the executive branch. Consequently, the Guild’s argument for relitigating first discovery in forfeiture actions is rejected, affirming that the district court correctly excused the government from proving this element. Additionally, the Guild claims the government did not demonstrate that the fifteen ancient coins were illegally removed from Cyprus or China.

The argument centers on the interpretation of the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), which does not prohibit the importation of all designated archaeological or ethnological material, but only that which has been exported from a State Party after designation, and without proper documentation proving lawful export. The Guild asserts that the government must demonstrate the illegal removal of such materials as part of its initial forfeiture case. This interpretation is rejected, as prior case law (Ancient Coin I) indicates that Congress anticipated attempts to import archaeological material lacking precise provenance documentation. Consequently, the government is not required to prove the provenance or export status of designated archaeological materials during forfeiture proceedings.

When Customs designates archaeological materials by type and includes them in a restricted list, the burden shifts to importers to prove that the material is importable by providing specific documentation. If they fail to do so, Customs is mandated to refuse the release of the material. The Guild argues that the reasoning from Ancient Coin I does not apply to forfeiture actions, but the CPIA does not mandate the government to establish the provenance of seized materials in this context.

For forfeiture proceedings to commence under section 2609, the authorities must show that the seized material is subject to section 2606, meaning it qualifies as designated archaeological or ethnological material covered by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and listed under section 2604. The government faces a significant burden in demonstrating that the seized material meets these criteria, including the specificity and precision of the designated list.

The legal document outlines the criteria that the government must meet in a forfeiture action regarding archaeological or ethnological material under the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA). Specifically, the government must demonstrate that: 1) the material is covered by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 2) it is listed by regulation under section 2604, and 3) the listing is sufficiently specific to ensure fair notice of the restrictions. The district court found that the government met its burden, confirming that the seized ancient coins were covered by enforceable MOUs with Cyprus and China, which are recognized as State Parties under the CPIA. The court also noted that a previous decision, Ancient Coin I, had resolved the validity of the Designated Lists, leaving only the need to prove that the Guild’s coins were listed under section 2604. The Guild conceded this point, affirming that the seized coins matched those on the lists, thus satisfying the government's burden and shifting the onus to the Guild to prove otherwise.

In a second contention, the Guild argued that the district court improperly excluded the testimony of its expert witnesses and the circumstantial evidence derived from that testimony. The Guild claimed that the court's requirement for particularization of the expert evidence was erroneous. However, the government maintained that the court appropriately discounted the experts' evidence, which conflicted with the CPIA's logic and failed to rebut the government's initial case. The court clarified that it did not exclude the experts' opinions outright but found their evidence insufficiently particularized to challenge the government's showing.

No abuse of discretion was found in the district court's handling of expert evidence, which did not create a disputed material fact to counter the government's prima facie case. Expert evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with courts performing a gatekeeping role to ensure opinions are based on a reliable foundation and relevant to the issues at hand, as established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. The Supreme Court emphasizes that relevance is essential for admissibility, aiding the trier of fact in understanding evidence or determining factual issues.

In evaluating the Guild's claims regarding its proposed experts, the district court's requirement for specific opinions to demonstrate that the fifteen ancient coins were not subject to forfeiture was upheld. The Guild argued that the term "particularized" is absent from the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) and that its burden on rebuttal was not specified. The Guild referenced 19 U.S.C. § 2610 and § 2609, asserting it could use any admissible evidence against the presumption of forfeiture. However, the court found no error in requiring tailored expert evidence, as the CPIA mandates that importers must demonstrate the importability of archaeological materials by referencing the specific articles in question. The importer must satisfy one of three statutory criteria regarding lawful exportation, which was taken into account by the district court in assessing the expert evidence related to the specific Cypriot and Chinese coins sought for import.

Permitting the Guild to counter the government's prima facie forfeiture case with generalized evidence about ancient coins contradicts the logic of the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA). Such expert evidence would not aid in determining the specific export status of the articles in question nor prove their lawful exportation. Instead, it would only challenge the legitimacy of designated lists that are not open to contest in these proceedings. The district court's requirement for particularized evidence ensured that the Guild's rebuttal expert evidence was relevant to the specific coins involved, adhering to the standards set forth in Daubert. Consequently, the Guild could not undermine the legitimacy of the designated lists or present evidence inconsistent with the CPIA.

The Guild argued that the district court improperly dismissed Mudd’s testimony about ancient Cypriot and Chinese coins as being specific enough to address whether the coins were exported before CPIA restrictions. However, Mudd's assertions were found to be generalized and did not specifically address the provenance or export status of the coins in question. His claims were characterized as a reiteration of the Guild's argument against the State Department's import restrictions, which had already been resolved in a prior decision. Therefore, the district court rightly rejected Mudd's testimony as insufficient to rebut the government's case.

Additionally, the Guild contended that the court improperly discounted McCullough’s specific evidence regarding ancient Cypriot coins to support the claim that they were lawfully exported while CPIA restrictions were in place.

McCullough asserted that the export of the disputed Cypriot coins from the UK was legal under EU and Cypriot law, satisfying the requirements of the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA). However, the government contended that McCullough's testimony only confirmed lawful export from the UK, not from the State Party that imposed restrictions. The district court sided with the government, noting that the CPIA requires consideration of the original export from the State Party, not subsequent exports. Consequently, the court found McCullough's opinions irrelevant and insufficient to counter the government's case in the forfeiture proceedings.

The Guild raised a separate issue, arguing that a Customs regulation (19 C.F.R. 12.104), which governs CPIA enforcement, conflicts with the statutory requirements under 19 U.S.C. 2601(2). This alleged conflict, according to the Guild, undermines an importer's ability to understand which items are subject to import restrictions. The Guild highlighted that the CPIA defines "archaeological or ethnological material of the State Party" in a way that connects the "first discovered within" language to all categories of objects. In contrast, the regulation seemingly applies this clause only to fragmented objects, implying that intact objects are exempt. The Guild contended that this inconsistency represents a significant drafting error in the regulation.

The Guild claims it was deprived of "fair notice" regarding import restrictions under 19 U.S.C. § 2604, asserting that the definitional regulation in 12.104(a) was insufficient. However, this claim is unfounded as § 2604’s fair notice provision applies only to designated lists of archaeological or ethnological materials, not to the definitional regulation cited by the Guild. To successfully challenge the fair notice, the Guild would need to argue that the Cypriot or Chinese Designated Lists lacked specificity in notifying them about restricted materials, such as ancient coins, which they failed to do.

Additionally, the Guild contends that it was unconstitutionally deprived of adequate notice under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The clause mandates that individuals must receive fair notice before property deprivation. Fair notice requires regulations to inform an average person clearly about prohibitions. The court referred to the Hoechst Celanese case, highlighting the necessity of a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the defendant had reasonable notice of regulatory obligations. In that case, the court found that Hoechst had not been adequately informed of its compliance requirements regarding benzene emissions, which contributed to its inability to meet regulatory standards. The inquiry revealed that Hoechst had sought clarification from regulators but received incorrect information. Ultimately, the court determined that Hoechst could not be held liable due to the lack of fair notice during the relevant period.

The EPA communication provided clear notice regarding how regulations applied to a specific plant's operations, establishing that Hoechst was aware its interpretation of benzene regulations conflicted with the EPA's guidance, leading to civil liability for violations after notification. In contrast, the Guild has been aware since 2007 that its interpretation of the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) regulations directly conflicts with the government’s interpretation. The Guild admitted to deliberately importing ancient coins that were subject to import restrictions, intending to challenge the forfeiture action. Thus, the Guild cannot claim it was unconstitutionally deprived of property, as its actions were knowingly in violation of federal law. Furthermore, the Guild's argument about the ambiguity between statutory and regulatory definitions does not demonstrate a lack of clarity in the import restrictions; the Guild itself used the designated lists to identify potentially seized coins, indicating that a reasonable person could understand the applicable laws. The Guild's due process rights were not violated, and its fair notice claim is rejected.

Additionally, the Guild contends the district court abused its discretion by not allowing discovery on the circulation patterns of Cypriot and Chinese coins, arguing this was relevant to evaluating the government's forfeiture case. The Guild claims this denial hampered its experts' ability to create complete reports. However, courts typically have broad discretion in managing discovery, and such decisions are rarely overturned without clear abuse of that discretion.

The court disagrees with the Guild's claims regarding the relevance of circulation patterns to the government's forfeiture case, asserting that the government is not required to prove first discovery for its prima facie case. Even if circulation patterns were relevant, the Guild was not barred from presenting this defense, having engaged a numismatic expert who argued that ancient coins should not be regarded as part of a country’s cultural patrimony based on historical circulation. However, the district court rejected this expert testimony, and the Guild failed to demonstrate how further discovery about circulation patterns would have changed the court's ruling.

Additionally, the Guild argued it was unfairly denied essential discovery related to the reasons for the seizure of its coins. The court found no prejudice to the Guild’s defense, noting that it had opportunities to depose government officials, including an import specialist and a Customs Assistant Director, regarding the seizure. Limitations on further discovery were imposed when the Guild sought legal conclusions from these officials, which the court deemed inappropriate based on established legal standards. The court affirmed that opinions and reasoning of government officials are generally not subject to discovery.

Lastly, the Guild contended the district court improperly struck its Amended Answer. The court indicated that there is no abuse of discretion in such rulings, as established by precedent, and upheld the district court's decision. Overall, the Guild's objections regarding discovery and the striking of its pleadings were rejected.

The applicable standard of review for a district court's decision to strike a pleading under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the abuse of discretion standard, as established by several circuits, including the Seventh Circuit. The court will not overturn such a decision if it is reasonable and not arbitrary. In this case, the Guild argued that the district court erred in striking its Amended Answer, asserting that the affirmative defenses removed did not fall into the categories specified by Rule 12(f). The Guild noted that motions to strike are generally disfavored, as they are seen as a drastic remedy.

However, the district court's decision to strike was justified as it adhered to the precedent set in a prior case, Ancient Coin I, which allowed the Guild to challenge the government's claims regarding import restrictions in a more specific context. The defenses stricken by the court were deemed not particularized to the current forfeiture action and sought to revive claims already decided against the Guild in Ancient Coin I. Examples of stricken defenses included claims of improper imposition of import restrictions and allegations of bureaucratic bias, all of which had been resolved in favor of the government in earlier rulings. Consequently, the court concluded that the district court did not err in its decision to strike the defenses, as they were irrelevant to the ongoing forfeiture case.

The Guild's motion to strike is argued as a violation of its due process rights, referencing the Supreme Court case Degen v. United States, where it was held that a claimant's right to defend property must be respected. In Degen, the claimant faced forfeiture of properties allegedly purchased with illegal drug proceeds but was barred from participating in the civil forfeiture case due to his absence from the country. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, stating that the claimant's due process rights were violated by preventing him from defending his property.

However, the Guild's situation is notably different; it has not been barred from defending its interests in the forfeiture action. The district court and appellate court have already considered and rejected the Guild's claims regarding the import restrictions on ancient coins, indicating that the Guild has had multiple opportunities to present its case. Consequently, the court finds no violation of the Guild's due process rights and affirms the district court's judgment of forfeiture.

Moreover, the Guild's argument to revisit earlier rulings based on alleged bad faith in imposing import restrictions is also dismissed, with the court declining to reconsider the prior decision on that basis.