In the Matter of the Paternity of J.G.L.: Kenya Roberson v. Quentin Lenig (mem. dec.)

Citation: 107 N.E.3d 1086Docket: 18A-JP-496

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; July 27, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Memorandum Decision outlines the appellate case concerning the paternity and custody of J.L., a child born on March 10, 2016, to Kenya Roberson (Mother) and Quentin Lenig (Father). In early 2017, both parties agreed to establish Father's paternity and signed a custody, support, and parenting time agreement in the Starke County Circuit Court, which granted Mother primary physical custody and allowed her to relocate permanently to California with the child. Subsequently, Mother filed motions to transfer jurisdiction to California under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and for contact between the Indiana trial court and the San Diego Superior Court, which the trial court denied.

Mother appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court erred in not transferring jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's denial was indeed an error, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded with instructions to transfer jurisdiction to California. The procedural history indicates that after the initial custody order, disputes arose between the parents, including allegations of interference with parenting time and claims of violence and illegal drug use by Father. A California restraining order was issued against Father, mandating that he stay at least one hundred yards away from Mother and Child for three years.

The California Restraining Order includes two attachments: a Child Custody and Visitation Order and the Court's Findings and Orders dated January 29, 2018. The Child Custody and Visitation Order prohibits visitation by the Father. The Court's findings indicate that the Father was not truthful, downplayed his abusive behavior, and failed to recognize its seriousness. The Court substantiated the Mother's abuse allegations against the Father, issued a three-year restraining order protecting both the Mother and Child, and set a hearing for custody modification for March 12, 2018. The Court claimed jurisdiction under Family Code § 3424 and expressed intent to reassess custody and emergency jurisdiction at the upcoming hearing.

During a hearing on February 19, 2018, regarding the Mother’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to California, the trial court ruled against transferring jurisdiction. The judge emphasized that the Mother had been attempting to exclude the Father from the Child's life and referenced the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) to justify retaining jurisdiction, as the decree of paternity was established in Indiana. The judge advised the Mother to attend future hearings for any issues concerning the Child.

The court denied Mother's request to transfer custody proceedings to California, citing several reasons in its order dated February 21, 2018. Key points include: 

1. Mother had relocated to California with the child, violating Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2.
2. Temporary custody was granted to Mother on the condition she remain in Indiana until the final custody hearing.
3. The court observed that Mother had hindered Father’s relationship with the child without just cause.
4. The court had previously approved Mother’s relocation based on an agreement that allowed Father extended parenting time.
5. The court emphasized that the child's relationship with Father was deemed in the child's best interest, which influenced its approval for relocation.
6. Father’s parenting time was reaffirmed, specifically scheduled for March 26, 2018, through April 6, 2018, during spring break.

Mother appealed the decision, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the factors laid out in Indiana law regarding jurisdiction transfer. However, the court noted that jurisdiction was not in dispute, as Father’s continued residency in Indiana maintained a significant connection to the state, thus allowing the court to retain exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters. The court has discretion to defer to a more convenient forum, but this does not apply as long as one parent remains in Indiana.

A court must evaluate whether it is in a child's best interest to transfer jurisdiction to a more convenient forum, as outlined in Indiana Code section 31-21-5-8. An Indiana court can decline to exercise jurisdiction if it finds itself an inconvenient forum and another state is more appropriate. This determination can be initiated by a party's motion, the court's own motion, or another court's request. Before deciding on inconvenient forum status, the Indiana court must consider various factors, including the presence of domestic violence, the child's residency duration outside Indiana, the distances between courts, the parties' financial situations, any agreements on jurisdiction, the nature of required evidence, the courts' abilities to expedite decisions, and their familiarity with the case.

The Mother claims that the trial court ignored these factors, which she believes constitutes an abuse of discretion, as the statute mandates consideration of them. The court concurs with her assertion. Additionally, while the enumerated factors are not exhaustive, courts may consider all relevant factors in their decisions. Previous cases have shown trial courts thoroughly reviewing relevant considerations. The interpretation of whether a trial court must account for all relevant factors remains an unresolved issue. Statutory interpretation aims to reflect the legislature's intent, relying on the statute's plain language.

The court emphasizes that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, it should be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of its terms without resorting to interpretative rules. Indiana Code section 31-21-5-8(b) mandates that before determining if an Indiana court is an inconvenient forum, the court must consider whether it is appropriate for a court in another state to have jurisdiction, allowing parties to submit relevant information. The term "shall" is interpreted as mandatory, and there is no indication that the legislature intended a different meaning. Consequently, the trial court is required to consider all relevant factors, although it is not obligated to address each factor explicitly.

In this case, the trial court failed to provide findings or explanations concerning the relevant factors, focusing instead on its belief that the mother was obstructing the father's relationship with the child. The court's determination to retain jurisdiction, despite California potentially being a more convenient forum, demonstrated an abuse of discretion as it did not comply with the statutory requirement to consider all relevant factors. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to consider the relevant factors before making a determination about jurisdictional convenience.