Anthony D. Eckman v. Northgate Terrace Apartments, LLC

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-18-00254-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 28, 2018; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Anthony Eckman appeals the judgment of the trial court that granted possession of his apartment to Northgate Terrace Apartments, LLC. Eckman argues that the court lacked jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer action because the original plaintiff, Northgate Terrace Apartments, was a non-existent entity at the time of the suit, thus lacking standing. He claims that evidence he submitted demonstrates that the corporate status of Northgate Terrace Apartments had expired prior to the filing of the lawsuit, and therefore it could not legally pursue the action. He highlights that standing and capacity are both required for a party to bring a suit, referencing Texas law which mandates that an assumed name must have an active certificate to maintain an action. 

The lease in question was signed by Eckman with Northgate Terrace Apartments, represented by Jelita Mills. Evidence shows that the Millses owned the property when the lease was executed and that Ronald Mills had filed an assumed name certificate for Northgate Terrace Apartments in 1996, which expired in 2006 without renewal. Eckman argues that the lapse of this certificate meant that Northgate Terrace Apartments lacked the legal authority to initiate the forcible-detainer action. Despite these claims, the court decided to vacate the trial court’s sanction against Eckman’s attorney but affirmed the judgment granting possession of the apartment to Northgate Terrace Apartments, LLC.

The Assumed Business or Professional Name Act mandates that a lawsuit cannot proceed without a valid assumed-name certificate; however, failure to file such a certificate is a capacity issue, not a jurisdictional one. This issue should be raised through a verified plea in abatement, allowing the plaintiff to rectify the defect. An assumed name does not constitute a legal entity, and the individual holding the assumed name retains personal liability for its obligations. The Millses’ lack of a valid assumed name certificate did not negate their standing; instead, it represented a correctable capacity defect. Although Eckman filed a plea in abatement, it was after the Millses transferred ownership of the Premises to Northgate Terrace Apartments, LLC. Consequently, Eckman was permitted to amend the pleading to reflect the new ownership, thus eliminating the need for an abatement. The distinction between misnomer and misidentification is crucial; in this case, the correct plaintiff was involved from the outset, and there was no indication that Eckman was misled or disadvantaged by the misnomer. Therefore, the Millses had standing to pursue the lawsuit, and the trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction despite the misnomer issue. Eckman's challenges were accordingly overruled.

Eckman asserts that the trial court erred by not submitting a jury question regarding whether the appellee provided adequate notice of lease termination. He claims the appellee did not give him specific notice of termination, despite having received a timely 30-day notice to vacate. Eckman argues that the lease required him to acknowledge receipt of the notice, and without this acknowledgment, the termination notice was ineffective. The court rejects these claims, noting that evidence, including Eckman’s testimony and the notice he received on October 16, 2015, establishes that he was properly notified to vacate by November 30, 2015. The lease stipulates that while the tenant must obtain written acknowledgment of their move-out notice, the landlord is only required to provide a 30-day termination notice, which was satisfied. Therefore, the trial court correctly declined to submit the jury question.

In Eckman’s fourth issue, he contends the court abused its discretion by imposing $1,250 in sanctions against his attorney without prior notice or opportunity to respond. The court agrees, indicating that the request for sanctions was made orally during a hearing regarding Eckman’s pre-trial motions, and the appellee's counsel did not provide sufficient context or justification for the request.

The trial court scheduled a trial for the week of August and noted it would consider a motion for sanctions amounting to $1,250. Subsequently, the court ordered plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees from Brian Guequierre, the defendant's counsel. Eckman's motion to reconsider this sanction order was denied, where Guequierre cited insufficient notice. Review of sanction orders requires examining the entire record, and such orders will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion. While courts have the inherent authority to impose sanctions for judicial process abuses, this power is constrained by due process, which mandates reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to sanctions being imposed. The court found that Eckman and his attorney did not receive adequate notice regarding the oral sanction motion, leading to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. Regarding Eckman's fifth issue, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his special exception related to a violation of Texas Property Code § 92.201 for not disclosing the new owner's information. The court did not assess the substantive merit of Eckman's complaint but determined that it lacked jurisdiction to address the issue.

The primary focus of forcible-detainer suits is the right to actual and immediate possession of property, as outlined in Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e). Courts are limited to adjudicating possession rights and cannot address issues of title. Counterclaims and the inclusion of third parties in eviction cases are prohibited; any claims not presented due to this restriction must be filed in a separate suit in an appropriate court. Justice and county courts have limited jurisdiction in these cases, only addressing specific matters defined in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, such as rent or damages directly related to possession disputes. Violations of Chapter 92 of the property code are not included in these permissible matters. The court upheld the trial court's decision to grant possession to the appellee and vacated an order requiring Eckman’s attorney to pay $1,250. The ruling was affirmed in part and vacated in part as of June 28, 2018.