Grubbs v. Delphi Automotive Sys.

Citation: 2018 Ohio 2352Docket: 2017-T-0097

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; June 18, 2018; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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In Grubbs v. Delphi Automotive Systems, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Appellate District of Ohio reversed and remanded a summary judgment granted in favor of Delphi Automotive Systems and several individuals, including Thomas E. Flak, George Svirbely, and Dominic Amato. Plaintiff Ronnie Grubbs, an African-American former employee, raised claims of racial discrimination, wrongful termination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress following his discharge in 2014 after 16 disciplinary incidents. Grubbs contended that he faced disparate treatment compared to non-minority employees, including being subjected to disproportionate discipline and being recalled after less senior non-minority employees. The court evaluated whether this evidence could establish genuine issues of material fact regarding the discrimination and retaliation claims. Grubbs argued that Flak, the general supervisor, had a personal bias against him and that other supervisors, including Amato, exhibited discriminatory behavior. The court found sufficient grounds to question the lower court's ruling and ordered further proceedings on these claims.

In November 2008, Grubbs faced disciplinary action from supervisor Bob Poweski for violating Shop Rule 20 regarding time-wasting, resulting in being sent home for the remainder of his shift. Grubbs claimed that supervisor Flak had improperly assigned another employee, Mike Long, to operate his press during his lunch break, leading to the production of defective parts and a cover-up that implicated Grubbs. Following this, in January 2009, Grubbs was disciplined by Flak for allegedly threatening fellow employees (violating Shop Rule 22) after he informed operators about the unsafe conditions of a machine. Flak dismissed Grubbs' concerns, stating he trusted the supervisor's word.

In December 2010, Grubbs wrote to Delphi's labor relations department to complain about the disciplinary actions and the lack of responses to his grievances. In September 2011, he was disciplined by African-American supervisor Paulette Clay for having a radio/antenna at his workbench, claiming he was not warned about the policy and that Caucasian colleagues were not disciplined for similar violations. Grubbs alleged that Flak instructed Clay to issue the discipline. This disciplinary action was later removed from his record.

Grubbs filed two complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming Flak was unfairly targeting him. In April 2012, Grubbs received two additional disciplinary actions for violating Shop Rule 40 concerning FMLA call-off procedures, despite finding that other employees had not faced similar consequences. Flak could not explain Grubbs' alleged violations.

In July 2012, Grubbs submitted a second complaint to the EEOC. In August 2013, he was again disciplined by Flak for wasting time at his assigned press, with the claim that he had fallen asleep while another employee was assigned there. Finally, in March 2014, Grubbs was disciplined by Mark Anderson for being out of his assigned work area, which ultimately led to his termination from Delphi.

Grubbs disputed Amato's claim of being outside his assigned work area by presenting witnesses during the investigation. He requested the attendance of Larry B. Peoples, the African-American human resources manager, at his disciplinary hearing; however, Peoples was not informed of the situation until after Grubbs was terminated, expressing concern about being unaware of discharges from his plant. In December 2015, Grubbs returned to work at Delphi Plant 47 under a Last Chance Agreement, which stipulated his return after all permanently laid-off tool and die makers were offered positions. This allowed two Caucasian workers, John Daugherty and Keith Zreliak, to return before him despite their prior terminations for misconduct and having less seniority. 

On September 14, 2017, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which Grubbs appealed on October 10, 2017, asserting that the court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact regarding his claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and pretext. The standards for summary judgment under Civil Rule 56(C) were outlined, emphasizing that it is only appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reviews such decisions de novo, without deference to the trial court's conclusions. Grubbs' first assignment of error specifically challenges the trial court's summary judgment regarding his racial discrimination claims, asserting that under Ohio law, it is unlawful for employers to discharge or discriminate against employees based on race, necessitating proof of discriminatory intent, which can be established directly or indirectly.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in Ohio by demonstrating membership in a racial minority and experiencing adverse employment action while non-minority employees in similar situations were treated more favorably. Upon establishing this prima facie case under R.C. Chapter 4112, the employer must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the treatment. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must then prove that these reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Summary judgment for the employer is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to raise a triable factual issue on any critical element. 

In the case of Grubbs, he has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, evidenced by ten years of employment without significant discipline contrasted with his sixteen disciplinary actions under a supervisor who may have treated similarly situated non-minority employees more leniently. Although Delphi offered legitimate reasons for Grubbs’ disciplinary actions, he presented evidence suggesting these reasons could be pretextual, including disproportionate punishment compared to other employees for similar infractions. The trial court initially deemed Grubbs' evidence as "conclusory" and "self-serving," but it was determined that sufficient evidence exists to potentially support his claims of pretext. Importantly, while direct evidence of racial bias was lacking, the evidence of disparate treatment allows for an inference of racial motivation, which should be assessed by a jury. It is established that a plaintiff’s race need not be the sole factor in an employment decision, but it must have made a difference.

The trial court's ruling on Grubbs' retaliation claim was incorrectly decided. Under Ohio law, retaliation occurs when an individual faces adverse employment actions after engaging in protected activities against discriminatory practices. To prove retaliation, a claimant must demonstrate that they participated in a protected activity, the employer was aware of this participation, an adverse action was taken, and there is a causal link between the two. While a plaintiff does not need to conclusively prove all elements initially, they must ultimately show that their protected activity was a decisive factor in the employer's action. 

The trial court erred by stating that Grubbs' 2012 EEOC complaint was too far removed from his 2014 termination to establish a causal connection, failing to recognize that Grubbs had filed an earlier complaint in October 2011. Following that complaint, he faced two disciplinary actions linked to his Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) usage, which were significant enough to lead to his termination due to progressive discipline rules. Although the time gap between a protected activity and an adverse action can impact the perceived strength of the causal link, retaliatory actions have been upheld even after a year. In Grubbs' case, a record of sixteen disciplinary actions over seven years, coinciding with his EEOC complaints, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

Furthermore, the trial court also failed to recognize genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the reasons provided for Grubbs' disciplinary actions and termination were pretextual. A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing that the employer's stated reasons lack factual basis, did not motivate the adverse action, or were insufficient to justify the adverse action.

Grubbs has provided evidence suggesting that the reasons for his disciplinary actions were not genuine, indicating potential discrimination. He was disciplined for actions (such as violating the laptop and video device policy and FMLA call-off procedures) for which other employees faced no or lesser consequences. Furthermore, evidence shows that Delphi supervisors did not thoroughly investigate the facts behind the disciplinary actions, with one supervisor claiming that a supervisor’s assertion of a violation was sufficient for discipline. Grubbs reported that supervisors acted on Flak's directives rather than their own judgment regarding the necessity of discipline. His termination stemmed from being out of his assigned work area, despite having witnesses who could dispute this claim; these witnesses were not consulted before the discipline was enforced. Additionally, Grubbs requested the presence of a union representative at his termination hearing, but this representative was not informed of the situation until after the hearing, contradicting normal procedures. This accumulation of evidence raises significant questions about the legitimacy of the disciplinary actions taken against Grubbs. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings, with costs to be borne by the defendants.