You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Wendy Osorio Martinez v. Attorney General United States

Citation: 893 F.3d 153Docket: 17-2159

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; June 18, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
Petitioners, four children of Salvadoran and Honduran descent and their mothers, are appealing expedited removal orders in a case previously adjudicated by the Third Circuit. In a prior ruling (Castro v. United States Department of Homeland Security), the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to review their claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as the petitioners' minimal ties to the U.S. (only a few hours of presence before apprehension) were insufficient to challenge this lack of jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. The District Court's dismissal of their petition was affirmed. In the current appeal, the critical difference is that the children have since obtained Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status, a classification intended to protect abused, abandoned, or neglected alien children. This status provides various rights and protections, including the ability to adjust to lawful permanent resident status, exemptions from certain grounds of inadmissibility, and procedural safeguards against revocation without just cause.

The court determined that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees seeking judicial review of expedited removal orders. Unlike the petitioners in the previous case of Castro, the current Petitioners—eight individuals who fled violence in Honduras and El Salvador—satisfied the eligibility criteria for SIJ status, thereby granting them the constitutional protections necessary to invoke the Suspension Clause. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's denial of the Petitioners' request for injunctive relief.

The Petitioners initially crossed into the U.S. in 2015, were detained, and subsequently ordered for expedited removal after their asylum claims were denied. They challenged the constitutionality of the removal procedures in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed their claims due to lack of jurisdiction. The key issues revolved around whether the INA stripped the court of jurisdiction and whether this stripping violates the Suspension Clause. The court reaffirmed its previous finding in Castro that it lacked jurisdiction under the INA to review the Petitioners' claims, as it could only assess the validity of the expedited removal order itself.

Petitioners were determined unable to invoke the Suspension Clause due to their status as recent unsanctioned entrants classified as "aliens seeking initial admission," which limited their constitutional rights regarding admission applications. During the Castro litigation, four children applied for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status, obtaining court orders stating that reunification with their parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and that returning them to their country of origin was not in their best interest. USCIS approved their SIJ petitions in late 2016, granting them eligibility to apply for lawful permanent resident status, although necessary visas were not available at that time, resulting in a two-year wait-list.

Despite their SIJ status, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continued attempts to expedite their removal to countries deemed unsafe for the children. This was notable as DHS had not previously sought to remove SIJ-classified children on an expedited basis. In response, Petitioners filed a class action for a writ of habeas corpus and injunction against expedited removal, claiming it violated their constitutional rights, statutory protections, and procedural regulations. They also raised a Bivens action regarding their detention. The District Court initially issued a temporary restraining order, but a subsequent judge dissolved it, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to provide the relief sought based on the interpretation of the Castro case. An appeal followed this decision.

The standard of review for preliminary injunctions involves three components: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the decision to grant or deny an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court has jurisdiction to assess its own jurisdiction, particularly concerning whether federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over Petitioners’ claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or the Suspension Clause. The Petitioners' release from physical detention does not impact jurisdiction since the "in custody" status is evaluated at the time of filing the petition. 

The Government argues that this case is similar to the precedent set in Castro, asserting that it limits jurisdiction under 1252(e)(2). However, the court distinguishes that while Castro restricts jurisdiction, it does not address the constitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping provision concerning Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees. The case examines two conflicting INA provisions: one allowing expedited removal for inadmissible aliens, which limits their court access, and another providing protections for certain aliens, like SIJ designees, who cannot be removed without due process. Petitioners argue that their SIJ status exempts them from expedited removal and preserves their right to judicial review.

The INA generally requires that inadmissible aliens be placed in standard removal proceedings, which provide procedural protections, including the right to present and challenge evidence. In contrast, expedited removal allows for quicker removal based on criteria set by immigration officers without these protections.

Under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), aliens subject to expedited removal must meet specific criteria: they must be 'arriving in the United States' or not have been continuously present for two years, not have been admitted or paroled into the U.S., and either lack valid immigration documentation or have made a misrepresentation regarding their immigration status. These individuals are afforded minimal procedural protections, primarily limited to an asylum interview, and judicial review of expedited removal orders is severely restricted to three narrow grounds: confirming the petitioner’s alien status, verifying if an expedited removal order was issued, and assessing legal permanent resident, refugee, or asylum status. The statute explicitly limits the review to whether an order was issued and its relation to the petitioner, while barring claims related to the order's implementation.

Expedited removal also imposes significant future admission restrictions, making any alien ordered removed under these provisions inadmissible for five years and subject to a ten-year inadmissibility if they reenter without admission.

Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) classification was established by Congress in 1990 to protect abused, neglected, or abandoned children who entered the U.S. illegally. SIJ status requires meeting strict eligibility criteria, including a juvenile court's determination that returning the child is not in their best interest, dependency on the court, and state custody. The process involves USCIS approval and consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security. Once granted, SIJ status provides significant benefits: SIJ designees are considered paroled into the U.S. for status adjustment, are exempt from several inadmissibility grounds, and can access educational support and preferential employment-based visa status. Notably, SIJ designees are exempt from inadmissibility due to lack of valid entry documents, which is the basis for expedited removal allegations against some petitioners.

SIJ (Special Immigrant Juvenile) status, once granted, cannot be revoked without notice and requires the Government to demonstrate 'good and sufficient cause' for revocation, provide notice of intent, and allow the SIJ designee to present opposing evidence. The designee has the right to appeal adverse decisions first to the Associate Commissioner and subsequently to federal courts if claiming legal wrong due to agency action. 

Petitioners assert that their SIJ status qualifies them for an exception to the general bar on judicial review related to expedited removal procedures, arguing that once granted SIJ status, they are deemed paroled into the U.S., rendering expedited removal orders unenforceable. However, precedent from the case Castro indicates that jurisdiction for review of expedited removal orders is narrowly limited to whether such an order was issued and whether it pertains to the petitioner, without allowing for broader inquiries such as claims of illegal application of the order. This ruling also dismisses similar arguments regarding parole status made in prior cases, affirming Congress' intent to restrict judicial review in expedited removal scenarios.

The court in this case supported the petitioners by interpreting 1252(e)(5) to focus on whether an expedited removal order pertains to the petitioner, concluding that reviewing the lawful application of the statute involves determining if such an order has been issued against them. However, the court in Castro criticized this interpretation as unsupported and contradictory to the statute's language. Petitioners claimed their challenge was not to the orders themselves but to actions by the Government that could effectively revoke their Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status post-order. Despite this distinction, 1252 restricts judicial review not only of the orders but also of any claims related to their implementation, with the term "relating to" interpreted broadly, potentially encompassing claims with only a tenuous connection to the removal orders. The court determined that the petitioners' claims regarding the impact of their SIJ status on the enforceability of the removal orders do indeed relate to those orders, thereby falling within the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 1252.

Additionally, the court addressed the constitutional question of whether the jurisdiction-stripping violates the Suspension Clause, which protects the right to habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion. Following the Supreme Court's analysis in Boumediene v. Bush, the court examined if the petitioners could invoke the Suspension Clause and if the alternative remedies were adequate to challenge their removal. The factors considered included the petitioners' citizenship and status, the circumstances of their apprehension and detention, and the practical difficulties in resolving their entitlement to habeas relief.

Petitioners may invoke the Suspension Clause due to their status as Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees, which parallels the status of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and supports their claim for habeas corpus. The analysis does not consider all factors from prior cases but notes that Petitioners were not detained outside U.S. territory and face no serious obstacles to habeas corpus proceedings other than minor resource expenditures. Previous rulings, including Castro, established that aliens apprehended shortly after entering the U.S. could not invoke the Suspension Clause based solely on physical presence. However, the circumstances surrounding the Petitioners' SIJ status—indicating significant ties to the U.S. and legislative intent for protective measures—allow them to claim this right. The expedited removal process fails to serve as an adequate substitute for judicial review, leading to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ for these Petitioners. In the initial step of the Boumediene analysis, it is noted that aliens seeking admission to the U.S. do not have constitutional rights regarding their application, a distinction clarified through the interpretation of prior case law. The ruling emphasizes that 'initial admission' and 'initial entry' are synonymous, reinforcing that the distinction between aliens in exclusion versus deportation proceedings is crucial to understanding their rights under the Suspension Clause.

The legal landscape regarding aliens and their rights in the context of immigration has long differentiated between "admission" and "entry." Aliens apprehended shortly after entering the U.S. are categorized as seeking initial admission and thus cannot claim constitutional protections under the Suspension Clause for judicial review beyond what Congress provides. This contrasts with the situation of Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees, who are distinguished from those merely at the threshold of entry and possess constitutional due process protections due to their established ties within the U.S.

The court referenced precedents indicating that once an alien gains admission and establishes connections to the U.S., their constitutional status evolves. Specifically, SIJ designees have met stringent eligibility criteria that recognize them as wards of the state, thereby fostering a significant legal relationship with the U.S. Congress has enacted protections for these children, and their eligibility for permanent residency is imminent, further solidifying their ties to the country. The court concluded that, unlike the petitioners in Castro, SIJ designees embody a substantive connection to the U.S. that aligns with Congress's plenary power over immigration matters.

Establishing Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status requires a successful applicant to be recognized as a ward of the United States with both state and federal approval. SIJ status is defined for children who have been declared dependent by a juvenile court in the U.S. or placed under state agency custody, where reunification with one or both parents is unviable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, as per 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). The purpose of SIJ status is to protect vulnerable children who have entered the U.S. illegally, as noted in legislative history and agency policy, emphasizing humanitarian protection for these individuals.

To maintain eligibility for adjustment of status while awaiting a visa, SIJ designees must remain under the jurisdiction of the state court or agency that committed them. Eligibility criteria include being physically present in the U.S., unmarried, under twenty-one, and having a dependency order from a state juvenile court affirming that the applicant is dependent or in custody of a state agency. The court must also determine that returning the applicant to their country of origin is not in their best interest and that reunification with their parents is not viable due to specified adverse conditions. These determinations must align with state law governing dependency declarations.

8 C.F.R. 204.11(c)(3) outlines that obtaining Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status requires petitioners to meet specific state residency requirements, such as Pennsylvania’s rule mandating that dependency actions be filed in the child's home county or a county where the child has resided within the last six months. Petitioners must have lived in Pennsylvania for over six months prior to seeking dependency declarations, as this is a prerequisite for applying for SIJ status. Following the state court's issuance of a dependency order, applicants must file with USCIS, providing evidence of eligibility and payment of the requisite fee. 

States often impose additional dependency requirements beyond those in the SIJ statute, highlighting the independent relationship between the SIJ applicant and the state. For instance, Nebraska requires proof that reunification with neither parent is feasible, and Florida mandates that abuse must not be too remote in time. The Secretary of Homeland Security must consent to the SIJ status, confirming the application is made in good faith primarily to seek relief from abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 

These regulations underscore the dependency and significant connections that SIJ designees have with both state and federal authorities, emphasizing the risk to their well-being if removed to their countries of origin. The relationship established through SIJ designation reflects more than mere entry into the U.S. and affirms Congress’s intent to provide abused, neglected, or abandoned children a legal connection to the United States, safeguarding their rights to retain and enhance that relationship without due process violations.

SIJ (Special Immigrant Juvenile) status provides significant benefits to eligible aliens, including the opportunity to establish connections in the U.S. while their adjustment of status applications are pending. SIJ designees are considered "deemed" to have been paroled into the U.S. for the purpose of applying for lawful permanent residency under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). A key legal question involves whether this "deemed" parole status grants SIJ designees an exemption from expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), which applies to aliens who have not been admitted or paroled. Petitioners argue that being "deemed" paroled should exempt them from expedited removal, while the Government contends this status only applies for adjustment purposes and does not confer broader parole rights. The District Court supported the Government's position, suggesting that "deemed" is a legal fiction intended solely for determining eligibility for immigrant visas. However, Congress has specified exemptions for SIJ designees from the general admission or parole requirements for adjustment of status and has also removed certain grounds of inadmissibility, thereby strengthening the legal relationship between SIJ designees and the U.S. and supporting their right to judicial review.

Congress has established various statutory benefits for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees, enhancing their connection to the U.S. while they await adjustment of status. These benefits include access to federally funded educational programs and preferential status for employment-based visas. Additionally, SIJ designees possess procedural rights to protect their status, as revocation can occur only for “good and sufficient cause” as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Any revocation requires a notice of intent, an opportunity to contest the allegations, a written explanation for the decision, and the right to appeal within the agency.

Judicial review is available for SIJ designees challenging agency actions that are not committed to discretion by law, including denials and revocations based on compliance with SIJ criteria. However, expedited removal threatens these protections, as removed SIJ children would be unable to adjust their status due to the requirement of physical presence in the U.S. and would face a five-year reentry bar. While the Director of USCIS may waive inadmissibility, this decision is unreviewable, lacks a fixed processing timeline, and incurs significant application costs. Ultimately, expedited removal could nullify SIJ status and raise constitutional due process issues by stripping SIJ designees of their statutory rights without adequate cause, notice, or review.

In Yeboah, it was established that the discretion of the INS Director in granting a juvenile alien consent for a dependency hearing, necessary for obtaining Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status, is limited only by due process. Juvenile aliens have the right to have their dependency hearing requests evaluated per INS policy, as emphasized by relevant case law. SIJ status provides significant legal benefits, and due process rights are tied to statutory rights conferred by Congress. Historically, the Executive has respected these rights, allowing SIJ designees to remain in the U.S. while their status adjustments are pending. Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permits the DHS to expedite removal of certain aliens, it has not typically sought expedited removal for SIJ designees during their application process. The agency has traditionally restricted expedited removal to specific circumstances. The President's directive to apply expedited removal to certain aliens has not changed the status of SIJ designees, who cannot be subjected to these proceedings without published policy changes. Furthermore, USCIS policy mandates that removal proceedings must be terminated before adjudicating an SIJ adjustment application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) supports the continuation of proceedings for SIJ applicants unless there is evidence of ineligibility.

In the case of In re Adelina Gonzalez-Morales, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) emphasized that unaccompanied children applying for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status should have their cases administratively closed or reset to facilitate the appropriate legal process in state or juvenile courts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicated plans to issue a new notice regarding expedited removal, potentially altering existing limitations. The Attorney General has directed that cases should only be administratively closed when explicitly permitted by regulation or judicial settlement, with cases deemed not suitable for continuation being terminated. 

Petitioners with SIJ designation are recognized as having at least minimum due process rights, distinguishing their situation from historical cases involving aliens detained at entry points, which did not afford similar constitutional claims. The legal relationship of SIJ designees to the U.S. is significantly stronger than that of individuals apprehended shortly after entry, as they are close to qualifying for lawful permanent resident status, pending the availability of immigrant visas and necessary approvals. The discussion does not imply that habeas relief requires prior due process determinations, nor does it necessitate a clear understanding of the Petitioners’ rights in relation to the Suspension Clause.

The relationship between the Suspension and Due Process Clauses is currently ambiguous. Aliens without constitutional rights cannot invoke the Suspension Clause, but those with statutory and due process rights related to Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status can. Lawful permanent residents (LPRs) are granted broad constitutional protections, including due process rights that prevent deprivation of life, liberty, or property without legal process. Once SIJ designees obtain LPR status, they will be exempt from the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), allowing for judicial review of any removal orders against them.

The government argues that adjustment of status is discretionary and that SIJ designees do not automatically gain this status or constitutional protections. However, this discretion does not negate the potential for constitutional claims. Previous case law indicates that undocumented aliens who have lived in the U.S. for years can successfully challenge their status constitutionally, suggesting that the lack of LPR status and potential inadmissibility do not preclude habeas review.

Petitioners, having exercised their rights as SIJ designees and with LPR applications pending for nearly two years, are on the verge of receiving visas, which underscores their substantial connection to the U.S. Their physical presence in the country during this time, including periods outside of detention, is a critical factor in assessing their constitutional rights.

The Plenary Power Doctrine affirms that Congress and the Executive have broad authority over immigration decisions, particularly concerning the admission or exclusion of aliens, which is largely shielded from judicial review. In Castro, where petitioners had no ties to the U.S., this deference led to a ruling favoring the Government. However, the doctrine is not absolute; it is subject to constitutional limitations, and courts retain the authority to assess whether Congress has exercised its power in a constitutionally valid manner. 

The distinction is made between aliens seeking initial admission, who have no constitutional protections, and those with substantial connections to the U.S., who do have rights, including habeas review under the Suspension Clause. In the current case, Petitioners qualify for the latter category as Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees, having met eligibility criteria, been declared dependents of the State, and granted various statutory rights. They are considered paroled into the U.S. for adjustment of status when visas are available.

Given these factors, the plenary power does not preclude the use of the Suspension Clause in their situation. Instead, the rights afforded to SIJ designees should be factored into removal proceedings, which would be undermined by the expedited removal pursued by the Attorney General. Furthermore, the Executive branch has previously recognized the unique status of SIJ designees, indicating that their removal proceedings must be halted to allow USCIS to process their adjustment applications.

The power of Congress over immigration includes the authority to expel or deny lawful status to aliens, but this also implies the discretion to refrain from such actions. The case Kleindienst v. Mandel establishes that Congress's legislative power is comprehensive regarding alien admission. The plenary power is used here to protect Petitioners, ensuring they seek the rights granted by Congress rather than pushing for judicial review beyond what is legislatively permitted. When the Attorney General's actions are perceived as contrary to Congress’s directives under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the challenge is about the scope of the Attorney General’s authority, which is not discretionary but must align with Congress’s policy formulation.

Habeas corpus cannot be denied to Petitioners, prompting further inquiry into whether the statute stripping jurisdiction provides sufficient alternative procedures for habeas corpus, as required by the Suspension Clause. The statute fails to offer an adequate substitute for habeas review, particularly in cases of executive detention, where effective review of detention legality is crucial. Historical precedent underscores the importance of habeas corpus in evaluating executive detention, emphasizing a meaningful opportunity for detainees to contest the legality of their detention. However, the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions limit habeas review to three narrow issues, failing to meet the fundamental standards of review necessary for due process.

The provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) restrict judicial review regarding an alien's admissibility and claims related to removal orders, thereby preventing examination of the lawful application of the expedited removal statute. The court emphasizes that these restrictions violate the Suspension Clause as applied to Petitioners, affirming that the District Court retains jurisdiction to consider their claims. The discussion references the Second Circuit's analysis in Luna v. Holder, which assessed whether statutory motions to reopen provide adequate alternatives to habeas corpus, ultimately supporting the Petitioners' position. 

In evaluating the District Court’s earlier denial of injunctive relief, the court indicates that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus or to prevent the Petitioners' removal. It outlines the criteria for granting a preliminary injunction, which include demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, the risk of irreparable harm, the balance of equities favoring the moving party, and the public interest. If the first two factors are established, the court will weigh all factors to determine if preliminary relief is warranted.

In immigration cases where the Government is the non-moving party, the third and fourth factors typically merge. The District Court’s decision to dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and deny the Petitioners’ motion for injunctive relief was found to be erroneous. The first factor, likelihood of success on the merits, was established due to the conflict between expedited removal orders and the statutory rights of Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) designees, which include eligibility for adjustment to Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) status and protections against revocation of SIJ status without due process. The second factor, irreparable harm, was satisfied by a juvenile court’s finding that reunification with the child’s parents was unviable due to abuse or neglect, and returning the child to their country of origin was contrary to their best interests. The third and fourth factors also favored the Petitioners, as the urgency of removal was undermined by the Government's prior lack of action against SIJ applicants, and the public interest was better served by allowing individuals access to their statutory rights and judicial review. Consequently, the court decided to reverse the District Court’s denial of injunctive relief and remand for consistent proceedings. The relief granted is limited to minor Petitioners, highlighting a lack of justification for the prolonged detention of one of the Petitioners and their mother.