Differences between two documents were noted, specifically between versions labeled "16-111_new2" and "16-111." Both documents are 59 pages long, but the new document is larger at 388 KB compared to the old document's 328 KB. The change on page 42 was made on June 4, 2018, with the first change occurring on page 9. No pages were deleted, and the report uses specific highlights to indicate changes, deletions, and movements of content.
The syllabus pertains to the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, concerning a Colorado bakery owned by Jack Phillips. In 2012, Phillips refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious beliefs, although he offered to sell them other baked goods. The couple filed a complaint under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Colorado Civil Rights Division found probable cause for a violation, leading to a ruling against Phillips by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was affirmed by both the Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court held that the Commission's actions violated the Free Exercise Clause. While laws can protect the civil rights of gay individuals, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage must also be respected. The Court emphasized that the application of the law must remain neutral regarding religion, recognizing Phillips' claim that creating a wedding cake constituted expressive speech intertwined with his religious beliefs.
In 2012, prior to Colorado's recognition of same-sex marriages and relevant Supreme Court rulings (United States v. Windsor and Obergefell), the baker, Phillips, argued that his refusal to create a custom cake for a same-sex wedding was lawful under state law, which permitted storekeepers to decline requests for messages they found offensive. The State Civil Rights Division had previously ruled in favor of bakers who refused to create cakes with anti-gay messages. Phillips was entitled to a fair review of his claims, but this was undermined by the Commission's treatment of his case, which displayed hostility towards his religious beliefs. Commissioners publicly disparaged Phillips' faith and compared it to justifications for slavery and the Holocaust, with no objections recorded or disavowed. The Commission's inconsistent treatment of Phillips compared to other bakers who had similar objections indicated a bias against the religious basis of his refusal. The Commission's ruling against Phillips, based on the attribution of the cake's message to the customer rather than the baker, was not consistently applied in other cases involving anti-gay requests. This disparity, coupled with the Commission's failure to acknowledge Phillips' willingness to serve other customers, raised concerns about the fairness of the proceedings. Consequently, the Commission's actions violated the First Amendment's requirement for governmental neutrality towards religion, as the state cannot impose regulations that demonstrate hostility towards religious beliefs. Factors influencing the assessment of governmental neutrality include the historical context and statements made by decision-makers involved in the case.
The Commission's handling of Phillips' case demonstrated a lack of tolerance and respect for his religious beliefs. It appeared to assess his religious objection through a biased lens, questioning the legitimacy of his conscience-based objection, which is outside the government's purview. This lack of neutrality infringes on the Free Exercise Clause, as the State's interests were not balanced against Phillips' sincere religious beliefs in a manner that upheld the required religious neutrality. Additionally, certain comments from commissioners conveyed hostility towards religion, further undermining the impartiality expected in such cases. The Commission’s treatment of Phillips was inconsistent compared to similar cases involving other bakers, indicating a disparate application of standards. The Supreme Court's opinion, delivered by Justice Kennedy, highlights these issues in the context of a 2012 incident where Phillips refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious convictions, which led to a discrimination claim under Colorado law. The Court must now assess whether the Commission's ruling infringed upon Phillips' constitutional rights while also considering the rights of same-sex couples facing discrimination.
The excerpt addresses the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, particularly regarding freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. The case examines the complexities surrounding a baker’s refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, noting that the refusal's specifics—such as whether it involves designing a cake with religious messages or simply refusing to sell any cake—are crucial in determining the applicability of protected speech and free exercise claims. It highlights that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's handling of the case lacked the religious neutrality mandated by the Constitution, resulting in a violation of the Free Exercise Clause due to the baker's sincere religious beliefs. The excerpt emphasizes that the baker, Jack Phillips, views his participation in a same-sex wedding celebration through the creation of a cake as contrary to his religious convictions, which assert that marriage should be exclusively between one man and one woman. Ultimately, the Commission's actions are deemed inconsistent with constitutional protections, warranting that its order be set aside.
Phillips encountered Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins in his shop during the summer of 2012, where the couple expressed their intention to order a wedding cake for their upcoming marriage, which they planned to legally celebrate in Massachusetts due to Colorado's lack of recognition for same-sex marriages. Phillips declined to create a wedding cake for them, stating he does not make cakes for same-sex weddings due to his religious beliefs opposing such unions. He elaborated that fulfilling their request would constitute an endorsement of their marriage, which he believed contradicted his religious teachings. Following this interaction, Craig's mother contacted Phillips for clarification, and he reiterated his stance based on both his faith and the legal context of Colorado at the time.
Colorado's historical legal framework prohibits discrimination in public accommodations, originating from an 1885 law aimed at ensuring equal rights for all citizens regardless of race or background. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) further reinforces this principle, having been amended in 2007 and 2008 to include protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation. CADA makes it unlawful to deny individuals access to services in public accommodations based on various protected characteristics. It defines "public accommodation" broadly, encompassing businesses that sell to the public while exempting places used primarily for religious purposes. An administrative system is in place under CADA for addressing discrimination complaints, managed by the Colorado Civil Rights Division.
The Division investigates claims of violations under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) and, if probable cause is found, refers the case to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission decides whether to conduct a formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who hears evidence and issues a written decision. The ALJ's decision can be appealed to the full Commission, which consists of seven appointed members and holds a public hearing before voting on the case. If a CADA violation is confirmed, the Commission can impose statutory remedies, including cease-and-desist orders, compliance reports, and mandates for affirmative action, but cannot levy monetary damages.
In September 2012, Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and its owner, Phillips, alleging denial of service based on sexual orientation. The investigation revealed that Phillips had previously refused to serve same-sex couples, citing religious beliefs and a policy against creating cakes for same-sex weddings. The Division found probable cause of a CADA violation and referred the matter to the Civil Rights Commission, which ordered a formal hearing. The ALJ ruled in favor of Craig and Mullins, rejecting Phillips' argument that his refusal did not violate state law, determining that his actions constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation. Phillips also claimed that being compelled to create a cake for a same-sex wedding infringed upon his First Amendment right to free speech.
The ALJ determined that preparing a wedding cake does not constitute protected speech and that creating a cake for Craig and Mullins would not compel Phillips to adopt an ideological viewpoint. The application of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) was viewed by the ALJ as not infringing on Phillips' freedom of speech. Furthermore, Phillips argued that being required to create cakes for same-sex weddings violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Citing precedent from Employment Division v. Smith, the ALJ classified CADA as a valid and neutral law, concluding its application did not breach the Free Exercise Clause. The Commission upheld the ALJ's ruling, ordering Phillips to stop discriminating against same-sex couples and mandating training for staff on public accommodations laws, alongside quarterly compliance reports for two years documenting denied services and remedial actions taken.
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's decisions, rejecting claims that compliance would unconstitutionally compel him to express a celebratory message about same-sex marriage and that it violated his free exercise rights. The court reiterated that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt individuals from adherence to valid and neutral laws. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case, leading Phillips to seek review from the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. He renewed his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.
The document acknowledges the societal recognition of the dignity and worth of gay individuals and couples, emphasizing that the law and Constitution must protect their civil rights. It also notes that while religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected, the First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and individuals can express their beliefs freely.
Religious and philosophical objections are generally protected; however, they do not permit business owners to deny equal access to goods and services under public accommodations laws. Legal precedents, such as Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, support this view. States have the authority to enact laws that protect groups targeted by discrimination without violating the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Clergy may refuse to officiate gay weddings based on religious grounds, which is recognized as an exercise of their religious rights. However, if this exception were broadly applied, it could lead to widespread discrimination against gay individuals in accessing goods and services related to weddings, undermining civil rights protections.
Colorado law can protect gay individuals in obtaining services as other individuals do, ensuring equality in public accommodations. The excerpt notes that if a baker refused to serve any cakes for gay weddings, it would likely violate public accommodations laws. The case at hand involves a baker, Phillips, who argues that creating a wedding cake constitutes an expressive act that conflicts with his religious beliefs. His challenge lies in distinguishing between delivering goods and being compelled to convey a message he opposes. This situation is complicated by the fact that Colorado did not recognize gay marriages at the time of Phillips' refusal in 2012.
At the time of the relevant events, the Colorado Constitution and state law did not recognize same-sex marriages, and there had been no Supreme Court decisions addressing the issue. The baker, Phillips, argued that his refusal to create a cake for a same-sex wedding was lawful, as it aligned with his sincerely held religious beliefs and was a limited expression against gay marriage. State law allowed some discretion for business owners to refuse to create messages they found offensive. The Colorado Civil Rights Division previously supported bakers who declined to create cakes that demeaned gay individuals or marriages, indicating a precedent for limited refusals.
However, the state had potential counterarguments related to enforcing public accommodation laws. A ruling in favor of Phillips could lead to widespread refusals of service based on religious objections, risking discrimination against gay individuals. Despite this, Phillips deserved neutral and respectful consideration of his claims.
The Civil Rights Commission's treatment of Phillips' case, however, exhibited hostility toward his religious beliefs, particularly during public hearings. Commissioners suggested that religious beliefs should not influence business practices and implied that those holding such beliefs were unwelcome in the business community. One commissioner explicitly stated that if a businessman has conflicts between his beliefs and the law, he should consider compromising, indicating a stance that may prioritize public policy over personal convictions.
Comments made by a commissioner during a public meeting on July 25, 2014, are criticized for being inappropriate and dismissive of Phillips’ free exercise rights. The commissioner disparaged Phillips' religious beliefs by equating the use of religion to justify discrimination with historical atrocities such as slavery and the Holocaust, labeling such rhetoric as despicable. This characterization undermines the sincerity of Phillips' faith and raises concerns about the impartiality of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in adjudicating his case, especially since no other commissioners objected to these remarks. Additionally, the context of these comments differs significantly from legislative discourse, as they were made by an adjudicatory body handling a specific case. Evidence of bias is further suggested by the disparate treatment of Phillips' case compared to other bakers who refused to create cakes with messages against same-sex marriage, which were deemed lawful by the Commission on grounds of conscience. This inconsistency raises questions about the fairness of the Commission's decisions regarding religious beliefs and discrimination.
The treatment of conscience-based objections in three cases is compared to the Commission's handling of Phillips' objection regarding his refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The Commission ruled against Phillips, arguing that the wedding cake's message would be attributed to the customer rather than the baker, a point not raised in the other cases involving cakes with anti-gay marriage symbolism. In those other cases, the Commission found no violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) partly because the bakeries were willing to sell other products with Christian themes. However, the Commission dismissed Phillips' willingness to sell other baked goods to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant.
Phillips contended that the inconsistent treatment indicated hostility toward his religious beliefs, alleging that while other bakers' objections were deemed legitimate, his was not. The Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged this disparity only briefly, suggesting that the cases differed because the other bakeries refused requests based on the offensive nature of the messages, leading to no impermissible discrimination. The ruling implied that the government cannot determine what constitutes an offensive message, which could unfairly privilege one viewpoint over another, thus signaling disapproval of Phillips' religious beliefs.
The Commission's treatment of Phillips' case was found to violate the First Amendment by reflecting hostility towards his religious viewpoint. The Court emphasized that the government must remain neutral and tolerant toward citizens' religious beliefs, as even subtle biases against religion are prohibited under the Free Exercise Clause. Consequently, the Commission was required to handle Phillips' case with neutrality and respect for his religious convictions.
The Constitution mandates governmental religious tolerance, requiring officials to consider their duty when state actions appear to arise from animosity or distrust toward religion. Key factors in assessing governmental neutrality include the historical context, events leading to the policy, and statements from decision-makers. In this case, the Commission's handling of Phillips' case showed a lack of respect for his religious beliefs, as it seemed to evaluate his objection negatively rather than neutrally. The government must not determine the legitimacy of religious objections. The Court inferred that Phillips’ religious objection was not afforded the neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, the Commission's apparent hostility, reflected in certain comments, was inconsistent with First Amendment protections. The disparate treatment of Phillips compared to other bakers further highlighted this inconsistency. Consequently, the Commission's and state court's decisions were invalidated, emphasizing the need for neutral adjudication that respects sincere religious beliefs while balancing the rights of all individuals in the marketplace. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals was reversed.
Religious and philosophical objections do not permit business owners to deny equal access to goods and services under public accommodations laws. State actors must treat religious views with "neutral and respectful consideration," a requirement the Colorado Civil Rights Commission failed to meet regarding the case of baker Jack Phillips. The Court noted a disparity in how Phillips' case was treated compared to three other bakers who declined to make cakes with anti-same-sex marriage messages for a customer, William Jack. These bakers were found to have acted in accordance with the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), as they denied a request that was offensive in nature, applying the law uniformly without targeting Jack's religion. Conversely, Phillips refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, violating CADA's mandate for equal enjoyment of services regardless of sexual orientation. The Court emphasized that the differing outcomes in these cases could have been justified by a straightforward interpretation of Colorado law, free from bias against religious beliefs. The Court’s opinion aligns with this interpretation, focusing on the reasoning of the state agencies without addressing the ultimate distinctions between the cases.
Justice Gorsuch argues that the Jack cases and the Phillips case should be treated similarly because the bakers in both scenarios refused to sell requested cakes to anyone, which he claims does not constitute unlawful discrimination. However, he acknowledges that Phillips regularly sells wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples, leading to a characterization of the product at issue. Gorsuch contends that Phillips refused to sell a "cake celebrating same-sex marriage," rather than a standard wedding cake. He asserts that the cake requested was merely a wedding cake suitable for both same-sex and opposite-sex weddings and that a vendor cannot avoid public accommodation laws based on religious beliefs regarding customers' identities. He cites precedent establishing that vendors must serve all customers equally, regardless of sexual orientation or other protected traits. Gorsuch concludes that Colorado could distinguish Phillips’ discriminatory actions from those of the bakers in the Jack cases, who did not engage in prohibited discrimination. Additionally, he emphasizes that while the state can protect individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation, it must ensure that its enforcement is free from religious bias. Gorsuch acknowledges the ongoing debate surrounding the free exercise of religion, referencing the case Employment Division v. Smith, but maintains that government neutrality toward religious exercise is crucial to avoid legal complications.
The government must demonstrate that its restrictions on religious practices meet strict scrutiny standards, serving a compelling interest and being narrowly tailored (Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah). The Supreme Court found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not act neutrally in its treatment of Jack Phillips, a baker who refused to create a cake for a same-sex wedding based on his religious beliefs. In contrast, the Commission allowed three other bakers to decline requests that conflicted with their secular beliefs, yet denied Phillips similar accommodation, citing that his beliefs were "offensive." Such a dismissal of a sincerely held religious belief contradicts First Amendment protections.
The Commission's reasoning failed to uphold strict scrutiny, as it did not justify its disparate treatment of Phillips compared to other bakers. The situation was further complicated by complaints from William Jack, who sought cakes with messages opposing same-sex marriage. Although the Colorado Civil Rights Division ruled that the bakers' refusals were based on their moral convictions rather than Jack's religious beliefs, the Commission ultimately denied Phillips relief without adequately addressing the evidence of hostility toward his faith. This raises concerns about the Commission's neutrality in its treatment of religious beliefs under the law.
Mr. Phillips asserted that he could not create a cake for a same-sex wedding due to his religious beliefs but was willing to make other baked goods for the couple. He confirmed that he would refuse to make a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage for any customer, regardless of their sexual orientation. The record indicated that he had previously declined a similar request from Mr. Craig's mother. The claim that Mr. Phillips would serve a heterosexual customer seeking a cake for a same-sex marriage or would not sell other products to a homosexual customer misinterprets the factual record. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission determined that Mr. Phillips's actions violated public accommodations law. Both Mr. Phillips and other bakers involved in similar cases refused service based solely on their personal convictions, not an intention to discriminate against a protected class. While the bakers recognized their refusals would leave customers from protected classes without service, they maintained that their decisions were based on the nature of the cake requested, not the customer's identity. The distinction between intended actions and their foreseeable effects is acknowledged in both life and law, suggesting that some choices come with unavoidable consequences.
The Commission exhibited a lack of neutrality by inconsistently applying legal standards in cases involving service denial based on protected class status. In Mr. Jack's case, despite bakers knowingly denying service to an individual in a protected class, the Commission found no violation because the bakers intended to distance themselves from the requested message's offensive nature. This contrasts sharply with Mr. Phillips's case, where the Commission dismissed a similar defense, presuming intent to discriminate against a protected class based on the bakers' actions. The Commission's reasoning suggested that Mr. Phillips's intentions were tied to the sexual orientation of the parties involved, while failing to apply the same logic to Mr. Jack's case, despite both instances potentially affecting customers with protected characteristics. The Commission's double standard is evident as it required no proof of discriminatory intent in Mr. Phillips's case but did in Mr. Jack's. This inconsistency raises concerns about the Commission's ability to apply the law uniformly, particularly in distinguishing between religious and secular objections. Ultimately, the Commission cannot selectively apply different standards based on the nature of the objection, as this undermines the principle of neutral treatment of religion.
The Commission's actions against Mr. Phillips for his religious beliefs are critiqued as lacking a persuasive justification that could withstand strict scrutiny. The Court emphasizes that while some may view Mr. Phillips’s beliefs as irrational or offensive, the role of secular authorities is to protect the free exercise of religion rather than to judge it. The First Amendment safeguards unpopular religious beliefs, reinforcing the commitment to religious freedom in the U.S. The excerpt argues that the Commission's efforts to differentiate between cases based on the specific requests for cakes do not respect Mr. Phillips's faith, and the rationale that certain cakes convey messages while others do not is deemed irrational. It asserts that all wedding cakes, irrespective of wording, symbolize the celebration of marriage, including same-sex weddings, and thus carry a message.
A cake for a same-sex wedding symbolizes approval of a specific institution, and Mr. Phillips intended to withhold that approval due to his religious beliefs. The Commission denied him the choice to refuse, while allowing bakers in another case the freedom to decline messages they found offensive. This inconsistency is viewed as non-neutral, as it implies that one must be forced to express a belief through written words rather than symbols. Civil authorities lack the authority to dictate what constitutes "orthodox" religious beliefs or to assess whether someone has correctly interpreted their faith. Legal protection should extend to any sincere expression of faith, regardless of whether it is articulated in words or symbols.
The case centers on the distinction between a generic cake and one specifically celebrating a same-sex wedding. The Commission's approach to generality was inconsistent, as it treated Mr. Jack's request for cakes differently than Mr. Phillips's case. If the broad category of "cakes" were applied, the Commission should have mandated the bakers to create Mr. Jack's cakes just as it required Mr. Phillips to make the wedding cake. Conversely, defining the cakes as those conveying messages related to same-sex marriage would justify Mr. Phillips's refusal. Consistent application of the same level of generality would necessitate equal treatment for both bakers.
Adjusting the level of generality in legal reasoning based on the identities and views of the parties involved is improper and can lead to biased outcomes. In this context, the Commission's differential treatment of Mr. Jack's cake, which conveys a message about same-sex marriage, versus Mr. Phillips's cake, which conveys no such message, demonstrates this issue. The application of public accommodation laws must respect religious beliefs neutrally, treating all cases with the same level of generality. Mr. Phillips’s religious beliefs deserve equal respect as the secular beliefs in Mr. Jack's case, underscoring that individuals should define their religious commitments without interference from authorities. Past cases, such as Thomas and Lee, highlight that personal definitions of religious obligations must be protected under the First Amendment. Consequently, the Commission must grant Mr. Phillips the same consideration afforded to Mr. Jack's bakers, as the prior rulings failed to provide neutral treatment of his religious objections. The Court has reversed the Commission's decision, indicating that future cases may require a neutral standard for service refusals, but the current rulings must be invalidated.
Mr. Phillips has established a violation of his First Amendment rights after nearly six years of facing unlawful civil charges, warranting a judgment in his favor. The Supreme Court, in a case involving Phillips and the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, found that the Commission discriminated against him based on his religious beliefs, treating his case differently from similar cases involving other bakers. This differential treatment was attributed to hostility towards Phillips’ religion, evidenced by disparaging remarks made by some Commissioners. While the Court recognizes the disturbing nature of these comments, it emphasizes that the discriminatory enforcement of Colorado's public-accommodations law alone suffices to violate Phillips' rights.
Phillips' free-exercise claim is upheld, but the Court does not address his free-speech claim due to uncertainties in the record regarding whether he refused to create a custom wedding cake or simply refused to sell any wedding cake to the respondents. The Colorado Court of Appeals sided with Phillips, stating he refused to design a cake for a same-sex wedding. However, the Appeals Court concluded that his actions were not expressive and did not constitute protected speech, suggesting that an observer would interpret his compliance with the law as non-expressive. Justice Thomas criticizes this reasoning, arguing it undermines fundamental free-speech principles and could justify laws that compel speech. The First Amendment, applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state laws that infringe upon freedom of speech, distinguishing between regulations of speech and conduct, the latter generally not deemed an infringement on speech rights.
Public-accommodations laws prohibit discrimination in the provision of services, not speech itself. However, these laws can burden protected speech when they effectively treat speech as the public accommodation. For instance, in *Hurley*, the Supreme Court found that a Massachusetts law requiring a St. Patrick’s Day parade to include a unit of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals violated the sponsor's free speech rights. The Court determined that parades are expressive forms of communication and that the law altered the parade's expressive content by compelling the addition of a new unit, which conveyed specific messages about sexual orientation and social acceptance. The Court emphasized that government cannot dictate acceptable thoughts or statements, as this undermines free speech. The opinion highlighted that expressive conduct extends beyond mere words and can include various forms of symbolism. The Court assesses whether conduct is expressive by considering if it was intended to communicate a message and if it would reasonably be understood as such by observers.
The excerpt emphasizes that the government cannot restrict or compel speech, including expressive conduct, as protected under the First Amendment. It highlights that expressive conduct is not limited to spoken words but includes artistic expressions such as the works of Jackson Pollock, musical compositions by Arnold Schöenberg, and literary works by Lewis Carroll. The document cites various Supreme Court cases underscoring this principle, affirming that individuals have the right to choose their messages and determine what not to communicate.
The Colorado Court of Appeals viewed the custom wedding cake creation by Phillips as expressive conduct. Phillips, identifying as an artist, meticulously designs each cake, reflecting his creativity and personal engagement with clients, which includes consultations to capture the couple's preferences. His cakes serve as a symbolic representation of marriage, recognized by guests and integral to the wedding celebration. The excerpt notes the cultural significance of wedding cakes, describing them as laden with symbolism that communicates the event of marriage to observers, thus reinforcing Phillips's argument for artistic expression in his work.
Wedding cakes are integral to the wedding tradition, serving as a customary element that is seldom questioned. They play a pivotal role in various wedding events, such as photographs, cutting the cake, and distributing it as favors, although their primary purpose is not consumption. Many individuals may express dislike for eating wedding cake yet still choose to include it in their ceremonies. The cake symbolizes the commencement of marriage and the celebration of the couple, making the creation of custom wedding cakes an expressive act. The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized that wedding cakes can convey a message of celebration, particularly in the context of same-sex marriages, but the essential communication of a wedding is evident regardless of specific designs or inscriptions. The requirement for Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings, similar to those for opposite-sex weddings, does not differentiate based on the cake's design. Criticism of Phillips for not providing evidence of the expressive nature of wedding cakes lacks precedent; prior cases involving expressive acts did not necessitate such evidence. The Court concludes that Phillips’ artistry is inherently expressive and that requiring him to create a cake implicates his First Amendment rights by forcing him into a position of shared speech with the couple.
The opinion of Justice Thomas addresses the conflict between Colorado's public-accommodations law and the First Amendment rights of Jack Phillips, a baker who refuses to create custom wedding cakes for same-sex marriages based on his religious beliefs. The law's requirement for Phillips to acknowledge and celebrate same-sex weddings alters the expressive content of his message, which he argues is prohibited by his faith. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that Phillips' conduct was not sufficiently expressive to warrant protection, asserting that a reasonable observer would see his actions as mere compliance with the law rather than an endorsement of same-sex marriage.
Justice Thomas criticizes this conclusion, arguing that it misinterprets the nature of compelled speech. He contends that if the reasoning of the Colorado Court were accepted, it could justify any law compelling protected speech. He emphasizes that prior Supreme Court cases, like Hurley, have rejected the idea that compliance with public-accommodations laws equates to altering one's message. The opinion argues that the decisions cited by the Colorado Court involved situations where entities were compelled to provide a platform for third-party speech, not to alter their own message. Ultimately, Thomas insists that the government cannot compel individuals to change their own expressive conduct.
The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized Masterpiece as a for-profit bakery but emphasized that a profit motive does not allow the government to compel speech. The court referenced prior cases affirming that speech is protected even when sold for profit. Masterpiece’s owner, Phillips, intentionally prioritizes his Christian beliefs over profit, as evidenced by his business practices—such as closing on Sundays, paying employees higher wages, and refusing to create cakes with certain messages. This control over his bakery's messages supports the argument that his conduct is expressive.
Additionally, the court criticized the idea that Phillips could post a disclaimer to separate his views from those of the bakery, arguing it would permit government-compelled speech, which is unconstitutional. The court reiterated that individuals cannot be forced to affirm beliefs they do not hold.
Since Phillips’ conduct is deemed expressive, Colorado’s public-accommodations law could only penalize him if it passed strict scrutiny, a standard the Court of Appeals did not assess. The situation differs from cases where laws apply regardless of an expressive component, highlighting that Colorado is penalizing Phillips specifically for his refusal to create cakes endorsing same-sex marriage, necessitating rigorous judicial examination.
A government regulation of expressive conduct can be justified if it is constitutional, advances a significant governmental interest unrelated to suppressing free expression, and imposes only an essential restriction on First Amendment rights. In the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, the respondents argue that Colorado's law can compel cake maker Jack Phillips to prevent the denigration of same-sex couples. However, this rationale contradicts established free-speech principles, as the government cannot penalize protected speech merely because it is deemed offensive or hurtful. The First Amendment protects ideas that society may find disagreeable, and any law that seeks to regulate speech to create a bias-free society undermines its constitutionality. The law's intent to shield listeners from offensive expressions equates to government hostility towards certain views. In Phillips' case, his statement that he would not make cakes for same-sex weddings does not stigmatize individuals more than other forms of protected speech previously upheld by the Court. Comparatively, his statement is less harmful than other tolerated expressions of hate or discrimination.
Concerns regarding "dignity" and "stigma" did not prevent the Court from affirming the rights of individuals expressing controversial views, as seen in cases involving white supremacist activities and the circulation of inflammatory materials. The Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage, does not negate Phillips' right to free speech, as differing views on marriage can coexist under the First Amendment. The dissent emphasizes that the traditional understanding of marriage is still held by many sincere individuals and that increased social acceptance of homosexuality underscores the importance of protecting dissenting speech. The dissent warns that the conflict between religious liberty and the Obergefell decision is manifesting, with future implications for free speech. It argues that reasoning from lower courts that restrict free expression must be rejected to preserve the vitality of First Amendment rights. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent agrees that generally applicable public accommodations laws can protect LGBTQ+ individuals, asserting that businesses cannot refuse service based on moral objections to same-sex marriages.
Gay individuals are entitled to dignity when seeking goods and services in the marketplace. The Court, as noted by JUSTICE THOMAS, does not classify wedding cakes as speech or expression protected by the First Amendment. To qualify as protected expression, conduct must be perceived as communicative by an observer. The Court determined that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not neutrally consider baker Jack Phillips’ religious objections, pointing to perceived hostility towards religion based on its disparate treatment of Phillips compared to other bakers who refused service. Evidence of this hostility includes comments made during public hearings and the different outcomes in similar cases.
Phillips asserts that his cakes convey specific messages, yet he provided no evidence that an objective observer would interpret a wedding cake as expressing the baker’s message rather than that of the marrying couple. Furthermore, experts in the wedding industry could not agree on the symbolic meaning of wedding cakes. The Court found no precedent suggesting that providing baked goods is expressive conduct, contrasting it with recognized expressive activities like parades and performances. JUSTICE GINSBURG dissents, arguing that the evidence does not demonstrate the level of hostility required for a free-exercise violation. The excerpt also mentions an incident where William Jack visited multiple bakeries requesting cakes that resemble an open Bible, highlighting the context of the case.
Jack requested two cakes with specific religious messages and imagery, including Biblical verses and symbols denouncing homosexuality. One cake was to feature an image of two groomsmen with a red 'X' over it, while the other had messages stating "God hates sin" and "Homosexuality is a detestable sin" on one side, and "God loves sinners" and "While we were yet sinners Christ died for us" on the other. In contrast, Craig and Mullins only sought a wedding cake without any particular message. Three bakeries responded to Jack’s requests: one offered to make cakes in the shape of Bibles but refused the requested messages, another declined due to viewing the messages as hateful, and the third agreed to bake the cakes but not include the messages. Jack subsequently filed complaints with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found no probable cause for discrimination claims against the bakeries, noting they regularly created cakes with Christian symbols and had previously refused requests deemed demeaning to protected classes under the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act (CADA). The Commission upheld this finding, stating that the refusal of the bakeries to fulfill Jack’s requests was consistent across all customers, regardless of their religion. In contrast, Phillips’s refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was based solely on their sexual orientation, which constituted discrimination prohibited by Colorado law. The distinction lies in the nature of the requests and the consistent service offered to other customers by the bakeries.
Jack did not experience service refusal based on his religion or any protected characteristic and was treated like any other customer. The relevance of Phillips selling cakes to gay and lesbian customers is dismissed, as the key issue is Phillips' refusal to provide services to a same-sex couple. The core distinction made is that while the bakers’ refusal to serve Jack was not based on religious opposition to same-sex weddings, Phillips discriminated against Craig and Mullins due to their sexual orientation. The bakers objected to Jack’s cake request because it featured a demeaning message, not due to religious beliefs. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission correctly identified discrimination in Craig and Mullins' case but not in Jack's. Furthermore, the treatment of Phillips compared to other bakeries highlights that Phillips refused to fulfill any order for a same-sex couple, while other bakers declined specific requests based on the content of the message. The distinction is made clear: Phillips rarely produces wedding cakes with inscriptions, reinforcing that the refusal to serve was not simply about the nature of the cake but about the identity of the customer requesting it.
The Division and Court of Appeals can legally differentiate between cases involving disparaging messages and those concerning a wedding cake with no specific design. The crux of the distinction lies in the nature of the requested cake: one involves offensive content, while the other does not. The Colorado court noted that the denial of service to Craig and Mullins was based on their identity, which is protected from discrimination under state law. In contrast, the bakeries’ refusal to fulfill Jack's order stemmed from the offensive nature of his request, without evidence of discrimination based on his creed. The Court affirms that Colorado law can equally protect gay individuals in their access to services. Additionally, the dissenting opinion critiques the relevance of comments made during the public hearings on Phillips’ case, asserting that they do not undermine the multiple layers of decision-making that occurred in the case. The dissent argues that the Court's reliance on the precedent from Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye is misplaced since that case involved a single decision-maker, unlike the multiple adjudicators in Phillips’ case. Thus, the application of Colorado law to Phillips’s refusal to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple should be upheld, supporting the Colorado Court of Appeals' judgment.
