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Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky
Citations: 138 S. Ct. 1876; 201 L. Ed. 2d 201; 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3685Docket: 16-1435
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 14, 2018; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Minnesota law prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel inside polling places on Election Day, as stipulated in Minn. Stat. 211B.11(1). This prohibition extends to clothing and accessories bearing political messages, with enforcement left to state election judges. Violators face civil penalties or misdemeanor prosecution. The Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) and other plaintiffs challenged the ban on First Amendment grounds shortly before the November 2010 election. The state responded by issuing an Election Day Policy outlining examples of prohibited items, which included apparel supporting or opposing candidates and issues. On Election Day, some voters, including Andrew Cilek, were reportedly turned away for wearing politically themed items. The MVA argued that the ban was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The District Court dismissed the facial challenge, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed this dismissal while remanding the as-applied challenge. Summary judgment was later granted to the state on the as-applied challenge, which the Eighth Circuit also affirmed. The MVA petitioned for review solely on the facial claim. The Supreme Court held that Minnesota's political apparel ban violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It determined that polling places qualify as nonpublic forums where content-based restrictions are permissible if they are reasonable and not aimed at suppressing particular viewpoints. The Court recognized that while the ban serves a legitimate purpose, it must be evaluated against the forum's objective of facilitating voting, referencing precedents that allow for certain restrictions in similar contexts. The Burson plurality, supported by Justice Scalia, upheld Tennessee's law establishing a campaign-free zone outside polling places, citing historical issues of fraud, voter intimidation, and disorder. They argued that this zone was essential to protect the secret ballot and ensure a safe voting environment. MVA contends that Burson only addressed active campaigning, while Minnesota’s law also restricts passive voter self-expression. However, the Burson ruling broadly banned any campaign-related display, suggesting a strong interest in maintaining a calm voting atmosphere. The Court affirmed that the polling place should distinctly separate voting from campaigning. While the State can set reasonable restrictions, Minnesota's law fails due to vague definitions and inconsistent interpretations of "political." The lack of clarity around what constitutes “political” apparel complicates enforcement and could include any government-related topic. Although Minnesota attempts to narrow the definition to items perceived as election-related, this leads to confusion, particularly with the broad category of “issue-oriented material.” The enforcement of such ambiguous rules, which require election judges to be well-versed in various candidates' platforms, is deemed unreasonable. Overall, the statute's lack of clear guidelines undermines its validity. The State's ban on wearing political apparel at polling places is not restricted to organizations that have endorsed candidates or taken specific positions on ballot questions. This broad interpretation allows various associations, educational institutions, businesses, and religious groups to express opinions on voter issues, potentially leading to inconsistent enforcement based on an election judge's subjective knowledge. The requirement for groups to have “well-known” political stances raises concerns about arbitrary application, as it relies heavily on the individual election judge's understanding of what constitutes "political." The Supreme Court emphasized that a vague prohibition increases the risk of misuse, especially if judges' personal political beliefs influence their enforcement decisions. Inconsistent enforcement can undermine the State's goal of maintaining a neutral polling environment. The Court concluded that Minnesota's approach lacks the necessary clear standards to achieve its intent of a distraction-free polling place. The ruling reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration, with Chief Justice Roberts delivering the opinion joined by several justices, while Justices Sotomayor and Breyer dissented. Voting historically occurred in public spaces, often under the scrutiny of onlookers, creating a chaotic environment outside polling stations, akin to an auction setting. Electioneering was rampant, with crowds heckling voters, making the process uncomfortable for those favoring democratic ideals. By the late 19th century, states began reforms to enhance election integrity, notably adopting the secret ballot between 1888 and 1896, which allowed voters to vote privately. This shift necessitated designated voting compartments and led to the establishment of viewpoint-neutral restrictions on election-day speech, with 34 of 45 states implementing such measures by 1900. Currently, all states and the District of Columbia enforce laws limiting speech near polling places. Minnesota’s law includes prohibitions against displaying campaign materials and wearing political insignia within the polling place, a regulation in place for over a century. Election judges are responsible for enforcing the political apparel ban, requiring individuals wearing prohibited items to conceal or remove them, but they must allow voting to proceed if the individual refuses, while documenting the incident for authorities. Violators of Minnesota's political apparel ban face administrative proceedings through the Office of Administrative Hearings, which can issue reprimands or civil penalties. Additionally, complaints may be referred to county attorneys for prosecution as petty misdemeanors, carrying a maximum $300 fine. The Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA), a non-profit advocating for election reforms, along with registered voter Andrew Cilek and former election judge Susan Jeffers, filed a lawsuit challenging the apparel ban on First Amendment grounds shortly before the November 2010 election. They intended for supporters to wear buttons stating “Please I. D. Me” and related imagery, despite Minnesota not requiring voter identification. The District Court denied their request for a temporary restraining order, permitting the ban to remain in effect. In response, local officials issued guidance on enforcing the ban, specifying items deemed prohibited, including apparel supporting political parties or candidates. Instances of voter intimidation due to the ban were reported on Election Day, including Cilek being initially turned away for wearing prohibited items. MVA and the plaintiffs argued the ban was unconstitutional, but the District Court dismissed their claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the facial constitutionality of the law while reversing the dismissal of the as-applied challenge, indicating that the District Court had improperly considered external matters. Judge Shepherd dissented, arguing that the broad restriction did not reasonably serve the state's interests. The District Court granted summary judgment for the State on an as-applied challenge regarding Minnesota's ban on political insignia in polling places, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. MVA, Cilek, and Jeffers (collectively MVA) sought review of their facial First Amendment claim, which was accepted by the Supreme Court. The First Amendment prohibits laws that abridge freedom of speech, and Minnesota's ban clearly restricts expression within polling places, necessitating a forum-based analysis of the restriction. The Court identifies three types of government-controlled spaces: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums. In traditional and designated public forums, content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, while nonpublic forums allow the government more flexibility to regulate speech as long as the regulations are reasonable and not aimed at suppressing specific viewpoints. A polling place is classified as a nonpublic forum, being government-controlled property designated solely for voting purposes, thus allowing for greater restrictions on speech. The Court highlights that the interior of a polling place is subject to stricter regulations and that access is limited to specific purposes on Election Day. Previous rulings established that the government can impose content-based restrictions in nonpublic forums, including those that exclude political advocacy. Therefore, MVA's First Amendment challenge is assessed under the nonpublic forum standard. Minnesota's apparel ban does not discriminate based on political viewpoint, as MVA acknowledges. The key issue is whether the ban is reasonable given its purpose related to voting. The analysis begins with the Supreme Court's decision in Burson, which upheld a Tennessee law establishing a 100-foot campaign-free zone around polling places. This law, similar to Minnesota’s, restricted solicitation, distribution of materials, and display of campaign-related items. The Burson plurality found the law met strict scrutiny due to concerns about voter fraud, intimidation, and disorder at polling places, deeming the campaign-free zone necessary for maintaining the integrity of the voting process. MVA argues Burson is not applicable to Minnesota’s law, asserting that Burson dealt only with active campaigning outside polling places, while Minnesota's prohibition targets passive self-expression by voters inside. MVA also contends that the concerns addressed in Burson are less relevant to restrictions on voter apparel. Although Burson did mention campaign buttons and apparel in its discussions, the Court did not specifically address these applications. Nonetheless, the Tennessee law was broadly upheld, and the plurality suggested that the state’s interest in creating a calm environment for voters was substantial. Minnesota's rationale for excluding certain forms of advocacy from polling places is seen as valid, aiming to provide a peaceful space for voters to make decisions. Casting a vote is a significant civic responsibility, akin to a jury's verdict or a legislative vote. The State has a valid interest in ensuring that polling places maintain a non-partisan environment to prevent partisan discord and distractions during voting, especially after a potentially divisive election season. While expressive apparel may be non-disruptive in other contexts, such as airports or schools, the unique setting of a polling place warrants restrictions on campaign-related clothing and accessories to allow voters to concentrate on their decisions. Minnesota's law aims to prohibit certain political apparel; however, it faces challenges due to the vague definition of "political." The law's broad interpretation could potentially include any message related to government, thus failing to set a clear boundary for what is permissible. The State contends that the ban applies only to messages directly related to the electoral choices at hand, but it acknowledges that "political" apparel encompasses more than just campaign material. The lack of clarity in the law's application and enforcement undermines its constitutionality, as the State must provide a reasonable basis for distinguishing permissible from prohibited items in the polling place. Minnesota's law extends the prohibition on campaign speech to include additional political speech, as articulated by the State’s counsel. The interpretation of this law relies on the State's "authoritative constructions," which, rather than clarifying the ambiguous nature of the political apparel provision, has resulted in confusion regarding what constitutes prohibited items. The State cites the 2010 Election Day Policy as a guiding reference, highlighting clear prohibitions on items featuring political party names, candidate names, and positions on ballot questions. However, the term “issue-oriented material designed to influence or impact voting” lacks clarity, raising questions about what qualifies as an "issue." It appears any topic associated with a candidate or party's stance may fall under this prohibition. For example, "Please I. D. Me" buttons were banned, despite voter ID not being on the ballot, because candidates had previously expressed views on the requirement. This suggests that election judges would need to keep track of various candidates' positions, making the enforcement of such a rule unreasonable. The law’s scope could potentially encompass items like "Support Our Troops" or "MeToo" shirts if relevant candidates have expressed opinions on those topics. Additionally, the State interprets items promoting groups with political views as subject to prohibition based on their relevance to election issues, further complicating the enforcement landscape. The State asserts that misleading messages about voting requirements can be prohibited. The excerpt critiques the State's interpretation of "political" as it relates to messaging at polling places, arguing that it unjustly limits the definition to groups that endorse candidates or ballot positions. It highlights that numerous organizations, such as the ACLU and AARP, express opinions on electoral issues, raising questions about whether their insignia would be banned if their views align or conflict with those of candidates. The text provides examples of potential apparel that could be considered political, illustrating inconsistencies in enforcement. For instance, a shirt saying "All Lives Matter" may be viewed as political, while one featuring the National Rifle Association would definitely be banned. Conversely, a rainbow flag shirt could be permissible unless it relates to a gay rights issue on the ballot. Overall, the excerpt emphasizes the ambiguity and potential for arbitrary application of the State's electoral choices standard, which relies heavily on the subjective perceptions of election officials. Perfect clarity and precise guidance are not required for regulations that restrict expressive activity, as established in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. However, the state's challenges with its restrictions extend beyond ambiguous cases, particularly when the goal is to prohibit political expression. An indeterminate prohibition can lead to abuse, especially when it allows for broad interpretations, as highlighted in Jews for Jesus and Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. Election judges have discretion to determine what constitutes "political" expression at polling places, which, while often exercised fairly, risks inconsistency without clear, objective standards. This lack of standards may result in the personal politics of election judges influencing enforcement, undermining the state's interest in maintaining a distraction-free polling environment. Other states have successfully implemented clearer regulations regarding political expression at polling places, which Minnesota has not matched. The court emphasizes the need for a more discernible approach if Minnesota aims to create polling places free from partisan conflict. Ultimately, while the attempt to balance political discourse with the right to vote is commendable, Minnesota's law lacks the necessary clarity for effective application. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The state suggested postponing the decision to seek clarification from the Minnesota Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of the relevant statute. The dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor asserts that the decision to certify a case lies within the discretion of the federal court, referencing *Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman*. The dissent criticizes Minnesota's late request for certification, noting that the litigation has been ongoing for over seven years without a prior request for certification from lower federal courts. It highlights that Minnesota has not adequately justified why certification would eliminate the need to address constitutional questions. Sotomayor indicates that the analysis presented reflects the State's interpretation and would remain unchanged even if the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a different view, as no viable alternative construction has been proposed. The excerpt also lists various state laws regarding polling place regulations, demonstrating the legal context surrounding the case. Casting a vote is a significant civic duty, and states can take measures to prevent partisan discord at polling places, including banning certain apparel that conveys political messages. The dissent expresses disagreement with the Court's ruling that Minnesota's political apparel ban is unconstitutional on its face, arguing that the Court has not allowed Minnesota courts a chance to interpret the statute. The dissent suggests certifying the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court for clarity on the political apparel ban under Minn. Stat. 211B.11(1). Historically, Minnesota implemented this ban in response to tumultuous voting conditions in the late 19th century, where voters faced harassment based on their perceived political affiliations. The ban, which prohibits wearing political badges or insignia at polling places, aims to maintain order, protect voters from intimidation, and uphold the integrity of elections. The dissent notes that while modern polling places may not reflect the chaos of the past, they still face risks of conflicts and attempts to influence voters. The majority acknowledges the state's compelling interests in limiting advocacy at polling sites to ensure a peaceful voting environment, as interference, even if subtle, can deter voters before any corrective measures can be taken. A polling place is classified as a nonpublic forum, allowing states to impose reasonable speech limitations to uphold order, prevent confusion and intimidation, and protect the integrity of the voting process. However, the Court incorrectly declared Minnesota's political apparel ban unconstitutional without guidance from the state's highest court on the law's interpretation. The dissent argues that the majority fails to seek clarification from state courts about the statute's application, which is essential for avoiding misinterpretation and ensuring constitutional compliance. The dissent emphasizes that federal courts should be cautious in speculating about state laws without state court input and outlines that certification to state courts is a valuable tool to clarify legal ambiguities. The majority dismissed a request for certification as untimely, but the dissent contends that certification is not subject to forfeiture and is crucial to prevent errors in federal court interpretations of state statutes. The Court has the authority to certify questions to a state court on its own initiative, even if the parties did not request it and prior courts have addressed the relevant state law. This practice is supported by precedent and aligns with state-federal comity principles, which require respect for state courts’ interpretations of their own laws. The majority's assertion that respondents have not provided adequate justification for certification neglects the Court’s duty to defer to state courts and presumes incorrectly that the Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt respondents’ interpretation without consideration of its own. The term "political," as used in the relevant statute regarding political insignia, is definable and has previously been interpreted in similar contexts without ambiguity. The majority acknowledges that a significant amount of speech qualifies as "political," and while it struggles with certain aspects of the statute’s scope, this does not preclude a constitutional interpretation of the statute as a whole. The Court emphasizes that the mere possibility of unconstitutional applications of a statute does not automatically render it unconstitutional, referencing United States v. Williams. This principle is particularly relevant when a state court can clarify the statute's boundaries, as established in Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn. Inc. The dissent argues that Minnesota's historical application of its political apparel ban should be considered in evaluating the facial challenge, citing Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement. There is no evidence indicating that individuals have been unjustly prevented from voting or prosecuted under the statute. The political apparel ban, challenged for the first time on the grounds of speech not being "political," has consistently been upheld by lower courts, with no review sought by petitioners. The dissent warns against hastily invalidating a law that has constitutional applications supporting significant state interests, advocating for certification to the state’s highest court for further assessment. The dissenting opinion concludes with a call for caution and respect for state judicial processes.