United States v. Calvin Stoddard

Citation: 892 F.3d 1203Docket: 15-3060

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; June 15, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

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Calvin Stoddard, Sidney Woodruff, and Jerome Cobble were convicted of conspiracy related to heroin distribution and money laundering charges following a joint trial. The convictions stemmed from a government investigation into Jermaine Washington, a known drug dealer, which included wiretaps of his communications. Stoddard and Woodruff were found guilty under 21 U.S.C. for conspiracy to distribute heroin, while Cobble was convicted of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. The District Court sentenced Stoddard and Woodruff to mandatory-minimum sentences based on the drug quantity determined by the jury.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed several decisions of the District Court, including the denial of motions to suppress evidence from wiretaps, motions for acquittal, and the admission of prior conviction evidence. However, the court reversed Cobble’s money-laundering conviction due to insufficient evidence and vacated the sentences of Stoddard and Woodruff, ruling that a jury must determine drug quantities attributable to each defendant individually for mandatory minimum sentencing. The court also instructed the District Court to reassess Woodruff’s career-offender enhancement in light of a recent Supreme Court decision. The original investigation began in 2012, focusing on Washington’s heroin trafficking in the D.C. area.

The Government utilized an informant for controlled drug purchases in Southeast D.C., leading to the identification of Washington as a heroin source. An extensive affidavit by FBI Special Agent Joshua Taylor resulted in a District Court granting a wiretap on Washington's cell phone from July 16 to August 14, 2012, followed by a second wiretap authorized on August 16, 2012. Physical surveillance was conducted, during which the Government recorded conversations between Washington and co-defendants Woodruff and Stoddard, both of whom met with Washington once. Washington's cousin, Jerome Cobble, assisted him in purchasing vehicles, including a financed Nissan Altima and later a Lexus SUV, which was also financed in Cobble's name using funds from Washington's gambling winnings. The Lexus was stolen shortly after its purchase.

On December 6, 2012, a search of Washington's apartment yielded 20.1 grams of heroin, a digital scale, and $17,850 in cash. Washington later cooperated with authorities, pleading guilty to drug distribution conspiracy and related charges on April 11, 2013. A superseding indictment charged Stoddard, Cobble, and Woodruff with conspiracy to distribute over 100 grams of heroin and Cobble with additional money laundering and wire fraud conspiracies.

Before trial, the defendants filed motions to suppress evidence from the wiretaps, arguing the applications did not meet the necessity requirement under 18 U.S.C. 2518. The District Court denied these motions, finding the Government met the necessity standard. The day before trial, the Government expressed concerns about Washington's willingness to testify, leading to a competency evaluation, which he passed. At trial, the Government presented testimony from law enforcement and an expert on drug dealer methods, with Washington's testimony being pivotal. He interpreted wiretapped conversations for the jury, discussing drug transactions and Cobble's involvement in vehicle purchases. Evidence included audio recordings of conversations indicating negotiations and financial dealings related to drug transactions among the defendants.

Woodruff was recorded stating that he had a customer arriving to purchase 40 grams of heroin, which Washington interpreted as a clear indication of drug dealing. In another conversation, Stoddard discussed with Washington the specifics of heroin cuts and user preferences, highlighting their business acumen in the drug trade. Washington testified that between 2011 and 2013, Woodruff bought heroin from him more than ten times, while Stoddard made purchases two to four times. 

Washington implicated his cousin, Jerome Cobble, in facilitating the purchase of a Lexus SUV while Washington was dealing heroin. Cobble helped with the vehicle's title since Washington lacked a driver’s license, and Washington made the down payment with casino winnings. They planned to make vehicle payments from Cobble’s bank account. The Lexus was stolen before any payments were made, although Washington claimed to have used it for selling heroin. 

Recorded conversations between Cobble and Washington included discussions about marijuana and Washington’s attempt to buy a gun. During his testimony, Washington exhibited erratic behavior, expressing unreliability as a witness and suggesting he might sell false statements. His emotional instability culminated in an outburst regarding Cobble, leading to a motion for mistrial, which was denied. 

Following the government's case, the defendants moved for acquittal, which the District Court denied for Woodruff and Stoddard immediately and reserved decision for Cobble. Ultimately, Cobble's acquittal motion was also denied, with the court noting sufficient evidence for promotional money laundering based on Washington's use of the vehicle for narcotics delivery and his close relationship with Cobble.

The Government initially suggested that jurors determine the drug quantity attributable to each defendant through individual verdict forms. However, the District Court opted for a single verdict form assessing the conspiracy's total drug quantity, acknowledging a circuit split on this issue. The jury convicted Woodruff and Stoddard of drug conspiracy, finding the conspiracy involved 100 grams or more of heroin, while Cobble was acquitted of conspiracy but convicted of money laundering. Woodruff and Stoddard subsequently sought new trials, arguing the jury should have assessed drug amounts individually. The Government opposed but concurred that the jury should have been instructed on individual amounts, suggesting the defendants should be sentenced based on an indeterminate quantity instead of the 100 grams tied to the conspiracy.

The District Court denied the motions, asserting individual drug quantity findings were unnecessary since the jury had established the conspiracy involved at least 100 grams. It noted that the legal precedent did not clarify whether individual drug amounts must be found for triggering mandatory minimum penalties under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). The jury instructions aligned with the view that only the total conspiracy amount needed to be determined. At sentencing, Woodruff and Stoddard reiterated their objections regarding the imposition of the five-year minimum and forty-year maximum sentences, which the District Court overruled. 

Woodruff also contested aspects of his Presentence Report (PSR), particularly a career-offender designation based on prior convictions. The PSR recommended a career-offender enhancement resulting in a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, which Woodruff contested. The District Court, however, did not address this objection, noting both parties sought a sentence below the guidelines. Ultimately, it sentenced Woodruff to 80 months and Stoddard to 60 months, both with supervised release, while Cobble received 24 months of probation. The District Court indicated it would have imposed the same sentence even without the mandatory minimum.

Appellants contest the District Court's rejection of their motions to suppress wiretap evidence and motions for acquittal. Cobble specifically challenges the jury instructions regarding money laundering, while Stoddard and Woodruff dispute their sentences, arguing the jury did not individually attribute over 100 grams of heroin to them. Woodruff further contests the District Court’s decision allowing his 1984 armed-robbery conviction to be used for impeachment if he testified and challenges its use for applying a career-offender sentencing enhancement. 

The Appellants assert that the District Court erred in denying their suppression motions. The review process involves de novo consideration of legal conclusions and clear error review of factual findings. While the reviewing court defers to the authorizing court’s determinations of probable cause and necessity, it does not extend this deference to the District Court’s evaluation of those determinations. The necessity determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

The District Court’s denial of the suppression motions is upheld. Under 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c), a wiretap application must demonstrate the failure of other investigative procedures or explain why they are unlikely to succeed. This "necessity requirement" is crucial to the regulation of electronic surveillance, ensuring wiretaps are not used when traditional methods are adequate. The affidavit supporting the wiretap application must provide specific reasons why ordinary investigative techniques would fail, rather than general assertions about drug conspiracies. Appellants claim the wiretap authorization lacked a specific necessity analysis, arguing the District Court merely repeated statutory language without demonstrating wiretap necessity. However, the authorizing court found probable cause that the target was communicating about narcotics activities and concluded that normal investigative procedures had been tried and failed or were too dangerous. Appellants overlooked significant details in Special Agent Taylor’s wiretap application, which detailed prior investigative efforts prior to seeking the wiretap.

Special Agent Taylor provided evidence indicating that Washington utilized his phone for drug transactions, justifying the need for a wiretap as previous investigative techniques had become less effective. The necessity for a wiretap does not require the government to exhaust all investigative methods; it suffices to show that other methods are impractical. The District Court's denial of motions to suppress wiretap evidence was upheld. Cobble contended that there was insufficient evidence to support his money-laundering conspiracy conviction, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his acquittal motion. Under Title 18 section 1956, a violation occurs when an individual engages in a financial transaction knowing it involves proceeds from unlawful activity, intending to promote such activity or to conceal its nature. Cobble was charged with both promotional and concealment money laundering, with the trial focusing on concealment. The District Court found sufficient evidence for a conviction under the promotional theory. The concealment prong involves engaging in transactions designed to hide the proceeds of unlawful activities. A precedent case illustrated that the government must dispel reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's innocent explanation for transactions. The promotional prong targets transactions funneling illegal gains back into criminal ventures, requiring intent to promote illegal activities, which can be demonstrated by the defendant's benefit from or knowledge of the illegal activity.

The trial record reveals insufficient evidence to uphold Cobble's conviction for money laundering. Although it is assumed that a reasonable factfinder could infer Cobble's awareness of the drug-related origins of the money involved, there is no evidence demonstrating that Cobble participated in a conspiracy with the intent to conceal the source of the funds or to promote Washington's drug-trafficking activities. The concealment theory fails as no evidence was presented to indicate that the transaction was designed to hide the source of the funds. Cobble's explanation for the transaction—helping his cousin purchase a car—was unchallenged by the Government. The District Court concurred, struggling to find evidence of Cobble's intent to promote drug dealing or conceal the funds' origins. The Government's attempts to argue otherwise lacked substance, as they did not provide evidence of any concealment efforts. The transaction involved Cobble and Washington openly purchasing the Lexus together, without any indications of concealment. Furthermore, the Government could not prove Cobble's intentional promotion of Washington's drug dealing, as Cobble had been acquitted of related conspiracy charges and no evidence linked him to aiding Washington's drug activities. Cobble’s innocent explanation for the car purchase necessitated the Government to present evidence to dispel reasonable doubt regarding his guilt, which they failed to do, highlighting the distinction between money laundering and simply spending illicit funds.

The principle from law applicable to promotional money laundering asserts that the Government's evidence was inadequate to prove Cobble's intent to promote illegal activity. Washington testified that Cobble was not involved in his heroin-dealing operation, and the jury accepted this testimony. The Government failed to provide evidence that contradicted Washington’s assertion that Cobble's assistance in purchasing a Lexus SUV had an innocent explanation. Although the Government claimed there was substantial evidence indicating Cobble's knowledge of the drug conspiracy, this was found to be lacking. The evidence presented only showed a close relationship between Cobble and Washington, discussions about purchasing a gun, and a small marijuana transaction. None of this established Cobble's knowledge of the heroin trafficking or his intent to promote it, failing to meet the statutory requirement for a financial transaction aimed at promoting unlawful activity. Cobble's explanation for purchasing the vehicle—to help his cousin with bad credit—was not rebutted by the Government. Consequently, Cobble’s conviction was reversed.

In contrast, for Woodruff and Stoddard's convictions of drug conspiracy, the Government needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they knowingly conspired to distribute narcotics. The jury found sufficient evidence to support their convictions, primarily relying on Washington’s testimony and recorded conversations from a wiretap. However, the appellants argued that Washington's testimony was unreliable, and without it, no reasonable jury could convict them. They pointed out the lack of direct evidence linking them to heroin distribution, as well as the absence of heroin or drug paraphernalia at their homes post-arrest. While Washington’s credibility was questioned, the evidence from wiretaps and corroborating testimonies from a cooperating witness and FBI agents contributed to the jury's verdict. Thus, despite the concerns about Washington's reliability, the overall evidence was deemed sufficient to sustain Woodruff and Stoddard's convictions.

No physical evidence linked Woodruff and Stoddard to heroin, and no law enforcement officers observed them with the substance. Settles also did not see them with Washington. Despite Washington's unreliable testimony, the recorded conversations between him, Woodruff, and Stoddard provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict them of conspiracy to distribute heroin. The recordings included discussions about pricing and quantities of heroin, suggesting they were involved in distribution. The court does not revisit jury credibility determinations, and thus affirmed the District Court’s denial of motions for acquittal based on the evidence presented.

Regarding the District Court's admission of evidence, the appellants contended that it abused its discretion by allowing the Government to impeach Woodruff with his 1984 armed robbery conviction if he chose to testify. However, Woodruff did not testify, aligning with the ruling in Luce v. United States, which requires a defendant to testify to preserve a claim of improper impeachment. Although the Government did not cite Luce in its brief, the court opted to address the issue as it was fundamentally relevant to the dispute.

The legal document addresses the issue of whether an error in the District Court's ruling on a motion in limine was harmless. E. Woodruff and Stoddard contest their sentences, arguing that the District Court incorrectly imposed the mandatory minimum penalty for conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. They contend that the jury did not make specific findings regarding the amount of heroin attributable to each defendant. The jury was only required to determine if the defendants conspired to distribute any amount of heroin and whether that amount exceeded 100 grams. The District Court instructed the jury that it needed to prove the defendants' membership in the conspiracy without requiring knowledge of all details, but must establish that each defendant was aware of the conspiracy's common purpose and was a willing participant.

The jury was informed that the specific amount of the controlled substance was not an element of the conspiracy offense. It was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the total amount distributed under the conspiracy was 100 grams or more. The text highlights a circuit split regarding whether a jury must find individualized responsibility for the quantity of drugs to impose a mandatory minimum sentence. The document favors the individualized approach, which necessitates that the jury determines that each defendant could reasonably foresee the distribution of 100 grams or more of heroin. Consequently, the document calls for the vacating of Woodruff’s and Stoddard’s sentences and remanding their cases for resentencing. The legal question of whether the mandatory minimum applies without such individualized findings is reviewed de novo, as established by relevant statutes and case law, including the Supreme Court's requirement for juries to ascertain any facts that lead to increased penalties for a defendant.

Apprendi v. New Jersey establishes that facts increasing a mandatory minimum sentence are elements that must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States reinforces this principle, particularly in drug-conspiracy cases where a statutory mandatory minimum applies if death results from the distributed drug. Under Burrage v. United States, a jury must establish the fact of death to trigger the mandatory minimum. The discussion extends to whether the specific drug quantity increases the mandatory minimum or if the total amount attributable to the conspiracy suffices for an individual defendant. There is a circuit split on this issue: the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits advocate for an individualized approach, whereas the Third and Seventh Circuits support a conspiracy-wide approach. Notably, the circuits favoring the conspiracy-wide method adopted this stance prior to Alleyne, and subsequent cases have called this approach into question. The Sixth Circuit, initially supportive of the conspiracy-wide approach, has also raised doubts regarding its compatibility with Alleyne, highlighting the evolving legal landscape around this issue.

In United States v. Gibson, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of individualized findings for co-conspirators in drug conspiracy cases, aligning with the Tenth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Stiger, which stated that juries need not make specific findings for each co-conspirator regarding drug quantities, as long as the sentencing does not exceed the statutory maximum established by the jury's verdict. However, subsequent decisions, particularly United States v. Ellis, challenged the Stiger precedent, emphasizing that following the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne, judges cannot unilaterally determine facts that would elevate a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence. Other circuits, including the Third and Seventh, have also begun questioning earlier conspiracy-wide sentencing approaches. For instance, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cruse noted that a failure to instruct juries on drug quantities did not harm the defendant's rights, while the Third Circuit in United States v. Miller found error due to lack of jury determination on drug quantity but deemed it harmless. The document advocates for an individualized approach to drug quantity determinations that impact mandatory minimum sentences, insisting that co-conspirators can only be held liable for actions that are both in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to them, as established in Pinkerton v. United States. This principle, reinforced by the decisions in Alleyne and Burrage, asserts that reasonable foreseeability applies to drug quantities influencing enhanced penalties, and it aligns with the rationale in Law, where a single conspiracy encompasses multiple criminal acts. The ruling rejects arguments that sentencing should be based solely on the largest transaction within a conspiracy, asserting that a single agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one conspiracy.

A single violation of the conspiracy statute includes all crimes that are reasonably foreseeable within that conspiracy. A defendant convicted of conspiracy to deal drugs must be sentenced based on the drug quantity the jury finds to be a foreseeable part of the conspiracy. The principle established in Law emphasizes that sentencing should reflect individualized drug quantities attributed to each defendant. The Supreme Court's decision in Burrage introduced a framework for considering drug conspiracy offenses, particularly when death results from drug distribution, which requires a jury to find facts that trigger mandatory minimum sentences. This individualized approach is further supported by Alleyne's ruling regarding the necessity for jury findings on aggravating elements affecting sentences. The decisions from other circuits reinforce this approach, indicating a shift within the justice system towards more individualized sentencing rather than a conspiracy-wide methodology. The government's argument for a broader conspiracy-wide approach appears limited to this specific case, with indications that they are moving toward an individualized strategy in future drug conspiracy charges. The court found that the District Court's error in this case was significant, as the evidence regarding the heroin quantity that was reasonably foreseeable to the defendants was not overwhelming.

The jury's potential misinstruction and improper verdict form could have impacted the case outcome. Consequently, Stoddard’s and Woodruff’s sentences are vacated and the matter is remanded to the District Court for resentencing specific to each Appellant's individual liability for conspiracy to distribute heroin. Woodruff's sentence is vacated, and thus his challenge regarding the career-offender enhancement is not addressed at this stage. On remand, the District Court is instructed to reevaluate the appropriateness of applying the career-offender enhancement to Woodruff's Guidelines range, considering new arguments and the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles. The court will determine if Woodruff's 1984 armed robbery conviction qualifies as a valid predicate offense for the enhancement after his new sentence is imposed. The appellate court affirms the District Court's denial of the Appellants' motions to suppress and their motions for acquittal, while reversing the denial of Cobble’s motion for acquittal, leading to the vacating of Woodruff’s and Stoddard’s sentences and their remand for resentencing. The implications of the residual clause's constitutionality have been clarified in the Beckles decision, influencing the arguments available to the Government on remand.