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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n
Citation: Not availableDocket: 16-111
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 4, 2018; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., owned by Jack Phillips, a devout Christian baker, refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple in 2012 due to his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, though he offered to sell them other baked goods. The couple filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Commission found probable cause for a violation, leading to a formal hearing where an Administrative Law Judge dismissed Phillips' First Amendment claims regarding free speech and free exercise of religion. Both the Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld this decision. The Supreme Court held that the Commission's actions violated the Free Exercise Clause. It acknowledged that while laws can protect the rights of gay persons, they must be applied neutrally toward religion. Phillips argued that creating a cake represented an expressive act tied to his religious beliefs. At the time of the incident, Colorado had not recognized same-sex marriages, and Phillips reasonably believed his decision was lawful. The Court noted that the Commission's handling of his case displayed hostility toward his religious beliefs, undermining the neutral consideration he was entitled to. Some commissioners at the Commission’s public hearings expressed views that dismissed the legitimacy of carrying religious beliefs into the public and commercial spheres, labeling Phillips' faith as despicable and likening his religious objections to historical injustices such as slavery and the Holocaust. These remarks went unchallenged by other commissioners and were not addressed in subsequent state-court rulings or briefs. This lack of objection raises concerns about the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s proceedings regarding Phillips’ case. Additionally, the Commission treated Phillips’ case differently from other bakers who had similar objections to anti-gay messages, ruling against him on the premise that any message on the requested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, a point not addressed in cases involving cakes with anti-gay symbolism. The Commission dismissed Phillips’ willingness to provide other products as irrelevant, further indicating a bias against the religious basis of his objections. The treatment Phillips received violated the State’s First Amendment obligation to refrain from enacting laws or regulations that exhibit hostility towards religion. Government regulations cannot reflect judgment on the legitimacy of religious beliefs. The record demonstrates that the Commission's approach was not neutral or respectful towards Phillips’ religious beliefs, as evidenced by the negative evaluation of his objections and the inconsistency in the treatment of similar cases. The official hostility expressed by commissioners and the disparate handling of Phillips’ case indicate a failure to uphold the required religious neutrality. Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's opinion in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, addressing a conflict between state anti-discrimination laws and the First Amendment rights of the cake shop owner. In 2012, a same-sex couple requested a wedding cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop, but the owner refused due to his religious beliefs against same-sex marriage, which Colorado did not recognize at the time. The couple filed a discrimination charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which ruled in their favor, leading to affirmation by Colorado state courts. The Court examined the balance between the state's authority to protect the rights of same-sex couples and the baker's rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. The opinion notes the complexity surrounding the baker's refusal, emphasizing distinctions based on the nature of the requested service, such as whether it involved creating a custom cake with specific religious messages or simply selling any cake available. The case raises nuanced questions about the extent of constitutional protections in new contexts, highlighting ongoing debates over the limits of religious freedom and anti-discrimination principles. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission failed to uphold the state's obligation of religious neutrality in its consideration of a case involving a baker, Jack Phillips, who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on his sincere Christian beliefs. The Court emphasized that while generally applicable laws may limit an individual's free exercise of religion in a public business context, any adjudication must avoid religious hostility from the state. In this instance, the Commission did not maintain the required neutrality, leading to a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, has operated his bakery for 24 years, prioritizing obedience to his faith in his work. He believes that marriage should only be between one man and one woman, and thus considers creating a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage as contrary to his beliefs. The incident occurred in 2012 when two men, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, approached Phillips to order a cake for their upcoming wedding, which would take place in Massachusetts. Phillips informed them that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings, and he reiterated this refusal during a follow-up conversation with Craig's mother. The individual expressed that creating a wedding cake for a same-sex ceremony would be a personal endorsement of a relationship contrary to his Biblical beliefs. Historically, Colorado has prohibited discrimination in public accommodations since 1885, beginning with laws ensuring “full and equal enjoyment” of public facilities for all citizens, regardless of race or condition. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) continues this tradition, having been amended in 2007 and 2008 to include sexual orientation among other protected characteristics. CADA makes it unlawful to deny individuals equal access to goods and services based on various characteristics, while broadly defining public accommodations to include any business engaged in sales or services to the public, excluding religious institutions. CADA establishes an administrative process for addressing discrimination claims through the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which investigates complaints and, if probable cause is found, refers cases to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission for potential formal hearings. The Commission can impose remedies, such as cease-and-desist orders and compliance reporting, but lacks the authority to impose monetary damages or fines. In August 2012, Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and its owner, Phillips, alleging they were denied full service due to their sexual orientation, with claims that it was Phillips's standard practice not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings. An investigation by the Civil Rights Division revealed that Phillips repeatedly refused to create cakes for same-sex weddings, citing his religious beliefs and a belief that same-sex marriage was illegal. This refusal extended to other same-sex couples as well. The investigation established probable cause that Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), prompting a referral to the Civil Rights Commission. The Commission initiated a formal hearing, where an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found no material disputes and ruled in favor of the same-sex couple, Craig and Mullins. The ALJ dismissed Phillips' argument that refusing to create a wedding cake did not violate state law, affirming that his actions constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation. Phillips claimed that CADA's application violated his First Amendment rights regarding free speech and the exercise of religion. The ALJ rejected these claims, stating that creating a wedding cake did not constitute protected speech and that CADA is a neutral law of general applicability, thus not infringing on his religious freedoms. The Commission upheld the ALJ's ruling, ordering Phillips to cease discrimination against same-sex couples and implement remedial actions, including training staff on public accommodations laws and submitting compliance reports for two years. Phillips subsequently appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed both the Commission's legal conclusions and remedial orders, dismissing his claims regarding compelled speech and the Free Exercise Clause. The court reaffirmed that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt individuals from adhering to valid, neutral laws that apply generally, even if compliance interferes with religious beliefs. It ruled that enforcing compliance with a statute did not violate Phillips' free exercise rights. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case, prompting Phillips to seek review, which this Court granted. He renewed his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The opinion emphasized the societal recognition that gay individuals and couples deserve equal dignity and protection under the law. While religious objections to gay marriage are acknowledged and protected, such beliefs do not justify denying equal access to goods and services under public accommodation laws. The court noted that states have the authority to enact laws to protect groups targeted by discrimination, which generally do not conflict with the First or Fourteenth Amendments. It was clarified that certain exceptions exist, such as clergy who object to performing gay marriage ceremonies on religious grounds, which would not violate their free exercise rights. However, allowing broad exceptions could lead to widespread discrimination against gay individuals seeking wedding-related goods and services. The court concluded that Colorado law can protect gay persons in accessing goods and services on equal terms with others, and noted that if a baker refused to sell any goods for gay weddings, that would violate laws ensuring equal access. Phillips, however, argued that his situation presented a narrower issue. Phillips asserts that his refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple was rooted in his artistic expression and deeply held religious beliefs, invoking First Amendment protections. He faced a dilemma in balancing the customers' rights against his own right to personal expression, particularly since, in 2012, Colorado did not recognize gay marriages. At that time, relevant Supreme Court decisions had not yet been issued, and state law allowed bakers some discretion in refusing to produce messages they found offensive. The Colorado Civil Rights Division had previously ruled that bakers could lawfully decline to create cakes with derogatory messages against gay persons or marriages. However, the state's enforcement of its regulations raised concerns about potentially allowing discrimination against gay persons if bakers were permitted to refuse service based on religious beliefs. Phillips was entitled to a fair examination of his claims, but the Civil Rights Commission's handling of his case displayed elements of hostility towards his religious objections, particularly evident during public hearings. Commissioners indicated that religious beliefs should not influence actions in the public or commercial spheres, suggesting that individuals with such beliefs may be unwelcome in Colorado's business community. One commissioner asserted that while individuals can hold personal beliefs, they cannot act on them in business, emphasizing the need for compromise if personal beliefs conflict with state laws. These statements can be interpreted as either a straightforward assertion that businesses cannot refuse services based on sexual orientation or as a dismissive disregard for an individual's free exercise rights, with the latter interpretation being more plausible given subsequent comments. During a later meeting, another commissioner criticized Phillips’ religious beliefs, equating the use of religion to justify discrimination with historical injustices like slavery and the Holocaust. This comparison not only disparaged Phillips’ faith but also trivialized it as insincere rhetoric. Such remarks are inappropriate for a Commission tasked with impartially enforcing anti-discrimination laws that protect both religious beliefs and sexual orientation. The absence of objections from other commissioners and the lack of acknowledgment of these comments in subsequent legal reviews raise concerns about the fairness of the Commission's proceedings in Phillips’ case. The Court acknowledges the complexity of determining whether legislative statements can indicate intentional discrimination against religion, yet stresses that the context here—comments from an adjudicatory body in a specific case—is significant. The excerpt highlights a perceived inconsistency in the treatment of different bakers' conscience-based objections to creating cakes with specific messages relating to same-sex marriage. Phillips’ case was ruled against by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which argued that the message on the wedding cake would be attributed to the customer rather than Phillips himself. In contrast, the Commission previously found that other bakers acted lawfully when they refused to create cakes with anti-same-sex marriage imagery, citing the cakes' derogatory or hateful content. Additionally, the Commission dismissed Phillips' willingness to sell other products to gay customers as irrelevant, while this willingness was acknowledged in the other cases. Phillips argued that this differential treatment indicated hostility toward his religious beliefs, as the Commission considered other bakers’ objections legitimate while dismissing his. The Colorado Court of Appeals briefly addressed this disparity, suggesting that the difference stemmed from the perceived offensiveness of the requests rather than an assessment of religious beliefs. However, it was noted that the government should not determine what constitutes offensiveness, aligning with legal precedents emphasizing the importance of protecting diverse opinions. The treatment of Phillips' case by the Commission violated the First Amendment's requirement that laws not be based on hostility toward religion or religious viewpoints. The court highlighted that the Commission's practices signaled official disapproval of Phillips' religious beliefs and failed to address his concerns about discrimination against his religious objections. Citing *Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye*, the court reiterated that the government must avoid regulations that display hostility toward religious beliefs and must act neutrally and tolerantly. It emphasized that even subtle departures from neutrality are prohibited under the Free Exercise Clause, which commits the government to religious tolerance. The assessment of governmental neutrality includes examining the historical context and the events leading to the official policy. The record indicated that the Commission did not treat Phillips' religious beliefs with the necessary respect and tolerance. Instead, it appeared to evaluate his objections negatively, suggesting an illegitimacy to his religious grounds. The court emphasized that the government has no role in determining the legitimacy of religious objections. The evidence of hostility from some commissioners’ comments, which were not disavowed, further indicated a lack of neutrality. The disparate treatment of Phillips compared to other bakers reinforced this conclusion. Consequently, the order against Phillips must be set aside, as the Commission's actions were inconsistent with the First Amendment's requirement for neutrality toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would thoroughly consider his religious objection amidst the circumstances of the case. The adjudication highlighted the need for tolerance and respect for sincere religious beliefs while ensuring that gay individuals are not subjected to indignities in accessing goods and services. The rulings of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the state court enforcing its order are invalidated, with the Colorado Court of Appeals' judgment reversed. Justice Kagan, concurring, emphasizes that while business owners cannot deny protected individuals equal access to goods and services based on religious or philosophical objections, state actors must treat these religious views with neutrality and respect. She asserts that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission failed to meet this obligation in Phillips' case, which was treated differently than similar cases involving other bakers who refused to create cakes with messages against same-sex marriage. The differing legal reasoning applied to Phillips' case compared to those involving the other bakers raised concerns about the state's assessment of offensiveness. Kagan points out that a valid rationale for the disparate treatment was available, as the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits denying equal services based on sexual orientation and creed, which the bakers in the other cases did not violate. Jack requested a cake that disparaged gay individuals and same-sex marriage, which the bakers refused to create, treating him equally to any other customer, as required by Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA). In contrast, the same-sex couple requested a wedding cake that the baker, Phillips, would have made for an opposite-sex couple, but he refused, violating CADA's mandate for equal access to public accommodations regardless of sexual orientation. The different outcomes in the Jack and Phillips cases can be justified by a neutral interpretation of Colorado law, free from religious bias. Justice Gorsuch argues that both cases should be treated identically since the bakers in both instances refused to sell the cakes to anyone. However, this view inaccurately portrays the Phillips case, where he regularly sells wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples. Gorsuch's assertion that Phillips refused to sell a "cake celebrating same-sex marriage" mischaracterizes the request, as it was merely a wedding cake applicable to any wedding type. The law affirms that vendors cannot deny service based on religious beliefs related to the customers’ characteristics, including sexual orientation. Therefore, Phillips unlawfully discriminates by selling wedding cakes only to opposite-sex couples, while the bakers in the Jack cases did not engage in discrimination. The excerpt addresses the legal principles surrounding the treatment of individuals based on sexual orientation and religious beliefs within the context of the Masterpiece Cakeshop case. Justice Kagan concurs that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission can protect gay individuals in accessing goods and services on equal terms with others. Discrimination against individuals based on sexual orientation can be treated differently by the state, provided that such actions are free from religious bias. Justice Gorsuch emphasizes that the government must act neutrally regarding the free exercise of religion; failure to do so necessitates strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling interest and narrowly tailored restrictions. He notes that the Commission did not act neutrally towards Jack Phillips’s religious beliefs, as it allowed other bakers to refuse requests based on their secular commitments but denied Phillips the same consideration. The Commission's rationale, labeling Phillips's beliefs as "offensive," contradicts the protections of the First Amendment, which safeguards all religious expressions. Gorsuch expresses agreement with the Court’s findings but questions the assertion from some justices that the Commission acted neutrally, reinforcing the view that the case illustrates a clear bias against Phillips's beliefs. The mention of William Jack’s case serves to highlight the inconsistency in the Commission's treatment of similar requests based on differing religious viewpoints. Three bakers denied Mr. Jack's request for cakes, citing that the request contradicted their secular beliefs. In response, Mr. Jack filed complaints with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, invoking Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations based on traits such as sexual orientation and religious creed. Mr. Jack contended that the cakes he wanted represented his religious beliefs and that the bakers could not refuse service based on their disagreement with those beliefs. However, the Division concluded there was no violation, stating the bakers refused service based on their moral convictions regarding the cakes, not Mr. Jack's religious views. The bakers indicated they would treat all customers in the same manner and were willing to make other cakes for religious individuals. After the Division's decision, Mr. Jack's appeal to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission was denied. Separately, Mr. Phillips refused to create a cake for a same-sex wedding, stating it conflicted with his religious beliefs, though he offered to provide other baked goods. He testified that he would not create such a cake for any customer, regardless of sexual orientation, and previously refused a similar request from Mr. Craig’s mother. The Commission found Mr. Phillips's actions violated Colorado public accommodations law. Both Mr. Jack's and Mr. Phillips's cases involved bakers refusing service based on personal convictions, with no intent to discriminate against customers with protected characteristics, as both bakers expressed willingness to serve other items to individuals in those protected classes. Bakers in two cases demonstrated a pattern of refusing service based on the nature of the cake rather than the identity of the customer. In the first case, bakers would not sell a cake denigrating same-sex marriage to an atheist, while in the second, a baker refused a cake celebrating same-sex marriage to a heterosexual customer. Both sets of bakers were willing to serve customers from the opposing group but objected to specific messages. The distinction between intended and knowingly accepted effects is highlighted, noting that life and law often differentiate between these concepts. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission acted inconsistently by treating the cases differently. In Mr. Jack's case, the Commission recognized the bakers' intent to distance themselves from an offensive message without finding a violation, despite knowing they denied service to a protected class. Conversely, in Mr. Phillips's case, the Commission presumed intent to discriminate based on the sexual orientation of the parties involved from his refusal to serve. This inconsistency suggests a failure to apply a neutral legal rule, as both instances involved bakers rejecting orders tied to characteristics of protected classes. Ultimately, the Commission's judgments appeared to reflect a presumption of discriminatory intent in one case while overlooking similar implications in the other. A state appellate court highlighted a double standard in the treatment of cases involving discrimination based on religious beliefs, indicating that the Commission cannot selectively apply different standards of intent (mens rea) based on its preferences. In Mr. Phillips’s case, the court found that actual proof of discriminatory intent was not required, contrasting it with Mr. Jack’s case, where such proof was necessary. The Commission's inconsistent application of legal standards undermines the neutral treatment of religion, as it cannot impose a more lenient test for secular objections compared to religious ones. The court criticized the Commission for intending to penalize Mr. Phillips for his religious beliefs, labeling them as “irrational” or “offensive,” which cannot withstand strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. It emphasized that government entities should not judge religious beliefs but should protect their free exercise, reinforcing the principle that unpopular religious beliefs deserve protection. The court dismissed post hoc justifications for the Commission's actions, asserting that the distinctions drawn between cases (e.g., differences in cake decoration requests) do not justify the disparate treatment. Mr. Phillips's case cannot be simplistically categorized as merely involving a generic wedding cake, as doing so disregards the unique context of his religious beliefs. The assertion that cakes without words do not convey a message is irrational and inconsistent, especially since a wedding cake inherently symbolizes the celebration of a marriage, including same-sex marriages. The Commission's treatment of Mr. Phillips, in contrast to the bakers in Mr. Jack’s case, reflects a lack of neutral respect for his faith, as it denied him the choice to abstain from endorsing a message contrary to his beliefs. Furthermore, the court should not impose a requirement that expression must involve written words to engage religious considerations. Legal protection must extend to all sincere acts of faith, beyond mere verbal or written expressions. The Commission's approach to defining the cake in Mr. Phillips's case—balancing between overly general and overly specific descriptions—was inconsistent, particularly when compared to how it evaluated Mr. Jack's situation. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission acknowledged the bakers' right to refuse service for Mr. Jack's requested wedding cakes, which they viewed as conveying a message that conflicted with their convictions. This ruling indicates that both cases involving bakers should be treated consistently based on the same level of generality, whether broadly defined as "cakes" or more specifically as "cakes conveying a message regarding same-sex marriage." Adjusting the level of generality selectively based on the parties involved creates an improper bias in the Commission's decision-making. The principle established under Smith mandates that public accommodation laws must not allow vendors to evade compliance solely based on religious beliefs, but they must be applied neutrally respecting religious convictions. The failure to maintain the same level of generality between Mr. Jack's and Mr. Phillips's cases raises concerns about the potential infringement of constitutional protections for specific religious beliefs. The precedent established by the Court reinforces that individual interpretations of religious tenets should receive equal respect, regardless of whether they align with general societal views. The reference to the case of Thomas illustrates that the Court has consistently upheld the notion that personal beliefs, even if not universally shared, must be recognized and respected. Mr. Thomas is entitled to define his own religious commitments, which are protected under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court asserts that it is inappropriate for the Court to equate Mr. Phillips's wedding cake with ordinary items, disregarding its religious significance. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission failed to give neutral consideration to Phillips's religious objections, resulting in a violation of his rights. The Commission's prior rulings, which treated Phillips's case differently from similar cases, were influenced by hostility towards his religion. Consequently, the Court reversed the lower judgment and invalidated the Commission's order. Mr. Phillips has demonstrated a clear violation of his First Amendment rights and is entitled to a judgment after facing unlawful charges for nearly six years. Justice Thomas, concurring with Justice Gorsuch, emphasizes the discriminatory application of Colorado's public-accommodations law against Phillips. While the Court did not address Phillips's free-speech claim due to uncertainties regarding the factual record, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed that Phillips refused to create a custom wedding cake to celebrate a same-sex wedding. The excerpt addresses a legal analysis regarding the intersection of public-accommodations laws and First Amendment protections for free speech. It notes that the Colorado Commission ordered baker Jack Phillips to sell any product he would offer to heterosexual couples, including custom wedding cakes, which he refused to do. The Court of Appeals determined that Phillips’ actions were not expressive and thus not protected speech, concluding that an observer would perceive his compliance with the law rather than a message. This interpretation challenges fundamental free-speech principles by allowing laws to compel speech. The First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids state laws that infringe on free speech, distinguishing between regulations on speech and conduct. Generally, public-accommodations laws regulate conduct rather than speech, targeting discrimination in the provision of goods and services. However, specific applications of these laws that declare speech as the public accommodation can invoke First Amendment protections. The excerpt references the case of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, where the Supreme Court ruled that a public-accommodations law violated a parade sponsor's free speech rights by requiring them to include a gay rights group, altering the parade's expressive content. This precedent emphasizes that the government cannot mandate speech or thoughts that align with particular groups, as it contradicts the essence of free speech. The Constitution is recognized as encompassing various forms of expression beyond just spoken or written words. Symbolism serves as a fundamental means of communication, recognized as falling under the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments when conduct is deemed sufficiently expressive. The Supreme Court has identified various forms of expressive conduct, such as nude dancing and flag burning, while clarifying that mere intent to convey an idea does not automatically qualify an action as protected speech. Courts assess whether conduct is intended to be communicative and if it would be reasonably understood as such by an observer. The requirement for a specific message is not necessary for protection, as demonstrated by the appreciation of abstract art and unconventional literature. Once conduct is classified as expressive, governmental restrictions on it are limited. An individual has the right to choose not only what to express but also how to express it, which encompasses the tailoring of both opinions and factual statements. This principle applies across various forms of speech, regardless of whether the government is regulating its creation, distribution, or consumption. In the case involving Phillips, the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized his custom wedding cake creation as expressive conduct, underscoring his identity as an artist through his meticulous design process, personal engagement with couples, and artistic branding reflected in his business. Phillips, the baker, emphasizes the importance of personalizing wedding cakes to reflect the couple's preferences and personalities, as well as the symbolic nature of these cakes in wedding celebrations. He notes that wedding cakes signify the commencement of a marriage and the celebration of the couple, which is universally recognized—so much so that an average person would identify a multi-tiered white cake as a wedding cake without question. This symbolism has deep roots, tracing back to Victorian England and becoming an integral part of American wedding traditions post-Civil War. The cake serves multiple ceremonial purposes during weddings, such as being a focal point for photographs, the cutting ceremony, toasts, and distribution to guests, underscoring its role beyond mere consumption. Even those who claim to dislike wedding cake often still have it at their weddings, indicating its cultural significance. Phillips argues that his artistic creation of custom wedding cakes is a form of expressive speech, conveying a clear message that celebrates marriage. The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized that a wedding cake could convey a specific message regarding same-sex marriage based on its design or inscriptions. However, Phillips contends that even a plain wedding cake inherently communicates the basic message of a wedding celebration, irrespective of its design. The Commission's order does not differentiate between types of wedding cakes, mandating that Phillips produce any wedding cake for a same-sex wedding that he would for an opposite-sex wedding. The dissenting opinion criticized Phillips for failing to provide evidence that wedding cakes communicate a message, which Phillips argues is self-evident. The requirement for evidence detailing the expressive nature of artistic works, such as parades or wedding cakes, is unsupported by precedent. The Court's decisions, including Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, establish that artistic expression does not necessitate extensive evidence to be recognized as such. Phillips’ artistry in creating wedding cakes is deemed expressive, communicating the idea of a wedding, regardless of the couple's own message. Forcing Phillips to create custom cakes for same-sex weddings compels him to endorse a message that conflicts with his religious beliefs, thereby implicating his First Amendment rights. The Colorado Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that Phillips’ actions were not sufficiently expressive, asserting that a reasonable observer would view his compliance with the public-accommodations law rather than an endorsement of same-sex marriage. This rationale misinterprets the essence of compelled speech, which the Court has consistently ruled against. The precedent set in Hurley clarifies that laws requiring alterations to the expressive content of an artist's work cannot justify a claim of mere compliance. The Colorado Court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed, as it misapplies the principle of compelled speech, suggesting a dangerous precedent for state compulsion over protected expression. Three legal decisions are referenced where groups challenged being compelled to facilitate third-party speech: FAIR involved a law school denying military recruiters access, Rosenberger related to a public university withholding funds from a religious student publication, and PruneYard concerned a shopping center barring signature collection. These cases established that requiring a group to provide a forum for third-party speech does not equate to endorsing it. However, the government cannot force speakers to change their own messages, as noted in Pacific Gas. The Colorado Court of Appeals' analysis of Masterpiece Cakeshop, a for-profit bakery, overlooked that profit motives do not grant the government greater authority to compel speech. The Supreme Court has affirmed that speech remains protected even when commercialized. The owner, Phillips, actively prioritizes his Christian beliefs over profits, refusing certain types of cake orders that conflict with his values, which demonstrates his expressive conduct. The court also critiqued the suggestion that Phillips could issue a disclaimer to separate Masterpiece from affirming same-sex marriage; such an argument would justify any compelled speech, contrary to established legal principles. Therefore, since Phillips’ actions are deemed expressive, Colorado’s public accommodations law can only penalize him if it meets strict scrutiny, as the government cannot compel individuals to affirm beliefs they do not hold. The excerpt explores the application of strict scrutiny to laws that regulate expressive conduct, particularly in the context of a case involving custom wedding cakes and same-sex marriage. It distinguishes between punishing refusal to create any custom cakes and punishing refusal based on the message conveyed, emphasizing that the latter is subject to more rigorous examination. The individual respondents argue that Colorado's law compels Phillips to speak in a way that affirms the dignity of same-sex couples, asserting that failure to do so would be denigrating. However, the text argues that justifications tied to preventing offense or humiliation conflict with established free speech principles, which protect expression even if it is deemed offensive or disagreeable. The government cannot regulate speech solely to create a bias-free society, as this undermines constitutional protections. Restrictions on speech based merely on audience reactions reflect government hostility and are generally deemed unconstitutional. Phillips informed the couple that while he would provide various baked goods, he would not make cakes for same-sex weddings. This statement raises questions about its potential to stigmatize LGBTQ+ individuals compared to other forms of protected speech, such as the right to express racist sentiments or to participate in parades that may offend certain groups, as previously upheld by the Supreme Court. The opinion argues that concerns regarding dignity and stigma did not prevent the Court from protecting free speech in past cases involving hate speech or discriminatory expressions. The concurrence asserts that the recognition of same-sex marriage does not negate Phillips' right to express his differing beliefs, emphasizing that individuals are entitled to hold and voice opinions contrary to the prevailing societal views, including opposition to Obergefell v. Hodges. The growing acceptance of homosexuality highlights the necessity to protect the First Amendment rights of dissenters. The opinion warns that the conflict between religious liberty and the recognition of same-sex marriage is already evident, and while the decision supports Phillips' free exercise rights, future cases may require robust defenses of free speech to prevent suppression of dissenting views under the guise of upholding a new social orthodoxy. The opinion calls for rejecting reasoning from lower courts that undermines these fundamental freedoms. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissents from the majority opinion in a case concerning a Colorado bakery's refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on the owner's religious objections. Ginsburg affirms that religious and philosophical objections cannot justify denying equal access to goods and services under public accommodations laws, which protect individuals, including gay persons, from discrimination. She argues that businesses cannot refuse service based on moral or religious beliefs, specifically stating that signs indicating refusal to serve gay marriages are unacceptable. Ginsburg challenges the majority's conclusion that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission showed hostility towards Phillips' religious beliefs. She contends that the evidence cited, including comparisons to other cases and statements made during hearings, does not sufficiently demonstrate bias against religion. Furthermore, she disputes the notion that wedding cakes constitute expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment, stating that Phillips failed to provide evidence that an observer would interpret a wedding cake as conveying a specific message or that any such message would be attributed to the baker rather than the couple. Ginsburg emphasizes that there is no established precedent recognizing baked goods as forms of protected expression. Previous case law recognizes parades as a form of expressive conduct, with rulings in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. affirming nude dancing as similarly expressive. The Court has a long-standing acknowledgment of flag symbolism, as noted in Spence v. Washington. Justice Ginsburg's dissent argues that the actions in question do not demonstrate the hostility towards religion necessary for a free-exercise violation. On March 13, 2014, William Jack visited three Colorado bakeries requesting cakes shaped like open Bibles with specific, controversial messages related to homosexuality. His requests included phrases such as "God hates sin" and "Homosexuality is a detestable sin," alongside images of groomsmen marked with a red 'X'. In contrast, Craig and Mullins simply sought a wedding cake without any specific message. One bakery agreed to make Bible-shaped cakes but refused the requested messages, while another declined due to the perceived hatefulness of the content. The third bakery was willing to bake the cakes but would not include the requested messages. Jack subsequently filed discrimination complaints with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found no probable cause for his claims, noting that the bakeries routinely produced cakes with Christian symbols and had previously denied requests that would demean individuals protected under the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act (CADA). The Commission upheld the Division's findings. The Court noted discrepancies in how Phillips' religious objections were treated compared to other bakers' objections, emphasizing that the refusal to create cakes with Jack's messages was consistent across the board, regardless of the customers' religious affiliations. The bakeries' refusal to create cakes for Jack differed significantly from Phillips’ refusal to serve Craig and Mullins. Phillips outright denied service based on the couple’s sexual orientation, while the bakeries did not provide an ideological rationale for their refusal to create certain cakes for Jack. The essence of the cakes requested by Craig and Mullins was to celebrate their wedding, not to distinguish between types of weddings. In contrast, Jack's requests were not denied due to any protected characteristic like religion; he received the same treatment as other customers. The argument emphasizes that while Phillips served gay and lesbian customers generally, he discriminated against Craig and Mullins based on their sexual orientation by refusing to provide them a wedding cake. The bakeries' refusal was based on the nature of the requested cake, which they found demeaning, rather than a religious objection to same-sex weddings. The key distinction lies in the fact that the bakers' objections were to the specific messages requested by Jack, and not to his sexual orientation, illustrating that Phillips discriminated against a same-sex couple while the other bakeries did not discriminate based on religious beliefs. The Colorado Court of Appeals did not misinterpret the situations, recognizing the critical differences in the basis for refusal between the two cases. The Colorado Court of Appeals did not differentiate between the case of Phillips and those of three other bakeries solely based on the nature of messages requested. The court's assertion of inconsistency regarding the treatment of Phillips versus the other bakeries is questioned, particularly since Jack was denied specific cake designs while Craig and Mullins were refused any wedding cake service altogether. Phillips reportedly seldom produces wedding cakes with inscriptions. The court and Division rationally distinguished between cases involving offensive text and those where cake design was not specified. They concluded that the refusals by the bakeries were not based on Jack's religious beliefs, but rather on the offensive nature of his request, while Phillips discriminated based on sexual orientation. The court affirmed that Colorado law can protect individuals from discrimination in acquiring goods and services. Statements made during the public hearings on Phillips' case do not substantiate the Court's decision, as the determination involved multiple independent decision-makers, and there is no indication of prejudice affecting the adjudicators' findings. The application of CADA to Phillips' refusal to serve a gay couple should lead to upholding the Colorado Court of Appeals' judgment.