Nicholas Arthur Dozet v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-18-00097-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 24, 2018; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Nicholas Arthur Dozet is the appellant in an appeal against the State of Texas, the appellee, stemming from a case in the 149th District Court of Brazoria County (Cause No. 81296-CR). The appeal was filed with the First Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas, with the brief prepared by Assistant Criminal District Attorney Trey D. Picard. Oral argument is not requested.

The document outlines the identity of parties and their legal representatives, including attorneys for both the appellant and appellee. It includes a table of contents listing various sections such as the Statement of the Case, Issues Presented, Statement of Facts, Summary of the Argument, and the Argument itself.

Key legal arguments presented include: (1) the assertion that there was reasonable suspicion justifying the appellant's detention, and (2) the claim that since the appellant was only temporarily detained during an investigation, Miranda warnings were not required prior to questioning him about his presence at the scene.

The document includes a prayer for relief, certificates of service and compliance with Rule 9.4, and an appendix. An index of authorities lists relevant case law, including key rulings such as *Miranda v. Arizona* and several Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases. It references various statutes from the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Penal Code. 

The statement of the case outlines that the appellant was indicted for burglary but was convicted of the lesser offense of criminal trespass, with a sentence of six months in county jail. The trial took place in the 149th District Court of Brazoria County, Texas. The appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made under the precedent established in *Miranda v. Arizona*. The primary legal issue is whether the appellant was reasonably detained rather than arrested when questioned by an officer about his identity and presence at the alleged burglary scene.

Appellant, a homeless individual, was found inside a closed concession stand at the Angleton Independent School District's baseball field on February 14, 2017, by Lynda Thomas, a parent volunteering nearby. The stand was closed at the time, and upon discovering appellant in a locked storage room, Ms. Thomas reported the incident to the police, noting some food supplies appeared consumed. Officers were unable to locate appellant after a 20-minute search.

On March 2, 2017, appellant was seen loitering at the same location by baseball coach Brian Lostracco, who, aware of the previous incident, contacted the school district police. When police arrived, Lostracco and an officer found appellant crouching inside the concession stand, wearing a baseball shirt from the stand. It was suggested that appellant accessed the stand through a family restroom connected by a crawl space. Upon the officers' arrival, appellant fled but was intercepted by Officer Ronnie Falks, who believed appellant was trespassing, given the previous break-in and the fact that appellant matched the suspect description.

Officer Falks initially detained appellant for questioning without providing a Miranda warning. During the inquiry, appellant stated he was sleeping in the concession stand because he had no place to go. Falks did not immediately arrest appellant, and the investigation continued.

Appellant was lawfully detained during an investigation of a suspected burglary at school district property, which did not require a Miranda warning before questioning. The trial court correctly overruled appellant’s objection to the officer’s testimony about his statements made during this detention. Oral argument was deemed unnecessary as the relevant facts and legal arguments were adequately presented in the briefs and record.

The standard for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is abuse of discretion. Appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard, granting significant deference to the trial court’s factual findings, especially those involving credibility. If mixed questions of law and fact are not based on credibility assessments, appellate courts may conduct a de novo review. In cases with no requested or filed findings of fact, the evidence is viewed favorably to the trial court’s ruling, assuming implicit fact findings exist.

The court confirmed that reasonable suspicion justified the appellant's detention, noting that not all seizures violate the Fourth Amendment, only unreasonable ones. Both investigative detentions and arrests are classified as seizures, differentiated by the degree of intrusion and the legal justifications required. While an arrest involves actual restraint or custody, distinguishing between arrest and detention depends on factors such as the duration of detention, force used, and the investigation conducted.

Detention can be justified based on reasonable suspicion, which requires specific, articulable facts indicating that a person may be engaged in criminal activity, as established in *Terry v. Ohio*. An officer has the authority to conduct a lawful temporary detention when reasonable suspicion exists, determined by the totality of the circumstances. In this case, Officer Falks believed the appellant had committed criminal trespass, defined under Texas law as entering or remaining on property without consent and with knowledge that entry was forbidden.

The circumstances leading to the detention included the late hour, the closed and locked concession stand, the absence of school activities, prior complaints about trespassing, and the appellant's attempt to flee as officers approached. These factors provided reasonable suspicion of criminal trespass. Additionally, the officer's actions in temporarily detaining the appellant to ascertain his identity and reason for being on school property were lawful. The situation did not amount to an arrest, as the totality of the circumstances indicated a justified detention for further investigation rather than an arrest.

Appellant was temporarily detained during an investigation, which did not constitute custody; thus, Miranda warnings were unnecessary before questioning him about his presence at the scene. Miranda warnings are required only during custodial interrogations, as established in Miranda v. Arizona and further supported by Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits the use of statements from custodial interrogations unless procedural safeguards are followed. A defendant must prove that any statements resulted from a custodial interrogation. “Custody” is defined as a situation where a reasonable person would feel their freedom of movement is restrained as if under formal arrest. Temporary investigative detentions, where the individual is not free to leave while police investigate a possible crime, do not trigger the need for Miranda warnings, as clarified in Berkemer v. McCarty. Law enforcement may use reasonable force during such detentions, which are constitutionally permissible. Factors determining whether a detention is investigative or an arrest include the force used, duration of the detention, efficiency of the investigative process, location of the questioning, and police intent. In this case, an officer confirmed that the appellant was detained for questioning, not arrest, during the investigation, which the court upheld against defense objections.

An investigative detention occurs when a person submits to a police officer's authority, believing they are not free to leave. The appellant contends that the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress statements made without Miranda warnings while he was in custody. He claims he was not free to leave, was not informed of his freedom to leave, and that the officer believed there was probable cause for his arrest for criminal trespass. However, the mere lack of freedom to leave does not automatically indicate custody for Miranda purposes. The Court of Criminal Appeals identifies four scenarios that may constitute custody: 1) significant physical deprivation of freedom, 2) explicit restriction on leaving, 3) situations leading a reasonable person to feel restricted, and 4) probable cause without informing the suspect they are free to leave. The fourth situation does not inherently establish custody; it requires that the combination of probable cause and other circumstances leads a reasonable person to believe they are under arrest-like restraint.

In this case, Officer Falks briefly detained the appellant to ascertain his identity and reason for being on school property, which is permissible under reasonable suspicion. The appellant argues that the detention escalated to custody due to the officer's belief in probable cause for arrest. However, the subjective belief of the officer is relevant only if it is communicated to the suspect. The appellant was never informed he was a suspect or under arrest before questioning. Considering the circumstances favorably to the trial court's ruling, the court concluded that the appellant was not in custody at the time of questioning, but rather subjected to a lawful investigative detention, thus Miranda warnings were not required.

Temporary detention in handcuffs in the back of a patrol car during a DWI investigation does not constitute an arrest, and therefore, Miranda rights are not triggered. The appellant was lawfully detained while questioned about his identity and presence inside a closed school district facility, where he had no apparent authorization. The officer's belief that the appellant was trespassing, though subjective, was not communicated to the appellant and is irrelevant. Since the appellant was detained but not under arrest or in custody, no Miranda warning was necessary before questioning. The State requests the Court of Appeals to overrule the appellant’s issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment. The document includes certification of service to all parties and compliance with filing rules.