The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the June 30, 2017 order from the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, which granted Anthony M. Bunton's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence related to a blood draw. The suppression court found that Trooper Timothy Nicklas had probable cause to arrest Bunton and request the blood draw after his December 18, 2016 arrest. Bunton was informed he could refuse the test, but was not coerced into consenting to the blood draw, which he did after being read the DL-26B form. He had prior DUI convictions and was aware that refusing the blood test would result in severe penalties. The Commonwealth argues the suppression court erred in concluding that Bunton voluntarily consented to the blood draw, asserting that he was not sufficiently informed of the consequences of refusal. The appellate court will uphold the suppression court's factual findings if supported by the record but will review the legal conclusions independently to determine if the law was properly applied. The Commonwealth complied with procedural requirements for the appeal, certifying that the order would significantly handicap prosecution.
In the appeal, undisputed facts indicate that the suppression court concluded a defendant is presumed to know the laws and penalties in the Commonwealth, including those related to refusing a blood draw. The court ruled that the appellee, unaware that enhanced penalties for refusal under 75 Pa.C.S. 3804(c) would not apply, did not knowingly waive his rights. The arresting officer's failure to communicate this lack of enforcement was deemed insufficient to inform the appellee of his rights. The suppression court's decision was influenced by the case of Commonwealth v. Miller, which involved a similar situation where the defendant was not warned of enhanced penalties for refusing a blood test. The Miller court determined that defendants are presumed to know both statutory and case law and that police are not required to inform defendants about the absence of enhanced penalties for refusal. Consequently, the suppression court's ruling granting the appellee’s suppression motion was found to be erroneous. The Miller court also referenced Commonwealth v. Evans, emphasizing that the totality of circumstances must be evaluated to determine if consent for a blood draw was voluntary, considering factors such as custodial status, coercion, knowledge of the right to refuse, education, belief about incrimination, and cooperation with law enforcement.
In Commonwealth v. Gillespie, the court addresses the defendant's claims regarding the voluntariness of his consent to a blood draw. The defendant incorrectly relies on Commonwealth v. Myers, asserting his consent was not voluntary due to his belief he would face increased penalties for refusal. However, the court clarifies that Myers involved a defendant who was unconscious, thus unable to consent, and does not apply to conscious individuals like the defendant in this case.
The defendant argues that prior warnings he received about enhanced penalties influenced his belief, citing the DL-26 form he was read during a previous DUI arrest. However, the court emphasizes that while subjective beliefs can be considered, they are overshadowed by the explicit warnings given by police. In Commonwealth v. Strickler, it was established that incorrect subjective beliefs, contrary to police warnings, diminish the weight of the defendant's argument.
Here, the police read the DL 26B form, which clearly stated the penalties for refusal, thereby undermining the defendant's claims based on personal experiences with DUI laws. The court reiterates that a driver's subjective belief regarding implied consent warnings is insufficient to challenge the validity of consent, referencing Nardone v. Commonwealth, which upheld this principle. Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court confirmed that this precedent remains valid post-Birchfield. Overall, the court finds that the defendant's consent to the blood draw was voluntary, despite his claims to the contrary.
An incorrect subjective belief regarding the criminal consequences of not consenting to a blood draw should not significantly affect the assessment of voluntariness, similar to how such beliefs are treated in the civil context. The case emphasizes that repeat DUI offenders, due to their history, should not receive leniency compared to first-time offenders. It argues against the notion that repeat offenders should face a lower standard, asserting that individuals with repeated offenses should be held to a higher standard due to their actions endangering public safety. The General Assembly supports this approach with stricter penalties for repeat offenders, as outlined in 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3804. The defendant's claim regarding subjective beliefs about increased penalties is deemed meritless. Consequently, upon reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the court concludes that the appellee's consent to the blood draw was voluntary, resulting in a reversal of the suppression court’s order. The case is remanded for further proceedings, and jurisdiction is relinquished.
