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Dominic F. Tripoli v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18A-CR-193

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; May 24, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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A memorandum decision, filed on May 24, 2018, asserts that it is not to be considered precedent except for establishing res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. The case involves Dominic F. Tripoli, the appellant-defendant, who is appealing his conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Tripoli contends that the trial court erred fundamentally by admitting hearsay statements.

The procedural history reveals that Tripoli and C.B. were in a relationship from 2014 until their separation in January 2016, after which C.B. secured a civil protective order against him. This order prohibited Tripoli from contacting C.B. in any form. On January 27, 2016, he was personally served with this order by a sheriff's officer, who informed him of its terms and potential consequences for violations.

On November 18, 2016, C.B. received a call from a restricted number, recognizing the caller as Tripoli despite his refusal to identify himself. During the call, C.B. reiterated the existence of the restraining order and requested that he cease all contact. Following the call, C.B. contacted the police to report the violation, providing them with a recorded conversation of the interaction.

Officer Dowling responded to C.B.'s report, where she detailed previous calls from Tripoli and his presence near her home. He advised her on how to document further violations and provided a control number for future incidents. Later, on December 10, 2016, C.B. received multiple calls from a restricted number, which she identified as Tripoli's, prompting her to confront him during one of the calls.

Tripoli initiated a conversation with C.B., expressing confusion over her previous declaration of love, which she countered by stating she had repeatedly communicated her lack of feelings and desire for distance over the past eight months. C.B. recorded this exchange and subsequently contacted the police. Officer Mitchell Gearhart responded, during which C.B. reported receiving numerous calls from a restricted number, which she identified as Tripoli, and played the recorded conversation for the officer. After Gearhart left, C.B. experienced an influx of calls that prevented her from using her phone to call the police, prompting her to use a friend's phone to dial 911, expressing concern that Tripoli was monitoring her. 

Upon returning to C.B.'s residence after dispatch informed him of the ongoing calls, Officer Gearhart noted five new missed calls from the same restricted line. As he departed, he spotted a dark Dodge vehicle, familiar from Tripoli’s past ownership, but could not identify the driver due to tinted windows. After relaying the vehicle's license plate to dispatch, he confirmed Tripoli was one of its registered owners. Gearhart advised C.B. to alert the police if she observed any suspicious activity. 

On January 31, 2017, Tripoli was charged with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, found guilty on December 14, 2017, and sentenced to 365 days with 185 days suspended. Tripoli's appeal raised a hearsay issue regarding dispatch's identification of him as the vehicle's owner, which he did not object to during the trial. The court noted that failure to object waives the issue for appeal unless fundamental error is established. However, they concluded that even if the statement was inadmissible hearsay, no fundamental error occurred.

The fundamental error exception is strictly limited to cases where an error represents a significant breach of due process, causes substantial harm, and prevents a fair trial. Such errors must be egregious and can only be invoked in extreme circumstances. To secure a conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Tripoli knowingly violated a protective order prohibiting him from contacting C.B. Tripoli does not dispute that C.B. received unwanted calls but claims that the absence of corroborative evidence linking him to the calls undermines the conviction. He argues that due to the calls coming from a restricted line, C.B. could not definitively identify him as the caller. However, the court found sufficient independent evidence of his guilt, including C.B. identifying Tripoli's voice during the calls and their past relationship. Additionally, Officer Gearhart testified that a vehicle registered to Tripoli was spotted near C.B.'s residence, which supported her belief that Tripoli was nearby. The court determined that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict Tripoli, and any error regarding the vehicle registration was harmless due to the cumulative nature of the evidence presented. The court affirmed the conviction.