Ronald Miller v. Mark Gywn, Director Of The Tennessee Bureau Of Investigation

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2017-00784-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; May 23, 2018; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Ronald Miller, convicted in Maryland in 2001 for sexually molesting his eleven-year-old niece, registered with Tennessee's sex offender registry (SOR) after moving there in 2007. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) reclassified him multiple times, ultimately granting his request for removal from the SOR in 2013. However, a 2014 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. 40-39-207 mandated lifetime registration for offenders whose victims were twelve years old or younger. Following this amendment, the TBI reinstated Miller on the SOR. Miller challenged this decision in court under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, leading the trial court to reverse the TBI's action, asserting that Miller's Maryland offense did not qualify him for lifetime registration since it did not involve a crime against a minor under twelve.

Upon appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals examined the details of Miller's conviction and the nature of his offense. The court confirmed that Miller's victim was indeed eleven years old at the time of the crime, which aligned with the lifetime registration requirements. The court found the TBI's decision to reinstate Miller on the SOR was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, ruling that Miller must remain registered on the SOR for life. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the opinion delivered by Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr., and joined by Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney.

The TBI erroneously interpreted Maryland's Fourth Degree Sexual Offense statute in its determination that Miller's crime involved a victim who was an older minor. After Miller's request for removal from the Sex Offender Registry (SOR) was granted on July 17, 2013, Tennessee amended its statute on July 1, 2014, stipulating that offenders must register for life if the victim was 12 years old or younger. The TBI reinstated Miller on the SOR on September 25, 2014, based on this amendment. Miller appealed, and the trial court ruled that the TBI had incorrectly denied his removal since the victim was eleven years old at the time of the offense, and there was no corroborating evidence for her age at that time. The court concluded that the TBI's reliance on the victim's statement was misplaced, as the conviction did not involve a crime against a child aged twelve or younger, thus exempting Miller from lifetime registration. The TBI subsequently appealed this ruling. 

The appeal raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in reversing the TBI's decision based on Miller's conviction involving a victim under the specified age. The Supreme Court has established a narrow and deferential standard of review for administrative agency decisions under the TUAPA, allowing agency decisions to be reversed only if they violate statutory provisions, exceed authority, are made through unlawful procedures, are arbitrary or capricious, or lack substantial evidence. Courts are to defer to agency expertise in specialized areas.

Courts lack the authority to review factual questions de novo or to reassess the evidentiary weight attributed by an agency, even if alternative conclusions could be drawn from the evidence. Under Tenn. Code Ann. 4–5–322(h)(5)(B), a reviewing court must not replace the agency's judgment on the weight of the evidence. The same limited review standard applies at both trial and appellate levels (StarLink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 668-69 (Tenn. 2016)). 

Tenn. Code Ann. 40-39-202(1) stipulates that a conviction for a sexual offense or violent sexual offense in another jurisdiction is considered a conviction for Tennessee's purposes, regardless of the plea or finding. The TBI's general counsel, Jeanne Broadwell, affirmed that TBI is responsible for classifying out-of-state convictions for Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration. 

The Maryland statute for 'sexual offense in the fourth degree' was examined, revealing that two subsections require the victim to be aged 14 or 15, which contradicted the facts of Mr. Miller's case, where the victim was eleven at the time of the offense. Only one subsection pertains to sexual contact without age restrictions, classifying it as a crime if done against the victim's will and without consent. TBI concluded that Mr. Miller's conviction involved sexual contact with his eleven-year-old niece, aligning it with Tennessee's Sexual Battery statute (Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-505), thus categorizing it as a sexual offense under TCA 40-39-202(20)(A)(i) for registration purposes.

The trial court incorrectly stated that Maryland's fourth degree sex offense does not involve victims aged twelve or younger and erroneously limited the offense's applicability to victims aged fourteen or fifteen. The relevant Maryland statute prohibits non-consensual sexual contact without specifying an age limit. The victim in this case was eleven years old in July 1998, which Miller does not dispute. He argues that the TBI failed to prove the crime occurred in that month. Previous case law, specifically Livingston, established that when assessing if an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a sexual offense in Tennessee, the elements of the crime must be examined. The TBI reviewed the police report and other evidence related to Miller's conviction to determine its classification, as the crime could be committed in multiple ways, some qualifying as sexual offenses and others not. The TBI's review was deemed appropriate and not arbitrary, supported by substantial evidence, including sworn statements made by Miller declaring the victim's age and the offense date. Miller entered an Alford plea to the charges, acknowledging the indictment that specified the crimes occurred in July 1998. Consequently, the TBI was correct in reinstating Miller on the sex offender registry for life, based on his conviction involving a victim aged twelve or younger. The trial court's judgment is reversed, and the TBI's decision is reinstated, with costs assessed to Miller.