Deon Lamont Cartmell v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2017-00552-CCA-R3-PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; May 9, 2018; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Deon Lamont Cartmell was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting death of his wife, Shari Monique Cartmell, and sentenced to eighteen years. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Cartmell subsequently filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, along with three amended petitions, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error. Following a bifurcated hearing, the post-conviction court ruled the claims lacked merit, a decision that was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. 

The incident occurred on March 16, 2010, when emergency responders found the victim unresponsive at their home. Evidence collected at the scene included a nine-millimeter pistol, blood on various surfaces, and a cartridge casing. Cartmell reported he was in the kitchen when he heard the gun discharge. He claimed they were handling guns and that the victim wanted to "dry fire" the gun. After hearing a shot, he found the victim on the floor and attempted CPR. However, Detective Robinson raised doubts about the accidental nature of the shooting based on blood spatter and Cartmell's statements. The court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

The [Petitioner] provided inconsistent accounts regarding the victim's location during the shooting, initially stating she was in the kitchen and later claiming she was by the couch. Upon police arrival, the [Petitioner] had blood on his jeans, hands, and face, and was wearing a gray hoodie over a white shirt, which he was not wearing at the time of the incident. Detective Robinson observed blood on the right side of the white shirt, raising concerns given the [Petitioner]'s claim that the victim was on his left when he reached for the AR-15 and heard the shot. 

A gunshot residue test was requested, and the [Petitioner] cooperated fully, consenting to a search of his home and allowing his clothes to be taken for analysis. He also permitted Detective Robinson to examine text messages on his phone, which included communications with Paige Merriweather, although these messages were read to the jury but not transcribed. 

In an interview the day after the shooting, the [Petitioner] recounted a prior incident where the victim accidentally discharged a firearm, claiming she was "messing around" with it. During the shooting, he asserted that the victim was on his left when he heard a "bang" and felt the shot's impact. The [Petitioner] called 9-1-1, performed CPR, and applied pressure to the wound.

When questioned about marital issues, the [Petitioner] denied any problems, stating their relationship was good despite admitting to financial difficulties. He acknowledged a recent argument regarding bills but insisted their relationship was otherwise positive. Detective Robinson found evidence of the couple's financial struggles, including bills and letters, and noted a recorded argument at Skyline Medical Center concerning financial matters.

Surveillance footage confirmed the victim's presence at the hospital until shortly before her departure at 4:32 p.m. on the day of the shooting, as she was seen interacting with hospital staff prior to leaving to prepare for an outing.

Steve Rogers witnessed the victim outside his wife’s office on March 16 at approximately 4:30 p.m. Detective Robinson conducted eleven trips from Skyline Medical Center to the [Petitioner’s] residence, with the shortest journey lasting seven minutes, relevant for understanding the victim’s time at home. The 9-1-1 call was placed at 4:46 or 4:47 p.m., shortly after the victim left the hospital around 4:30 p.m. The [Petitioner] claimed to have engaged in various activities with the victim, including gun handling and cooking, but Detective Robinson expressed skepticism about the timeline, suggesting the victim was only home for about ten minutes prior to the emergency call.

Ms. Rogers recounted a 2009 phone call from the victim, who expressed fear when asking for a ride after a nightclub visit, mentioning prior incidents involving a gun. She heard the victim state in the emergency room that she had discharged the gun, contradicting the [Petitioner]’s account. Ms. Rogers perceived the couple as loving and believed the victim would have conveyed any danger to her. Officer Peebles, who interacted with the [Petitioner] in February 2010, noted the [Petitioner] made light of potentially abusive behavior towards his wife during a conversation about infidelity. 

Megan Prisco, who had a brief affair with the [Petitioner] in early 2010, ended the relationship after he disregarded her request for privacy. She observed him looking distressed shortly before the incident. Stephanie Lindblom, a friend of the victim, reported a heated argument between the victim and the [Petitioner] at work regarding financial demands, during which the [Petitioner] expressed frustration and used aggressive language, leaving the victim embarrassed and fearful.

Ms. Lindblom, a witness, recounted an incident where the victim sent her an email expressing distress about being left alone with the Petitioner. Following the incident, the victim indicated that if the Petitioner wanted a divorce, it was his choice. Lindblom observed that the victim's wedding ring was missing prior to her death, which distressed the victim as she valued the ring. Lindblom also noted the victim had previously mentioned an accidental discharge of a weapon in her home, but she doubted the victim would engage in such behavior.

Antoya Brandon, the victim's sister, testified about the victim's financial struggles and noted the missing wedding ring. She recalled advising the victim to have the Petitioner remove a gun from their home, to which the Petitioner reacted aggressively. Charlotte Barbour, the victim's mother, shared a conversation revealing the victim's fears regarding having children with the Petitioner, citing threats made by him. Barbour also noticed a gunshot hole in the victim's mattress and questioned the victim about it, but received no clear answer regarding the Petitioner’s involvement.

Ricky Iverson, a hospital manager, recounted a call from the Petitioner seeking information on life insurance for the victim on March 17, 2010, indicating a desire to discuss the situation with the victim’s co-workers. Corey Northern from Human Resources also received a similar call from the Petitioner about life insurance.

Forensic testimony revealed that gunshot residue was found on a paper towel at the crime scene and on the Petitioner’s clothing, suggesting proximity to a discharged firearm. However, the Petitioner’s gunshot residue test results were inconclusive. Analysis by firearms experts could not definitively link a bullet from the medical examiner to the Glock handgun found at the scene, although the bullet shared characteristics typical of those fired from a Glock.

A cartridge found in the living room was determined to have been fired from a Glock handgun, specifically a nine-millimeter caliber. The Glock's safety features were confirmed to be operational, requiring a trigger pull of approximately six and seven-eighths pounds to fire. TBI Special Agent Charles Hardy provided DNA analysis, indicating the presence of blood on various surfaces, with DNA matching the victim found on the wall, floor, front door, and the petitioner’s shirt. However, no blood was found inside the gun barrel, and a limited amount of human DNA did not yield a profile.

Dr. John Davis, a forensic pathologist, noted the victim, aged twenty-four, died from a gunshot wound to the right side of her face, with the bullet passing through her cheek and into her skull. The angle of the wound suggested that if the shooter was taller, they must have fired from below, and stippling indicated the gun was between six and nine inches from the victim’s face, closer to nine inches. Dr. Davis stated it was unlikely the victim fired the gun, as there were no lacerations on her hands, which would have resulted from holding the gun in a specific way. He speculated that the victim could have moved post-shooting, as she did not sustain a brain stem injury.

Greg Smith, the victim's insurance agent, revealed that she held a $23,000 life insurance policy, doubling if her death was deemed accidental. The petitioner was the beneficiary and applied for the payout. Metro Police Sergeant Pat Postiglione collected blood spatter evidence and observed the victim's movements, noting the time to walk to her car and drive home. The CAD history from the petitioner’s patrol car revealed he had made multiple visits to a specific address shortly before the incident. Crime scene expert Jerry Findley confirmed blood transfer stains on the gun and noted that a paper towel showed signs consistent with being used to handle the gun when fired.

Bloodstains on the victim's arm suggested she was holding it up when shot, while impact stains on her left palm indicated it was open and exposed to blood. The absence of impact stains on the underside of the victim’s right arm implied she was not extending a gun. The [Petitioner] had impact stains on his face and clothes, indicating he faced the victim directly during the shooting, and backspatter on his shirt suggested he was in close proximity to the source of the gunfire. No blood evidence was found in other rooms, contradicting the [Petitioner]’s claim about moving the AR-15 post-shooting. The forensic analysis did not support the [Petitioner]’s accounts of his whereabouts during the incident and indicated the victim did not fire the gun. It was believed the victim was shot near the front door and then moved to the sofa. 

The [Petitioner] recounted his relationship with the victim, detailing their meeting in high school and subsequent long-distance relationship. They became engaged on Valentine's Day 2007 and married in August 2007. Despite their marriage, the victim lived with her mother initially and later rented an apartment while the [Petitioner] remained in North Carolina due to his military service. After being honorably discharged in 2008, he joined the Metro Police Department and attended the police academy. The couple purchased a house in fall 2009, where the [Petitioner] kept numerous firearms, securing them when not home, but kept one accessible when they were together. 

The [Petitioner] admitted to a texting relationship with Megan Prisco, which included sexual content, and acknowledged flirtations with other women, including Paige Merriweather, despite being married. He deleted text messages from these interactions to hide them from the victim.

The Petitioner acknowledged financial difficulties with the victim, indicating that both lived paycheck to paycheck and had separate checking accounts, with the Petitioner responsible for larger bills and the victim for smaller ones. Utility bills were in the Petitioner's name due to the victim's poor credit. In March 2010, the Petitioner paid a $600 utility bill, taking $400 from his mortgage savings, and requested repayment from the victim. On March 11, 2010, the victim invited him to Skyline Medical Center to settle the debt after receiving her paycheck, but an argument ensued over the wait time. The Petitioner expressed frustration, later apologizing for his remarks, and the victim apologized for concealing missed payments. She eventually wrote him a $400 check, which he used to pay the mortgage.

On the day of the shooting, the Petitioner received a call about his motorcycle repair and was driven by the victim to the shop. After returning home, he began watching a movie and cleaned guns, including his Glock 19, which he described as his favorite. He detailed his gun cleaning process, emphasizing a standard he called "inspection ready." The Petitioner noted that he and the victim had previously fired guns at home and that the victim had experienced an accidental discharge earlier in the year, which led him to restrict her access to firearms. Despite this, the victim expressed a desire to learn more about guns, and they began disassembling the Glock together in the living room.

The petitioner claimed he could disassemble an AR-15 in under five seconds and described the circumstances leading up to a shooting incident involving the victim, who was preparing dinner. He indicated that the victim asked about making 'Shake and Bake' chicken and went to the kitchen while he watched a movie. His recollection of events following her return was unclear. He stated that he believed they were done with handling firearms, reloaded a Glock pistol, and placed it on the ottoman. When the victim came back, he offered to show her how to disassemble the AR-15. He then heard a shot and felt its impact, noticing the victim on her side and in distress. He called 9-1-1, performed CPR, and attempted to provide assistance despite complications such as an obstructed airway.

The petitioner claimed he did not know if the victim had seen him reload the Glock and was unsure of what happened immediately after the shooting. He consented to a police search, provided his clothes, and voluntarily went to the police station, where he was advised by a Fraternal Order of Police attorney not to make a statement that night. He expressed concern about the victim's funeral expenses and inquired about her life insurance. Throughout cross-examination, he denied shooting his wife and indicated they had discussed gun safety multiple times, despite admitting to having marital issues and making offensive comments towards her and other women. He acknowledged interactions with other women, including texting and visiting friends, but denied stalking behavior. Additionally, he confirmed the expertise of a police sergeant in firearms relevant to the investigation.

The .40 caliber Glock was compared to the nine-millimeter Glock, which was described as "extremely safe" due to its internal and external safeties. It would not fire if dropped or slapped because of its drop safety and required proper trigger pressure. A hand or finger could be injured if placed on the slide during discharge. It was noted that women often struggle more than men with gripping the firearm properly.

Michael Maloney, an expert in bloodstain pattern analysis, disputed that blood found on the wall or door originated from the victim's face after being shot, citing the horizontal direction of the blood. He also indicated that blood stains on the floor did not suggest a trail and noted the proximity of the Petitioner’s shirt to the shooting. Maloney observed that backspatter came from the left side, and he expressed uncertainty regarding blood on the victim's hands, as it could have resulted from life-saving efforts rather than the gunshot itself. He dismissed the notion that the victim's hand was bloodied from blocking her wound, based on the lack of expected blood patterns. He confirmed the victim did not walk through her blood to leave a shoeprint, as she was shoeless.

According to Maloney, the victim was seated to the left of the Petitioner on a sofa, with the gun positioned close to her cheek at the time of discharge. He could not determine who controlled the weapon. His analysis suggested that the victim was not laid on the floor for CPR and would have expected blood on a nearby AR-15 if it had been moved post-shooting. He found blood on the Petitioner suspect but acknowledged that some could be consistent with CPR efforts. Evidence did not indicate the Petitioner was in the kitchen or bedroom during the incident.

Defense witnesses, including LeAnne Schaffer and Rachel Walker, recounted instances where the victim discussed accidentally discharging a gun, suggesting prior accidental firings. The jury ultimately convicted the Defendant of second-degree murder, resulting in an eighteen-year sentence. The evidentiary hearing featured testimonies from the Petitioner, trial counsel, and three supporting witnesses, with the Petitioner claiming that counsel introduced prejudicial hearsay during the cross-examination of Chaplain James Duke.

Counsel's cross-examination of Chaplain Duke included testimony from Charlotte Barbour, the victim's mother, who claimed to have warned the Petitioner about his guns and accused him of killing her daughter. She showed Chaplain Duke a photo of the victim, stating, "Look what [the Petitioner] took from me." The Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for allowing this testimony. Additionally, he criticized counsel for introducing victim's emails, arguing that this highlighted her fear during an argument with him, which was not adequately vetted. The Petitioner alleged that counsel misunderstood the operation of a Glock handgun, notably instructing the medical examiner, Dr. John Davis, to improperly hold the weapon, leading to incorrect implications during testimony. This error was compounded by Sergeant Bob Allen’s testimony about the potential for injury from the gun's slide. 

Moreover, the Petitioner argued that during cross-examination of Sergeant Pat Postiglione, counsel inadvertently suggested premeditation by introducing a theory about the Petitioner putting chicken in the oven before the victim arrived home. The Petitioner expressed that counsel should have called certain witnesses to counter the State's portrayal of a troubled marriage, despite being informed that their testimony could lead to irrelevant issues. He clarified that a statement made at a jewelry store, which was misconstrued as an accusation about the victim, was a reference to her homosexual ex-boyfriend. Lastly, the Petitioner criticized counsel for not addressing the lack of fingerprints on the pistol and blood in the bedroom, asserting that counsel should have asked investigators to explain the difficulty of obtaining fingerprints from the Glock to counter the State's narrative.

The Petitioner asserted several points regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during trial. He referenced two audio files received in pretrial discovery, including a 911 call indicating a medical alert button was activated at his residence, which he claimed confirmed his presence in the bedroom. The Petitioner stated he had to remove a tooth from the victim's throat during CPR, contradicting the State's expert testimony that no evidence of CPR was present; a photograph of the tooth on the couch was introduced. He criticized his counsel for failing to highlight this evidence.

Additionally, the Petitioner noted that while he was cleaning firearms with Windex and a paper towel—evidence that was photographed—his counsel did not address the implications of this during trial. The State suggested he used the paper towel to avoid leaving fingerprints, but the Petitioner felt this detail was crucial to his defense. He also expressed concern that counsel did not effectively use crime scene photographs to counter the State's narrative regarding the victim's presence in the home, such as showing her keys, sweater, and shoes, which implied she had been there long enough to start cooking.

The Petitioner claimed he attempted to communicate important points to his counsel during the trial, including concerns about a witness, Ms. Barbour, who testified about a shot fired near the bed, which he believed was misleading. He alleged that counsel mishandled the appeal process, waiving significant issues, and made prejudicial statements about him during opening and closing arguments, labeling him as "cocky, arrogant, and immature," and further described as "a pervert and a flirt," which he felt negatively impacted his case. He also mentioned that the State misquoted prior testimony, specifically referencing a witness related to his texting relationship.

The Petitioner contends that the State misrepresented trial testimony regarding his marriage stress and his intent to address it, and claims that his counsel failed to object to this misrepresentation. During the trial, the victim’s mother testified that the victim threatened to kill herself and the baby to avoid child support, which the Petitioner argues was not adequately challenged by his counsel, despite a motion in limine being filed. Counsel did not object to the State's misquote of this statement during closing arguments, nor to inaccuracies regarding Dr. Davis's testimony about the victim's ability to hold the firearm as alleged by the Petitioner.

Counsel, who has extensive experience in criminal defense, stated that he and co-counsel communicated effectively prior to the trial. He explained his decision not to object to the State's arguments, believing it would draw more attention to them, given the jury's instructions to focus on the facts. Counsel also filed a motion to exclude testimony from Chaplain Duke, which the court denied, and considered the victim’s mother's statements admissible as excited utterances that benefited the Petitioner by showcasing her bias without knowledge of the facts.

Additionally, counsel asserted that he had adequately prepared Dr. Davis to demonstrate the shooting scenario, including the gun's proximity and angle of the wound. This demonstration aimed to support the defense theory that the victim accidentally discharged the firearm.

Counsel discussed the possibility of the gun injuring the victim's hand but chose not to question Dr. Davis, opting instead to assert during closing arguments that the gun would have discharged if held improperly. The State theorized that after the shooting, the Petitioner placed a chicken in the oven, a claim Counsel found illogical due to the absence of blood in the kitchen despite the Petitioner being covered in blood after administering first aid. Multiple witnesses testified regarding the chicken's cooking status, but Counsel was unclear on the timeline of events proposed by the State.

In his opening statement, Counsel characterized the Petitioner as "cocky, arrogant, immature, irresponsible around weapons," asserting that such truths are impactful. He regretted not being able to avoid characterizing the Petitioner negatively due to a denied motion in limine. The Petitioner provided a list of witnesses to counter claims of marital discord, yet Counsel believed their testimony could invite character evidence against the Petitioner.

Counsel noted that he had filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of domestic verbal abuse against the Petitioner, which was denied, and acknowledged his failure to address this in a motion for a new trial. Testimony from Paige Merriweather and Megan Evans regarding relationships with the Petitioner faced similar unsuccessful motions to exclude, which Counsel also should have raised in a new trial motion. He recognized it was likely a mistake to wait until closing arguments to suggest the victim could have accidentally shot herself and to have the Petitioner testify, particularly as the Petitioner struggled to recall events.

Despite the State's offer for the Petitioner to plead guilty to second-degree murder, he declined. Counsel engaged a former police officer as an investigator for pretrial preparation and trial support but chose not to object to certain statements during the State's closing argument, fearing it would damage his rapport with the jury. Counsel concluded by asserting that both the State and the victim's family had hastily judged the Petitioner.

The victim's mother expressed a belief that the Petitioner killed the victim, which supported the defense's argument. Counsel was aware that the statement from Stephanie Lindblom would be presented at trial and strategically questioned her about the victim's email. Prior to trial, counsel consulted Dr. John Davis, whose ruling on the victim's death as inconclusive regarding murder or suicide was crucial to the defense. Discussions with Dr. Davis included the weapon's proximity, gunshot residue on the victim’s hands, and the weapon's angle. Dr. Davis noted that the absence of gunshot residue was not significant, as it is not always present on someone who fired a weapon. A defense blood spatter expert indicated it would be challenging for the victim to have shot herself, although it was possible if she accidentally discharged the weapon. 

The analysis section outlines the process for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner must prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence, and factual findings by the post-conviction court are conclusive unless contrary evidence predominates. Appellate courts do not reassess evidence but apply the law to the facts de novo without a presumption of correctness. Ineffective assistance claims are evaluated under the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice to the defense. The performance deficiency must reflect serious errors that undermine the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective counsel, and the petitioner must demonstrate that these errors compromised the fairness and reliability of the trial outcome.

To establish the prejudice required for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had counsel performed competently, the outcome would have been different, particularly in the context of a guilty plea. In such cases, the petitioner must show they would have opted for a trial instead of pleading guilty due to counsel's deficiencies. Courts may evaluate the Strickland test in any order and do not need to assess both prongs if one is insufficiently demonstrated. 

The post-conviction court reviewed the Petitioner’s claims regarding trial and appellate counsel separately. Key issues included:

1. **Misstatements in Closing Argument**: The Petitioner argued that counsel failed to object to inaccuracies in the State's closing argument. Counsel claimed that objecting would draw attention to the misstatements. The court found this to be a strategic decision that it would not second-guess.

2. **Cross-Examination of Chaplain Duke**: Counsel questioned Chaplain Duke to support a defense argument about the police's hasty judgment in the case. The court deemed this a reasonable tactical choice.

3. **Cross-Examination of Stephanie Lindblom**: The Petitioner contended that counsel’s introduction of an email and certain witness testimonies were detrimental to the defense. However, the court found counsel's actions to be reasonable tactics.

4. **Cross-Examination of Dr. John Davis**: The Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance due to a misunderstanding of how a Glock was held during questioning. The post-conviction court noted that counsel had prior discussions with the Petitioner and an expert, finding no evidence of misunderstanding; thus, the claim was deemed unsubstantiated.

5. **Chicken in the Oven Theory**: The Petitioner criticized counsel for introducing a theory during cross-examination that the Petitioner may have placed a chicken in the oven, but specifics regarding the impact of this claim were not detailed.

Overall, the post-conviction court upheld that the Petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance regarding the various claims presented.

The post-conviction court found that there was strong evidence indicating the victim could not have been home for long before the shooting, which supported the counsel's tactical decision to question this aspect. The Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel during the opening statement, where the attorney described him negatively. Counsel argued that disclosing the Petitioner's character flaws was necessary for maintaining credibility with the jury, a strategy the court deemed reasonable. 

The Petitioner also argued that counsel was ineffective for not calling witnesses to counter claims about his marital issues. The court noted that bringing in such testimony could have exposed unfavorable evidence that had been successfully excluded prior to trial. Therefore, the decision not to present this evidence was considered appropriate and not ineffective.

Regarding cross-examination about the absence of fingerprints on a Glock pistol, the Petitioner contended that counsel was ineffective for not challenging whether the grip could retain fingerprints. However, counsel believed it was strategically better for the case not to highlight the absence of fingerprints. The court agreed this was a tactical decision.

Lastly, the Petitioner asserted counsel failed to adequately consider that a paper towel near the gun might indicate he was cleaning it. While this point was not explored in the hearing, the court affirmed that counsel had addressed it during the trial. Overall, the post-conviction court determined that counsel's decisions were reasonable and supported by the record, thus finding no ineffective assistance.

Counsel was criticized for not cross-examining several State witnesses about the potential use of Windex and paper towels in cleaning weapons. The court acknowledged that ethical concerns might have influenced counsel's decision not to question the Petitioner on this matter. While additional questioning could have been beneficial, the court found that the lack of it did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly since the Petitioner did not demonstrate any resulting prejudice.

The Petitioner also claimed ineffective assistance for not emphasizing that the victim's belongings—her car keys, sweater, and shoes—indicated she was home for the evening, contradicting the State's argument that she was only briefly present. The post-conviction court noted that both parties had already established the fact of the keys being on the table, and counsel had mentioned the victim not wearing shoes during cross-examination. The court determined that failing to underscore every potentially favorable piece of evidence does not equate to deficient performance, concluding that the Petitioner did not show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had these facts been highlighted in closing arguments.

Regarding a tooth found on the couch, which the Petitioner argued supported his claim of performing CPR, the post-conviction court noted that counsel had utilized this evidence during cross-examination. The court characterized counsel's decision not to emphasize this point in closing as a tactical choice and deemed the Petitioner’s argument meritless.

Lastly, the Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance for not cross-examining the victim's mother about her testimony regarding the victim's denial of responsibility for a bullet hole. The court highlighted that counsel's choice not to accuse Ms. Barbour of lying was a reasonable tactical decision. The record supports all of these determinations made by the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on the cumulative effect of errors during the trial, specifically highlighting two deficiencies: inadequate cross-examination of Dr. Davis regarding the victim’s firearm handling and failure to introduce evidence of a 911 call. The post-conviction court found no demonstrated prejudice from these actions, a conclusion supported by the record.

Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the Petitioner alleges that the State improperly attributed a statement to Megan Prisco about the Petitioner’s marriage, framing it as a misconduct claim. However, the court deemed this claim meritless, noting that it should have been raised on direct appeal instead of in the post-conviction relief petition.

The Petitioner also asserts ineffective assistance at the appellate level due to counsel's failure to preserve certain issues. He argues that counsel should have questioned the admissibility of the victim’s statement concerning a bullet hole in the bedroom and sought a jury instruction on the matter. The appellate court ruled this issue was waived as it was not included in the motion for new trial. The post-conviction court found no demonstrated prejudice from counsel's actions, supported by the trial record.

Additionally, the Petitioner contends that counsel failed to preserve the issue of whether the victim’s mother should testify about her missing wedding ring. The post-conviction court noted that counsel had initially sought to prevent this testimony, but since the State did not plan to introduce it, the trial court did not rule on its admissibility. Ultimately, the statement made by the victim’s mother was considered a personal observation rather than hearsay. The record also supports this determination.

The Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve for appeal the issue of Officer Peebles’ testimony regarding the Petitioner’s alleged domestic verbal abuse, which was deemed waived due to the lack of a pretrial motion to exclude the testimony or mention in the motion for new trial. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision that the testimony was admissible and noted that other witnesses corroborated Peebles’ statements. The post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner did not demonstrate any prejudice from this testimony.

Regarding text messages sent by the Petitioner to Paige Merriweather, the court found that the issue was waived as counsel did not object to their introduction. The court indicated that the Petitioner likely opened the door to this evidence through his own testimony, and again, the Petitioner failed to establish any prejudice from counsel's inaction.

As for Megan Evans’ intended testimony about an incident involving the Petitioner and the victim, the post-conviction court noted that Evans did not testify before the jury, thus the Petitioner could not show ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this issue.

Finally, the Petitioner claimed that the cumulative effect of his counsel's alleged errors constituted ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court held that the Petitioner did not prove he was prejudiced by any of the alleged errors, affirming the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. The record supports all these determinations.