Donald Alan Miller v. A.A. Stagner and R.L. Pulley, Leroy Freeman v. A.A. Stagner and R.L. Pulley

Citations: 757 F.2d 988; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 31589Docket: 84-5980, 84-5981

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 8, 1985; Federal Appellate Court

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Donald Alan Miller and Leroy Freeman, petitioners-appellants, were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder under California Penal Code Sections 182 and 187 and appealed the dismissal of their habeas corpus petitions by the district court. The case, heard by the Ninth Circuit, involved facts indicating that Miller, a physician and owner of two medical clinics, conspired with Freeman, a janitor at the clinics, to arrange the murder of Miller's estranged wife for $5,000.

In October 1978, after one clinic was destroyed by arson, Freeman, in contact with a friend named White, discussed the possibility of killing someone. White, who was linked to the investigation of the fire, agreed to the killing for the price. During meetings at Miller's office, Miller and White set plans for the murder, including payment details. However, after a series of failed meet-ups and discussions about logistics, including the need for a silencer, the plot continued to evolve.

Freeman later met with Russell, an undercover investigator, and facilitated the arrangement for the murder, providing cash and details about Miller's wife, including a diagram of her residence. Despite the initial plan, the murder was not carried out as intended, with ongoing negotiations about payment and logistics. The case illustrates the complexity of the conspiracy charge and the interactions leading to the legal proceedings against Miller and Freeman.

On January 4, Russell approached Miller at Alphy's Restaurant, introduced himself, and mentioned a mutual acquaintance, Freeman. Russell stated he would be handling a matter on behalf of White, who had declined to participate. He requested more money from Miller, who indicated he might be able to pay more in six months. Miller was subsequently arrested when he expressed a desire to end the conversation.

In the context of federal habeas corpus, state prisoners must demonstrate that their detention infringes on fundamental liberties protected by the Federal Constitution. Appellants argue their convictions are unconstitutional, asserting the prosecution failed to prove the intent to kill Mrs. Miller, which they claim is essential for a conspiracy to commit murder charge. They suggest a charge of conspiracy to solicit murder would be more appropriate, carrying a lighter sentence.

When reviewing challenges to evidence sufficiency in a habeas case, the standard requires assessing if any rational trier of fact could find all elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the evidence was deemed adequate, as detailed conversations among the appellants indicated a clear intent to kill, regardless of whether they intended to carry out the act themselves. The conspiracy's goal was murder, not merely solicitation.

The appellants also contend they were unconstitutionally convicted due to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on conspiracy to solicit murder as a lesser included offense. However, due process does not mandate such an instruction unless the evidence justifies it. California law similarly requires a jury instruction on lesser included offenses only when the evidence suggests that the charged offense may not have been committed.

Appellants' arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence and the denial of an entrapment jury instruction were unsuccessful. Evidence indicated that the conspiracy's objective was the murder of Mrs. Miller, not merely soliciting the murder, which supported the trial court's jury instruction. The right to an entrapment instruction depends on state law, and failure to provide such an instruction does not constitute a federal constitutional violation. Due process does not require an instruction unless evidence supports it; in this case, no evidence of inducement by law enforcement was presented, as appellants initiated the criminal plan and sought assistance from informants and undercover officers.

Appellants also contended that California Penal Code § 653f(b) (solicitation) should govern their case over the general conspiracy and murder statutes, but this argument failed to establish a federal right necessary for habeas corpus relief. Additionally, appellant Miller argued that the information against him was defective for not stating the requisite intent; however, the information sufficiently tracked state statutes to inform defendants of the charges without needing to specify mental state.

Lastly, the excerpt mentions potential prosecutorial misconduct involving Officer Woods, who was aware of Miller's representation and prior arrest but continued to use an informant to monitor Miller's intentions regarding his wife, ensuring that the informant would not interfere with the attorney-client relationship.

Watson contacted Miller multiple times, making various offers including dismissing Miller's case and eliminating prosecution witnesses, while advising Miller not to speak with his attorney. These communications were unknown to Miller's attorney and ended when police learned of Watson's proposition to kill witnesses. Miller subsequently moved to dismiss the case due to police misconduct, but the prosecution contended that excluding evidence from Watson's misconduct was the appropriate remedy. The trial judge denied Miller’s motion, ruling to exclude any evidence obtained by Watson, despite believing it lacked value for the prosecution.

At trial, Miller sought to introduce evidence of his dealings with Watson to support an entrapment defense, but the trial court excluded this under California Evidence Code Sec. 352, which allows for exclusion if the evidence's probative value is significantly outweighed by potential prejudice, confusion, or time issues. Miller argued this exclusion violated his due process rights. A habeas proceeding outlined that assessing the exclusion's impact on due process involves balancing the evidence's importance against the state's interests in exclusion. The court must evaluate the evidence's relevance, reliability, evaluation capability, whether it is sole or cumulative, and its significance to the defense.

The trial court found the evidence insufficiently relevant to the central issue and disconnected from the entrapment defense since it occurred after Miller's arrest. Thus, the court determined that the evidence's limited probative value did not surpass the state's interest in maintaining trial efficiency and clarity, affirming that there was no due process violation.

Furthermore, two jurors were dismissed during jury deliberations—one due to illness and the other due to suspected intoxication. The trial judge confirmed observations of the second juror's behavior and testimony regarding alcohol presence, leading to their replacement with alternates. The jury was instructed to disregard prior deliberations and restart their discussions.

Appellants argue that the dismissal and replacement of two jurors violated their rights to trial by jury and due process. However, the court found that the California procedure used for juror substitution maintained the jury's essential features as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, citing relevant case law. 

Regarding the exclusion of appellants from an in-chambers hearing, they claimed this violated their due process rights and the right to confront witnesses. The court recognized that defendants typically have the right to be present at all trial stages, but determined that the absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because their counsels were present, fully participated, and communicated with the appellants. Additionally, jurors are not considered witnesses against the defendants, thus not infringing on the right to confrontation. The trial judge had sufficient evidence regarding juror Johnston's behavior without needing the appellants' testimony, and the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding their proffered evidence.

On the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant Miller contended that his attorney, Mr. Scherotter, effectively abandoned him during jury deliberations by seeking permission to be absent, despite Miller consenting to representation by Mr. Mandanich. The court noted that for a successful ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both errors by counsel that a competent attorney would not make and resulting prejudice. Miller failed to establish either element.

Both claims presented by Miller were found to be meritless. The trial court addressed the transition of legal representation from Miller's original counsel to Mr. Mandanich, which Miller consented to. Miller was unable to prove that Mandanich failed to perform competently or that any resulting prejudice affected his case. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the habeas corpus petitions was affirmed. 

Circuit Judge Ferguson dissented, arguing that Miller's constitutional right to be present during a juror disqualification hearing was violated and should not be considered harmless error. Ferguson emphasized the importance of a defendant's presence during critical proceedings, particularly after the jury had announced it was deadlocked.

During the trial, after ten weeks and three days of jury deliberation, the jury indicated they were unable to reach a verdict. Miller's original counsel, Mr. Scherotter, informed him of a planned vacation, which led to a dilemma regarding representation. Ultimately, Miller consented to Scherotter's departure under pressure when informed that he would no longer represent him if Miller refused. This occurred while the jury was still deliberating, which culminated in a declaration of deadlock.

The next day, Mandanich, a junior associate, appeared as the substitute counsel. He was immediately called to discuss issues concerning jurors, including the illness of one juror and concerns raised about another juror's alcohol consumption.

Defendant Miller's substitute counsel, Mr. Mandanich, was tasked with discussing juror issues in an in camera session with the trial court and prosecutor. Acknowledging Mr. Mandanich's unfamiliarity with the case, the court inquired what Miller's previous counsel, Mr. Scherotter, might have done regarding the juror problems. Mr. Mandanich expressed uncertainty but waived any claim of error if juror Mr. Johnston remained. Nevertheless, the court decided to dismiss both Mr. Johnston and Mrs. Koch from the jury without obtaining Miller's consent.

During the session, Miller requested to attend the hearing twice, both of which were denied. Evidence was presented regarding Mr. Johnston's alleged misconduct, including testimonies from the jury foreman, who believed Johnston could still deliberate effectively, and a bailiff, who noted Johnston's belligerence and smell of alcohol. Johnston denied drinking during his duties but admitted to consuming three drinks the previous Thursday and attributed his lethargy to lack of sleep.

Following the in camera hearing, the trial court removed both jurors without explanation, citing misconduct for Johnston, despite objections from Miller's counsel. Two alternate jurors were then sworn in, and the jury was instructed to begin deliberations anew. When Miller questioned the denial of his presence during the disqualification hearing, the judge stated it would not have been beneficial.

Miller challenged the court's refusal to allow his attendance at the inquiry, but the majority dismissed his constitutional claims, suggesting that the presence of counsel sufficed. They speculated that defense counsel could consult with their clients during the inquiry and concluded the error was harmless. However, the dissenting opinion argued against this dismissal, suggesting the need for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the constitutional violation was indeed harmless.

The right of a defendant to be present at all stages of criminal proceedings is constitutionally protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This right is considered a fundamental aspect of justice, as affirmed by various Supreme Court cases. A defendant’s presence is crucial, especially during significant stages like jury deliberations, which directly impacts their right to a fair trial. The court acknowledged that while a defendant can lose this right through consent or misconduct, there was no indication that Miller waived his rights in such a manner. Instead, the trial court denied Miller's request based solely on doubts about the utility of his presence during a deadlocked jury inquiry. The commencement of jury deliberations and the substitution of jurors are pivotal moments in a trial that can affect a defendant's ability to seek a mistrial. The pressures on jurors during lengthy deliberations can lead to adverse dynamics, which the legal system recognizes as a necessary trade-off for ensuring the integrity of jury verdicts. Ultimately, safeguarding the deliberative process of the jury is essential to achieving a just outcome in trials.

A jury that has deliberated for five days should not be reconstituted solely for judicial convenience or juror comfort, as this infringes on the defendant's fundamental due process rights to a fair and impartial jury. A defendant is entitled to be tried by the jury originally selected, barring a few specific exceptions. Dismissing a juror after a jury reports being deadlocked, without assessing the remaining jurors' capacity, undermines due process. The validity of the juror's disqualification cannot be determined without the defendant present, which is vital for the integrity of the deliberative process.

While the defendant's presence is not always required, it should not be based on convenience for the court or counsel. The defendant's rights to defend himself and bear the consequences of a conviction underscore the necessity of his presence during critical proceedings. The Supreme Court has indicated that the defendant's presence can facilitate the defense's efforts, especially during juror examinations for potential disqualification.

In this case, the defendant, Miller, possessed crucial knowledge relevant to the juror's demeanor, yet the trial court did not consult him, relying instead on his former counsel, who lacked insight into the situation. Thus, Miller’s absence was not justified, as his input was essential for an informed defense.

Due process, while sometimes inconvenient for trial courts, is foundational to the criminal justice system, ensuring the defendant is not merely an observer in vital stages of their trial. Consequently, this case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the violation of Miller's due process rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.