Simonds Construction Permit

Citation: Not availableDocket: 83-6-14 Vtec

Court: Vermont Superior Court; May 18, 2015; Vermont; State Appellate Court

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William Simonds, Trustee of the H. Simonds Trust, along with William and Paula Pearsall, appealed the Town of Fairfield Planning Commission and Zoning Board of Adjustment's (ZBA) May 28, 2014 decision denying their building permit application. The ZBA's denial was based on insufficient road frontage for the property in question. The appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there are no disputed material facts and that they are entitled to the permit as a matter of law. They are represented by attorney Joseph F. Cahill, while the Town responded through Zoning Administrator Stephen Cushing. A Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts was submitted by both parties, establishing several key points: 

1. William Simonds, Jr. owns the property and the Pearsalls are prospective purchasers.
2. The property, located in Fairfield, Vermont, spans 3.63 acres.
3. A survey conducted by Northern Land Surveying delineated the property’s boundaries.
4. The property lies within the Lake Area District, part of the Conservation & Recreation District under town bylaws.
5. The primary legal issue pertains to the adequacy of the property’s road frontage; the application meets other dimensional standards.
6. The property’s southwestern boundary is partially outside and partially within the right of way of Madden Road, a Class 3 Town Highway, though ownership of the road is unclear.
7. The property is adjacent to lands formerly owned by Greg Christie. 

The appeal centers on the determination of road frontage adequacy as per zoning requirements.

The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) denied the Appellants’ application for a single-family residence on the basis that the parcel lacked the required road frontage. The Appellants are now seeking summary judgment, asserting that the facts show they do meet the road frontage requirement. Under V.R.C.P. 56(a), summary judgment is warranted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Court is tasked with determining whether the Appellants' application complies with the Town of Fairfield Subdivision and Zoning Bylaws concerning road frontage. The Bylaws stipulate that a property must have a minimum of 200 feet of frontage for year-round residential use in the Lake District. However, Bylaws 3.4(A) outlines requirements for access to land development, specifying that properties must either front a maintained public road (Class III or better) or have a Planning Commission-approved easement or right-of-way at least 20 feet wide. The Planning Commission may require a wider easement if necessary for public safety.

Bylaws 3.4(A) distinguishes between access and road frontage, indicating that road frontage is necessary for establishing development density, while access can be through other means. Therefore, the Appellants must demonstrate both sufficient road frontage and legal access to the property to meet the Bylaws’ requirements.

The Town denied the Applicant's application for a building permit due to insufficient legal access, specifically the lack of required road frontage for development density. The Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) ruled that land within the town highway right of way does not constitute valid road frontage unless the Town owns the right of way in fee simple. The applicants failed to prove ownership of a three-rod-wide strip of land required for access, which meant granting the permit would unlawfully convey access over adjacent private property. The Town stated it would approve the permit only if it did not result in granting access over Mr. Christie’s land or constitute an unlawful taking of his property rights. The court noted that the Town cannot grant a right-of-way for one landowner over another's land through a building permit. To qualify for the permit, the Applicants must demonstrate legal access from their property to a Class III Town road or possess an owned easement. The court recognized that approximately 350 feet of the Applicant's property lies within the right-of-way for Madden Road, satisfying the 200-foot frontage requirement, but emphasized that this does not grant the Applicants rights to use their neighbor's property. The court described two interpretations of the boundaries of Madden Road: one encompassing the entire right-of-way for public use and the other limiting it to the traveled portion of the road.

The Bylaws lack a clear definition of the legal limits of a Class III highway, leading to the conclusion that the limits of Madden Road extend to the right of way the Town holds for its establishment and maintenance. A portion of the Appellants' southern boundary falls within this right of way, resulting in over 200 feet of road frontage on Madden Road, which meets the requirements of Bylaw 3.2(B). Additionally, there are no factual grounds to dispute the Appellants' access to Madden Road, indicating their proposed single-family development also complies with Bylaw 3.4(A). The Court rules that a lot must have at least 200 feet of road frontage within the right of way of a Class III Town highway to meet dimensional and density requirements. The ruling does not address any independent right of way claims relating to neighboring properties. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment is granted, reversing the Town of Fairfield Planning Commission and Zoning Board of Adjustment's decision from May 28, 2014. The proceedings are remanded to the Town’s Zoning Administrator to issue a zoning permit for the Appellants' project. A Judgment Order accompanies this decision, concluding the matters before the Court. The document is electronically signed by Judge Thomas S. Durkin on May 18, 2015.