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Jose Garcia-Martinez v. Jefferson Sessions

Citation: 886 F.3d 1291Docket: 16-72940

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 9, 2018; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case concerns a lawful permanent resident who faced removal after the Department of Homeland Security classified his three Oregon theft convictions as crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld his removability and denied cancellation of removal, relying on a 2016 BIA decision that broadened the definition of theft CIMTs to include non-permanent takings. On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and undertook de novo review of whether the Oregon theft statutes categorically qualified as CIMTs. The panel found that, under longstanding BIA precedent, only thefts involving intent to permanently deprive qualified as CIMTs, and the Oregon statutes permitted convictions based on temporary deprivations. The court determined that the BIA’s new, broader definition of CIMT could not be applied retroactively to the petitioner, as the abrupt legal change undermined reliance interests and would impose severe consequences after decades of lawful residency. Citing analogous circuit precedent and factors limiting retroactive application of agency rules, the court set aside the removal order, granted the petition, and remanded the matter for proceedings consistent with its opinion, applying the earlier, narrower CIMT standard.

Legal Issues Addressed

Classification of Theft Offenses as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMT)

Application: The Ninth Circuit held that Oregon theft statutes, which do not require an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, do not categorically qualify as CIMTs under the pre-2016 BIA standard.

Reasoning: The Ninth Circuit panel, led by Judge Fernandez, found that the BIA erred in its classification, as the Oregon theft statutes did not necessitate a permanent taking of property.

Indivisibility of Oregon Theft Statutes

Application: Oregon’s theft statutes were found to be indivisible, precluding a modified categorical approach and requiring analysis under the categorical approach.

Reasoning: Oregon's statutory provisions on theft are deemed 'indivisible' under Or. Rev. Stat. 164.025 and relevant case law.

Limits on Retroactive Application of Agency Decisions

Application: The court found that retroactive application of new agency interpretations is limited when it would significantly burden an individual who relied on longstanding precedent, especially in removal proceedings.

Reasoning: While the BIA has the authority to retroactively apply new rules, this power is limited and requires balancing reliance interests against potential harms from non-retroactivity.

Presumptive Prospective Application of New CIMT Standards

Application: The panel applied recent circuit precedent to presume that new BIA rules defining CIMTs apply prospectively only, not retroactively to conduct predating the rule change.

Reasoning: Citing recent case law, including decisions from the Second and Tenth Circuits, it is concluded that the BIA's updated CIMT definition is presumed to apply prospectively only.

Retroactivity of New BIA Interpretations

Application: The panel determined that the BIA's 2016 decision in In re Diaz-Lizarraga, which broadened the definition of theft CIMTs, could not be applied retroactively to the petitioner due to reliance interests and the abruptness of the legal change.

Reasoning: The retroactivity factors favored Garcia due to the abrupt nature of the legal change, reliance on the previous rule, and the severe consequences of removal after over thirty years in the U.S.

Standard for Reviewing CIMT Determinations

Application: The court reviewed de novo whether the petitioner's convictions qualified as CIMTs, affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretations.

Reasoning: The determination of whether a crime is a CIMT is a legal question reviewed de novo, with appropriate deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.