Lety Robinson, Individually and D/B/A Kiss'l Flowers Shop, LLC v. Carlos Ochoa, Rosalinda R. Ochoa and Lorena Ochoa

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-16-00357-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 5, 2018; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Lety Robinson, individually and d/b/a Kiss’l Flowers Shop, LLC, is appealing a judgment from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Cameron County, Texas, favoring appellees Carlos Ochoa, Rosalinda R. Ochoa, and Lorena Ochoa. Robinson presents six key arguments in her appeal, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for liability, damages, and attorney’s fees, questioning the capacity of Rosalinda and Carlos to sue, alleging the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for continuance, and contesting the judgment's award of travel expenses and the post-judgment interest rate.

The underlying case arose from a contract between the parties for wedding services. Appellees claimed Robinson failed to deliver the agreed-upon services for Lorena's wedding, resulting in a lawsuit for breach of contract, fraud, conversion, promissory estoppel, money had and received, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Rosalinda agreed to pay Robinson $25,900 for various services, including floral arrangements, catering for 412 guests, and photography. An initial deposit of $2,600 was made, and the total invoice on the wedding day was $30,171.44, which the appellees paid without objection. However, Robinson requested a cash payment due to concerns about the check covering insufficient funds, leading Carlos to pay an additional $23,000 in cash. After the wedding, Robinson returned an excess payment of $25,600 to the appellees, who did not seek damages related to this overpayment at trial. The appellate court affirmed the judgment but modified certain aspects.

Robinson Lorena testified that Robinson failed to deliver various agreed-upon goods and services for her wedding, including bridal and bridesmaids bouquets, leading to improvised solutions using other flowers. Robinson provided only three of the ten boutonnieres, used artificial flowers for half of the decorations, and did not decorate the reception backdrop. The lighting at the reception was inadequate compared to prior demonstrations, with most illumination supplied by the separately hired disc jockey. The wedding cake lacked floral decorations, and table settings were incomplete, missing silverware and plates. Only one lounge area was provided for guests, and there was no designated photo area. Robinson also failed to supply photographs or video, prompting appellees to pay an additional $900 to obtain these from another photographer. Lorena estimated the discrepancy between promised and delivered services at $10,000 to $15,000. 

Robinson acknowledged imperfections in her services but believed she performed well, claiming she was unaware of the appellees' dissatisfaction until after the event. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellees, awarding them $15,000 for damages, $2,500 for travel expenses, $15,000 for attorney’s fees, and 8.25% post-judgment interest. Conditional appellate attorney fees of $3,000 were granted for appeals to both the Court and the Texas Supreme Court. Robinson's motion for a new trial was denied, and neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. Subsequently, Robinson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting appellees’ claims, and the appellate court noted that in the absence of requested findings, it would imply necessary findings to uphold the judgment. The court would review the evidence's sufficiency using standards applicable to jury findings.

The legal standard for assessing evidence sufficiency is whether it allows reasonable and fair-minded individuals to reach the challenged verdict. Favorable evidence is credited if reasonable, while contrary evidence is disregarded unless it cannot be reasonably disputed. Evidence within a realm of reasonable disagreement must be respected, and the reviewing court must consider all evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding, when evaluating factual sufficiency. A finding can only be overturned if it is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.

In the breach of contract claim involving Robinson, she contests the enforceability of the contract due to alleged indefiniteness and asserts insufficient evidence of her breach. To establish a breach of contract, a plaintiff must prove a valid contract, performance or tender of performance, a breach by the defendant, and resulting damages. A binding contract requires an offer, acceptance, a meeting of the minds, mutual consent, and consideration. 

Robinson challenges the contract's existence but does not dispute the testimony regarding its terms. The court finds the contract enforceable, affirming that it must be sufficiently definite to determine the parties' rights and obligations. A contract need only be definite regarding material and essential terms; if it provides a reasonable basis for determining minimum damages, it is enforceable. Lorena's testimony about the agreement's key terms, including Robinson's obligation to provide goods and services for a wedding at a specified time for a sum of $30,171.44, supports this enforceability.

Robinson was contracted to provide various wedding services, including floral arrangements, catering, waitstaff, a wedding cake, photography, lounge areas, and lighting. The contract's terms were deemed sufficiently clear to define the parties' rights and responsibilities. The court referenced prior cases affirming that an agreement is enforceable if it outlines essential terms. Partial performance by Robinson indicated a mutual agreement on these terms.

Robinson contested the sufficiency of evidence regarding breach of contract, asserting that the testimony did not adequately compare promised services to actual performance. However, evidence presented by Lorena detailed specific failures, such as missing flowers, inadequate decorations, insufficient staff, and lack of photography services. The court found that reasonable individuals could conclude that Robinson breached the contract based on this evidence.

The court upheld the contract's enforceability and affirmed the sufficiency of evidence supporting the breach claim, deciding not to address other causes of action raised by Robinson due to the validity of the breach theory. 

Regarding damages, the court noted that the standard measure for breach of contract is the benefit-of-the-bargain, aiming to restore the injured party to the position they would have been in had the contract been fulfilled. This measure involves comparing the value of what was promised to what was actually delivered.

The trier of fact possesses significant discretion in awarding damages based on the evidence presented at trial, provided there is a rational basis for the calculations. Trial court findings are upheld even if the rationale is unclear, and a lack of detailed reasoning does not invalidate damage calculations, as long as they fall within an evidence-supported range. A party breaching a contract remains liable, and uncertainty regarding the amount of damages does not prevent recovery if the fact of damages is established. Plaintiffs must demonstrate their damages with reasonable certainty when such facts are clear. 

Robinson contends that appellees' evidence on damages is conclusory and that they required expert testimony to substantiate their claims. However, Lorena's estimate of damages, supported by factual evidence, indicated the value of the undelivered goods and services was between $10,000 and $15,000, and Robinson received a total of $30,171.44 under the contract, establishing the value of the promised services. The court references previous cases to reaffirm that objective valuations, such as bills or estimates, can sufficiently inform a jury's assessment of reasonable repair costs. The trial court had a valid basis for its damage award based on the evidence comparing the promised and delivered goods and services. Additionally, the court rejected Robinson's argument that expert testimony was necessary to prove damages, clarifying that such testimony is only required for issues beyond the common understanding of jurors.

Tamez is deemed irrelevant in this case, as the trial court was not faced with a technical causation question requiring expert testimony. A plaintiff in a breach of contract case can establish benefit-of-the-bargain damages through lay testimony, as supported by Am. Heritage, Inc. v. Nev. Gold. Casino, Inc. The evidence was viewed favorably towards the trial court's findings, allowing for a reasonable determination that appellees incurred $15,000 in damages. The trial court's findings were not deemed clearly wrong or unjust, leading to the overruling of Robinson's second issue.

Regarding attorney’s fees, Robinson contends the evidence supporting the trial court's award is insufficient. Appellees argue Robinson did not preserve this issue for appeal, but Texas law permits sufficiency complaints to be raised for the first time on appeal in nonjury cases. Under Texas law, attorney’s fees can only be recovered if authorized by statute or contract. Section 38.001 of the civil practices and remedies code allows recovery for reasonable attorney’s fees in breach of contract claims. The burden of proof lies with the party seeking these fees.

Appellees’ attorney testified about his experience, billing rate, and the substantial amount of attorney's fees incurred, stating he was requesting a reduced amount between $15,000 and $20,000 due to complications attributed to Robinson's actions. Robinson argued that appellees did not provide evidence of the reasonableness of the fees, specifically failing to address the Arthur Andersen factors.

A trial court may take judicial notice of customary attorney’s fees and the case file contents without additional evidence in actions tried to the bench under section 38.001, as supported by TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. 38.004. It is presumed that the trial court did so, and there is a statutory presumption that such fees are reasonable (TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. 38.003). This judicial notice serves as sufficient evidence for the trial court's award of attorney’s fees, including appellate fees, as established in case law (e.g., Gill Sav. Ass’n v. Chair King, Inc., and Kendrick v. Seibert). 

Robinson contends that Rosalinda and Carlos cannot recover on a breach of contract claim due to lack of party status or third-party beneficiary status. To maintain a breach of contract action, a plaintiff must demonstrate either privity or third-party beneficiary status (John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC). A challenge to a party's capacity to sue is a merit-based issue rather than a jurisdictional standing issue and can be waived if not properly raised (Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist.). Robinson failed to challenge their capacity through a verified pleading, resulting in waiver of her argument.

Robinson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for continuance, which she requested to find legal representation. Under TEX. R. CIV. P. 251, continuances require sufficient cause supported by affidavit, party consent, or legal operation. The trial court has discretion in granting such motions, and its decision will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. The criteria for abuse of discretion involves whether the court acted unreasonably or arbitrarily without proper guidelines.

Movants are presumed to have failed in showing an abuse of discretion by the trial court when a motion for continuance is not supported by an affidavit. Specifically, when a motion for continuance is based on the withdrawal of counsel, the movants must prove their lack of representation was not due to their own fault. In this case, Robinson’s counsel withdrew a month before trial, and after a hearing that Robinson did not attend, the court granted the withdrawal. On the trial day, Robinson sought a continuance to secure new counsel, citing Villegas v. Carter, where the Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion due to a lack of fault on the movant’s part.

However, unlike Villegas, Robinson had prior notice of her counsel's withdrawal and did not oppose the motion or show diligence in finding new representation. She claimed an unnamed lawyer advised her that the motion to withdraw would not be granted, but failed to substantiate her efforts to retain new counsel. Additionally, Robinson had previously delayed the trial multiple times, accumulating over two years of continuances involving two different attorneys. The trial court could reasonably conclude that her lack of representation was due to her own negligence, and thus did not act arbitrarily in denying her motion. 

In a separate matter, Robinson challenged the trial court’s award of post-judgment interest at 8.25%, arguing it surpassed the statutory limit, as well as the awarding of $2,500 in travel expenses related to litigation. The court agreed with her on these points.

Post-judgment interest rates are governed by statute, specifically TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. 304.003, which assigns the consumer credit commissioner the responsibility for determining these rates. As of April 1, 2016, the date of the trial court's judgment, the applicable post-judgment interest rate was five percent, as noted in Pettus v. Pettus, 237 S.W.3d 405, 423 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2007). This judgment's interest rate was deemed excessive. Additionally, the trial court's award of $2,500 in travel expenses was contested, as Texas law generally does not permit recovery of litigation-related expenses unless explicitly stated by contract or statute, supported by cases such as New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus. Inc. and Shaikh v. Aerovias de Mexico. The appellate court has the authority to correct erroneous judgments per TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). Consequently, the judgment was modified to reflect the correct post-judgment interest rate of five percent and to eliminate the travel expenses award. The court affirmed the modified judgment. Justice Leticia Hinojosa delivered the ruling on April 5, 2018.