State of Iowa v. Deshaun Marvin Lamar Williams

Citation: 910 N.W.2d 586Docket: 16-0894

Court: Supreme Court of Iowa; April 6, 2018; Iowa; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case of Deshaun Marvin Lamar Williams, who appealed his conviction for driving while barred as a habitual offender, arguing that the State was required to prove the mailing of a notice of bar as an essential element of the offense. The court concluded that the essential elements the State must prove are: (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle, and (2) this occurred during the time his license was revoked as a habitual offender. The court determined that while the mailing of the notice by the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) may be relevant, it is not a necessary element for conviction. Consequently, the court affirmed both the district court's judgment and the court of appeals' decision, upholding Williams's conviction under Iowa Code section 321.561.

Background facts indicate that on December 12, 2015, a motorist reported erratic driving of a vehicle, which eventually stopped on a gravel road. The responding officer, Sergeant Dallas Wingate, found the driver, Williams, exhibiting signs of intoxication and discovered his driving privileges were revoked. Williams failed to provide a valid driver’s license and refused field sobriety tests, leading to his arrest for driving while barred.

Deputy Doug Twigg observed that Williams exhibited slow and slurred speech, confusion, and irritation upon exiting his vehicle, which was identified as a sedan incapable of holding nine passengers, contrary to Williams's claim of having dropped off nine people. Both Deputy Twigg and Sergeant Wingate had body cameras, with only Williams appearing on the footage. Twigg detected a strong odor of alcohol and noted Williams's bloodshot eyes before transporting him to Boone County jail, where Williams admitted he should not have been driving but refused a breath sample. At the jail, Williams displayed inconsistent behavior, alternating between cooperative and argumentative, a common trait in individuals impaired by alcohol. 

Williams was charged with driving while barred (an aggravated misdemeanor) and OWI third offense as a habitual offender (a class 'D' felony). His motions for acquittal on both charges, based on insufficient evidence, were denied by the district court. The jury subsequently found him guilty on both counts and confirmed his prior convictions. He was sentenced to fifteen years for OWI, with a three-year minimum, and two years for driving while barred, to be served concurrently. Williams appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, stating there was adequate evidence for the jury to determine he was under the influence and rejecting his argument regarding proof of mailing notice of his license bar as a required element. A dissenting opinion argued that proof of mailing was necessary. The case was then granted further review to address the statutory interpretation regarding mailing notice as an element of the driving-while-barred charge, while remaining issues from the court of appeals were left undisturbed.

Williams argues that his conviction for driving while barred should be overturned because the State failed to prove it mailed him a notice of revocation. The relevant statute, Iowa Code section 321.561, prohibits habitual offenders from operating vehicles during specified periods but does not include mailing notice as an element of the offense. The State contends Williams did not preserve error regarding the required elements since he did not object to the marshaling instruction, which did not mention mailing notice. However, Williams had previously moved for acquittal based on the lack of proof of notice, and thus did not need to further object after that motion was denied. The State's claim of invited error is also rejected, as proof of mailing can be established through other means beyond an affidavit. The statutes in question focus solely on the periods of license revocation, with no mention of notice being a requisite element. Evidence presented at trial, including a certified driving record, demonstrated that Williams was operating a vehicle during the relevant timeframe, specifically from October 2, 2012, to October 2, 2016, with his arrest occurring on December 12, 2015.

Sergeant Wingate and Deputy Twigg testified that Williams was informed of his arrest for driving while barred and acknowledged he should not have been driving, confirming his status as a habitual offender. The district court denied Williams’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on established case law, which clarifies that proof of mailing is not an essential element of the offense of driving while barred. Relevant cases, including State v. Boleyn, State v. Cook, and State v. Snyder, illustrate that the offense consists solely of two elements: operating a motor vehicle and having a barred license due to habitual offender status. The absence of notice as a required element was noted in these rulings. Furthermore, in State v. Kennedy, the court confirmed that the state must prove only that the defendant drove a vehicle while under license revocation, emphasizing that documentation such as certified abstracts of driving records suffices for conviction without needing to prove mailing notices. The court concluded that any errors regarding the admissibility of mailing affidavits were harmless, as the core elements of the offense were sufficiently established.

Kennedy's reasoning regarding the sufficiency of an abstract of a driving record applies to Williams's habitual offender revocation case. In Kennedy, the driving record abstract established that the defendant operated a vehicle post-revocation, supported by his admissions. The court determined that an affidavit of mailing was unnecessary for revocation proceedings. Williams contends that the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) was required to mail notice of his driving bar, as mandated by IDOT administrative rules, not the Iowa Code. While the rules necessitate mailing a notice of denial or revocation, the Iowa Code does not specify this requirement, leading to potential inconsistencies. However, the thirty-day waiting period specified in IDOT rules aligns with the time allowed for judicial review of habitual offender determinations. Ultimately, the key legal point is that the mailing of notice is not an element of the crime; the State's burden is to prove that Williams operated a vehicle while barred, irrespective of the notice process. This parallels other legal standards where specific documentation (like marriage licenses or birth certificates) is not required to prove certain elements in various cases, as long as competent proof is presented.

The legislature established a 'status crime' for habitual offenders operating vehicles while their licenses are revoked, as outlined in Iowa Code section 321.561, which does not require proof of notice for the revocation. This contrasts with other laws, such as Minn. Stat. Ann. 171.24(2), where notice is an element of the crime. The case of State v. Green is referenced to highlight that the state must prove the mailing of a notice of suspension; however, the precedent does not necessitate independent proof of the suspension itself, such as a driving record or admissions from the defendant. Other jurisdictions have similarly ruled that notice is only essential when the defendant disputes receipt. Cases cited include Osborne v. District of Columbia, Griffin v. State, and People v. Gonzalez, which all demonstrate that sufficient evidence, including the defendant's admissions or testimony, can validate a conviction without requiring proof of notice of suspension.

In *State v. Mecham*, 331 P.3d 80, 89 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), three elements define first degree driving while license suspended (DWLS): 1) the defendant was driving in Washington; 2) the defendant's driving privilege was revoked at the time; and 3) the revocation stemmed from habitual traffic offender status. Mailing notice of revocation is not a trial element but pertains to due process compliance. The court affirmed the district court and court of appeals' judgments, with justices Wiggins and Appel dissenting and Hecht abstaining. Justice Wiggins contended that the State should prove mailing notice to the defendant as part of the offense. Citing *State v. Green*, 722 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 2006), he discussed statutory notice requirements under Iowa Code, emphasizing that proof of mailing is vital for establishing the offense of driving while suspended. Wiggins highlighted the necessity of interpreting Iowa Code sections collectively to ascertain legislative intent, asserting that words in statutes should be understood in their ordinary context, ensuring that no part is rendered superfluous.

The review indicates that the majority's interpretation of the habitual offender statutes and administrative rules is flawed, particularly regarding the effective date of the bar order. Under Iowa Code section 321.556, the IDOT must notify an individual in writing once determined a habitual offender, allowing for a hearing. The bar period, as specified in section 321.560, begins from the later of either the IDOT's final decision or the district court's upholding of that decision. Administrative rules require the IDOT to send a notice by first-class mail, with a mandatory thirty-day waiting period before the suspension or bar takes effect. This waiting period aligns with the time allowed for seeking judicial review, reinforcing the idea that the effective date of the bar cannot simply start on the date of the IDOT's decision. Ignoring the phrase "whichever occurs later" undermines the purpose of the statutory provisions and could lead to unreasonable outcomes regarding due process. The statutory interpretation should consider the entirety of the provisions and rules to ensure they function cohesively.

The majority views the phrase "from the date on which the district court upholds the final decision of the department, whichever occurs later" as superfluous since the IDOT’s final decision occurs before the district court's upholding. The thirty-day delay allows individuals barred an opportunity to seek judicial review, regardless of whether they actually pursue it. This mechanism is aligned with due process, ensuring individuals can exhaust legal remedies short of appealing to the court. The majority incorrectly concludes that Iowa Code section 321.560 supersedes rule 761—615.36 of the Iowa Administrative Code without clarifying what "the date of the final decision" entails. The precedent set in Purethane, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review establishes that the date a decision is mailed starts the thirty-day appeal period. Applying this to habitual offender statutes, the IDOT's final decision date is when the notice of barred status is mailed, initiating the judicial review period. This interpretation aligns rule 761—615.36 with section 321.560, stipulating that the IDOT must send notice to the licensee. Consequently, the State must demonstrate it mailed notice to Williams to establish the offense of driving while barred. Additionally, the case State v. Cook is deemed irrelevant, as it did not establish mailing notice as an essential element of the driving while barred offense.

In Cook, the court addressed an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where the defendant contended that his attorney should have objected to the introduction of his habitual offender status as it was prejudicial. The court determined that habitual offender status is a necessary element of the crime, requiring the state to provide proof. This ruling is not applicable to Williams's insufficiency-of-evidence claim regarding driving while barred, as Cook does not address the essential elements required for that offense.

The court referenced State v. Kennedy, which dealt with a license revocation rather than a license bar due to habitual offender status. In Kennedy, the defendant contested the introduction of a certified driving record but did not raise the issue of mailing proof. The key distinction is that license revocation for OWI occurs immediately upon conviction, while a habitual offender's license bar necessitates proof of mailing to initiate the appeal process and establish the effective date of the bar.

The court concluded that the correct marshaling instruction for driving while barred consists of two elements: (1) operating a vehicle, and (2) operating with a barred license. The second element requires the state to show that the defendant's license was barred on the relevant date and that notice of the bar was properly mailed to the defendant, although knowledge of the bar is not required for conviction. The lack of evidence demonstrating that the IDOT mailed notice to Williams at his last known address means the state did not meet the burden of proof needed for a conviction. Consequently, the jury's verdict on the driving-while-barred charge should not be upheld. Justice Appel joined in this dissent.