United States v. Mark Esposito

Citations: 754 F.2d 521; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28999Docket: 84-5090

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; February 7, 1985; Federal Appellate Court

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Mark Esposito was convicted for unauthorized work activity on federal lands under 36 C.F.R. Sec. 261.10(c) but appealed the conviction on two grounds: that the regulation did not apply to him as a holdover tenant and that his actions were justified. The court reversed the conviction, determining that Sec. 261.10(c) was not applicable due to ongoing issues related to Esposito's pending appeal under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 4621-4637).

The federal government acquired the Max Patch land in North Carolina to relocate the Appalachian Trail, taking possession in September 1982. For five years prior, Esposito had been living on the land as a tenant at will, caring for the property. In May 1982, he purchased 4,000 Scotch pine seedlings intending to grow them as Christmas trees. After the government notified him of its land acquisition and his need to vacate, it also informed him of his rights under the Relocation Act but denied him permission to transplant the trees, offering to relocate them instead.

Esposito attempted to resolve the situation through estimates from nurseries, but the government found them too costly. Subsequently, in December 1982, he filed a lawsuit to enforce his rights under the Relocation Act, but the district court dismissed it for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Following this, he pursued administrative appeals.

In March and April 1983, concerned about the seedlings' condition, Esposito cleared land and transplanted 100 seedlings, which led to the charge of unauthorized work activity. The complaint noted his admission to the act and his defense that he aimed to save taxpayers' money.

The district court trial established that Esposito transplanted 100 seedlings from a planting bed in a federal forest without consent, which he admitted to doing in order to preserve the seedlings while awaiting a decision on his appeal regarding the Relocation Act. A regional forest service official supported the necessity of this action. Following the complaint against him, the Chief of the Forest Service affirmed some of Esposito's claims regarding relocation assistance but did not resolve the issue of the seedlings. The court determined that Esposito's actions constituted work activity, violating 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c), which prohibits unpermitted activities in federal forests. Consequently, he received a six-month suspended sentence and one year of probation, along with a $500 fine.

Esposito was a holdover tenant who had received government assistance for relocating his dwelling, but his seedlings, recognized as his property, remained on the land. The Chief acknowledged that Esposito had not been fully relocated and that the matter concerning the seedlings was unresolved. Notably, both parties conceded that there was no precedent for prosecuting a holdover tenant for such actions while pursuing administrative remedies under the Relocation Act. This prosecution contradicts the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act’s intent to ensure fair treatment for those displaced by federal programs. Regulations allow for the head of an agency to permit a former tenant to use the property, which Esposito sought. His appeals regarding relocation assistance were still pending at the time of the charges, indicating that the resolution of his claims was not yet conclusive.

Esposito believed he had a valid claim under the Relocation Act and met the tenant definition in Sec. 21.226 of the regulations, with the government acknowledging his entitlement to benefits under the Act. He acted reasonably by transplanting seedlings to mitigate potential loss while awaiting permission to use the property per the Act’s regulations. The regulation under which he was prosecuted and the Relocation Act both address the government's enforcement of possessory rights against holdover tenants. A literal interpretation of the regulation could permit prosecution; however, such an interpretation contradicts established principles of statutory construction that prioritize the legislative intent and the broader context of the law. 

Prosecuting a holdover tenant for preserving crops while awaiting administrative permission contradicts the Relocation Act’s intent, which favors civil resolution of relocation disputes rather than criminal prosecution. Common law remedies for landlords against holdover tenants have historically involved civil actions, and Congress has not established criminal penalties for holdover tenants under the Relocation Act. Therefore, Esposito's prosecution under 36 C.F.R. Sec. 261.10(c) was inappropriate, and his claims, along with the government's complaints, should be resolved through administrative and civil proceedings. The district court's judgment is reversed.