State of Tennessee v. Roscoe Dixon

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2017-01051-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; March 5, 2018; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Former state senator Roscoe Dixon, convicted of bribery and other offenses in 2006, appealed the denial of his voting rights restoration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204. After serving his sentence and completing probation, Dixon petitioned for the restoration of his citizenship and voting rights. The trial court initially granted restoration of citizenship rights but excluded voting rights, citing section 40-29-204(3), which prohibits restoration of voting rights for certain crimes. Dixon contended that his conviction date was before the statute's effective date, while the State argued it was on the judgment date, post-effective date. The trial court ruled that the statute applied to Dixon’s conviction, rendering him permanently ineligible to vote. In his appeal, Dixon raised three issues: the timing of his conviction relative to the statute's effective date, the applicability of the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution, and the permanent forfeiture of his voting rights under section 40-29-204(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding no reversible error.

The appeal involves the de novo interpretation of statutes, devoid of any presumption of correctness, as established by Tennessee case law. The primary objective is to ascertain legislative intent without expanding or limiting the statutes' intended scope. Every word in the statutes is presumed to have significance, requiring interpretation based on its natural meaning and the statute's overall purpose. Clear statutes are enforced as written without unnecessary complication.

Key statutes regarding voting rights are highlighted, particularly the Tennessee Constitution, which allows the disqualification of individuals convicted of infamous crimes from voting. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-112 states that felony conviction renders a defendant infamous and disqualified from suffrage. Additionally, section 2-19-143 mandates that individuals convicted of infamous crimes cannot vote unless pardoned or their citizenship rights restored. This retroactive application was deemed unconstitutional by the Tennessee Supreme Court in May v. Carlton, which recognized that retroactive disenfranchisement violates constitutional provisions regarding suffrage.

The Tennessee Constitution specifies that suffrage cannot be denied except following a jury conviction of an infamous crime, confirmed by a competent court. Hence, those deemed infamous can only regain voting rights through a pardon or restoration. The petitioner acknowledges his disqualification due to federal conviction but contends entitlement to restoration of voting rights under Tennessee law, specifically section 40-29-101(a), which allows individuals disqualified due to infamous crimes to petition for restoration after serving their maximum sentence.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has established that individuals deemed infamous or stripped of citizenship rights do not automatically regain full citizenship rights even after fulfilling the criteria of restoration statutes. This principle is reflected in State v. Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tenn. 2002), which emphasizes legislative authority over the restoration process. In 2006, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204, effective July 1, 2006, which permanently disqualifies certain crimes, including bribery and official misconduct, from restoration of voting rights. Specifically, subsection (3) prohibits individuals convicted post-July 1, 2006, of specific felony violations from registering to vote. The statute was later amended to extend this prohibition to similar felonies adjudicated in other jurisdictions. The petitioner acknowledges that his federal convictions fall under this statute but contests that he was not "convicted on or after July 1, 2006," asserting his conviction date as June 8, 2006, when the jury verdict was delivered. Conversely, the State contends his conviction occurred on October 13, 2006, when the judgment was entered. The debate centers on the interpretation of "convicted" in section 40-29-204(3), which lacks a definition in the statute, necessitating reliance on external sources and the ordinary meaning of terms in light of the statute’s purpose. Tennessee case law supports both interpretations, confirming that "conviction" may have different meanings based on context, as established in State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

A 'conviction' in Tennessee is defined as the result of a criminal trial culminating in a judgment or sentence declaring the accused guilty. This definition incorporates both a finding of guilt and a subsequent sentencing by the court, as established in McClain v. State, where the absence of judicial approval and sentencing renders a conviction incomplete. The term 'technical conviction' specifically requires a 'judgment of conviction,' which details the plea, verdict, and sentencing, providing the legal basis for incarceration. While the term is typically used to denote indirect consequences, such as civil disabilities, it does not always necessitate a formal judgment or sentence. The Tennessee Supreme Court has distinguished between a conviction, which signifies a jury’s guilty verdict, and a judgment, indicating that a conviction can exist independently of a judgment or sentence. Consequently, the legislature may use 'conviction' to refer to a stage in the trial process, emphasizing the verdict. In specific contexts, such as statutes that distinguish between conviction and judgment, the general sense of conviction as a declaration of guilt—either through a guilty plea or verdict—may apply. The interpretation of 'conviction' must align with related statutes to ensure consistency. Notably, the statute in question, section 40-29-204(3), does not explicitly distinguish between conviction and judgment, diverging from other statutes that do make such distinctions.

Defining 'convicted' under section 40-29-204(3) cannot be done in a general sense, as the term applies to future civil disabilities, specifically disenfranchisement. Disenfranchisement is recognized as a civil disability by Tennessee courts, which have identified various rights lost due to conviction, including the right to vote and hold public office. The petitioner argues that section 40-29-204(3) concerns the restoration of voting rights, thus not implicating the technical definition of 'convicted.' However, although a federal court noted that Tennessee's re-enfranchisement laws do not impose affirmative disabilities, this distinction does not apply to section 40-29-204(3). Unlike the statutes that regulate restoration, which require conditions such as payment of court costs and child support, section 40-29-204(3) permanently disenfranchises individuals for certain crimes, without offering procedures for re-establishing voting rights. Therefore, it imposes a future civil disability regarding voting rights, making the technical definition of 'convicted' relevant. Additionally, other statutes specify that disenfranchisement occurs at the time of judgment, not merely upon conviction, reinforcing the application of the technical definition in this context.

The re-enfranchisement statute in Tennessee stipulates that the right to vote is removed only upon the entry of judgment, as per Tenn. Code Ann. 40-29-202(a). Individuals deemed infamous and deprived of their suffrage rights can apply for restoration under certain conditions, with the deprivation occurring at judgment rather than at the verdict. The Tennessee Supreme Court has previously ruled that in the statutory framework, 'conviction' must adhere to its technical definition, reinforcing the requirement of a judgment. The Tennessee Constitution explicitly states that voting rights cannot be revoked until a judgment is rendered. 

In this case, the petitioner’s conviction occurred after July 1, 2006, resulting in a permanent voting rights ban under section 40-29-204(3). The petitioner argues that applying this statute violates the Tennessee Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws, asserting that laws enacted post-offense cannot strip voting rights. However, the State contends that this argument was waived since the petitioner did not raise it in response to the State's motion but only on appeal. Tennessee law dictates that constitutional issues should only be adjudicated when essential to resolving the case, emphasizing a higher standard for facial challenges to statutes.

Raising constitutional questions for the first time on appeal is generally discouraged unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional on its face. In City of Elizabethton v. Carter County, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that a petitioner waived his claim that an amended statute constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law, as he failed to raise this argument in the trial court. This principle was affirmed in State v. Turner, where a party cannot introduce new issues during an appeal unless the statute is evidently unconstitutional. The petitioner did not argue that the statute was obviously unconstitutional and acknowledged that his failure to raise the issue previously resulted in waiver. He requested the court to exercise discretion under Rule 13 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to consider the issue to prevent unnecessary litigation. However, the court noted that this discretion should be applied sparingly. The court also recognized ongoing debate about whether laws disenfranchising convicted felons fall under the ex post facto prohibition, referencing May v. Carlton and Johnson v. Bredesen, but concluded that since the state was not notified of the petitioner's argument prior to the appeal, it would not exercise discretion to consider it. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings, with costs taxed to the appellant, Roscoe Dixon.