Com. v. Crothers, M.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 266 EDA 2017

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; February 27, 2018; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Matthew Dylan Crothers, an eighteen-year-old, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter following the stabbing death of his nineteen-year-old brother. The conviction arose from events on June 9, 2014, when a fight between the two brothers resulted in the fatal injury. Crothers filed a pre-trial motion to suppress statements made to police, claiming that his request for an attorney during questioning was ignored, violating his constitutional rights. The trial court denied this motion.

During the jury trial, eyewitness testimony revealed that Crothers' fifteen-year-old sister sought help from a neighbor after the incident, indicating a fight had occurred. The neighbor, Trisha Moore, witnessed Crothers with visible injuries and called 911. Upon arrival, police found Crothers in distress and learned from his mother that he was the one who stabbed his brother. Crothers, while being questioned, admitted to being involved in a physical altercation and described the circumstances surrounding the stabbing, asserting it was unintentional. The police were informed about the victim's serious condition and observed his injuries upon entering the house. The court ultimately upheld Crothers' conviction after reviewing the case.

Blood was discovered in the hallway and a downstairs bedroom, alongside a blue-handled knife. Trooper Tomlinson interviewed August at school, noting she had been crying but showed no injuries. August recounted an argument between her brothers over Christina Collins, the victim's girlfriend, and allegations of drug involvement. She stated the victim and Appellant fought, with the victim threatening her but did not confirm he struck her.

Emergency Medical Technician Loren Parker arrived at the scene, finding the victim in critical condition due to severe blood loss from stab wounds. The victim was unconscious and experienced multiple cardiac arrests before reaching Pocono Medical Center at 7:43 a.m. Trauma surgeon Dr. David Scaff treated him, identifying three stab wounds and significant blood loss, necessitating large volumes of blood post-surgery. Despite surgical intervention, the victim remained critically ill and died on June 13, 2014. 

The Monroe County coroner confirmed the cause of death as "sharp force injuries to the right lower extremity" with a manner of death labeled as "homicide." Forensic dentist Dr. David Wyke took dental impressions of the victim and compared them to bite marks on Appellant's arm, concluding they were consistent. Trooper David Andreuzzi documented the scene, noting no visible injuries on the victim's family but finding blood on the victim’s mother’s leg. Appellant had injuries on his right hand and arm, with blood on his clothing, but no visible injuries to his head or back.

Trooper Andreuzzi inspected the Crothers' home, finding no signs of struggle, such as overturned items or damage to walls, despite a large pool of blood near the staircase and in Appellant's room, along with a knife. He concluded that the violent altercation occurred within a confined 3-foot by 6-foot area, indicating no evidence of a chaotic fight. Trooper Andreuzzi discovered marijuana and a pipe in the victim's bedroom but none in Appellant's. Trooper Eric Porpiglia recorded an interview with Appellant at the police station.

Forensic pathologist Dr. Wayne Kenneth Ross testified that the victim died from "sharp force injuries to the right lower extremity," resulting from three distinct stab wounds. He explained that the wounds suggested a controlled attack, not random or accidental, and indicated the victim likely experienced shock and total blood loss at the scene. Dr. Ross noted the absence of defensive wounds on the victim's palms and suggested that the victim was attacked from behind, with the leg wounds being consistent with defensive injuries. He described Appellant's hand injury as an "offensive sort of wound" and found no signs of struggle or injury on Appellant consistent with being attacked.

Dr. Ross also pointed out bite marks on Appellant’s arm, indicating he attacked the victim from behind. The defense’s witness, Dr. Isidore Mihalakis, agreed that the victim died from stab wounds but disputed the intent behind the attack. He argued that a stab wound to the leg was an unusual cause of death and suggested that, had Appellant intended to kill the victim, more lethal areas like the chest or abdomen would have been targeted. Dr. Mihalakis acknowledged the wounds occurred in close succession but maintained that the specific location of the stab wound was not necessarily fatal.

During cross-examination, it was confirmed that the victim was unarmed. Witness August Crothers recounted an early morning incident where she intervened in an argument between her brothers concerning their girlfriend. After siding with the appellant, the victim confronted August aggressively, leading to a physical altercation where the victim pinned her down and yelled in her face. August attempted to escape, but the victim continued to pursue and attack her. The appellant intervened to help August, resulting in a struggle between the brothers. Their mother, Gabrielle Crothers, testified that the victim exhibited extreme aggression, including violence towards August and the family dog. In the ensuing conflict, the victim tackled the appellant and bit him. After Mrs. Crothers attempted to separate them, the appellant, holding a knife, warned the victim he would call the police, which incited further aggression from the victim. In the course of the fight, the appellant stabbed the victim, who then claimed he had been injured. Despite Mrs. Crothers' attempts to stop the bleeding, she was unsuccessful. The Commonwealth's rebuttal witness, Trooper Jesse D. Bachman, noted that August described the victim's aggressive actions during her interview, including being pushed and pinned. Ultimately, the jury convicted the appellant, who was sentenced to a prison term of 72 to 180 months. Following a post-sentence motion that was denied, the appellant filed a timely appeal, meeting all procedural requirements.

Appellant raises several issues for review, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in various aspects of the case. Key points include:

1. **Involuntary Manslaughter Charge**: Appellant argues that the court erred by not allowing the jury to consider involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. However, this issue is deemed waived as defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction, indicating acceptance of the ruling instead.

2. **Suppression of Interview**: Appellant contends the court erred by not suppressing his interview with state police after he requested an attorney, implying a violation of his rights.

3. **Expert Testimony by Dr. David Wyke**: Appellant challenges the court's decision to permit Dr. Wyke to testify as an expert in forensic odontology, questioning both his qualifications and the general acceptance of his methods in the scientific community.

4. **Sentencing Issues**: Appellant claims the court erred in imposing a sentence of 72 to 180 months, arguing that mitigating factors outweighed aggravating ones.

5. **Voluntary Manslaughter Verdict**: Appellant seeks to overturn the voluntary manslaughter verdict, asserting it was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented.

Overall, the court found that certain claims, particularly concerning the jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter, were waived due to lack of timely objections from the defense.

Appellant argues that Troopers Eric Porpiglia and Bruce Wesnak violated his constitutional rights during custodial interrogation by failing to cease questioning after he requested an attorney. He contends that his statements made during this interrogation should be suppressed. The appellate court reviews the denial of a suppression motion by examining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and if the legal conclusions drawn from those findings are correct. The Commonwealth's evidence is primarily considered, alongside any uncontradicted evidence from the defense. The appellate court is bound by the suppression court's factual findings but may reverse if legal conclusions are found to be erroneous.

The right to counsel during custodial interrogation is supported by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as established in *Miranda v. Arizona*. In *Edwards v. Arizona*, the Supreme Court reinforced that once an accused invokes the right to counsel, they cannot be subjected to further interrogation unless they initiate communication themselves. This rule aims to prevent coercive practices by law enforcement. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the invocation of the right to counsel must be clear enough for a reasonable officer to interpret it as a request for legal assistance. If the request is ambiguous, interrogation may continue.

In this case, it is undisputed that Appellant was in custody and that the interaction with police constituted an interrogation under *Miranda*.

The police provided the Appellant with Miranda warnings, which he did not contest as being unknowing or involuntary. Although he waived his rights, he retained the ability to invoke them during interrogation. The key issues addressed are whether the Appellant invoked his right to counsel, and whether continued questioning after such invocation violated his constitutional rights. The suppression court determined that the Appellant did not clearly invoke his right to counsel, a conclusion that was thoroughly analyzed by Judge Margherita Patti-Worthington.

In another matter, the Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. David Wyke to testify as an expert in forensic odontology. However, this argument was deemed waived due to the Appellant's failure to develop a meaningful legal argument, despite Dr. Wyke's extensive background in dentistry. The Appellant pointed out that Dr. Wyke had only taken a one-week course in 1999, had never previously testified in court, and had limited experience with bite mark cases. Additionally, Dr. Wyke did not examine the Appellant’s body directly but relied on photographs.

The Appellant also contended that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Wyke to testify about a method not generally accepted in the scientific community, claiming that bite mark analysis lacks acceptance. However, this issue was also waived as the Appellant did not properly preserve it for appeal, given his ambiguous objections during trial and insufficient preservation efforts in response to a Rule 1925(b) order.

Finally, the Appellant challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence, acknowledging that he received a standard range sentence but arguing that the trial court did not adequately consider mitigating factors such as his abusive childhood and major depressive disorder. This challenge must be treated as a petition for permission to appeal.

A four-part analysis is conducted by the Court before addressing a discretionary sentencing issue, focusing on: 1) the timeliness of the notice of appeal, 2) preservation of the issue at sentencing or in a reconsideration motion, 3) potential fatal defects in the brief, and 4) whether there is a substantial question regarding the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing Code. The Appellant timely appealed and preserved his issue through a motion for reconsideration, but failed to include a separate statement in his brief as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Despite this omission, the Commonwealth's lack of objection means the defect is not necessarily fatal. However, the Appellant did not raise a substantial question about his sentence's appropriateness, claiming only that the trial court inadequately considered mitigating factors and suggesting a mitigated range sentence, which does not constitute a substantial question per established precedent. 

Regarding the jury's verdict, the Appellant argues it is against the weight of the evidence, asserting the jury "overlooked" evidence of his lack of intent to kill. However, this claim is deemed waived since it was not presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607. 

Lastly, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The Court's review of this claim follows the principle that the evidence, viewed favorably to the Commonwealth, must allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude all elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellant, convicted under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b), must demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, but the analysis considers all evidence presented at trial and recognizes the jury's discretion in evaluating it.

Voluntary manslaughter is defined as the intentional or knowing killing of an individual under circumstances that the defendant believes would justify the act, even if that belief is unreasonable. The appellant argues he did not intentionally or knowingly kill the victim, citing insufficient evidence for the jury's guilty verdict. He notes the victim was stabbed in the leg, which he claims is not indicative of an intent to kill, as there were no fatal wounds to critical areas such as the chest or neck.

The concept of voluntary manslaughter requires a deliberate action from the defendant, and previous court rulings establish that a nonmalicious killing with the intent to either kill or seriously injure qualifies as voluntary manslaughter. In this case, evidence showed that the appellant and the victim had an argument that escalated into a physical altercation, during which the appellant stabbed the unarmed victim three times in the leg. The forensic pathologist testified that the stab wounds were methodical and purposeful, not random or accidental, indicating a specific intent to injure. The nature of the wounds, described as deep and substantial, further supported the conclusion of intentionality. 

Witness testimonies corroborated that the victim suffered severe injuries, including a significant laceration exposing muscle tissue. Ultimately, the evidence presented was deemed sufficient for the jury to conclude that the appellant acted with the requisite intent for a voluntary manslaughter conviction, leading to the affirmation of the jury's verdict.

On June 9, 2014, Defendant was interviewed by Pennsylvania State Police regarding a stabbing incident involving his brother, David Cody Crothers (the Victim). A criminal complaint for Criminal Homicide was filed against Defendant on November 20, 2015, based on statements made during this interview. The affidavit of probable cause indicated that during a fight, Defendant stabbed the Victim three times in the leg, leading to the Victim's death on June 13, 2014, due to a severed femoral artery. Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and was formally charged on February 8, 2016, with Criminal Homicide and Possession of an Instrument of Crime.

On May 2, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the statements from the June 9 interview. A hearing held on May 23, 2016, included an audio recording, transcription of the interview, and a signed waiver of rights form. The court determined that a suspect must be informed of their Miranda rights when in police custody and under interrogation. It was established that Defendant was in custody and that the interaction was indeed an interrogation. Police provided Defendant with Miranda warnings, and there was no dispute regarding the validity of his waiver of rights. The only issues remaining were whether Defendant invoked his right to an attorney during the interrogation and if continued questioning violated his constitutional rights.

Once a defendant has effectively invoked their Miranda right to counsel, interrogation must cease. Courts affirm that Miranda rights are essential to protect individuals from coercive pressures that may compel them to speak involuntarily. The U.S. Supreme Court allows law enforcement to continue questioning after a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights until a clear request for an attorney is made by the suspect. This request must be articulated clearly enough for a reasonable officer to recognize it as a demand for counsel; ambiguous or equivocal statements do not necessitate a halt in questioning. Officers are not required to seek clarification on ambiguous requests. 

In the present case involving Matthew Crothers, his statements during a conversation with Troopers Porpiglia and Wesnak are examined. After being read his Miranda rights and waiving them, Crothers expresses confusion and a desire for legal counsel without making a clear request. His comments indicate apprehension about self-incrimination and uncertainty regarding the situation, but they do not constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. The conversation demonstrates a lack of clarity in his requests, which does not compel the officers to stop questioning.

Matthew Crothers expresses his fear and uncertainty about discussing the events leading to his potential incarceration, insisting he has done nothing wrong and describing the situation as an accident. He feels overwhelmed and hesitant to share details, worried that anything he says could be used against him. Trooper Wesnak emphasizes the seriousness of the situation, urging Crothers to explain his perspective. Crothers struggles to articulate his thoughts due to the chaotic nature of the incident and expresses frustration with interruptions. He highlights that he is still processing what happened, which adds to his anxiety about speaking with law enforcement. The conversation indicates that Crothers is caught between his desire to assert his innocence and his apprehension about the legal implications of his statements. Following this exchange, Crothers continues to respond to questions from Troopers Porpiglia and Wesnak regarding the events surrounding the victim's injuries.

Defendant contends that his statements to police should be suppressed despite having signed a waiver of his right to an attorney, arguing he clearly requested legal counsel during the interrogation and that this request should have halted questioning. He claims to have made two requests for an attorney, stating he needed to consult one before answering questions. Additionally, he asserts that the police officers interrupted him, indicating they ignored his request.

The Commonwealth counters that Defendant's references to an attorney were not clear and amounted to equivocal statements, failing to meet the standard for invoking the right to counsel as outlined in prior case law. The Commonwealth highlights the relaxed interrogation environment, suggesting Defendant had ample opportunity to request counsel clearly but did not do so.

Upon reviewing the audio and transcript of the interrogation, it is determined that Defendant did not make an unequivocal request for an attorney. His mentions of needing a lawyer were contextualized as concerns about formulating his thoughts rather than explicit requests for legal counsel. Consequently, the review concludes that Defendant did not effectively invoke his constitutional right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment, as his Sixth Amendment right had not yet attached due to the lack of formal charges at the time of the interview.

Defendant expressed uncertainty about speaking without legal counsel, indicating a desire to consult an attorney but not making a clear request. Previous statements demonstrated his understanding of Miranda rights, as he worried about self-incrimination. Despite the serious tone of the conversation, Troopers Porpiglia and Wesnak reassured him they would not compel him to speak. When the Defendant mentioned needing a lawyer, it was in the context of television portrayals of police interviews, which Trooper Wesnak clarified were not applicable to his situation. The Defendant's reluctance to talk stemmed from processing chaotic events, not from an absence of counsel. He later asserted his preference not to be interrupted, which the Troopers respected. The court found that the Defendant did not clearly request counsel, allowing the interrogation to continue without violating his rights. Consequently, the motion to suppress Defendant's statements was denied, and a pretrial conference was scheduled for August 5, 2016, with the case remaining on the September 2016 Trial Term.