Virginia Zepeda, Yolanda Gamboa, Guillermo Olvera, Maria Josefa Botello, Ramon Munoz, Domingo Zepeda, Rafael Pastor, Joe Paz, David Loura Tapia and Paz Raul Flores v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, David Crosland, Edward O'connor, Joe Howerton and Philip Smith

Citation: 753 F.2d 719Docket: 80-5464

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 25, 1985; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a case involving plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens and legal residents of Mexican descent, who challenged the actions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regarding alleged violations of constitutional rights during enforcement operations. The district court had issued a preliminary injunction against the INS due to claims that agents unlawfully entered and searched residences and businesses without consent or warrants, and detained individuals without reasonable suspicion. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for these violations. The district judge denied a petition to certify the class because the plaintiffs sought damages in addition to injunctive relief. While the appeals court affirmed part of the preliminary injunction, it reversed and remanded for modifications to its scope. Evidence presented included depositions, affidavits, local news articles, and an INS policy statement that indicated the agency’s enforcement practices were not compliant with established protocols, despite prior stipulations by the INS to address the alleged unlawful actions.

The district judge determined that INS agents routinely approached homes to question, search, or arrest individuals without reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts indicating the presence of aliens, often conducting these actions at night and lacking court orders, probable cause, or exigent circumstances. The judge found that the agents entered residences and nonpublic business areas without consent, warrants, or justifying exigent circumstances. Additionally, agents questioned individuals about their immigration status without reasonable suspicion, relying solely on Hispanic appearance, Spanish language use, or presence in predominantly Hispanic areas. Arrests were made without warrants or probable cause to believe individuals were aliens likely to evade capture. Furthermore, the INS collaborated with local police in enforcing federal immigration laws without obtaining arrest warrants during these operations, and there was a reasonable expectation that these practices would continue unless legally restrained.

A preliminary injunction was issued by the district judge to restrain the INS from several actions regarding immigration enforcement:

1. **Home Approaches**: INS officers cannot approach homes for questioning, searching, or arresting individuals unless there is reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that individuals unlawfully present in the U.S. are in those homes.

2. **Time Restrictions**: Approaching homes for similar purposes between 8:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. is prohibited unless exigent circumstances exist with probable cause or there is a valid arrest warrant.

3. **Entry Restrictions**: INS officers are barred from entering residences or nonpublic business areas without valid consent, a search warrant, or exigent circumstances based on probable cause.

4. **General Searches**: General searches of homes or nonpublic business areas are not permitted, except during lawful arrests where officers can search the arrestee and the immediate area for evidence. Searches are also allowed if there is probable cause that evidence may be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained.

5. **Questioning Individuals**: Officers cannot approach and question individuals in homes, businesses, or public places about their immigration status without reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts. Questioning based solely on Hispanic appearance, language, or location in predominantly Hispanic areas is prohibited.

6. **Detaining Individuals**: Detaining and questioning individuals about immigration status requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.

7. **Arresting Individuals**: Arrests may only occur with an arrest warrant issued under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357, a warrant from a U.S. District Judge or Magistrate, or with probable cause based on articulable facts suggesting the individual is unlawfully present and likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.

8. **Assistance from Local or State Police**: INS agents may seek assistance from local or state police only if there is a reasonable belief of personal danger or when questioning individuals in custody of local or state police agencies.

The excerpt outlines the limitations of appellate review concerning preliminary versus permanent injunctions. Preliminary injunctions are evaluated under stricter standards, allowing reversal only if the district court made an error in legal premises or abused its discretion. The appellate court's review of factual findings is constrained by the limited record available at the preliminary stage. In contrast, for permanent injunctions, all legal conclusions are subject to comprehensive review, and factual findings may be reassessed in light of a fully developed evidentiary record.

The excerpt highlights concerns that parties often appeal preliminary injunction decisions to gauge appellate court views on substantive legal issues, which can delay proceedings and inefficiently use judicial resources. It also notes that the district court retains discretion in granting or denying preliminary injunctions, with reversals only possible for abuse of discretion, which can occur through incorrect legal standards, erroneous factual findings, or inappropriate application of standards. The document suggests that the appeal process for preliminary injunctions may hinder timely resolution of cases, as demonstrated by the specific situation referenced, where the case could have progressed more swiftly without preliminary appeals.

A district court's order can be reversed for legal error if it fails to apply the correct legal standards for issuing a preliminary injunction or misinterprets the law regarding the case's underlying issues. Abuse of discretion may occur if the court bases its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, which is defined as leaving the reviewing court with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In evaluating the district court's decision, a reviewing court will not overturn the order simply for reaching a different conclusion; it must assess whether the district court considered relevant factors and made a clear error of judgment.

Federal district courts possess the equitable authority to issue injunctions against law enforcement agencies that demonstrate a persistent pattern of misconduct. This power is supported by case law indicating that an injunction is warranted in the presence of ongoing violations rather than isolated incidents. However, injunctive relief may be denied if the plaintiff does not show a likelihood of future injury from the practices being challenged.

Plaintiffs on appeal contend that the Immigration and Nationality Act limits INS agents' authority to question individuals about their immigration status without reasonable suspicion. The INS counters that the statute allows for extensive questioning of individuals believed to be aliens. The court concurs with the INS's interpretation, affirming their authority under the statute.

The statute in question does not limit itself to merely questioning individuals about their immigration status; the term "interrogation" implies a situation that involves detention. Legislative history indicates that prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, INS officers lacked explicit powers to "interrogate." The 1925 statute, a precursor to the 1952 provisions, granted INS similar powers of search, seizure, and arrest, without specific mention of interrogation. During the legislative process for the 1952 bill, both supporters and opponents viewed section 1357(a)(1) as an expansion of INS authority. Although no case has directly addressed this issue, the interpretation is supported by the Third Circuit's decision in Babula v. INS, which affirmed that INS officers' authority under the Fourth Amendment is applicable when arresting aliens.

Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(a)(1), INS agents may interrogate individuals believed to be aliens without a warrant, but this authority is constrained by the Fourth Amendment. The court in Lee v. INS established that any questioning must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for initiation. Therefore, the standards for evaluating seizures under section 1357(a)(1) align with those under the Fourth Amendment, allowing permissible questioning under both legal frameworks.

Additionally, the district judge found that the INS had engaged in practices violating the Fourth Amendment rights of certain individuals, particularly those of Latin-American descent, and that there was a reasonable expectation these practices would continue without an injunction. Although these findings were based on evidence not developed through a trial and were adopted from the plaintiffs’ proposed facts, the court concluded that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.

The district court's decision to affirm the preliminary injunction is supported by the proper application of established criteria, namely: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest. The individual plaintiffs demonstrated probable success by evidencing a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations by the INS, along with the potential for irreparable harm since monetary damages would be inadequate for constitutional rights violations. Additionally, they raised serious questions about the INS's practices, with the balance of hardships favoring them, as the INS admitted it faced no enforcement difficulties under prior temporary restraining orders. The court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to enjoin the INS's unconstitutional actions.

However, the scope of the injunction was deemed overly broad and must be limited to the individual plaintiffs unless class certification is granted by the district judge. Federal courts can issue injunctions only within the jurisdiction over the parties involved and must tailor injunctions accordingly, as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). The court referenced prior cases to emphasize that an order limiting the scope of relief does not constitute an appealable issue.

The District Court treated the lawsuit as a class action but failed to certify it as such under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) and 23(c)(3), rendering it improperly classified. Citing *Hollon v. Mathis Independent School District*, the document notes that without class certification, relief cannot be granted to a class. Additionally, the injunction issued by the district court is to be modified due to reliance on an incorrect legal interpretation regarding the Fourth Amendment. The court mistakenly concluded that approaching individuals for questioning constitutes a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment, a view contradicted by Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, in *INS v. Delgado*, the Supreme Court clarified that police questioning alone does not violate the Fourth Amendment as it is a consensual encounter unless the circumstances are intimidating enough to suggest that a reasonable person would feel they were not free to leave. Previous rulings affirm that inquiries about immigration status do not necessitate reasonable suspicion of alienage in the absence of a seizure. The ruling in *Benitez-Mendez v. INS* is distinguished, emphasizing that while the encounter there led to an unreasonable detention, the initial approach did not constitute a seizure. The focus remains on the reasonableness of the initial encounter before any physical restraint occurs.

The restriction on INS officials' ability to approach homes for questioning is limited to instances of reasonable suspicion of illegal aliens' presence, impacting routine investigations involving neighbors and landlords. This limitation, alongside a general prohibition on questioning without reasonable suspicion, hinders immigration law enforcement practices that are constitutionally sound. Additionally, the injunction's prohibition on INS agents approaching homes between 8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., except in exigent circumstances, is based on a flawed interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which does not vary by time of day. The timing of a search or seizure may influence its reasonableness but does not affect the fundamental determination of whether a search or seizure occurred. 

The injunction also restricts INS from seeking local police assistance unless there is a reasonable belief of danger or lawful custody of a questioned individual, which misinterprets Supreme Court rulings and California law. The case of Kurtz v. Moffitt, cited by the district court, is distinguishable as it involved military deserters, whereas INS actions involve cooperation with local police under their direction. The California Penal Code does not prohibit such cooperation. The court concluded that the district court improperly restricted INS from requesting police assistance for non-controversial purposes, which could hinder effective law enforcement and public safety. The decision includes a partial affirmation and reversal of the lower court's ruling. Judge Norris concurs in part and dissents in part.

Dissent is expressed regarding two aspects of Part V of the court's opinion. First, the dissent opposes the reversal of the injunction that prohibits INS agents from approaching plaintiffs' homes at night without exigent circumstances, probable cause, or a valid arrest warrant. Second, it challenges the assertion that the injunction is overly broad due to its benefits extending beyond the individual plaintiffs. The dissent agrees with the majority's standard for determining whether a seizure has occurred, which hinges on whether police conduct suggests a lack of freedom to leave. However, it contests the majority's claim that the time of day is irrelevant in this context, arguing that nighttime confrontations are inherently more menacing, especially given a documented history of intimidating behavior by authorities towards the plaintiffs. Specific instances of past abusive actions, such as unwarranted searches during the night and threats to family safety, are cited as evidence that nighttime contact by INS agents would reasonably lead plaintiffs to feel they are not free to go. Consequently, the dissent supports maintaining the injunction's prohibition on nighttime contacts.

Additionally, the dissent disagrees with the majority's view that the injunction is overly broad because it could benefit non-parties. It clarifies that Rule 65(d) allows an injunction to bind only the parties involved while permitting benefits to similarly situated individuals. The dissent asserts that the majority misinterprets this rule, emphasizing that injunctive relief can naturally extend benefits to others affected by the same practices without rendering the injunction overly broad.

The reliance of the majority on Rule 65(d) is criticized as misleading and obscuring the core issue, which is whether the injunction's scope is necessary to protect the individual plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The district court correctly determined that to safeguard these rights, the INS must be enjoined from stopping or questioning individuals based solely on Hispanic appearance, language, or neighborhood. An injunction limited to the individual plaintiffs would be ineffective, as INS agents would not be able to identify them among others who fit the description. Therefore, a broader injunction is essential to prevent unlawful government intrusion for all persons based on these characteristics.

The case law, particularly Bailey v. Patterson, supports this broader injunction, as the relief sought by the plaintiffs aligns with the need to protect all similarly situated individuals, not just the named plaintiffs. The majority's argument that the injunction is overly broad because it was issued pre-class certification is deemed irrelevant since the necessity of class-wide relief to protect individual rights does not depend on such certification. The established precedent indicates that effective injunctive relief can be granted without class certification when it is essential for the plaintiffs' protection. The court finds no need to address whether the district court erred in denying class action treatment.

Appellants are entitled to the same decree whether or not class action treatment is granted, as their rights require that the decree benefit both named plaintiffs and all similarly situated persons. Relevant case law indicates that individual relief can produce results akin to class-wide relief. Without proper class certification, a court cannot grant relief on a class-wide basis, as established in several precedents. The absence of certification renders the action not properly a class action, and without it, any potential class action may become moot if compliance with Rule 23(c) is inadequate. Recent decisions affirm that in the absence of class certification, injunctive relief should be limited to the named plaintiffs, in line with the principle that such relief should be narrowly tailored to address specific harms rather than broadly enjoining all potential violations. A preliminary injunction is intended solely to maintain the status quo and should not be more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.

A district court's authority to issue a preliminary injunction should not extend beyond its capabilities following a full trial, particularly regarding nonparties. If the granted relief proves inadequate, the court retains the option to certify a class subsequently. The dissenting opinion misinterprets this legal principle, relying on cases related to class certification denials, which stem from a misreading of *Bailey v. Patterson*. In *Bailey*, the court determined that class certification was unnecessary because the relief sought by individual plaintiffs was identical to that required for a class, as they aimed for desegregation of transportation facilities accessible to all, not merely to sections reserved for "whites only." This interpretation has been incorrectly cited in other cases, suggesting that class certification can be denied in discrimination cases due to the availability of broad injunctive relief for individual plaintiffs. However, the Supreme Court's precedents cannot be overridden by lower court rulings like *Bailey*. The distinction is crucial: while the relief for the *Bailey* plaintiffs inherently benefited a broader class, the current case involves individual challenges to INS enforcement policies against Hispanics, where the requested injunctive relief does not necessarily affect the entire class. The dissent's references to cases that justify denying class certification because individual relief also benefits potential class members do not apply here.

Injunctive relief granted to an individual plaintiff can effectively extend to benefit a potential class, as defendants tend to treat all similarly after such relief is issued. However, legal limitations on injunctions remain important. A notable line of cases supports the notion that a single holding can have a stare decisis effect, although some rulings have been reversed by the Supreme Court, indicating that previous circuit support for broad relief in certain cases was not upheld. Specifically, in cases like *Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.*, the court suggested the possibility of nonparty benefits under Title VII but ultimately vacated such injunctions. The ongoing question of whether individual plaintiffs in Title VII cases can obtain relief benefiting nonparties remains unresolved, as seen in *Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union*, where class certification denial precluded broad injunctive relief. The dissenting argument that an injunction limited to individual plaintiffs would lack effectiveness is critiqued for misunderstanding the enforcement burden, clarifying that individual plaintiffs do not need to identify themselves for the injunction to be complied with by the defendant.

The burden of compliance rests with the INS, which may need to cease its contested practices to avoid violating the injunction and facing contempt sanctions. Unlike the situation in Bailey, class-wide relief is not guaranteed; however, the narrow injunction may still benefit similarly situated individuals. Plaintiffs cannot expand their individual claims into a class-wide action until class certification is achieved, limiting their protection to their own cases against the INS's practices. The preliminary injunction is vacated because it improperly extends relief to individuals not part of the case, which exceeds what is necessary for the individual plaintiffs' rights. If the injunction's scope is narrowed, it will adequately protect the individual plaintiffs without affecting others they do not represent. This principle emphasizes the necessity of class certification, as individual plaintiffs lack the authority to act on behalf of all similarly situated individuals without such certification. While concerns about Rule 23's requirements may arise, the rule is intended to ensure proper scrutiny of class actions and representation. The dissent's position, though appealing due to perceived fairness, does not align with legal standing principles. The law does not allow individual plaintiffs to serve as broad representatives without qualifying under Rule 23. The case highlights the distinction between the rights of named plaintiffs and the potential treatment of nonparties, reinforcing the need for a structured approach to class actions to prevent overreach in granting relief.

A narrow interpretation aligns with Supreme Court precedents. The district court determined that the defendants' random questioning, searching, or arresting individuals in their residences constitutes an arbitrary invasion of privacy and qualifies as a "search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Such actions are deemed unreasonable unless supported by a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that unauthorized aliens are present in the home. Without reasonable suspicion, approaching individuals in homes, businesses, or public areas regarding their immigration status violates 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357 and the Fourth Amendment. The majority's cited cases do not support their conclusion, as they fail to address whether the injunction's scope is necessary to protect individual plaintiffs' rights. Additionally, in cases like Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., it was acknowledged that injunctive relief under Title VII may benefit those not directly involved in the lawsuit. An injunction is not overly broad simply because it extends protections to others if it is essential for providing necessary relief to the prevailing parties.