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City of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Properties, Inc.
Citation: 95 N.E.3d 116Docket: 49A04-1612-PL-2784
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; February 19, 2018; Indiana; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
In a legal dispute between the City of Hammond and Herman Kittle Properties, Inc. (HKP), the City sought nearly $86,000 in overdue registration fees based on its rental housing inspection program initiated in 1961. HKP contested the fees, citing a 2014 state law restricting such fees for rental registration programs established after July 1, 1984. Hammond filed a declaratory judgment to assert that its program qualified for an exemption due to its pre-1984 establishment. Subsequent to Hammond's complaint, the Indiana General Assembly enacted a 2015 law that clarified the definition of rental registration programs, indicating Hammond's program did not qualify for the fee exemption. Hammond then amended its complaint to challenge the constitutionality of the 2015 legislation, claiming it constituted special legislation in violation of Article 4, Sections 22 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution. Both parties moved for summary judgment, with the trial court ruling in favor of Hammond on the initial fee claim but granting summary judgment to HKP on the constitutional challenges. Hammond appealed, raising three primary issues regarding the constitutionality of the fee exemption and its severability from Indiana law. The Court of Appeals found that Hammond had standing to challenge the fee exemption, concluded that the exemption violated the Indiana Constitution, and determined that it could not be severed from the related statute. The court reversed the trial court's ruling on Counts II and III, remanding the case for summary judgment in favor of Hammond. In August 1961, Hammond enacted Ordinance 3337, establishing minimum standards for the maintenance and occupancy of dwellings within the city. The ordinance sets forth the responsibilities of property owners and occupants, authorizes inspections to determine dwelling conditions, and allows for the condemnation of uninhabitable properties, along with penalties for violations. The ordinance empowers the Health Officer, Fire Inspector, and Building Commissioner to inspect all dwelling units, rooming units, and premises to safeguard public health and safety. Definitions provided in the ordinance include: - "Dwelling" as any building used for living or sleeping; - "Dwelling unit" as a room or group of rooms within a dwelling intended for living, sleeping, cooking, and eating; - "Rooming unit" as a room or group of rooms for living and sleeping, excluding cooking and eating. Additionally, a specific section addresses hotels and rooming houses, defining a "rooming house" as a dwelling with three or more rooming units rented to individuals not closely related to the owner. Hotels and rooming houses are mandated to undergo biannual inspections and pay an annual inspection fee of $5 per establishment. Overall, the inspection program encompasses both owner-occupied and rental properties. In January 2001, Hammond enacted Ordinance 8327 aimed at protecting public health, safety, and welfare by mandating the annual registration of all rental housing units within the city. The ordinance defined "rental housing" broadly and imposed a $5 annual registration fee per dwelling or rooming unit. This fee was increased to $10 in 2004, and further raised to $80 in 2010 to cover rising costs of inspections and enforcement. A subsequent ordinance in 2011 maintained the $80 fee. Noncompliance with the registration requirement incurs daily fines for the owner per unregistered unit. In 2011, House Bill 1543 was introduced to regulate residential leases, proposing to prevent political subdivisions from requiring rental unit registration and associated fees. However, the Indiana General Assembly later enacted a related statute allowing such fees but stipulating that they must be allocated to a special fund dedicated to the costs of services provided by the political subdivision. The enacted law also permits landlords to pass these fees onto tenants. The bill was declared an emergency and took effect immediately on May 10, 2011. House Bill 1313, enacted in 2013, amended chapter 36-1-20 to impose a temporary moratorium on new or increased registration fees for rental units, effective until July 1, 2014. This legislation aimed to address concerns regarding rising fees impacting housing affordability and rental property management. An interim study committee was formed to explore regulatory policies concerning residential leases, with discussions highlighting the detrimental effects of existing fees on rental housing development. In 2014, House Bill 1403 was introduced to amend chapter 36-1-20, allowing political subdivisions to establish rental unit registration programs while limiting registration fees to a one-time charge of no more than five dollars. A Fiscal Impact Statement indicated that several Indiana municipalities had existing rental registration and inspection programs, with fees ranging from $10 to $200 per rental unit, most of which were established after 2000, except for Bloomington. A revised version of House Bill 1403 introduced a Fee Restriction that limits political subdivisions to charging a maximum annual registration fee of five dollars for rental units. An amendment later exempted subdivisions with rental registration or inspection programs established before July 1, 1984, from this fee limit, allowing them to impose higher fees. The Fiscal Impact Statement identified fourteen cities with rental programs, noting that Bloomington and West Lafayette were unaffected by the changes due to their pre-1984 programs. However, Hammond was not mentioned despite having an earlier inspection program from 1961. The enacted bill, effective June 30, 2014, explicitly states that the Fee Restriction does not apply to subdivisions with programs predating July 1, 1984, and allows for the establishment of registration programs. It stipulates that a registration fee, if applicable, covers all units in a rental community, while individual fees can be charged for separate properties. The ownership transfer of rental units also permits political subdivisions to impose registration requirements on new owners. Furthermore, House Bill 1165 proposed narrowing the Fee Exemption to programs created between July 1, 1977, and July 1, 1984, which would subject Bloomington's early 1970s program to the Fee Restriction. Indiana Code chapter 36-1-20 previously incorporated definitions from chapter 32-31-3, wherein a “rental unit” included “rooming houses.” House Bill 1165 proposed a new definition for “rental registration or inspection program,” specifying it as a program solely for the registration or inspection of rental units, excluding general housing programs. The definition of “rental unit” was expanded to encompass structures used as residences by individuals or groups, including apartments, mobile home spaces, and single or two-family dwellings. Amendments would restrict the “rental registration or inspection program” to only inspect rental units, thereby excluding rooming and boarding houses. The Legislative Services Agency’s Fiscal Impact Statement indicated that this change might reduce the number of units subject to rental registration fees, particularly affecting programs in cities like Bloomington, which currently includes rooming houses in its inspection criteria, as well as similar provisions in West Lafayette and Hammond. The Fee Exemption date range was abandoned, and Indiana Code section 36-1-20-5 retains its 2014 form, limiting fee imposition on political subdivisions unless they had a rental registration or inspection program before July 1, 1984. HEA 1165 amended this code by introducing a new definition for “rental registration or inspection program,” which specifies that such programs must exclusively pertain to rental properties. As a result, Bloomington and West Lafayette continue to qualify for the Fee Exemption since their programs only cover rental housing. In contrast, Hammond's program, which includes inspections of non-rental housing and is a general inspection program with mandatory hotel and rooming house inspections, no longer qualifies for the exemption. Since 2011, the Indiana General Assembly has regulated rental registration and inspection programs, initially proposing to eliminate registration fees entirely, which was not adopted. Instead, fees were restricted to $5 annually for rental units unless the program met specific criteria established before 1984. Legislative changes left all political subdivisions subject to the Fee Restriction, except Bloomington and West Lafayette. Hammond's City Controller provided an affidavit detailing the adverse effects of these legislative changes, highlighting that the costs of administering Hammond's rental registration program far exceed the revenue generated, leading to a projected budget shortfall of over $700,000 after a significant reduction in registration fees from $80 to $5. HKP manages two rental communities, Golden Manor Apartments and Saxony Townhomes, in Hammond. On May 20, 2014, Hammond notified HKP of an $85,840 debt in unpaid 2014 rental registration fees, comprising $6,400 and $40,000 in late fees for Golden Manor, and $5,440 and $34,000 in late fees for Saxony. HKP's regional manager responded on June 2, 2014, indicating that the delay in payment was due to uncertainty regarding the pro-rating of fees resulting from changes under HB 1403, noting that fees would decrease after June 30, 2014. Additionally, due to Indiana Code section 36-1-20-4.1, Hammond could not raise inspection fees to cover the shortfall. HKP's corporate counsel sent a letter on June 6, 2014, disputing the validity of the claimed debts totaling $39,440 and $46,400, and mentioned a scheduled hearing with the Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety on July 3, 2014, to resolve the dispute. HKP requested that Hammond refrain from further collection or litigation efforts until after the hearing's outcome. Hammond initiated a declaratory judgment action prior to the July 3 hearing, asserting that House Enrolled Act 1403 (HEA 1403), signed into law by Governor Mike Pence on March 26, 2014, amended the Indiana Code and introduced a cap on local rental registration fees at $5 per unit, effective June 30, 2014. However, HEA 1403 includes an exemption for political subdivisions with rental registration or inspection programs established before July 1, 1984. Hammond argues it qualifies for this exemption as it enacted a rental inspection program in 1961 and a rental registration program in 2001, which was later amended in 2010 to charge an $80 annual fee per unit. HKP has refused to pay the $80 fee, claiming it conflicts with the $5 cap. Consequently, Hammond seeks a declaration affirming that its programs qualify for the exemption under HEA 1403, allowing it to continue enforcing the $80 fee against all rental property owners and managers, including HKP. After the enactment of HEA 1165 in 2015, which amended the definition of “rental registration or inspection program,” Hammond revised its complaint. Count I sought a declaration that Hammond qualified for a Fee Exemption in 2014, asserting that the new law confirmed this qualification. Hammond argued that if it did not qualify, there would have been no need for HEA 1165 to disqualify it starting in 2015. Counts II and III claimed that the 2015 amendment to Indiana Code section 36-1-20-5 violated the Indiana Constitution: Count II cited Article 4, Section 22 against special laws regarding fees, while Count III referenced Article 4, Section 23 mandating general applicability of laws. Hammond contended that the Fee Exemption was inseparable from the statute. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Hammond maintained that its rental inspection program predated July 1, 1984, thus qualifying it for the Fee Exemption in 2014, but argued that the 2015 amendments were intended to benefit only Bloomington and West Lafayette, rendering them unconstitutional for creating non-uniform fees statewide. HKP countered by claiming Hammond did not have a qualifying program, lacked standing to raise constitutional issues, and argued that the fees in question were not those covered by Article 4, Section 22. HKP characterized the Fee Exemption as constitutional general legislation and claimed that even if it was special legislation, it was justified due to the unique characteristics of the referenced cities. The Indiana Attorney General intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute, agreeing with HKP on Hammond's lack of standing but acknowledging the statute's special legislation status while defending its constitutionality based on the characteristics of Bloomington and West Lafayette. After thorough briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to Hammond on Count I, affirming its entitlement to the 2014 registration fees, a ruling that HKP did not appeal. The appeal now solely concerns the constitutionality of Indiana Code section 36-1-20-5, with findings related to Count I omitted. The trial court granted summary judgment to HKP on Counts II and III of Hammond's complaint, determining that Indiana Code section 36-1-20-5 constitutes constitutional special legislation. Hammond was found to have standing to bring these claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act, despite HKP and the State's arguments based on Howard County v. Kokomo City Plan Commission, which they claimed precluded Hammond's standing. The court clarified that Hammond alleged an actual injury and was seeking to uphold the validity of its ordinance, supported by Indiana Department of Natural Resources v. Newton County, which confirmed a county's standing to challenge the validity of its ordinances. Regarding the Fee Exemption, Hammond's claims asserted that it constituted special legislation in violation of Article IV, Sections 22 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution. The State conceded that the Fee Exemption is special legislation, while HKP maintained it was a standard grandfather clause. The court noted that the Fee Exemption selectively benefits certain municipalities, as it limits the ability to charge rental registration fees to those with pre-1984 programs, effectively singling out Bloomington and West Lafayette. Additionally, legislative attempts to modify the Fee Exemption after Hammond filed suit further indicated its special nature, as they targeted Hammond specifically. Hammond's Count II alleges the Fee Exemption violates Article IV, Section 22, which prohibits local or special laws, reinforcing the claim that the exemption constitutes unconstitutional special legislation. Fees or salaries for county officials can be graded based on population and necessary services, as outlined in Article IV, Section 22. The term "fees" relates to a historical “fee system” used in the 19th century, which was replaced by salaries for county officials in the 1890s. The fees referred to in Section 22 are those directly paid to county officials as compensation. The annual rental registration fee under Indiana Code 36-1-20-5 does not qualify as a salary or compensation since it is allocated to a special fund, thus the fee limitation does not apply to it under Article IV, Section 22, granting HKP judgment as a matter of law on Count II. In Count III, Hammond argues that the Legislature's use of a July 1, 1984 cut-off date in the Fee Exemption unlawfully exempted only Bloomington and West Lafayette from the Fee Restriction of Subsection 5(c), violating Article IV, Section 23, which mandates that general laws must apply uniformly across the state. For a law to be unconstitutional under this section, it must be both special and not generally applicable. The uniqueness of Bloomington and West Lafayette, particularly their rental housing markets and demographics, justifies their exemption from the Fee Restriction. These cities face unique challenges with a high population of first-time renters and have historically imposed costs on landlords for oversight. Consequently, the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that these circumstances warranted the Fee Exemption. Hammond did not sufficiently prove that the classification was unjustified, leading to the conclusion that Indiana Code 36-1-20-5 is constitutional under Article IV, Section 23, and HKP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count III. Following the trial court's denial of Hammond's motion to correct error, Hammond filed an appeal. Summary of Legal Document Excerpt: When reviewing summary judgment, the same test as the trial court is applied, confirming that summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court's review is limited to the facts designated at trial, and all facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the non-moving party, who bears the burden to demonstrate that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Summary judgment can be affirmed if it is valid under any theory supported by designated evidence. The trial court is not required to make specific findings and conclusions, although such insights assist in review. Cross-motions for summary judgment do not change the standard of review; each motion must be considered separately. In matters concerning the constitutionality of a statute, there is a presumption of constitutionality that can only be overcome by clear contrary evidence. Doubts about a statute's constitutionality are resolved in favor of its validity. The issue of standing is critical, focusing on whether the party challenging the law has a personal stake in the outcome and has suffered or is in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury. The State supports HKP's position regarding standing, emphasizing judicial restraint in constitutional matters. HKP references a prior case to argue that Hammond lacks standing to pursue the constitutional challenge. The Board of Commissioners of Howard County contested a statute allowing cities in counties with populations under 84,000 to exercise planning and zoning authority up to two miles outside city limits without county consent. The county argued that this statute discriminates against its residents, citing constitutional provisions in Article 4, Sections 22 and 23. The court noted the county did not claim direct injury as a governmental entity and clarified that such a claim would not withstand the state's authority over its subdivisions. It emphasized that counties lack the sovereignty to protect individual citizens' rights, limiting their ability to represent residents in constitutional claims. Although the precedent established in Howard County has not been explicitly overturned, its applicability is debated. Subsequent case law has clarified that a political subdivision can challenge a state statute if there is a legitimate controversy regarding its operation, as seen in State ex rel. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Marion Superior Court, where a county was granted standing to dispute a tax-related determination due to its vested interest in the outcome. The court differentiated its ruling from previous cases where political subdivisions lacked standing due to the absence of a “personal” interest in the dispute. In Lentz v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., a county assessor's challenge to a state tax board decision lacked standing as it did not affect the county directly. Conversely, in Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Newton Cty., the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that a county has a legitimate interest in defending its ordinances against conflicting state statutes, affirming that counties can challenge statutes if they have a direct stake in the outcome. In Marion Cty. v. State, the court found that Marion and St. Joseph Counties had standing to contest a state statute demanding $75 million in arrears for juvenile detention facilities, as the financial implications directly impacted the counties' treasuries. The court clarified that while Howard County established limitations on standing, it did not preclude counties from seeking to invalidate statutes when they face direct injury. Subsequent cases have upheld the standing of political subdivisions when they have direct stakes in the matter, as illustrated by Alpha Psi Chapter of Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity v. Auditor of Monroe Cty. and Mun. City of S. Bend v. Kimsey. These precedents indicate that standing may not have been contested in certain cases, implying potential waiver by the opposing parties. Additionally, the city of Hammond risks significant annual revenue loss due to state law changes limiting its ability to collect rental registration fees. Hammond's fee revenue for 2011 was $851,899, and for 2012, it was $862,384. Hammond seeks to represent its own interests regarding its rental registration ordinance, establishing standing due to a direct stake in the litigation's outcome and potential injury if the statute is upheld. Under the Indiana Constitution, Article 4, Section 22 prohibits local or special laws concerning specific subjects, while Section 23 mandates that laws be general when possible. A law is deemed "general" if it applies uniformly to all within a specified class, whereas a "special" law targets specific cases or entities. The State acknowledged that the statute in question is a special law. HKP argued that the Fee Exemption, which applies to fewer municipalities, is permissible as common statutory practice intended to protect those relying on previous laws, akin to a grandfather clause. However, HKP has shifted its position on appeal, and the assumption is that Indiana Code section 36-1-20-5 is special legislation affecting particular cases or places. The focus then shifts to the constitutionality of the law. Hammond does not contest the constitutionality of the Fee Restriction, which applies universally to all political subdivisions. The trial court previously ruled in favor of Hammond, granting summary judgment for approximately $86,000 in fees owed for 2014. HKP does not contest the court's decision regarding Hammond's entitlement to the Fee Exemption as it existed in 2014. Hammond does not challenge the constitutionality of the 2014 statute, which also benefitted him, but instead raises concerns about the Fee Exemption after the legislature's 2015 amendment that defined “rental registration and inspection program,” thus excluding Hammond from the exemption. The alleged injury arose only after this change. Under Article 4, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution, a statute considered special legislation related to certain subjects is per se unconstitutional. Hammond argues that the statute violates this provision by prohibiting local or special laws concerning fees. HKP contends, supported by the trial court, that the term "fees" in Section 22 refers solely to those historically used for compensating public officials, as understood at the time of its drafting in 1851. Historical interpretations clarify that fees were compensation for specific acts, distinct from wages or salaries. HKP asserts that the Fees and Salaries clause of Section 22 is now outdated and cannot substantiate Hammond's claim of unconstitutionality regarding the Fee Restriction, as the nature of fees has evolved since the section's enactment. Officials in larger counties provided more services and collected more fees than those in smaller counties, prompting the amendment of Section 22 in 1881 to allow compensation of officers to be graded based on population and necessary services. This section was further revised in 1984 to modernize the language. The Fees and Salaries clause is argued to have survived the abolition of the fee compensation system, meaning the legislature cannot enact special laws governing fee payments. Although fees continued post-abolition, they were treated separately from salaries under Sections 22 and 23. In State ex rel. McCoy v. Krost, the court determined that the validity of fee laws is independent of salary laws, stating that deficiencies in salary provisions do not invalidate the fee law. Despite over a century without litigation on the Fees and Salaries clause, its constitutional provision remains in effect. The 1980s amendments to the Indiana Constitution did not deem this clause antiquated, as only the introductory language was changed, confirming its ongoing relevance. HKP contends that fees from the 1890s were paid to constitutional officeholders for their services, contrasting them with the current fees in question. While this distinction is noted, a broader interpretation of Section 22 suggests that all fees set by the State should be uniformly applied. The State has the authority to establish reasonable fees for official services, which must be consistent across the state. However, the current regulation allowing municipalities to set varying rental registration fees does not align with this requirement for uniformity. The Indiana legislature mandates that rental registration fees be allocated to a special fund exclusively for covering costs associated with the registration and inspection programs. This is similar to the historical fees from the 1890s, which were used to compensate officials. The rental registration fees are employed to support the program's operational costs, including the salaries of inspectors. Section 36-1-20-5 permits only Bloomington and West Lafayette to charge different fees from other political subdivisions, which violates Article 4, Section 22 that prohibits special laws concerning fees or salaries. Consequently, Section 36-1-20-5 is deemed unconstitutional under Section 22, making further exploration of its constitutionality under Section 23 unnecessary, though it is addressed for thoroughness. Section 23 necessitates that laws be general and uniformly applied throughout the State when possible. Even if the rental registration fee were not subject to Section 22, it could still be invalidated under Section 23 if it does not adhere to the mandate for general applicability. All parties involved acknowledge that Section 36-1-20-5 constitutes special legislation. The determination of whether a law is special is essential in assessing its constitutionality. This involves evaluating if the law applies uniquely to a specific area or class, justifying its differential treatment based on distinctive traits. Courts have upheld various statutes as unique due to specific local conditions, such as Lake County's high number of small precincts or its history of underassessment, which warranted special legislative measures. Conversely, some statutes have been struck down when the claimed uniqueness did not sufficiently differentiate the affected group from others, as seen in cases involving fraternities or annexation laws that lacked specific local justifications. The document indicates that House Bill 1543 originally enacted as a general law eventually became a special law through amendments, primarily benefiting Bloomington and West Lafayette, allowing them to charge rental registration fees. Political subdivisions were allowed to charge rental registration fees until the enactment of House Bill 1313 in 2013, which prohibited the introduction of new fees after February 28, 2013, while allowing existing fees to continue. Following a 2014 amendment introducing the Fee Restriction and Fee Exemption, most political subdivisions were limited to a fee of five dollars, except for Bloomington, West Lafayette, and Hammond. A subsequent 2015 amendment specified that only Bloomington and West Lafayette qualified for the Fee Exemption, enabling them to set their own fees. This legislative outcome was intentional, aimed at maintaining the Fee Restriction for all but these two cities, which HKP argues are justified in receiving the exemption due to their unique housing markets and longstanding rental regulation practices. In contrast, Hammond contends that these unique characteristics existed prior to 2011 and questions the fairness of the exemption. Furthermore, Hammond suggests that the process leading to the Fee Exemption is indicative of unconstitutional special legislation, as legislative history shows a deliberate focus on benefiting only Bloomington and West Lafayette. The law governing rental registration fees is argued to be suitable for statewide uniformity, addressing issues common across all political subdivisions related to landlord identification and tenant protection. The law in question imposes restrictions on political subdivisions based on a specific date and narrowly defined terms, originally intended for general applicability but later amended to exclusively benefit two Indiana cities. Such limitations on special legislation aim to prevent preferential treatment of certain localities. The central issue is whether the purported "unique circumstances" of Bloomington and West Lafayette truly warrant their exemption from the Fee Restriction. In the case Buncich, the Indiana Supreme Court examined a law that established a committee in Lake County for consolidating small voting precincts. Lake County had an exceptionally high number of small precincts compared to other counties, which the state argued justified special legislation due to the associated costs. Buncich contended that many counties faced similar issues and thus questioned the uniqueness of Lake County's situation. The court found that Buncich did not successfully rebut the presumption that the legislature deemed Lake County's characteristics significant enough to warrant special legislation. The court also noted that the statute allowed local decision-making regarding the management of small precincts. In comparing this to the current case, HKP argues that the legislature's creation of the Fee Exemption for Bloomington and West Lafayette is justified due to their high percentages of rental housing and a significant population of first-time renters, as well as their extensive history of landlord regulation through rental registration and inspection programs. Data indicated that a considerable portion of housing in Bloomington is rented, particularly by younger, non-family members. In West Lafayette, 68.8% of occupied housing is renter-occupied, with 71.1% of these renters being non-family members aged 15 to 34. East Chicago follows with 56.6% renter occupancy, while Muncie has 37.2% of its renter-occupied units occupied by non-family members in the same age group. Hammond has 38.2% renter-occupied housing, with 12.6% occupied by non-family members aged 15 to 34. The legislative allowance for Bloomington and West Lafayette to charge higher rental registration fees lacks a clear connection to their demographics, which include a significant number of young renters and dominant landlords. The uniqueness of these cities does not justify their exemption from the general fee restriction that limits other political subdivisions to a $5 fee. Although HKP argued for oversight in these markets, it acknowledged that landlords often require parental guarantees for renting to young adults. Section 23 aims to prevent unequal benefits or burdens among localities; however, the current fee exemption is only available to cities with rental registration programs established before July 1, 1984. Of fourteen cities identified with such programs in 2014, only Bloomington and West Lafayette can continue charging fees above $5, while the remaining twelve must operate with reduced funding. The legislative history of section 36-1-20-5 indicates that the Fee Exemption was designed to benefit Bloomington and West Lafayette while disadvantaging all other cities. Legal precedents emphasize that the statute's interpretation should consider the context of its enactment, which reveals that the purported "unique circumstances" of Bloomington and West Lafayette were selectively justified after the fact. Unlike other statutes that directly address specific local issues, the Fee Exemption deviates from a general law applicable statewide, raising constitutional concerns under Section 23. Regarding severability, the Fee Exemption's unconstitutional nature necessitates its removal. Hammond contends that this exemption cannot be separated from the rest of the section, which includes the Fee Restriction, thus requiring the entire section to be invalidated. However, a statute can remain valid in parts if the provisions are separable. A provision is considered separable if it can function independently and if legislative intent indicates it would survive without the invalid portions. The test for severability assesses whether the legislature would have enacted the statute absent the invalid provisions. Indiana law assumes parts of a statute are severable unless a nonseverability clause is present, which is absent in this case. Therefore, while the Fee Exemption is unconstitutional, section 36-1-20-5 could still be effective as a law of general applicability without it. In the absence of a severability clause, the proponent of legislation must demonstrate that specific provisions can stand independently. HKP argues that the Fee Exemption is not so intrinsically linked to the Fee Restriction that the legislature would not have enacted one without the other, citing the legislative voting results on House Bill 1403, which passed with significant majorities despite the Fee Exemption affecting only two House and Senate districts. Legislative history indicates an intention that the Fee Restriction would not apply to Bloomington and West Lafayette, as the bill underwent multiple amendments to accommodate this. The addition of the Fee Exemption was crucial for the bill's passage, as the legislature aimed to mitigate escalating fees that could hinder affordable rental housing while applying restrictions broadly to other political subdivisions. The court concludes that the Fee Exemption is inseparable from section 36-1-20-5, necessitating the striking of the entire section due to its failure to comply with the Indiana Constitution's provisions regarding special laws. The trial court's decision in favor of HKP on certain counts of Hammond’s complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.