United States v. Jessie Gonzalez-Mares

Citation: 752 F.2d 1485Docket: C.A. 84-5026

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 23, 1985; Federal Appellate Court

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Jessie Gonzalez-Mares appealed her conviction for obstruction of justice and making false statements to a United States Probation Officer, which occurred during her earlier prosecution for illegal transportation of aliens. After her arrest on August 2, 1983, she met with her attorney and signed a consent form to proceed before a magistrate. United States Probation Officer Stanley Winters interviewed her to prepare an oral presentence report, having received permission from her counsel but not advising them to be present. During the interview, Winters did not inform Gonzalez-Mares of her Miranda rights but warned her about the consequences of providing false statements. She denied using other names and having a criminal record.

After her guilty plea, Winters presented a report to the magistrate, falsely stating that Gonzalez-Mares had no prior record. A subsequent record check revealed her previous criminal history, leading to her indictment for obstructing justice and making false statements. The district court found her guilty on both counts. On appeal, Gonzalez-Mares contended that the court erred in denying her motions to suppress her statements and for acquittal. The appellate court upheld the district court's decision to deny the suppression of her statements made during the probation officer's interview.

Appellant argues that her pre-plea interview with the probation officer was a custodial interrogation, necessitating Miranda warnings. While the government acknowledges that she was in custody, it contends that the interview did not qualify as "interrogation." Judicial precedent establishes that whether interrogation occurred is a factual determination reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. However, the court notes uncertainty regarding this standard's applicability, ultimately determining that the district court did not err regardless of the approach.

Not all inquiries in a custodial context require Miranda warnings; the key test is whether questions are likely to elicit incriminating responses. The probation officer's questions regarding other names and prior criminal records were not directly connected to the crime charged. This contrasts with past cases where questions were directly related to the suspected crime. Furthermore, unlike typical Miranda scenarios, the appellant's responses were not used to establish prior criminality; instead, her false answers constituted the prohibited conduct.

The district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress was based on *Baumann v. United States*, which clarified that routine presentence interviews do not constitute critical stages requiring counsel's presence or Miranda protections. The *Baumann* court argued that the purposes of Miranda are not served in post-conviction interviews, where information is solely for sentencing. Appellant's attempt to differentiate her case from *Baumann* due to the timing of the interview (pre-guilty plea) is unpersuasive, as the questions asked were still not likely to elicit incriminating responses.

Appellant contends that the probation officer's inquiries aimed to determine her probation or parole status and that admitting to this could lead to the revocation of her parole. Generally, a probationer cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination concerning probation status inquiries. As established in *Minnesota v. Murphy*, the potential use of information obtained in revocation proceedings does not constitute a valid basis for claiming this privilege. Appellant also speculates that truthful responses to the probation officer could influence the government’s decision regarding a plea offer; however, the officer's testimony is deemed speculative regarding the government's reaction.

In this case, appellant's answers were used solely for sentencing purposes, consistent with *Baumann*, which allows false statements made in response to legitimate inquiries after conviction to be admissible in a prosecution for false statements. The timing of the questions, prior to the plea, does not alter their admissibility since they did not incriminate her regarding the original charge of illegal transportation of aliens, nor do they conflict with her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

The district court's denial of appellant's motion for acquittal on obstruction of justice charges was upheld. Appellant argues that no judicial proceedings were pending at the time of her statements to the probation officer. Typically, obstruction of a government investigation not connected to an ongoing judicial proceeding does not fall under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The question of whether a judicial proceeding was pending at the relevant time is legal and subject to de novo review. 

Appellant was arrested on August 2, 1983, and remained in custody until she was taken to court on August 3, where she consulted with her attorney and signed a consent form waiving her right to trial and sentencing before a district court judge. Afterward, she was interviewed by the probation officer, who informed her of her candidacy for an oral presentence report, with her attorney's prior knowledge and consent.

Appellant was not under investigation by a government agency during her presentence interview, which was deemed a judicial proceeding under Section 1503, regardless of when a complaint was officially filed. The district court found that the timing of the complaint's filing, whether before or after the interview, was immaterial. Appellant's false statements made to a magistrate at sentencing are argued not to constitute obstruction of justice on their own. However, false statements made under oath can be considered obstruction under certain circumstances. The Omnibus Clause of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 encompasses various acts that corruptly influence the administration of justice. Precedents indicate that false testimony can obstruct justice if it impedes investigations. Although appellant contends that false testimony alone does not support a conviction, it is unnecessary to resolve this point, as the record indicates her false statement impeded justice by misleading the court. Her statements were not easily testable due to the nature of the presentence report process, which allowed her to secure a more lenient sentence.

Appellant argues that her false statements did not obstruct government inquiries since official records were accessible; however, this overlooks the efficiency of the oral presentence reporting system, which allows for immediate sentencing post-guilty plea. The district court correctly denied her motion for acquittal on the charge of making false statements to a probation officer. Appellant contends that the "exculpatory no doctrine" should apply, asserting her negative responses did not constitute "statements" under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. This doctrine, which typically protects false denials of guilt, has not been well-received in this Circuit, as demonstrated by several precedents. In previous cases, such as United States v. Rose and United States v. Carrier, convictions for false statements were upheld because the statements impaired agency functions and were made in the context of seeking privileges from the government. The current case aligns more closely with Rose and Carrier than with the earlier Bedore decision, as Appellant's falsehoods misled the probation department, affecting its recommendations and the subsequent sentencing based on inaccurate information. Additionally, Appellant argues that the probation officer's inquiries were not within the office's jurisdiction, asserting a narrow interpretation of "jurisdiction" that does not apply since the probation office's role is to make recommendations and not impose sentences.

Appellant's interpretation of Section 1001 was rejected in *United States v. Rodgers*, where the Supreme Court determined that the statute applies to false statements made during investigations by the FBI and Secret Service, even though these agencies lack adjudicative power. The questions posed by the probation officer regarding appellant's identity and prior record fall within the jurisdiction of the United States Probation Office, which uses the information to recommend a sentence. The court's final decision is not relevant to the probation office's authority in this context. Additionally, the circuit court has affirmed that Section 1001 applies to judicial matters. 

Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to prove guilt regarding the charges in Count II, which alleges two false statements: that she had never been arrested for anything other than traffic offenses and that she had never used aliases. Although appellant claims there is no evidence of specific aliases or prior arrests, testimony from Stanley Winters indicated that she was on parole under a different name and had an extensive criminal history with various aliases. The court accepted this testimony, determining that, when viewed favorably for the government, the evidence sufficiently proves beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had indeed been arrested for non-traffic offenses and had used aliases. 

The district court's judgment is affirmed. The case was previously argued before Judge Ely, who passed away, leading to Judge Tang's involvement. Furthermore, the plea agreement signed by appellant did not clarify that she was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor or that a felony charge would be dismissed, indicating a lack of informed consent regarding her rights and the nature of the plea process.

18 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibits corruptly influencing, intimidating, or impeding witnesses, jurors, or court officials through threats, force, or coercive communication, imposing penalties of up to $5,000 in fines or five years imprisonment, or both. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 criminalizes knowingly falsifying or concealing material facts in matters within U.S. jurisdiction, with similar penalties. The record indicates that the pre-plea presentence interview may have involved coercion, as the appellant was informed she was a good candidate for probation, potentially influencing her responses. This context creates incentives for the defendant to cooperate in ways she might not otherwise choose. However, the probation officer's use of the appellant’s statements was limited to preparing the presentence report, and they were not used against her in the underlying charge. Post-conviction, the risk of using responses from probation interviews in trials is minimal; such responses could only serve to revoke parole or probation or reveal new offenses. While the effectiveness of the probation interview system may be questioned, it does not excuse the appellant’s criminal convictions. The timing of the complaint and the status of judicial proceedings are factual issues that the district court properly assessed.