In Re: Petition of: J.M.Y., Appeal of: J.M.Y.

Citation: 179 A.3d 1140Docket: 1323 WDA 2015

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; February 13, 2018; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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J.M.Y. appeals the March 10, 2015 order from the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas that denied his petition to expunge his mental health records and restore his firearms rights following an involuntary commitment under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA). The background involves an incident on September 21, 2012, where J.M.Y., a University of Pittsburgh student, was apprehended for attempting self-harm while under the influence of alcohol and prescribed medications. He was subsequently involuntarily committed to Western Psychiatric Hospital and discharged four days later. 

On November 24, 2014, J.M.Y. filed a petition for expungement of his commitment record under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1) and § 6111.1(g)(2). A hearing occurred on January 8, 2015, but the trial court denied his petition. J.M.Y. then filed exceptions, which were denied by operation of law, leading to his appeal on August 27, 2015. The case involves interpretations of prohibitions on firearm possession under state law and federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)). 

The court noted that, under § 6105(c)(4), individuals involuntarily committed cannot possess firearms, but relief can be granted if the court finds the applicant poses no risk. The appeal raised two primary issues: whether the trial court erred in affirming the validity of his commitment under § 303 of the MHPA, and whether sufficient evidence supported the commitment under § 302, both of which contributed to the denial of his expungement petition. The order was later entered on the docket on August 26, 2015, and the trial court subsequently restored J.M.Y.'s firearm rights under state law on July 28, 2015. A reargument en banc was granted on January 26, 2017, following a divided panel's affirmation of the trial court’s decision.

The trial court found the Appellant validly committed under section 303 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), which prohibits firearm possession under 18 Pa.C.S. 6105(a)(1) and (c)(4). Despite a July 28, 2015, order restoring Appellant's firearm rights under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 6105(f)(1), he remains barred federally under 18 U.S.C.A. 922(g)(4). The standard of review for expunction motions is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant contends that the commitment under section 303 was invalid and violated his due process rights, arguing it was merely a means to facilitate his release from a previous section 302 commitment. The court noted that prevailing case law prohibits expungement of mental health records from a section 303 commitment and that such commitments are separate judicial proceedings. Involuntary civil commitments require strict adherence to due process, given their significant impact on individual liberty. The legislative intent of the MHPA emphasizes the necessity of strict conditions for commitment orders to prevent wrongful deprivation of liberty and associated stigma. If due process requirements are violated during a commitment, the courts can vacate the certification and mandate the expungement of related records, as established in case law.

A section 303 commitment must provide sufficient due process to prevent the expungement of a section 302 commitment. In In re A.J.N., the Pennsylvania Superior Court examined a case where a young man was involuntarily committed under section 302 twice in 2004 due to drug withdrawal. After overcoming his addiction and serving in the Army, he sought to expunge his section 302 commitments to regain his firearm rights. Although the trial court restored his firearm rights, it denied his request for expungement. On appeal, the court found that the trial court had overlooked section 302's requirements, as police had forcibly committed the appellant without observing any behavior indicating he was a danger to himself or others. Consequently, the court ruled that the violations necessitated the expungement of the two commitments' records. 

Section 302 allows for a maximum of 120 hours of involuntary emergency treatment following a physician's certification or a warrant, while section 303 permits extended involuntary treatment for up to 20 days after a hearing where the patient is represented by counsel. This hearing must provide the patient with a clear explanation of the proceedings and allow them to question witnesses. The judge or mental health review officer must determine if the individual remains severely mentally disabled and in need of continued treatment; if not, they must order the person's discharge. Furthermore, any written certification for extended treatment must include the judge’s findings, reasons for continued treatment, and a description of the proposed treatment.

The application filed under section 303(a) requires a statement of legal representation and an explanation of the certification's implications, including the right to petition for release and the right to counsel. Following the filing of a certification for extended involuntary emergency treatment, a person may receive treatment for up to 20 days in an approved facility. If a hearing is conducted by a mental health review officer, the individual may petition the court of common pleas for a review of the certification, with a hearing mandated within 72 hours unless a continuance is requested. The court will assess the certification and any evidence presented; if it finds further treatment warranted and confirms procedural compliance, it will deny the petition, otherwise, the individual will be discharged.

In the review of the certified record, it was concluded that the certification was improper, rendering the section 303 commitment invalid. During the expungement hearing, the appellant stated he was unaware of the commitment hearing on September 25, 2012, despite having spoken with a public defender prior to his hospital release. The public defender, present during the expungement, could not specifically recall the appellant but acknowledged that the appellant did not attend the 303 hearing. Furthermore, Sergeant Andrew Redman from the University of Pittsburgh Police Department confirmed he did not attend the appellant's section 303 hearing and did not recall being informed of its occurrence. The certified record explicitly stated that the appellant was not present at the hearing, which found him severely mentally disabled and a danger to himself or others, leading to a 20-day treatment order.

Appellant did not sign the section 303 commitment certification, which failed to meet section 303(d) requirements, particularly lacking evidence of notification of his right to appeal under section 303(g) and an explanation of his right to counsel. Additionally, Appellant was not served with a copy of the certification as required by section 303(e), resulting in a violation of his due process rights. A review of Appellant’s discharge summary from Western Psychiatric Hospital indicated that he successfully contested his section 303 commitment hearing due to the absence of police. The trial court incorrectly upheld the validity of the section 303 certification and did not evaluate the sufficiency of evidence for Appellant's initial commitment under section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA). Despite Appellant's explicit challenge to the section 302 commitment in his Petition to Vacate and Expunge, the court failed to address it, leading to a procedural error. The appellate court concluded that due process violations occurred due to the invalid section 303 certification and ordered its expungement. The case was remanded for the trial court to conduct a hearing regarding the expungement of the section 302 commitment. The appellate court vacated the order and relinquished jurisdiction.