Roy Lee Ward v. Robert E. Carter, Jr., Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, and Ron Neal, Superintendent of the Indiana State Prison, In Their Official Capacities

Citation: 90 N.E.3d 660Docket: 46S03-1709-PL-569

Court: Indiana Supreme Court; February 12, 2018; Indiana; State Supreme Court

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Roy Lee Ward, a death row inmate, challenges the Indiana Department of Correction's modification of its lethal injection protocol, specifically the substitution of Sodium Thiopental with Brevital, claiming it constitutes a substantive rule that must comply with the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA). The Indiana Supreme Court found that the change does not impose legal standards regulating Ward's conduct, thus ruling it is not a rule under ARPA. The factual background reveals Ward was sentenced to death in 2007 for a 2001 crime, and the Department is responsible for executing death-row inmates. After the protocol change was announced in May 2014, Ward filed a complaint in December 2015, asserting violations of his rights under ARPA and due process. The trial court dismissed his complaint, ruling the change was an internal policy rather than a rule. Upon appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this dismissal, asserting that ARPA applies to the promulgation of rules. The case involves key procedural elements, including a substitution of parties during litigation and the framing of the legal arguments surrounding administrative rule-making.

The court determined that the Department's execution protocol is classified as a "rule" under the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA). Since the Department did not comply with ARPA's requirements when incorporating Brevital into the execution drug combination, the revised protocol is deemed void. The defendants argued that the protocol is merely an internal policy exempt from ARPA's regulations, while Ward contended it should adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking processes. The court sided with the defendants, affirming the trial court's decision.

The legal standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) is de novo, which focuses on the complaint's legal sufficiency. Administrative rules have the force of law and are governed by ARPA, which defines a "rule" as an agency statement with general applicability that affects the law or agency practices. A distinction is made between rules, which carry legal effects, and internal policies, which do not. The court noted that existing case law provides limited insight into the definition of "effect of law," primarily concerning court rules rather than administrative rules.

Court rules are binding on both the court and litigants, functioning with the force of law and impacting substantive rights, not just procedural aspects. This principle is supported by the Indiana case In re Adoption of J.T.D., which emphasizes that litigants can expect uniform enforcement of such rules to protect their rights and ensure orderly legal proceedings. While recognizing the instructive nature of this precedent, it is noted that it pertains specifically to court rules rather than agency rules.

In the case of Villegas v. Silverman, the Indiana Court of Appeals applied the concept of "effect of law" to agency rules, determining that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles' (BMV) documentation requirements constituted a rule under the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA). The court concluded that these requirements had the effect of law since failure to comply directly impacted individuals' ability to obtain necessary driver licenses, permits, or identification cards, thereby creating rights and obligations for applicants rather than the agency itself.

The court distinguished between agency rules and internal directives, noting that agency requirements impacting citizen conduct are considered rules with the effect of law, while those affecting internal agency operations are merely directives. Although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly apply its "primary impact" reasoning in its analysis, the distinction between rules and internal policies is deemed valuable. Overall, Indiana case law suggests that a rule with the effect of law primarily affects individuals' rights and can be enforced in court, but the limited number of cases addressing this concept indicates an incomplete understanding, prompting a search for further guidance from U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

The United States Supreme Court established the "effect of law" standard in Chrysler Corporation v. Brown, emphasizing that for a regulation to hold this status, it must impact individual rights and obligations, derive from legislative authority, and be properly promulgated. The substantive characteristic of affecting rights and obligations is key to distinguishing binding rules. In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the Court found that requirements imposed by the Port of Los Angeles, which mandated trucking companies to enter concession agreements and imposed penalties for noncompliance, qualified as having the "effect of law" because they imposed mandatory obligations. The Court indicated that a regulation carries the effect of law when it serves as a coercive mechanism, compelling individuals to conform their behavior under threat of legal consequences.

In the context of Indiana jurisprudence, an agency regulation has the effect of law when it prescribes binding standards of conduct for those under its authority. In the case at hand, the Department's lethal injection protocol, which Ward claims qualifies as a rule subject to notice-and-comment requirements, does not bind Ward’s behavior and therefore does not possess the effect of law. Ward's complaint asserted that the Department’s execution protocol held the effect of law, supported by exhibits detailing the lethal injection process and confirming the acquisition of Brevital.

Exhibits C, D, and E, which are confidential Department documents detailing drugs approved for executions, do not establish binding standards for condemned offenders. The analysis focuses on whether the Department’s three-drug lethal injection protocol imposes any obligations on offenders. It concludes that the exhibits represent internal policies rather than enforceable rules. 

Exhibit C outlines the drugs used and procedures for their administration but does not impose requirements on offenders. Exhibit D includes procedural training information for Department staff without regulating offender conduct. Exhibit E serves as a checklist for drug administration but similarly does not affect offender behavior.

None of these documents dictate the actions of condemned individuals, meaning they do not impact their rights or obligations. As a result, the Department's lethal injection protocol does not have the effect of law per Section 4-22-2-3(b) and is exempt from the rulemaking requirements of ARPA. Consequently, Ward's due process claims fail, as they rely on the assumption that the protocol constituted a rule under ARPA. The court affirms the trial court’s dismissal of Ward’s complaint.