The Bradley Center, a PA Non-Profit Corp. v. North Strabane Twp.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2028 C.D. 2016

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; February 11, 2018; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The case involves The Bradley Center, a Pennsylvania Non-Profit Corporation, appealing decisions related to land use concerning property it owns. Gateway Rehabilitation Center initially filed two appeals in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas regarding its intended use of the property as a juvenile drug and alcohol treatment center. The first appeal challenged the North Strabane Township Board's denial of Gateway's conditional use request. The second appeal contested the North Strabane Township Zoning Hearing Board's (ZHB) finding that Gateway's proposed use did not qualify as a continuation of a non-conforming use, which had been deemed abandoned.

The Trial Court reversed the ZHB's findings, citing judicial estoppel, which prevented a substantive decision on the Associations' objections. The Associations, Linden Vue Homeowners Association, Inc. and Majestic Hills Homeowners Association, sought review of the Trial Court's orders from October and November 2016. The Bradley Center had purchased the property in 1999 and received a conditional use designation to operate a residential treatment facility. A 2006 zoning map change classified its use as a legal non-conforming use. Gateway's application for a change of occupancy to establish a youth residential treatment facility was initially recommended for approval by the Planning Commission but ultimately denied by the Board. The Associations and local residents opposed Gateway's plans during the proceedings. Following the appeals, Gateway withdrew its purchase offer, leading to the Bradley Center becoming the appellant in both appeals, with the Township as the appellee. The Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

Linden Vue Homeowners Association, Inc. (Linden Vue) intervened in appeals regarding decisions from the Board and the Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) shortly after these were filed in the Trial Court. Linden Vue was included in the ZHB appeal caption but not in the Board appeal, though its counsel was listed on both dockets. Importantly, Linden Vue did not file a formal petition to intervene in either case. A consent order resolving the appeal from the Board's decision was granted on October 3, 2012, affirming that the property had not been abandoned, was still owned and marketed by the Bradley Center as a youth residential treatment facility, and directing the prothonotary to mark the action as settled. Linden Vue was not notified of this order and did not appear to contest it, only becoming aware of it in December 2013 when it sought to vacate the consent order. The ZHB appeal was stayed pending resolution of the Board appeal, which concluded on February 16, 2016. The Trial Court subsequently lifted the stay and allowed discovery to determine if Linden Vue's request to vacate the consent order should be granted. On October 7, 2016, the Trial Court reversed the ZHB decision, upholding the consent order and citing judicial estoppel, stating that the Associations were not candid in claiming differing issues between the cases. The Court found they were attempting to collaterally attack the consent order after missing their opportunity during the Board appeal. An unpublished decision affirmed two orders from the Court of Common Pleas: one vacating a prior order that stayed the consent decree and the other denying Linden Vue's request to appeal regarding the consent decree. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeals from the Associations. On November 4, 2016, the Trial Court reconsidered and stayed its earlier order, later finalizing the October 7 order and issuing a supplemental opinion addressing judicial estoppel and mootness. The court deemed the ZHB appeal moot for two reasons: the sale to Gateway fell through, and Southwood Psychiatric Hospital acquired the property and received an occupancy permit from the Township.

The Associations are seeking to have the Trial Court nullify the occupancy permit issued to Southwood, as recorded in case CV-2014-00238. Their request to vacate the Trial Court's order from November 21, 2016, was denied following its filing on December 14, 2016, leading to the current appeal. The Associations argued before the Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) that the issues at hand—whether the property's use had been abandoned or was a continued nonconforming use—were identical to those resolved by a consent decree in a prior appeal to the Trial Court. However, they later contended that those proceedings did not address the question of granting or denying the occupancy permit. The Trial Court ruled that judicial estoppel barred the Associations from making this argument, as they had previously succeeded on the opposite stance before the ZHB. 

The key legal question for this Court is whether the Trial Court erred in applying judicial estoppel, which is a legal doctrine preventing a party from arguing a position inconsistent with one they previously maintained successfully in court. This doctrine, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, aims to uphold judicial integrity by stopping parties from shifting positions opportunistically. Judicial estoppel requires that a party has taken an inconsistent position in a prior case and that this position was successfully maintained. A precedent case, Marazas v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, illustrated that the successful maintenance of a position is determined by the decision-maker's actions rather than the parties involved. The overriding purpose of the doctrine is to ensure honesty in judicial proceedings, and the Trial Court's reliance on judicial estoppel concerning the legal positions taken is deemed appropriate, encompassing both sworn facts and legal arguments.

In *Hospital, Health Association of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth*, the court ruled that the Commonwealth is judicially estopped from claiming it cannot comply with a remedy since it had previously argued the opposite in relation to a preliminary injunction. In *Gross v. City of Pittsburgh*, the court determined that a city could not present contradictory evidence in a state eminent domain case after introducing it in a federal civil rights trial, emphasizing that parties cannot alter evidence to suit their interests. In *Thompson v. Anderson*, a plaintiff was found estopped from asserting a different basis for injury after initially claiming it was due to intentional acts.

The Associations contend that the Trial Court's reliance on a 2009 ZHB hearing transcript is flawed because Majestic Hills was not represented by the same counsel at that time. They reference *Canot v. City of Easton*, where judicial estoppel did not apply due to the city’s lack of participation in prior proceedings. However, Majestic Hills did participate in the earlier proceedings, and while different counsel was involved, the Associations supported a consistent position, which the decision-makers accepted.

The Trial Court concluded that the Associations' current arguments attempting to differentiate the issues are an improper collateral attack on a consent order related to a prior appeal, which they failed to challenge appropriately. The court also agreed that even if judicial estoppel were not applicable, the mootness doctrine would still bar resolution on the merits due to changed circumstances that eliminated the original controversy. Citing prior cases, the court reiterated that a case is moot when changes in circumstances or law remove the ability to issue a meaningful order. In this matter, the termination of the purchase agreement between the Bradley Center and Gateway constituted such a change.

A change in ownership under the Township's zoning ordinance necessitates an occupancy permit application. The Associations argue that the Board's appeal did not address whether Gateway could obtain a permit for operating a youth residential treatment facility at the property. However, Gateway has since withdrawn its purchase offer from the Bradley Center and is no longer involved in the case, rendering the question of its occupancy permit moot. Additionally, the Bradley Center no longer owns the property. Consequently, the Trial Court's final order is fully affirmed.