Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Robert Breest v. Michael Cunningham, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison
Citations: 752 F.2d 8; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27615Docket: 84-1309
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; January 10, 1985; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Robert Breest v. Michael Cunningham, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a special additional sentence imposed on Breest under New Hampshire's psycho-sexual murder statute following his conviction for first-degree murder in March 1971. The statute required evidence of sexual assault or abuse related to the victim, but it did not define these terms. The court emphasized that every word in a statute is presumed to have meaning, positing that "sexual abuse" must include something distinct from "sexual assault," thereby suggesting a reading of the statute as "rape or any other form of sexual abuse." Breest's primary argument centered on due process, asserting that he was entitled to formal notice akin to a criminal charge regarding the psycho-sexual certification, which he argued constituted a new charge. The state contended it provided adequate notice through a bill of particulars that referenced "attempted sexual abuse." Breest countered that this bill failed to specify the intent or an overt act necessary for an indictment of attempted sexual abuse, thus challenging its sufficiency. The court considered these points in relation to the due process requirements established in precedent cases. Petitioner was entitled to adequate notice regarding the psycho-sexual certification charge, but it did not need to be as formal as an indictment. The bill of particulars provided sufficient information for the petitioner to understand the nature of the proceeding and prepare a defense, despite being somewhat sparse. The issue arose not from a lack of notice but from the court's significant deviation from the bill of particulars. The court's finding of guilt for psycho-sexual murder, based on an "attempted" sexual activity, was ambiguous due to its use of the term "either," which could imply either 'sexual assault' or 'sexual abuse.' This ambiguity led to confusion about whether the petitioner was being found guilty of the charged offense or a different one. The court correctly recognized an attempted offense, but there was no clear indication of the specific act the petitioner intended that constituted an attempt. Consequently, the only potential conviction could have been for attempted rape, which was not supported by the notice provided. The term "sexual abuse" was deemed not unconstitutionally vague, as it is generally understood to encompass various forms of sexual misconduct short of rape. However, since the state had excluded sexual assault in its particulars, it could not argue for a conviction based on attempts of either sexual assault or sexual abuse without proper notice. The state's failure to align its charges with the evidence indicated a fundamental issue, leading to the granting of the writ. The ruling was reversed, affirming the petitioner’s constitutional rights without concern for potential future implications of double jeopardy.