Maurice R. Lerner v. Matthew Gill, Etc.

Citations: 751 F.2d 450; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27510Docket: 84-1136

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; January 3, 1985; Federal Appellate Court

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The State of Rhode Island appealed a judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which deemed the state's denial of parole eligibility to Maurice Lerner as an ex post facto law. Lerner, convicted of murdering two men in 1968, was originally sentenced to two life terms and ten years for conspiracy, with all sentences ordered to be served consecutively. A Rhode Island statute in effect at the time of his crime required life-sentenced prisoners to serve at least 20 years before being eligible for parole, but this statute was amended in April 1970 to reduce the minimum to ten years.

Lerner was found guilty in September 1970 and was advised by the Attorney General in 1973 that prisoners with multiple sentences imposed non-simultaneously were considered to be serving concurrent sentences for parole eligibility purposes. However, Lerner’s sentences were explicitly ordered to be consecutive. In 1976, the Rhode Island Attorney General clarified that Lerner would be eligible for parole after serving ten years, leading to his transfer to a minimum security facility and the granting of work release and furlough privileges.

Despite this, Lerner was denied parole in March and September 1979. In October 1979, a new Attorney General reversed the previous opinion, asserting that Lerner needed to serve a total of 20 years for his consecutive life sentences before becoming eligible for parole, resulting in his return to maximum security. The court ultimately reversed the district court's ruling regarding Lerner's eligibility for parole.

On October 9, 1980, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion aligning with Attorney General Roberts's interpretation of the ten-year provision in section 13-8-13, as it existed in 1970. On May 7, 1981, the legislature amended section 13-8-13, mandating that prisoners sentenced to consecutive life terms for crimes committed after that date must serve at least ten years consecutively on each term, explicitly stating that this did not apply to those convicted of earlier crimes. 

On May 11, 1981, Lerner filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which was stayed pending the exhaustion of state remedies. After filing for post-conviction relief in state court, which ruled in Lerner's favor citing a violation of the ex post facto clause, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed this decision, supporting Roberts's interpretation. 

Subsequently, the federal district court lifted its stay and granted Lerner's habeas corpus petition, determining that the state's denial of parole eligibility after ten years violated the federal prohibition against ex post facto laws. This judgment prompted an appeal from the State.

The ex post facto clause of the Constitution prohibits laws that retroactively increase punishment or alter the terms of punishment, including parole eligibility. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that parole eligibility constitutes part of the punishment associated with a crime. If the interpretation of section 13-8-13 required Lerner to serve a longer period before parole than under the law at the time of his crime in 1968, the district court's ruling would be justified. However, the current interpretation does not support this conclusion.

On April 20, 1968, when Lerner committed his crimes, individuals sentenced to life imprisonment were required to serve a minimum of 20 years before becoming eligible for parole. As such, even with two consecutive life sentences, the minimum time before eligibility would not exceed 20 years. The current interpretation of a 1970 revision of the law, which also mandates a minimum of 20 years for those with consecutive life sentences, does not impose a harsher penalty than the law at the time of Lerner's offense. 

The ex post facto clause prohibits laws that inflict greater punishment than those in effect at the time of the crime. The district court verified that Lerner's parole eligibility remains unchanged at 20 years, thereby indicating no violation of constitutional protections against ex post facto laws. The court acknowledged that while the punishment under the revised law is not more severe than it was originally, it declined to accept the state's argument that this negated Lerner’s ex post facto claim. The court outlined three reasons: the state was not denying parole based on the original law, the original 20-year statute had been repealed, and Lerner should benefit from any less stringent laws enacted thereafter.

The arguments against applying the current law were deemed unpersuasive. The state is applying the amended law from 1970, which is permissible as it does not impose a harsher penalty. The Constitution’s ex post facto provision ensures that new laws cannot increase the punishment beyond what was applicable at the time of the offense.

The law at the time of the petitioner's murder mandated a 20-year incarceration period before parole eligibility. The evaluation of the later law's impact on this statute is critical to determine if it disadvantages the wrongdoer, referencing Lindsey v. Washington. It is noted that the earlier statute remains relevant for this analysis, regardless of whether it is currently enforced. 

The court addressed a second argument, clarifying that the subsequent law was not more stringent and thus did not eliminate the constitutionality of the previous law. The Supreme Court's ruling in Dobbert v. Florida illustrates that the existence of a prior statute reflects the legislature's intent regarding punishment severity, even if that statute was later deemed unconstitutional. In this case, the 20-year law provided clear warning of the minimum incarceration expected for a life sentence, and its repeal does not negate its prior existence.

The petitioner’s assertion that the law at the time of sentencing should dictate parole eligibility is rejected; the critical date for ex post facto analysis is when the crime was committed. Additionally, the court disagrees with the notion that a state must retroactively apply less stringent laws enacted after a crime or that such benefits cannot be withdrawn. This position is not supported by the Constitution or Supreme Court precedent, which has established that favorable judicial decisions do not require retrospective application. The principle from common law reinforces that the repeal of a law does not automatically entitle a prisoner to freedom based on the new legislation.

In Weaver v. Graham, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Ex Post Facto Clause focuses on the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when a legislature increases punishment after a crime has been committed, rather than on an individual's right to reduced punishment. The interpretation that the Rhode Island legislature intended a ten-year minimum for consecutive life sentences is unsupported, as the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has not made such a determination. Earlier interpretations by the Parole Board and the Attorney General were not authoritative and did not override the state's Supreme Court's jurisdiction to interpret laws. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not grant prisoners a vested right to an incorrect but favorable interpretation of the law. Furthermore, the authoritative interpretation of the statute by the state's highest court is not an ex post facto law since it does not increase the punishment beyond what was prescribed at the time of the crime.

Regarding due process, the petitioner argues that withholding parole eligibility for 20 years is a violation, referencing Bouie v. City of Columbia, where the Supreme Court invalidated a retroactively applied judicial interpretation of a statute. The Court stated that judicial constructions should not have retroactive effects if they are unexpected and indefensible based on prior law. However, the challenged law in this case does not define a crime, nor does it require the petitioner to conform his conduct to a law that lacked clarity. Thus, the Bouie case is only marginally relevant to this situation.

A parole eligibility statute differs from criminal definitions, as established in Breest v. Helgemoe, where the court noted that prisoners may rely on existing parole standards, and unexpected changes after a significant period could violate due process, even if intended to correct illegal sentences. The key issue is whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation of the 1970 parole statute was unforeseeable and whether Lerner's reliance on a more favorable interpretation was prejudicial enough to invoke the principle from Breest. The court concludes it was not. 

The district court noted that several Rhode Island officials and a dissenting justice believed Lerner would be eligible for parole within ten years, making the later interpretation by Attorney General Roberts and the state Supreme Court seem unforeseeable. However, the court asserts that the state’s interpretation of the statute is more consistent with the statutory language and reflects the sentencing judge's intent behind consecutive life sentences, suggesting that Lerner should face two parole waiting periods. 

The state's reasoning is supported by case law and is not irrational. The court also considers whether the nearly three-year period during which the Parole Board accepted the ten-year interpretation constituted a due process violation. Lerner argues this period was closer to ten years, but prior to an official interpretation in 1976, the statute did not guarantee him ten-year eligibility. The previous Attorney General’s ruling regarding concurrent sentences did not provide a basis for expecting the same for consecutive sentences. Therefore, the state did not mislead Lerner before the 1976 opinion, and by early 1979, it denied him parole, undermining any reliance on the earlier interpretation.

Lerner's anticipation of early parole, fueled by the Michaelson opinion and subsequent interpretations until 1979, ultimately led to disappointment. However, this raised expectation, based on an incorrect interpretation of the law, did not constitute a due process violation. The court noted that legal interpretations often evolve over time and acknowledged the seriousness of Lerner's crimes—murdering two individuals. The ambiguity surrounding the application of a ten-year parole rule to consecutive life sentences was understandable, and the state was not deemed to have violated due process by correcting the statute's application. Courts have historically required actual prejudice or harm, beyond mere frustration of expectations, to consider a due process violation. Lerner's situation did not meet this threshold; he did not experience tangible harm and, in fact, enjoyed certain privileges during the period he was misinformed about his parole eligibility. The court concluded that the 1970 amended parole statute, as interpreted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, was not an ex post facto law, and its application did not violate Lerner's due process rights. Consequently, the district court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for dismissal.