BLAKEMORE v. DIRT MOVERS, INC. Et Al.

Citation: 809 S.E.2d 827Docket: A17A1540

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; January 11, 2018; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals of Georgia must be physically received within ten days of the decision date to be considered timely. In case A17A1540, Natasha Blakemore filed a wrongful death action in Bibb County following her daughter Natroya Hulbert's death in a motor vehicle accident involving Dirt Movers, Inc. The accident occurred on Interstate 75, where Hulbert was allegedly struck by a tractor-trailer owned by Dirt Movers. Blakemore claimed that venue was proper in Bibb County under the Georgia Motor Carrier Act, as the accident took place there.

Dirt Movers, a domestic corporation engaged in interstate commerce, attempted to remove the case to Jeff Davis County, where its principal place of business is located, citing OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4). However, this section allows removal only when venue is based solely on that statute. The court concluded that Blakemore's venue allegations relied on a separate provision for motor carriers under OCGA § 40-1-117(b), thus Dirt Movers had no right of removal. Consequently, the trial court's denial of Blakemore’s motion to remand was reversed, allowing the case to return to Bibb County. The trial court's order did not address the venue regarding Crum & Forster Indemnity Company, which is also a defendant in the case.

Dirt Movers acknowledges that venue is appropriate in Bibb County under the Motor Carrier Act as per Blakemore's complaint. However, it claims entitlement to remove the action to Jeff Davis County based solely on the location of the accident, citing OCGA 14-2-510 (b)(4). The court concludes that OCGA 14-2-510 (b)(4) restricts a corporation's right to remove cases only when venue is established solely under that specific provision. If there is an alternative venue basis, as in this case, the corporation cannot remove the action. Under the Georgia Constitution, civil cases are to be tried in the county of the defendant's residence, with OCGA 14-2-510 defining venue for corporations. It specifies that a defendant can only remove a case to their principal place of business if venue is based solely on subsection (b)(4). Furthermore, OCGA 40-1-117 (b) allows actions against motor carriers in the county where the cause of action arose. The court emphasizes that because the complaint supports venue under multiple statutory provisions, Dirt Movers does not retain the right to remove the case based on its corporate status. The statutes must be interpreted according to their plain language, which does not permit removal when multiple venue bases exist.

In the interpretation of statutes, words should be given their ordinary meanings unless limited by specific language. The term 'solely' denotes exclusivity, meaning a corporation cannot transfer a case to its principal business county if there is any valid venue basis elsewhere. OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4) establishes that a plaintiff can file against a corporation where the cause of action originated, while OCGA § 40-1-117(b), relevant to motor carriers, allows venue in the county where the action arose. These statutes do not conflict; OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4) prevents removal to the corporation's principal place of business when another venue is valid. Previous case law, such as Coastal Transport v. Tillery and Southern Drayage v. Williams, provides context but does not settle the current inquiry. The argument that a motor carrier could retain removal rights under OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4) would contradict its plain language and undermine OCGA § 40-1-117(b). Statutory provisions are to be harmonized, and the removal procedure in OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4) was established in 2000 without repealing OCGA § 40-1-117(b). Repeals by implication are disfavored unless clear contradictions exist. Statutes on the same subject are interpreted together to ensure coherence.

The defendant argued for removal of the case to Gordon County, claiming its principal place of business was there, under OCGA 14-2-510 (b)(4). The plaintiffs amended their complaint to indicate the defendant also had an office and transacted business in Murray County. The plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to Murray County was granted, leading to the defendant's appeal. The court determined that removal under OCGA 14-2-510 (b)(4) is permissible only when venue is based solely on that paragraph. Since the plaintiffs' complaint supported venue under both OCGA 14-2-510 (b)(3) and (4), the defendant could not remove the case to its principal place of business. The precedent set in Atlanta-Asheville Motor Express v. Dooley confirmed that a plaintiff can sue a motor carrier in the county where the action originated, irrespective of the defendant's business presence there. Thus, Blakemore’s allegations supported venue under OCGA 40-1-117 (b), distinct from OCGA 14-2-510 (b)(4), negating the defendant's right to remove. The trial court's denial of the motion to remand to Bibb County was ruled erroneous, leading to a reversal of the judgment.